The Nyāya-Sūṭras of Gauṭama

Volume II

Mahāmahopāḍhyāya
GAṄGĀNĀṬHA JHĀ

This is a reprint of the English Translation of the *Nyāya Sūtras* of Gautama by Mm. Dr. Ganganatha Jha, the versatile Sanskrit scholar who will ever be remembered for his dedicated and selfless pioneer work and immense contribution in the field.

The work was first published serially in the *Indian Thought* (Vols. IV-XI), a quarterly journal devoted to Sanskrit learning, over a period of eight years from 1912 to 1919.

Dr. Jha's translation covers a large field and includes, besides the original *Sūtras* of Gautama, the *Bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana and the *Vārtika* of Uddyotakara in full as well as relevant notes from Vācaspatimiśra's *Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭīkā*, Udayana's *Tātparyapariśuddhi* and Raghūttama's *Bhāṣyacandra*. The work naturally became enormous in bulk and it is not surprising that it took for its completion so many years and so much energy of the author and as many as 1800 pages in print.

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THE NYĀYA-SŪṬRAS OF GAUṬAMA

THE NYĀYA-SŪṬRAS OF GAUTAMA

WITH THE BHĀṢYA OF VĀṬSYĀYANA AND THE VĀRṬIKA OF UḌḌYOṬAKARA

Translated into English

With notes from Vāchaspaṭi Mishra's 'Nyāya-Vārṭika-Ṭāṭparyaṭīkā', Uḍayana's 'Parishuḍḍhi' and Raghūṭṭama's Bhāṣyachandra

by

MAHĀMAHOPĀḌHYĀYA

GAṄGĀNĀṬHA JHĀ

Vol. II

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[Sūtras 1—7.]

BHĀṢYA.

[P. 60, L. 1 to L. 11.]

After this proceeds the *detailed examination* of *Pramāṇa* and the other categories. And, inasmuch as every definitive cognition has been declared (in Sūtra 1-1-41) to consist in the 'ascertainment of the real character of a thing after duly *deliberating* over the two sides of the question,' (whereby *deliberation* or *Doubt*, is made the precursor of all Definite Cognition)—it is Doubt that is examined first of all.*

Sūtra (1).

"No Doubt can arise either from the certain cognition of properties common to Several objects, or from the certain cognition of characters belonging to only one of the objects."†

(*a*) "As a matter of fact, Doubt arises from the *cognition* "of common properties, and not from the *properties* only‡;— " (*b*) or again, as a matter of fact, we do not find any Doubt " arising from the mere cognition of the property and the " things possessing that property;—*i.e.* no Doubt is found to.

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* The *Vārṭika* gives further reasons for beginning the *detailed examination* with Doubt, even though the *enunciation* has begun with *Pramāṇa*.

† Sūṭras 1 to 5 embody the *Pūrvapakṣa* view—which traverses the explanation of Doubt provided in Sū. 1-1-23.

‡ This opening sentence of the *Bhāṣya* is a little obscure. The words of the *Sūṭra* apparently mean that 'Doubt *does not arise* from the *cognition* of common properties'; while the *Bhāṣya* represents the sense to be that 'Doubt *arises* from the cognition of common properties.' The explanation given in the Footnote (in the *Vizianagram Series* Edition) is in itself a forced one: but it would be acceptable if it did not make this opening sentence identical in sense with what follows as the fourth alternative explanation provided by the *Bhāṣya* in L. 8 below. Both the *Vārṭika* and the *Ṭāṭparya* have felt this difficulty. The former characterises this first statement of the *Pūrvapakṣa* as '*Yaṭhāshruṭi uṭṭhanam*,' and the latter remarks that the statement is made regardless of the explanations that have been provided under Sū. 1-1-23. The real explanation is as follows, as is made clear in the *Bhāṣyachandra*.

The present Sū. I contains three statements—I समानधर्माध्यवसायात् न संशयः (this denies the first statement in Sū. 1-1-23, *viz.* समानधर्मोपपत्तेः संशयः); this is interpreted by the Bhā. as representing the four *pūrvapakṣas*:—(a) taking उपपत्ति of Sū. 1-1-23 to mean mere *presence* or *connection*, and denying that mere presence of common properties gives rise to Doubt, which only arises when these properties are duly recognised; (b) taking उपपत्ति to mean *cognition*, and denying that any doubt can arise even from the recognition of common properties in only one of the two things that enter into the doubt; (c) taking उपपत्ति=*definite ascertainment*; and (d) stating the objection in a different manner from (c). II. अनेकधर्माध्यवसायात् न संशयः (this denies the अनेकधर्मोपपत्ति of Su. 1-1-23, which containing the same term उपपत्ति is open to all the four *purvapakṣas* that have been urged above. III. अन्यतरधर्माध्यवसायात् न संशयः

" arise at the time that the observer has the idea ' I perceive " a property common to these two things* ;—(*c*) or it is not " possible for any Doubt to arise from the cognition of com- " mon properties, when the thing (in regard to which the " common properties are perceived) is different (from that in " which the common properties are perceived); *e.g.* when the " cognition (of common properties) appears in regard to one " thing, for instance *Colour*, the Doubt cannot arise in regard " to another thing, for instance *Touch* ;—(*d*) or lastly, from " *Aḍhyavasāya*,—which stands for *conviction, certain cognition,* " —there cannot arise *Doubt*, which stands for *uncertain* " cognition ; as in this case there would be no affinity between " Cause and effect (which is essential).

"These same objections apply also to the view that Doubt " arises *anēkaḍharmāḍhyavasāyāt, i.e.*, from the conviction of " the properties of several things.

" Nor does Doubt ever arise from the cognition of the " properties of any one out of two things ; on the contrary, " from such cognition there arises the *certain* cognition of " that one thing."†

Vārṭika on Sū. (1).

[P. 183, L. 4 to P. 185, L. 3].

Introductory.

It has been declared in the *Bhāṣya* [*Trans.* P. 11) that —' the Science of Reasoning proceeds by three processes, by *enunciation*, by *definition* and by *examination* ';—of these the *Enunciation* and *Definition* (of the Categories) have been explained under the foregoing *Aḍhyāya* ; next to follow is their *Examination*. Inasmuch as the *Definition* of the Categories has followed the order in which they were *enunicated*, the same order should be observed in the *Examination* also ; so that the categories should be examined in the same order ; and as the first category to be *enunciated* and *defined* was *Pramāṇa*, it would be only right to begin the *Examination* also with the same. Though thus the opening of the present

* 'This thing (which is seen) and that thing (which is remembered) ; इदं विशेषवत् वस्तु विशेषवत् स्मरत् यदं संवर्तेत—says *Bhāṣyachanḍra.*

† This alternative takes '*anēka*' as equivalent to '*anyaṭara*,' one of the two similar things.

Aḍhyāya should be the occasion for starting the *Examination* of the *Pramāṇas*, the Sūṭra skips over these, and proceeds with the *Examination* of *Doubt*. "Why should there be a change in the order?" Doubt is the first to be *examined*, because it is the principal accessory of all *examination*; as is clear from the definition that the Sūṭra (1-1-41) has provided of Definitive Cognition as the 'ascertainment of the real character of a thing after due *pondering over the two sides of the question*' [where it is shown that *pondering*, *i.e.* Doubt, stands at the base of all cogitation]. "But it has been declared (in the *Bhāṣya*, Text P. 48, L. 10 to 13) that it is not necessary that every Definitive Cognition should proceed after due pondering over the two sides of a question; and it has been added that in the case of Discussion the definitive cognition is arrived at by means of the arguments in support of the two sides of the question; and that in the case of a Scientific Treatise, it is arrived at without any (Doubt) at all. So that the present enquiry forming part of a scientific treatise, there is no reason why it should begin the section on *Examination* with *Doubt*; specially as it is only in the case of Hypothetical Reasoning that enquiry is preceded by Doubt." It is quite true that Doubt is not a necessary factor in all Definitive Cognition; but it is a necessary element in all enquiry; the Definitive Cognition may or may not be preceded by Doubt, but enquiry must always be preceded by Doubt. What the *Bhāṣya* has said in regard to the absence of Doubt in Discussion and Scientific Treatises is only with reference to the two parties to the discussion; the sense being that in regard to matters dealt with in the Science there is no doubt in the minds of the two controversialists, both of them (being learned and hence) quite certain as to the doctrines of the Science;* and

* The *Ṭāṭparya* adds—'It is only when the two persons are fully learned that they have no doubts in regard to what is contained in the *Shāsṭra*; but when the discussion is held between two students, or between a student and his tutor, there is certainly room for doubt; in which case the investigation is preceded

as regards the Science itself, of course there is no room for doubt; as the matters it deals with are such as are fully ascertained by the writer and are not open to doubt. For instance, in the course of discussion (on the eternality of words) the controversialists proceed to examine whether the arguments in support of eternality or those in support of non-eternality are the stronger of the two; and in the Science also there is enquiry as to the effectiveness or otherwise of the arguments that are adduced (in support of a certain doctrine); and for the ascertaining of this there has to be a Doubt. So that all enquiry being preceded by Doubt, and the entire process of Examination being dependent upon Doubt, it is *Doubt* that is *examined* first of all.

Var : P. 184.

Now Doubt is a cognition of the nature of uncertainty in regard to the exact nature of a thing. It might be urged that this involves a contradiction in terms,—that which is *Cognition* being asserted to be of the nature of *uncertainty* involving a contradiction [*cognition* always standing for definite *certain* cognition]. But this would not be true; as such an argument would show that the objector does not grasp the true nature of Cognitions: as a matter of fact, by itself *Cognition* is absolutely vague and abstract; so that when it appears in connection with an object, all that happens to it is that it becomes defined and concrete; and it does not necessarily follow that it apprehends the true nature of that object.

This Doubt having been defined (in Sū. 1-1-23) as 'that wavering Judgment arising from the cognition of common properties &c. &c.',—the following exception is taken to that definition.

by doubt.' The *Parishuddi* remarks—In the Shāstra the Investigation is for the benefit of the Pupil; and the Pupil certainly has his doubts. In discussion also it is true that the parties are *certain* as to their conclusions; but they also have their doubts as to the comparative strength and weakness of their arguments; and this is ascertained by Investigation.

"*No Doubt can arise, &c. &c.*"—says the Sūṭra. The objection herein urged is against what is directly expressed by the words of the definition (provided in Sū. 1-1-23).*

[The sense of the objection is as follows]—"(*a*) Doubt arises, as a matter of fact, from the *Cognition* of a common property, and not merely from the common property; what becomes a cause of Doubt is that common property *which is cognised*.—(*b*) Or, no Doubt is found to arise from the mere cognition of the property and the things possessing that property; for instance, where do we ever have any Doubt following from the cognition of a property and the things possessing it, which is expressed in the conception that 'I perceive a property common to these things'?†—(*c*) Or no doubt arises where the two things are different; that is to say, no Doubt arises in regard to one thing when what is perceived is a totally different thing ‡.—(*d*) Or the *Cognition of common property* cannot be the cause of Doubt, as a cognition partakes of the nature of *certainty*, which is absent in *Doubt* [and certainly what is *certain* in its character cannot be the cause of what is *not-certain*]. (*e*) These same arguments hold good in regard to *the cognition of the properties of several objects*.' §(e.1) No doubt can arise with regard to things perceived and not perceived (*e. g.*, the *post* and the *man*); it cannot arise with regard to what is perceived, because what is perceived is known with certainty; nor can it arise with regard to what is not perceived, for the simple reason that it is not perceived. (e.2) It is not right to assert that Doubt arises from 'the

Pūrvapakṣa.

* This, says the *Ṭāṭparya*, has been added because the objections urged do not at all lie against the definition that has been *deduced* by the *Bhāṣya* from the words of the *Sūṭra*.

† For instance, when the observer perceives the *man* and the *post*, and also their common property, *tallness*—no Doubt arises.

‡ *E. g.* When what is perceived by the eye is the *post*, there can be no doubt in regard to *Man*.

§ The *Vārṭika* adds four further items to the *Pūrvapakṣa*.

"cognition of common properties'; as it often happens that "even when there is 'cognition of common properties,' no "Doubt arises; that is to say, Doubt is not found to appear "even when the 'cognition of common properties' is present; "as for instance, when we cognise, in Sound, the character of "*being a product* (which is common to Sound along with "many other things), there does not arise any Doubt at all "[on the contrary, there appears the *certain* conviction of its "non-eternality]. (e.3) Nor will it be right to assert that* "what is meant is that Doubt arises *only* when there is "'*cognition* of common characters' [and not that whenever "there is such cognition Doubt must arise];—this will not "be right; for as a matter of fact Doubt is found to arise "otherwise also; for instance, Doubt arises

Var. P. 185.

"when on finding mutually contradictory "properties co-existing in the same thing, one fails to com-"prehend the real character of that thing; as we find in the "case of the 'neutralised' probans. (e.4) Lastly, the "property which subsists in only one thing cannot be called "'common'; and (in the case of Doubt, with regard to Man "and Post, for instance) the property (*tallness*) is perceived "as subsisting in only one thing (the Post;) and certainly that "which subsists in only one thing cannot be called 'common.'

Sūṭra (2)

(*f*) "NOR FROM THE COGNITION OF DIVERSITY OF OPINIONS, OR FROM THAT OF UNCERTAINTY."

Bhāṣya on Sū. (2)

[P. 60, L. 13 to P. 61, L. 2.]

(1) "Doubt does not arise either from 'diversity of "opinions' only, or from 'uncertainty' only; in fact Doubt

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* The reading in lines 19—21 of the Text is not quite satisfactory in either of the two editions. The Benares edition reads 'व्यवस्थात्वेन' in line 19 as well as in l. 21; the *Bib. Ind.* edition reads 'व्यवस्थातस्तु' in l. 19, and 'अव्यवस्थात्वेन' in l. 21. The right reading apparently is simply 'व्यवस्थायास्तु' in l. 19 (as read in the *Bib. Ind.* edition) and 'व्यवस्थात्वेन' in l. 21 (as found in the Benares edition).

" appears in a man who knows of the 'diversity of opinions';—" similarly it appears in one who is cognisant of the " uncertainty.'* (2) Or, how could any Doubt arise from " the certain cognition of the fact that 'some people think " that the Soul exists, while others think that it does not " exist'? Similarly,† in regard to the 'uncertainty of per" ception' (which has been held in Su. 1-1-23, to be a cause " of Doubt). What happens in the case of *uncertainty* is " that the observer duly recognises that there can be no certainty " as to the thing being *perceived* (actually cognised as pos" sessed of a certain character) and also that there is no " certainty as to its being *not perceived* (actually cognised " as *not* possessing a certain character); and when each of " these facts is duly cognised, there can be no Doubt‡

Vārṭika on Sū. 2.

[P. 185, L. 6 to L. 7.]

" The arguments put forward above serve also to preclude " the view that Doubt arises from the cognition of *difference* " *of opinions* and from that of *uncertainty*. Doubt arises from " the *cognition* of difference of opinion and from that of un" certainty, and not merely from 'difference of opinion' and " 'uncertainty.'

Sūṭra (3).

(*g*) " ALSO BECAUSE IN A CASE OF DIVERSITY OF OPINION THERE IS CERTAINTY OF CONVICTION.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (3).

[P. 61, L. 4, L. 6].

" That which you regard to be a case of 'diversity of " opinions' is a case of *certain conviction*; it represents the " certain conviction of two persons in regard to two opposite " ideas [one man being *certain* of the *existence* of the Soul

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* The *Bhāṣyachandra* says that this Pūrvapakṣa emanates from one who does not rightly comprehend the meanings of the two terms '*vipraṭipaṭṭi*' and '*anyavasthā*' as contained in Sū. 1-1-23, and hence denies the fact of Doubt proceeding from these.

And here also in the Bhāṣya, the statement of the *Pūrvapakṣa* (1) proceeds on the basis of the term '*upapaṭṭi*' being taken to signify mere *presence*, while that in (2) is based upon '*upapaṭṭi*' signifying *cognition*.

† तथा gives better sense—and is found in the Puri Mss. as also in three other Mss.

‡ The *Bhāṣyachandra* interprets '*upalabdhi*' as means of cognising a thing as possessing a character, and 'anupalabdhi' as a means of cognising it as not possessing it. So that in cases of uncertainty all that the observer feels is that there is neither any proof nor disproof of a certain fact; and what this means is that the man will have no idea at all, and not that he will have a doubt.

"while the other is *certain* of its *non-existence*, each man "having a firm conviction in regard to his own opinion, "which is contrary to the opinion of another person.]. So "that if Doubt arose from 'diversity of opinions,' it would "arise also from 'certain conviction' (which is absurd).

Vārṭika on Sū. (3).

[P. 185, L. 8.]

"As there is certainty of conviction in the case of what "you call 'diversity of opinions,' it is not a case of 'diversity "of opinions' at all [That would be a case of real 'diversity "of opinions' where the two opinions are held by the same "man, and not when they are held by different men; as "when one man holds that Soul exists and another holds "that it does not exist; and it is only in the former case "that the man would be in *doubt*].

Suṭra (4).

(*h*) "FURTHER, BECAUSE UNCERTAINTY ITSELF IS QUITE "CERTAIN IN ITS UNCERTAIN CHARACTER [NO DOUBT CAN ARISE FROM IT]".

Bhāṣya on Sū. (4).

[P. 61, L. 8 to L. 10.]

"*No Doubt can arise*—this has to be added to the Sūṭra. "The meaning is this:—If the *Uncertainty* (that has been held "to be the cause of Doubt) is, in itself, quite *certain*, then, "inasmuch as there is *certainty*—it would not be a case of "*Uncertainty* at all; so that there should be no Doubt possible. "If, on the other hand, the *Uncertainty** is not quite certain "in its own character, this would mean that it is not a real "*Uncertainty* at all, being not certain in its uncertain "character; and in this case also no Doubt should arise."

Vārṭika on Sū. (4).

[P. 185, Ll. 10-11].

"Inasmuch as every *Uncertainty* must be *certain* in its "own character, there can be no real *Uncertainty* at all (from which Doubt would arise).

* The printed text reads '*vyavasṭhā*', but the sense requires '*avyavasṭhā*'.

Sūṭra (5).

(*f*) "LASTLY, DOUBT WOULD NEVER CEASE; INASMUCH AS THE PROPERTY (WHOSE COGNITION GIVES RISE TO THE "DOUBT) CONTINUES TO EXIST."

Bhāṣya on Sū. (5).

[P. 61, L. 12 to 14.]

"You hold that Doubt arises from the cognition of a "common property; now on this theory Doubt should be "absolutely persistent;* for inasmuch as the cognition of "the common property (which is the cause) does not cease "to exist, there should be no cessation of the Doubt (which is "the effect). As a matter of fact, even while one is pondering "over a certain thing (the Post, for instance), this thing does "not cease to be known as possessing the (common) property "(*Tallness* for instance, whose perception may have given "rise to Doubt); in fact it always retains that property [so "that when the cause is there, the effect, in the shape of "the Doubt, must be there also].

Vārṭika on Sū. (5).

[P. 185, Ll. 13-14.]

"Such causes as the 'common property' and the like "being persistent in the thing, Doubt should be eternal; "such is the meaning of *Sūṭra*."

Bhāṣya on Sū. (6).

[P. 61, L. 14 to P. 64, L. 6.]

To the above detailed Objection (embodied in Sūṭras 1—5), the following is the reply briefly stated (in one Sūṭra)—

Siḍḍhanṭā.

Sūṭrā (6).

WHEN DOUBT IS HELD TO ARISE ONLY FROM SUCH COGNITION AS HAS BEEN DESCRIBED (IN SŪ. 1-1-23) AS NOT APPREHENDING THE SPECIFIC CHARACTER OF ANY ONE OBJECT,† —THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF EITHER THERE BEING

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* *I. E.* It should continue even when the distinguishing feature of any one thing would be clearly perceived.

† Though this is a qualification of *Doubt*, it may be regarded as qualifying the *Source of Doubt* also—*Bhāṣyachanḍra*.

NO DOUBT AT ALL, OR OF THERE ARISING A DOUBT THAT WOULD BE UNCEASINGLY PERSISTENT.* (Sū. 6).

There arises no such contingency as that no Doubt should arise, or that (when arisen) the Doubt should never cease.†

"How so?"

(a) Well, it has been argued by the *Pūrvapakṣin* (*Bhāṣya* P. 60, L. 2) that 'what is the cause of Doubt is the *cognition* of the common property, and not the common property itself';—and this is quite true. "Why then is not this fact clearly mentioned (in the Sūṭra)?" For the simple reason that this is already implied in the term '*vishēṣāpēkṣaḥ*'; 'in which the definite cognition of the specific character of any one object is wanting' (Su. 1-1-23). By the '*apekṣā*' of the 'specific character' is meant the *wanting to know it*;‡ and this is real and effective (and possible) only while the specific character is *not perceived*; and when the *Sūṭra* does not use the term '*samānadharmāpēkṣaḥ*', 'wanting the cognition of the common property'; this omission means that there is *no wanting* of the cognition of the common property; and this *no wanting* would be possible only when there is direct cognition of the common property; so that by the force of this (omission of the *wanting of the cognition of the common property*, it is implied that there is *cognition of the common property*, from which cognition the Doubt arises. § As a matter or fact however, the *Pūrvapakṣa* argument is set aside by the presence of the term '*upapaṭṭi*' itself in the Sū. (1-1-23): What the Sūṭra says is that Doubt arises from the '*upapaṭṭi*' of the common property; and there can be no *upapaṭṭi* of a thing apart from the *cognition of its existence*; for a common property whose existence is not cognised would be as good as *non-existent*. Then again [even granting that the term '*upapaṭṭi*' denotes mere *presence*, and not *cognition of existence*], a term that expresses an object also generally denotes the

Bhā. P. 62.

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* *The Nyāyasūṭravivaraṇa* explains the term '*vishēṣāpekṣaḥ*' of this Sūṭra to mean 'depending upon such peculiar circumstanees as the non-realisation of the difficulties caused by the remoteness of the object (and such other conditions which obstruct the correct perception of it)'.

† संशयानुच्छेदप्रसङ्ग is the correct reading as found in both Puri MSS. 'Doubts of any one kind cannot go on appearing unceasingly'—*Bhāṣyachandra*.

‡ *I. E.* 'The absence of its Knowledge'—says the *Bhāṣyachandra*.

§ This answer to the *Pūrvapakṣa* proceeds on the admission that the word '*upapaṭṭi*' in Sū. 1-1-23 means *presence*—the meaning assigned to the term by the Pūrvapakṣin. The real answer however is that the term '*upapaṭṭi*' itself means *cognition*; and this answer follows in the next sentence.

cognition of that object; *e. g.* when in ordinary parlance people say, 'fire is inferred from smoke', what this assertion is understood to mean is that 'Fire is inferred from the *perception of smoke*'; and why is it so? Simply because fire is inferred only when one has perceived the smoke, and not while he does not perceive it; and yet in the said assertion, we do not find the term 'perception', though everyone admits that that is what the assertion means; from which it is clear that the person who hears and understands the said assertion admits that a term expressing the *object* also denotes the *cognition of that object.* Similarly in the case in question, the term 'common property' may be taken to denote the *cognition* of the common property.

(*b*) It has been urged in the *Pūrvapakṣa* (*Bhāṣya*, P. 60, Ll. 5-6) that—"No doubt is found to arise at the time that the observer has the idea 'I perceive a property common to these two things', wherein there is an apprehension of the property and the things possessing it."*—But what is here asserted refers to what is perceived before (the appearance of Doubt),—the idea present in the observer's mind (at the time that Doubt appears) being in the following form—'I am perceiving now a property that is common to two things known to me (perceived by me before),—and I am not perceiving any property that belongs to any one of them specifically,—how may I find some such specific property whereby I may be certain as to one or the other?'—and certainly a doubt in this form does not cease merely on the perception of a common property bringing to the mind that property and the thing possessing that property.

(*c*) Thirdly, it has been urged (*Bhāṣya*, P. 60, L 6) that—"Doubt with regard to one thing cannot arise from the certain conviction with regard to another."—This could be rightly urged only against one who holds the view that mere certain conviction with regard to one thing is the cause of Doubt [and we do not hold any such view†].

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* The printed text spoils the passage by wrong punctuation :—It should read as—धर्ममुपलभ इति धर्मधर्मिग्रहणे संशयाभाव इति The Puri MS. 'A' reads 'उपलभ' instead of 'उपलभते' as in the printed text, and this is more in keeping with the form in which this statement has appeared in the *Pūrvapakṣa—Bhāṣya*, P. 60, Ll. 5-6. Puri MS. 'B' reads as in the printed text.

The Ṭaṭparya has explained यथोक्तरित्या as equivalent to यदृच्छया; the *Bhāṣyachandra*, construes thus—'यथा' यस्य कारणम्' अधिकृत्य' संशयकारणोत्पत्ते धर्मविशुद्धप्रत्यक्षविप्रमेव विशयम् अभ्युपगम्य 'you have assumed that the Doubter's direct apprehension is the cause of Doubt and then urged that &c. &c.'

† Our view being that Doubt arises regarding a thing with specific properties, when what is perceived is only a thing as possessing properties common to more than one thing.—*Bhāṣyachandra*.

(*d*) Fourthly, it has been urged (*Bhāṣya*, P. 60, L 8) that—"(From the certain cognition of common property. Doubt cannot arise) as in this case there would not be that affinity between cause and effect (which is essential)*'— But what constitutes the 'affinity between cause and effect is only the fact that the presence and absence of the effect are in accordance with the presence and absence of the cause; and further, when between two things it is found that if one comes into existence the other also comes into existence, and if the former does not come to existence, the latter also does not come into existence,—then the former is called the 'cause' and the latter the 'effect'; this is what constitutes another affinity' or 'homogeneity' (between cause and effect); † and certainly there is this 'affinity' between Doubt and its cause (the perception of Common Property).‡

Bhā. P. 63.

(*e*) The above reasoning also serves to answer the *Pūrvapakṣa* argument urged in (*Bhāṣya*, P. 60, L. 10), that no Doubt can arise from the cognition of the property of several things.

(*f*) It has been urged by the *Pūrvapakṣin* (under Sū. 2) that—'No Doubt can arise from the Cognition of either diverse opinions or uncertainty."—Now our answer to this is that, (as regards the case of *Diverse opinions*) when the Doubt appears, the idea present in the observer's mind is as follows—'From two contradictory statements I find the thing to be possessed of contradictory properties,—and I do not know of any specific circumstance attending it,—nor do I

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* The certain cognition of common property apprehends the *presence* of such property; while Doubt apprehends the *absence* of such property; and no affinity is possible between two such heterogeneous cognitions;—this is the meaning of the *Pūrvapakṣa-Bhāṣyachandra*.

† According to the *Bhāṣyachandra*, these are two *affinities* pointed out here as expressed in the translation. It may however be simpler to take the *second* as only explanatory of the *first*; the only *affinity* consisting in the fact that the presence and absence of the one are in accordance (simultaneous) with the presence and absence of the other; that is to say, the affinity consists in the fact that when one comes into existence, the other also does the same &c. &c.

‡ The *Vārtika* does not accept this view of 'affinity'; according to it the homogeneity between *Doubt* and its cause in the shape of the Cognition of common property consists in the fact that in both the Cognition of specific properties is wanting. The *Tātparya* adds that according to the view expressed in the *Bhāṣya*, the case of all *eternal* causes would be excluded; as they never *come into existence and cease to exist*.

perceive any such, whereby I could be certain with regard to one or the other of the two properties,—what specific circumstance could there be, whereby I could become certain with regard to one or the other'?—And such being the well-known form of the Doubt brought about by the *Diversity of Opinions* (as helped by the non-cognition of special conditions), it cannot be rejected simply by reason of the comprehension (by the third party) of the diversity of opinions.* The same holds good also with regard to what has been urged against Doubt arising from the 'uncertainty in regard to perception and non-perception'. † [In this case also the particular form in which the Doubt appears makes it clear that it arises from the *cognition of uncertainty* as helped by the non-cognition of special circumstances. And this Doubt also cannot be rejected merely by reason of the cognition of uncertainty].

(*q*) It has been urged (in Sū. 3) that—"Because there is certainty of conviction in the case of Diversity of opinions (no Doubt can arise from this latter)."—Now what is held to be the cause of Doubt is the Cognition of that which is denoted by the term 'Diversity of opinions,' this Cognition being wanting in the conception of any specific character (favouring any one of the opinions); and certainly it is not fair to discard the view merely by thrusting a different name (to what is meant by 'diverse opinions'); that is to say, the term 'diverse opinions' stands for *contradictory assertions with regard to one and the same thing*; what gives rise to Doubt is the Cognition (by the third party, the enquirer) of such assertions, as helped by the non-cognition of any special circumstances (in favour of one or the other); and it cannot cease to give rise to doubt merely by your giving to it a different name; so that this argument of the Pūrvapakṣin can only delude the ignorant.‡

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* विप्रतिपत्तिसंशय gives no sense. The Puri MSS. reads विप्रतिपत्तिसंप्रतिपत्ति. The meaning is that the presence of Doubt in the mind of the observer, the third party, is not incompatible with his comprehension of the fact that these two persons hold, two different opinions on this point. विप्रतिपन्नयोः सम्प्रतिपन्नत्व. विप्रतिपत्त्या सन्देहोऽविप्रतिपत्तिरस्तीति दुर्बोधस्य सम्प्रतिपत्तिमात्रेण न निवर्तयितुं शक्यः—*Bhāṣyachandra*.

† 'Perception' here stands for 'proof in support' and 'non-perception' for 'proof against'; there is 'uncertainty' in regarding these when the observer does not find either; and this certainly gives rise to Doubt—*Bhāṣyachandra*.

‡ It is true that the individual upholder of each of the diverse opinions has a certain conviction on the point; there is however no such conviction in the mind of the third party, who only hears these opinions expressed, and cannot find any special circumstances in favour of either.

(*h*) It has been urged (under Sū. 4) that—"Because uncertainty itself is quite certain in its uncertain character (it cannot give rise to Doubt)."—Well, in arguing thus it is admitted that there is such a thing as the 'Cause of Doubt,' and also that it is of the nature of 'uncertainty' essentially; all that is done is to give it a different name 'certainty,' (without denying the thing itself',—and this name' can apply to the said thing only in a sense different from its natural signification [*i.e.*, *Uncertainty* can be called 'certainty' only in the sense of *fixity*, *definiteness*, and not in the sense of *freedom from doubt*]; and this assumption of a different name also is absolutely futile; for a *certainty* can never be 'uncertainty', being as it is, *fixed* in its own (certain) character.* So that the assertion made by the Opponent does not deny the fact that Doubt is produced by the fact of perception and non-perception pertaining to both existence and non-existence (of the thing with regard to which the Doubt arises), as accompanied by the fact of a specific circumstance in favour of either not being available;—and in so far as the said *uncertainty* is fixed in its *uncertain* character, it does not lose its own character; hence the 'uncertainty' is admitted by (the Opponent's own assertion).—Thus it is found that even though a different name is assumed, it does not prove anything different (from the conclusion to which exception is meant to be taken).

Bhā. P. 64.

(*i*) It has also been urged (in Sū. 5) that—Doubt would never cease, as the property continues to persist".—But as a matter of fact, Doubt is produced, *not* merely by the *common property*, etc. (whose persistence would make the Doubt persistent), but by the *cognition of the common property*, as accompanied by a *remembrance of the specific characters*, (as shown under Sū. 1-1-23); so that there is no possibility of the Doubt being unceasingly persistent.

(*j*) Lastly, it has been urged by the *Pūrvapakṣin* (in the *Bhāṣya*, P. 60, L. 10) that—"Doubt never arises from the cognition of the properties of any one out of two things".—This objection is not well taken; for it has been distinctly

* Some Mss., the Puri Mss. among them, read स्व स्वभावः खलु न भवति instead of स्वस्वभावा खलु स्वस्वभावा न भवति; the former gives better sense; and is also supported by the *Bhāṣyachandra*, which construes the passage thus—स्वस्वभावा खलु न भवति अस्वस्वभावा—वेद न सदा इत्यर्थः—अत्र हेतुमाह स्वस्वभावेति and adds the explanation—'when a thing is endowed with its own character, it cannot at the same time be said to be not endowed with it'.

stated (in Sū. 1-1-23) that Doubt is that wavering judgment which is *wanting in the cognition of the specific character of a thing*; and as the 'specific character' can only consist in the 'property of one out of two things', when there is a cognition of such property, there can be no 'wanting in the cognition of the specific character' [and as such it would not be a Doubt at all].

Vārṭika on Sū. (6).

[P. 185, L. 15 to P. 188, L. 4.]

The reply to the *Pūrvapakṣa* is given in the next Sūṭra—'*When Doubt is held to arise etc. etc.*' [The sense of the reply may be thus explained]—The objection is not well conceived; as it is clear that the objector has not understood the meaning of the original Sūṭra (1-1-23).

For instance—(*b*)* it has been urged that—"No Doubt follows from the cognition of the property and the things possessing that property"; and for this objection there is no basis at all; as it is clear that the sense of the *Sūṭra* has not been grasped: We do not say that the cognised property (whose cognition is held to give rise to Doubt) is that of the *thing* cognised; in fact, the idea in the mind of the observer is to the effect that—'I now perceive a property that is common to the things, Post and Man, *which I have perceived previously*'. This same explanation also serves to set aside the objection taken by the Opponent [in *Vārṭika*, P. 185, L. 2 (E 4) above] that—"the property subsisting in one thing only cannot be called *common* etc."

Vār. P. 186.

(*c*) Secondly it has been urged that—"The cognition of one thing cannot produce Doubt in regard to another thing."—This also is baseless; for the simple reason that the view that is controverted has never been held by us. Some people offer the following answer to the objection under

* The *Vārṭika* does not accept the interpretation of Sū. (1), which in the *Bhāṣya* we have marked as (a).

reference—" I do not mean that the other thing that produces Doubt may be any object in general; what I mean is that it is a *particular kind of different thing*; and to the question as to what is the peculiarity of that 'particular kind of different thing'—our answer is that its peculiarity consists in its possessing the property perceived; so that our meaning is that when a property is perceived, there arises Doubt in regard to that particular thing which possesses that property";—and they proceed to point out that there is no such peculiarity in the case of *Colour* and *Touch* (where one is not a property possessed by the other) [and these two things are what have been cited by the *Pūrvapakṣa* Bhāṣya P. 60, L. 6]." But our opinion is that this is not an answer to the Pūrvapaksa-argument.* Why? Because even so the thing does not cease to be 'another thing', what we mean is that the thing possessing the property is as much 'another thing' in comparison to the property, as Colour is in comparison to Touch; so that the explanation proposed does not do away with the objection that 'the cognition of one thing cannot produce Doubt in regard to another thing.'

Our answer to this objection also is the same as before—that the view controverted is not held by us at all: We do not hold that the cognition of one thing (the property) produces doubt in regard to another thing in the shape of the thing possessing that property'; what we do hold is that from *the cognition of a thing possessing a common property* there arises Doubt with regard to *that same thing*, in so far as concerns its specific distinctive features (not perceived at the time).†

* The reading परतः । नैव of the *Bib. Ind.* edition is not right; the Benares edition supplies the reading अयन्तु न परिहार इति परतः:

† The translation follows the reading of the Benares edition धर्मिणस्तु विशेषे; the *Bib. Ind.* Edition reads धर्मेणतद्विशेषे, which means—'the Doubt arises with regard to that same thing which is not perceived at the time as possessing its distinctive features'. The sense of the argument is the same in both cases.

(*d*) The next argument of the *Pūrvapakṣa* has been urged on the basis of *want of a affinity* (*Bhāṣya* p. 60, ll. 9-10);—but as a matter of fact there *is* affinity (between the cause, the *cognition of a thing*, and its effect, *Doubt*) in this that both are wanting in the apprehension of the specific character of anything: just as the specific character of a thing is not apprehended by the *perception of common properties*, so also it is not apprehended by Doubt also. By the statement—that 'the presence of the effect follows from the effect of the cause'—the *Bhāṣya* should be understood to mean that the said character or relation subsists between the cause and effect,—and not that the requisite 'affinity' (in the particular case in question) consists in that fact; as the character would apply to *all effects* (and not specifically to the particular effect in question)—there being no effect whose presence ever follows except in the presence of the cause.

(*e*) '*The above reasoning*', says the *Bhāṣya* (P. 63, l. 2), '*also serves to answer the Pūrvapakṣa argument that no Doubt can arise from the cognition of the property of several things*';—that is to say, the answer that has been given in connection with the case of Doubt arising from the *cognition of a common property* applies also to the case of Doubt arising from the *cognition of the property of several things*.

(*e* (1) The next argument of the *Pūrvapakṣa* (put forward in the *Vārṭika*) is that—"no Doubt can arise with regard to things perceived and not perceived". This is not right; as it is clear that it proceeds from ignorance: We do not say that Doubt appears with regard to one thing, when what is definitely perceived is an entirely different thing; what we do mean is that when a thing is apprehended in a general vague form, there arises Doubt, the essence whereof lies in the fact that it does not definitely apprehend the specific character of any particular thing.

(*e* 2) It has been urged (by the Pūrvapakṣin, in the *Vārṭika*) that—"It often happens that even when there is cognition of common properties, no Doubt arises." This also is not right; as it shows that the *Pūrvapakṣin* does not understand what is meant by 'common properties' (in the present connection). The character of *being a product* (cited by the Pūrvapakṣin) is not a 'common property'. in the sense in which this term has been used here; the term 'common property' has been used here in a totally different sense; what is meant by a property being 'common' (in the present connection) is that it subsists in the thing intended and also in things other than those homogeneous to that thing, and certainly the character of *being a product* cannot be called 'common' in this sense.*

Vār: P. 187.

(*e* 3) Next it has been urged (by the *Pūrvapakṣin* in the *Vārṭika*) that—"It is not right to assert that Doubt arises only when there is cognition of common properties, as Doubt is found to arise otherwise also." This is not a right objection; as in the first place the case cited by the *Pūrvapakṣin* is not admitted by us to be one of Doubt; and secondly, the restriction objected to (that it is *only* when there is cognition of common properties that Doubt arises) is not accepted by us. That 'Doubt arises from the perception of mutually contradictory properties subsisting in the same thing' is also not admitted by us.† This same fact—that we do not mean to imply any *restriction* (as to Doubt arising *only* from the cognition of common properties)—also serves to set aside the *Pūrvapakṣa* objection that Doubt is often found to appear from

* In the case of the Post and Man, the property of 'tallness' that is perceived is one that subsists in the Post, as well as the *Man*—the latter being entirely unlike the former; in the case of *being a product*, it is found in Sound and only in things that are like it; or else it would not be a true *probans* in proving the non-eternality of Sound; just as *Tallness* cannot be a true probans in proving a thing to be a *man* or a *post*.

† As all that happens in this case is that there is no certainty of conviction in regard to any particular thing; and there is no *doubt* as to its being 'this *or that*'; because the idea of the second thing does not necessarily come in; and yet this is an essential factor in all *doubt*.

one's failing to comprehend the real character of a thing. As a matter of fact, we do not admit of any such restriction as that Doubt arises *only* from the cognition of common properties, and from no other causes; as we have stated (under Sū. 1-1-23) that Doubt arises also from such other causes as the cognition of '*anēkadharma*', (several properties of several objects).

(*f*) This same answer also meets the *Pūrvapakṣa* argument (urged in Sū. 2) that—" Doubt cannot arise from the cognition of diversity of opinions, or from that of uncertainty." We do not hold that Doubt arises either from 'diversity of opinions' alone, or from 'uncertainty' alone; nor do we hold that Doubt arises from 'uncertainty' all;—in fact all that we have asserted (in Sū. 1-1-23) is that the 'uncertainty attaching to perceptions and non-perceptions,' is a qualifying condition to what have been mentioned in the preceding words of the Sūṭra (as the causes of Doubt); so that the 'perception and non-perception' are the cause of Doubt only as qualifying the preceding words, and not by themselves. This is what is a clearly stated in the *Sūṭra* (1-1-23) itself.

(*g*) It has been urged by the *Pūrvapakṣa* (Sū. 3) that—"In a case of Diversity of Opinion there is certainty of conviction." Our answer to this is that a difference of names does not alter facts; you apply the name 'certainty of conviction' to what is generally called 'Diversity of Opinion,' on the basis of an entirely different fact; but that does not make it cease to be 'Diversity of Opinion'.* And so long as it is a case of 'Diversity of Opinion,' it remains a source of Doubt.

* It is called a case of 'Diversity of Opinion' on the ground of its being recognised by an independent observer as representing the different views held by different persons; the *Pūrvapakṣin* applies to this the name 'certainty of conviction' in reference to each of the opinions as held and expressed by its own exponent. It is true that in this latter sense we can call each opinion 'certain conviction', but that does not alter the fact that it is a case of 'Diversity of Opinion' for the uninterested third party.

(*h*) It has been urged by the *Pūrvapakṣin* (in Sū. 4) that—"Uncertainty itself being quite certain in its uncertain character, there can be no uncertainty at all." But this is not right; as it involves a self-contradiction. That is to say, you say that 'there is no uncertainty', and yet you add that 'uncertainty is certain in its uncertain character'; this certainly involves a clear self-contradiction. Then again, it has to be borne in mind that the mere assigning of a different name, on the basis of a different fact, cannot do away with the real character of a thing; whether you give a different name to a thing or not, the thing itself remains what it is.*

(*i*) It has been urged (in Sū. 5) that—"Doubt would never cease, inasmuch as the property continues to persist." This objection also is not well taken; as it shows that the meaning of the *Sūṭra* (1-1-23) has not been understood. The *Sūṭra* does not mean that Doubt arises singly from each of the factors mentioned—'Common Property' and the rest; what it does mean is that it arises *from the cognition of common property, as accompanied by the remembrance of specific character, when there is uncertainty attaching to perception and non-perception* (*i. e.*, from all the factors collectively);

Var. P. 188.

and such being the case there is no possibility of there being either no Doubt at all, or an unceasingly persistent Doubt.

Lastly, it has been urged by the *Pūrvapkaṣin* (in the *Bhāṣya*, *P*. 60, L. 10) that—"No Doubt can arise from the cognition of the property of either one of the things." This objection also is not well conceived; for the simple reason that (according to us also) no Doubt can arise from such cognition; in fact no Doubt ever arises from the cognition of the property of only one of the two things; such a cognition always brings about certain conviction in regard to that thing.

* So that you may call *uncertainty*, 'certainty'; but that does not do away with the *uncertainty* itself: and all that we hold is that 'uncertainty' gives rise to Doubt.

Sūṭra (7).

WHEREVER THERE IS DOUBT, THERE IS POSSIBILITY OF THE AFORESAID QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS.—(SŪ. 7).

Bhāṣya.

[P. 64, L. 8 to L. 10.]

Wherever the Investigation carried on is preceded by Doubt,—either in a scientific Treatise or in a Controversy—the Opponent will try to deny the very existence of the Doubt (in the manner of the above Pūrvapakṣa) ; and in that case he should be met with the answer (detailed above).* It is for this reason that, as pertaining to all Investigations, *Doubt* has been examined first of all.

Vārṭika on Sū. (7).

Wherever there is Doubt &c.,—says the *Sūṭra.* What is the sense of this Sūṭra? The sense is that it would not be right for a disputant to deny the existence of Doubt in regard to the point under discussion [as that would not lead him to the obtaining of the truth that he seeks]; in fact [he himself should take the Doubt as it stands; and] if his Opponent should try to show that there can be no Doubt in regard to the point at issue [in which case the Opponent will naturally make use of the *Pūrvapakṣa* arguments detailed under Sūṭras 1 to 3],—he should then meet him with the *Siḍḍhānṭa* arguments (detailed under Sū. 6). It is this instruction that the Sūṭra is meant to impart to the pupil.†

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* The *Nyāyasūṭravivaraṇa* remarks that this advice applies to the case of the examination of every one of the sixteen categories ;—the examination of *Pramāṇa* also is preceded by the doubt as to whether there are 2 or 3 or 4 Pramāṇas and so forth ; in regard to every one of such Doubts, the *Pūrvapakṣin* may try to deny the very existence of Doubt ; and then he is to be met in the manner explained here.

† The *Parishuḍḍhi* offers another interesting explanation of this *Sūṭra.* It takes it to be a sort of an explanation provided for the Sutra undertaking to enter into a thorough *examination* of *Pramāṇas* and a few other categories only, and omitting such others as *Prayojana* and the like. The Sū. is taken to mean that a thorough *examination* is called for only in regard to matters in regard whereto there are doubts. As a matter of fact the nature of *Prayojana* and the other categories, whose *examination* has been omitted, is fully known to all—from the learned philosopher down to the mere cowherdess ; so that no thorough examination is necessary in their case. Then again, the method of examination employed in regard to *Pramāṇa,* &c. may be applied to these other categories also ; this is what the *seventh* Sūṭra means—" Whenever there is any doubt in regard to any category we should employ the method of examination which consists of questions and answers."

The *Bhāṣyachanḍra* remarks as follows—" The Sūṭra is meant to be an advice to the Pupil to the effect that it is not right to deny the existence of Doubt as a

Section (2).

Detailed Examination of Pramāṇas in General.

[Sūṭrās 1—19.]

Bhāṣya.

[P. 64, L. 10 to L. 13.]

Next follows the detailed *Examination* of *Pramāṇa.**—

Sūṭra (8).

Pūrvapakṣa. " PERCEPTION AND THE REST CANNOT BE REGARDED AS INSTRUMENTS OF COGNITION, ON ACCOUNT OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF CONNECTING THEM WITH ANY OF THE THREE POINTS OF TIME."—(Sūṭra 8).†

" The character of Instrument of Cognition cannot belong " to Perception, &c., as it is impossible to connect them with " any of the three points of time; that is to say, it is not " possible for them either to precede or to synchronise " with or to follow (the *objects* cognised)." ‡

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preliminary accessory of all Discussion; the sense being that, inasmuch as Doubt is such an accessory, whenever any Discussion is started, one should not meet it with the preliminary objection that the very Doubt, on which the Discussion proceeds, is not possible; the right course is to supply answers to the questions raised. This advice being summed up in three verses:—'The dull ignoramus and the man who has reached the highest pinacle of wisdom, these two persons are happy; persons falling between these two extremes always suffer. (1) The man whose mind is in doubt is beset with difficulties at each step; freedom from Doubt represents highest bliss; this being the form of the Supreme Self. (2) For these reasons, you should listen to all theories, and then having raised questions in regard to these, you should enter in to the discussion with qualified persons and thereby ascertain the truth. (3).

*In the case of Doubt, it was necessary to alter the order in which the categories had been mentioned in Sū. 1-1-1; because Doubt forms the starting-point of all investigations. Among the rest of the categories, there is no reason for dealing with any of them out of its proper place; so the Author now takes up the examination of *Pramāṇa.* There again, he begins with the examination of the character of *Pramāṇa* in general, before proceeding with the particular Pramāṇas. The *Pramāṇa*, in general, may be defined as the Instrument of Cognition; and these instruments are Perception and the rest.—*Ṭāṭparya.*

† The Sūtra denies the very existence of Pramāṇas, on the ground that they do not prove the existence of these objects at any point of time—*Bhāṣyachanḍra.*

‡ The *Ṭāṭparya* thus sums up the *Pūrvapakṣa* embodied in Sūṭras 8-11 :—This Pūrvapakṣa emanates from the *Māḍhyamika* Bauḍḍha, and may be explained as follows :—Though our firm conviction is that nothing in the world can bear any investigation,—so that so far as we ourselves are concerned, *Pramāṇa* also is a subject that cannot bear any examination,—yet we proceed to show that *Pramāṇas*, as accepted by other people are untenable; and this we shall show on the basis of those same Pramāṇas that are held by those same people; and thus it is a fault of the Pramāṇas themselves that they melt away by their own inner contradictions. The argument against Pramāṇa may be thus formally stated—Perception and the rest cannot be

Vārṭika on Sū. (8).

[P. 188, L. 9 to L. 15.]

Next comes the turn of *Pramāṇa*; and this we now proceed to examine. "What is there to be examined in this connection;" * In the first place, it is necessary to examine the very possibility (existence) of *Pramāṇas*; there arises a doubt in our minds as to the very existence of *Pramāṇas* as such, because we find in them properties indicative of both existence and non-existence, and we do not perceive in them any specific properties that would distinguish them from *Pramēya* and the other categories.

The Opponent denies that there is any doubt as to the existence or non-existence of *Pramāṇas*, and proceeds to elaborate the *Pūrvapakṣa* view (that there is no such thing as '*Pramāṇa*'):—

Pūrvapakṣa.

"*Perception and the rest cannot be regarded as Pramāṇas,* "*as etc. etc.*—that is to say, *Pramāṇas* do not "serve their purpose (of proving the existence "of their objects) at any of the three points of time."

Bhāṣya on Sū. (9).

[P. 64, L. 13 to L. 17.]

"What has been stated above in a general way is next explained in detail (by the *Pūrvapakṣin*)—

Sūṭra (9).

"IF THE PRAMĀṆA EXISTS ALREADY BEFORE (THE OBJECT), THEN PERCEPTION CANNOT BE PRODUCED BY THE

regarded as Pramāṇa, because they cannot prove or indicate the presence of their objects at any point of time,—anything that does not prove its object at any time is not regarded as Pramāṇa, for instance, the conception of Hare's Horns;—Perception, &c., are such—therefore they cannot be regarded as Pramāṇa."

It is interesting to compare this statement of the *Mādhyamika* view with the Vedanta new expressed in *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhāḍya*, Trans. Vol. I Para. 79.

* All parties admit of certain *Pramāṇas*, for the establishing of their own views; as in the absence of Pramāṇas, no view can be established. A man who has no view of his own to establish cannot be regarded either as a wise man, or as an investigator. So that what *Pramāṇas* must be known to all intelligent man; what is there to be examined in this connection?—This is the meaning of the questioner.—*Ṭāṭparya.*

CONTACT OF THE SENSE-ORGAN WITH THE OBJECT."—(Sū. 9.)*

"Perception is the Cognition of such objects as Odour and "the rest; if this Perception (*Pramāṇa*) exists already, and "Odour, &c., come into existence *after* it, then the Perception "cannot be said to be produced by the contact (with the "sense-organ) of those things, Odour, &c." †

Vārṭika On Sū. (9).
[P. 188, L. 18 to L. 2.]

"*If the Pramāṇa exists already, &c. &c.*—says the Sūṭra—"the Perceptional Cognition cannot be produced by the "contact of the sense-organ with the object; so that what has "been declared in the Sūṭra (1-1-4) becomes stultified; "that is to say, if the cognition (Perception) exists already, "before the Object, then the contact of that object cannot "be its cause; and this would be contrary to what has been "declared before—that 'Perception is Cognition produced by "the contact of the Sense-organ with the Object' (Sū. 1. 1. 4)."

Sūṭra (10).

"IF THE PRAMĀṆA COMES INTO EXISTENCE AFTER (THE OBJECT), THEN THE EXISTENCE OF THE OBJECT OF COGNITION CANNOT BE DEPENDENT UPON PRAMĀṆAS*—(Su. 10).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (10).
[P. 65, LL. 2—3].

"While the Pramāṇa does not exist, by whose instru-"mentality would the thing be *cognised*, and thereby be-"come the *object of cognition*? It is only when a thing is "cognised by the instrumentality of Pramāṇas, that it comes "to be known as '*pramēya*', *object of cognition*.

* The meaning of the Sūṭra is as follows—As a matter of fact, Pramāṇa is an Instrument, and the Instrument is a particular kind of substance accompanied by a certain action or operation; neither the *operation* alone nor the substance alone can be called 'Instrument'; if then, this substance, along with the operation of bringing about the cognition, is already there, before the object has come into existence,—then the said cognition cannot be regarded as brought about by a contact with that object.—*Bhāṣyachandra.*

† I. E. The Substance can have no connection with the operation (which is absurd)—says the *Bhāṣyachandra.* Puri MS. A. has a lacuna here: it omits from *Bhāṣya*, P. 64, L. 11 to P. 66, L. 8.

Vārṭika on Sū. (10).*
[P. 189, L. 2 to L. 4]

*"*If the Pramāṇa* &c.—says the Sūṭra. That is to say, "this would involve the absurdity that a thing may be "called 'object of cognition' without being operated upon "by *Pramāṇas*. As a matter of fact, the *object of cognition* "cannot come into existence, cannot attain its true character, "except with the help of *Pramāṇas*; but (if the *Pramāṇas* "were to come into existence *after* the object) the existence "of the *object of cognition* could not be dependent upon Pra-"māṇas."

Sūṭra (11)

"IF THE TWO COME INTO EXISTENCE SIMULTANEOUSLY, THEN, INASMUCH AS EACH COGNITION IS RESTRICTED TO ITS OWN OBJECT, THERE CAN BE NO SEQUENCE AMONG COGNITIONS."† (Sū. 11).

Bhāṣya.
[P. 65, L. 6 to L. 11]

"If it be held that the *Pramāṇa* and its *Object* both "come into existence at the same time,—then, inasmuch "as all cognitions pertain to their own particular object, "it would be possible for them to come into existence "at the same time; and therefore, *inasmuch as each "cognition is restricted to its own object, there can "be no necessity of sequence among cognitions.* As a matter "of fact, all these cognitions are found to appear with "regard to their objects, one after the other; but this "sequence would not be necessary (if the cognition and its "object were to appear at the same time). And further,

* Though the existence of a thing, by itself, does not depend upon Pramāṇas, yet its existence *as object of cognition*, as *Prameya*, depends entirely upon the operation of the Pramāṇas; a thing cannot be the *object of cognition* until that cognition has come about, and the cognition can come about only by the operation of the *Instruments of Cognition*.—'In this Sūṭra, '*Pramāṇa*' stands for the Instrument along with its operation; and '*Prameya*' for the object as bearing the operation. Hence the meaning is that unless the Instrument, along with the operation of *Cognition* exists beforehand, there can be no possibility of the 'object' bearing that operation. [That is, a thing cannot be '*Prameya*' in the absence of '*Pramāṇa*'].—*Bhāṣyachandra.*

† 'Cognition' in this *Sūṭra* stands for '*Pramāṇa*', which as explained before, stands for the *means of cognition*, and also the *cognition itself.*

" [even if such sequence be not considered essential] this " simultaneity of cognitions would contradict what has been " declared (under Sū 1-1-16) to the effect that 'the presence " of the Mind is indicated by the non-simultaneity of cogni- " tions.'

" The aforesaid are the only three possible alternatives in " regard to the existence (or relation) of *Pramāṇa* and its *Ob-* " *ject*; and every one of them has been found to be untenable; " so the conclusion is that Perception and the rest cannot " be regarded as '*Pramāṇa*'."

Vārtika on Sū. (11).

(P. 189, L. 8 to L. 10).

" *If the two were simultaneous &c.*—says the *Sūtra*. If " Cognitions (*Pramāṇas*) and their Objects were to synchro- " nise, then cognitions would have to be held to appear " simultaneously; and this would be against what we actually " find to be the case;—cognitions are, as a matter of fact, " always found to appear one after the other. Further, such " a view would also involve self-contradiction: it would be " contrary to what has been declared in regard to '*non-* " *simultaneity*' of cognitions being indicative of the Mind " (in Sū. 1-1-16)".

Bhāṣya.

Siddhānta.

[P. 65, L. 11 to P. 66, L. 19].

The answer to the above is as follows:—

* ***As a matter of fact between what is called the 'cause or instrument of apprehension' and what the 'object of apprehension', there being no restriction as to the former coming into existence either before, or after, or simultaneously with the latter, we take each case on its own merits, just as we find it, and assert accordingly (either precedence or sequence or simultaneity of the one or the other):*** That is to say, in some cases the Cause of Apprehension appears first, and then its object; *e. g.* in the case of the apprehension of things coming into existence while

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* We have here certain passages printed in thicker type;—see in this connection our note on Sū. 15, below. The whole of the italicised portion occurs as a *Sūtra* in the सूत्रपाठ attached to Puri MS. B. The *Bhāṣyachandra* also appears to regard this first passage as a *Sūtra*.

the Sun is shining [in which case the sunlight, which is the cause of the perception, is already there, when the things are coming into existence]*;—in other cases the Object appears before and the Cause of its apprehension afterwards; *e. g.* when the lamp (just lighted) illumines, and makes perceptible, things already in existence;—in other cases again the Cause of apprehension and its Object come into existence together; *e. g.* when the apprehension of fire is brought about by means of smoke. † Now '*Pramāṇa*' is the name of the *cause of apprehension*, and '*Pramēya*' that of the *Object of apprehension*; so that (as shown above), there being no restriction as to exact precedence or sequence or simultaneity between the two, we have to take each case just as we find it.‡ So that there is no ground for the entire denial (of Pramāṇas) (which you have put forward); specially in view of the fact that you yourself admit the (efficiency of) *Pramāṇas* in general (in the shape *e. g.* of your own words) and then go on to deny the efficiency of all particular Pramāṇas §

Bhā P. 66.

||Secondly, *as the grounds on which the names* ('*Pramāṇa*' *and* '*Pramēya*') *are based pertain to all three points of time, the name also should be accepted as such.* That is to say, it

* The printed text puts the stop wrongly after प्रकाश it should be *after* उत्पद्यमानानाम्; the Puri MSS. reads प्रकाश उत्पद्यमानानाम्, which gives better sense.

† The apprehension of fire synchronises with the apprehension of smoke.

‡ 'Such is the sense of the Sūṭra'—says the *Bhāṣyachandra*; and from this it appears that the passage containing the term *vibhāgarachanam* constitutes a Sūṭra.

§ खलु विषय of the printed text appears difficult to construe. What the Pūrvapakṣin has done is to take no account of the particular facts of each case and has roundly denied the efficiency of all Pramāṇas promiscuously; so that the correct word would appear to be अविषय. The mistake may be due to the mis-reading of खलु for खल्व; लु and ल्व being very nearly alike in Marthili and Bengali characters. But the *Bhāṣyachandra* accepts the reading खलु विषय and supplies a reasonable explanation; which has been adopted in the translation. It remarks that the passage points out an inconsistency (*vyāghāṭa*) on the part of the Pūrvapakṣin. He denies all Pramāṇas, but certainly accepts his own word embodying this denial as a very valid Pramāṇa.

|| The italicised portion occur, as Sūṭra in the सूत्रपाठ attached to Puri MS. B. The *Bhāṣyāchandra* remarks—This refers to the following argument of the opponent—"There are four kinds of basis for the application of verbal names; these being—1) the presence of *Genus i.e.* this is a '*Cow*' 'this is a *Brāhmaṇa*' &c.; (2) Presence of *Quality*; 'the cow is *white*', 'the Brāhmaṇa is *patient*'; (3) Presence of certain things; 'the Brahmana *has a stick*'; and (4) Presence of action; 'this is a *doer*', 'this a *cogniser*' and so forth. So that the name 'Pramāṇa' also must have for its basis the actual *presence* of the *action of apprehension* at the same time; and it is therefore not right to say 'the *Prameya* is apprehended by the *Cogniser*, by means of the *Pramāṇa*'."—The answer to this, given in the Bhāṣya, is that the application of the name is not based upon the actual *presence of the action at the time;* it is based upon the *potentiality* of the thing to bring about the action; e.g. we speak of

has been urged (in Sū. 10) that—"if the Pramāṇa be held to come into existence *after* the Pramēya, then, at the time that the Pramāṇa is non-existent, (*i. e.* not actually bringing about the apprehension at that time) the object could not be called '*Pramēya*'; as it is only when an object is actually apprehended at the time by means of *Pramāṇa* that it is known as '*Pramēya*'" *;—but as a matter of fact, the application of the name '*Pramāṇa*' is due to the fact of what is so named being the *cause of apprehension* (*i. e.* being endowed with the potentiality of bringing about the cognition), and this fact pertains to all three points of time; for instance, [when we give the name 'Pramāṇa' to the cause of apprehension] we make use of either of the three expressions 'this has brought about the apprehension (therefore it is *Pramāṇa*)', or 'this brings about the apprehension (hence it is *Pramāṇa*); or this *will* bring about the apprehension (hence it is *Pramāṇa*); so that the grounds of the naming pertaining to all three points of time—past, present and future—, the name also should be taken as pertaining to all points of time.† So that when we apply the name '*Pramāṇa*', what is meant is that the object *has been apprehended* (in the past) by its means, or that the object *is apprehended* by its means (in the present), or that the object *will be apprehended* by its means (in the future); similarly when we apply the name '*Pramēya*', what is meant is that it *has been apprehended*, or that it *is apprehended*, or that it *will be apprehended* by its means. Such being the case, an object can very well be known as '*pramēya*' when we have such ideas as 'the apprehension of this thing *will* be brought about by the *right cause* [Pramāṇa, when it comes into existence]', 'this *will* be apprehended', and so forth. If this applicability of a name on the basis of the possibility of the requisite operation at all three points of time is not admitted, then much of ordinary usage would be impossible. That is to say, if one were not to admit the

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the 'cook' though he is only *going to do the cooking*; or we say 'the cook is bathing', where even though the *action* present is that of *bathing*, yet the name applied to the man is 'Cook'. This 'potentiality 'consists in the mere form of the thing concerned, as aided by the necessary accessories.

*सिद्धवदपि प्रमाणे is the reading of all manuscripts but one, as also of the two Puri MSS.; we have adopted this; specially as यदि प्रमाणे of the printed text does not give good sense.

†And when in defining 'Pramāṇa' we have said that it is *what actually brings about the cognition*—it is only by way of an illustration; and we do not mean to restrict the name *pramāṇa* only to what actually at the time brings about Cognition—*Bhāṣyachandra*.

application of names as described above, for him no such expressions would be possible as—'bring a *cook*, he *will do* the cooking', 'bring in a *wood-cutter*, he *will do* the cutting.'

Further, the assertion (made in Sū. 8) that—'Perception and the rest cannot be regarded as Instruments of Cognition, on account of the impossibility of connecting them with any of the three points of time'—apparently denies all 'Pramāṇa' entirely;—the person making such an assertion should be asked—what do you mean to accomplish by this denial? Do you mean to set aside the possibility or very form (of the Pramāṇas, Perception, &c.)? Or, to make known their impossibility or absence of any form? If the former, then the possibility or form of the Pramāṇas is admitted [as it is only what exists that can be *set aside*],—and the possibility or form being there, Perception and the other Pramāṇas cannot be denied entirely. If, on the other hand, the denial is meant to make known their impossibility, then the denial itself becomes endowed with the character of '*Pramāṇa*' (Instrument of Cognition, being that which *makes known* things); * as the denial becomes the cause or instrument of the Cognition of the 'impossibility of Pramāṇas.'

[Even knowing this inconsistency, the Opponent asks]—"What then?". The answer comes in the next Sūṭra].

Vārṭika on the Siḍḍhānṭa-Bhāṣya.

[Page 189, L 10 to P. 191, L. 16.]

The answer to the *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows :—

'*Between the cause of apprehension and the object of apprehension there is no restriction as to the former coming into existence either before or after or simultaneously with, the latter*'—says the *Bhāṣya* (P. 65, L. 12);—which means that what has been put forward as the Probans in the *Pūrvapakṣa* argument [*viz. impossibility of connecting them with any of the three points of time*—Sū. 8, *i. e.*, the impossibility of their making things known at any point of time] is open to the fallacy of being *asiḍḍha*,' 'unknown,' 'not admitted by all parties.'

* साधनं प्राहुः, the reading of all Mss. save one, gives better sense than साधनमाहुः

Further, the Pūrvapakṣin has stated his proposition in the form—'Perception and the rest are not instruments of Cognitions'; and this statement involves a contradiction in its own terms; as the proposition can only mean that 'Perception and the rest do not indicate the existence of their objects'; and this involves a self-contradiction * (self-stultification) on the part of the *Pūrvapakṣin*. How? Well, to call them 'Perception and the rest' and then to say that 'they do not indicate the existence of things,' certainly involves a self-contradiction; just as when one makes the assertion 'this thing is not known,' to call it 'this thing' and then to say 'it is not known' involves a self-contradiction; † in the same manner there is self-contradiction when you call them 'perception, &c.,' and then assert that 'they do not indicate the existence of things;' how else (*i. e.*, if they do not indicate the existence of things) can they be called 'Perception, &c.'? Certainly the names 'Perception' &c. are meaningless unless there is an indication of the existence of things.

Then again [what the *Pūrvapakṣin* does is to deny a certain character, that of *being Pramāṇa*, in regard to Perception &c.? and] when you deny a certain character to Perception, &c., it means that these 'Perception &c.' themselves you admit; that is to say, when you say that 'Percep-

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* अयं च व्याहत: as found in Bib. Iud. edition is the correct reading; not अर्थं च व्याघात: as in the Benares edition.

† The 'self-contradiction' meant by the *Vārṭika* is that between calling them 'Perception and other Pramāṇas' and saying that they do not indicate the existence of things.' The *Ṭāṭparya* explains the '*vyāghāṭa*' differently :—The Pūrvapakṣin apparently puts forward an inference to prove his proposition that Perception, &c., cannot be regarded as Pramāṇa; in putting forward this inference, he *ipso facto* admits the fact of inference being a Pramāṇa; and this is certainly not in keeping with the proposition he sets himself to prove. An inference can prove a conclusion only after it has itself acquired the position of a Pramāṇa. The proposition makes this impossible;—how then can an inference, under such circumstances, prove anything. This is how the *Pūrvapakṣin* has stultified himself. This also comes in the Vārṭika later on, top of P. 190. This is the *Vyāghāṭa* deduced by the *Bhāṣyachandra* also.

tion and the rest are not possessed of the character of Pramāṇa,' you do not deny the 'Perception, &c.' themselves; what you deny is only their particular character, that of *being Pramāṇa.* *

"But inasmuch as an abstract quality can never subsist by itself, Perception, &c., themselves are denied; that is te say, when we say 'Perception and the rest are not possessed of the character of Pramāṇa,' the 'character of Pramāṇa,' is an abstract quality; and being an abstract quality, when it is denied, this denial implies also the denial of the things possessing that quality."

Vār P. 190.

Even so, the 'self-contradiction' does not cease: You have got to prove the non-existence of Perception, &c.,—the meaning of your proposition being that 'Perception &c. do not exist'; now by what are you going to prove this? If Perception and the rest do not exist, there is nothing else that can prove the said non-existence. [It is only by means of Pramāṇa that anything can be proved; if there are no Pramāṇas nothing can be proved].

Further, your denial of some particular *Pramāṇas* would imply that you admit other Pramanas; when you say that 'the character of *Pramāṇa* cannot belong *to Perception and the rest*', it is clear that you admit Pramāṇas other than Perception and the rest; if this is not what you mean, then the specification by name,—'the character of Pramāṇa does not belong *to Perception and the rest*'—becomes entirely meaningless; if you do not admit of Pramāṇas other than 'Perception and the rest', then what is the meaning of the specification ('to Perception and the rest') that you have in your assertion—'the character of Pramāṇa does not

* For instance, when you say 'this boy is without the waterpot,' you simply deny his possessing the waterpot, and you admit the existence of the Boy himself. So that from the form in which the Pūrvapakṣin states his proposition, it would seem that he does not absolutely deny the existence of Perception and the other Pramāṇas.

belong *to Perception and the rest*'? If (with a view to escape from this predicament) you were to make your assertion in the general form -' there are no Pramaṇas',—then this would involve another self-contradiction: you assert that 'there are no Pramāṇas' and yet you are propounding explanations and arguments!*

[If then the Pūrvapakṣin were to say—'Yes, we do admit of Pramāṇas other than 'Perception and the rest,' what harm is there in that?—our answer would be]—That other Pramaṇa, which you admit, will also be open to the charge of not being 'connected with the three points of time'; so that the objection that you have urged (in Su. 8) against 'Perception and the rest' would apply to that other Pramāṇa also; for that which does not make things known at any of the three points of time,—how can that be called a *Pramāṇa*? This objection will apply with equal force to your Pramāṇa also.

If next you admit that what you are denying is only the *character* (of 'being Pramaṇa') [and not the very existence of 'Perception and the rest'] this would mean that you admit the existence of 'Perception and the rest' as apart from their character *of being Pramāṇa*,—just as when one denies the presence of the 'King's man', he may admit the presence of the *man*, apart from the character of *belonging to the King*;—and in that case, when you will be asked to describe the character of these, 'Perception and the rest', you will tumble on the same objections and the same 'self-contradictions'. On the other hand, if you do not admit of 'Perception and the rest' as distinct from the 'character of being Pramaṇa', it behoves you to explain the precise signification of the Genitive ending (in '*pratyakṣādīnām*') and, that of the nominal affix (in '*prāmāṇyam*'); that is to say,

* Explanations and arguments are intended to make things known; and this is exactly the function of 'Pramāṇas.

if the 'character of being Pramāṇa' is not something different from 'Perception and the rest,' then what is the sense of the Genitive in '*pratyakṣādīnām*'? It has, in fact, to be admitted that when you make the assertion '*pratyakṣādīnām prāmāṇyam nāsti*' (with the word '*pratyakṣādīnām* with the Genitive ending), whether you take it as a denial ('the character of *being Pramāṇa* does not belong to Perception and the rest'), or as an affirmation (the character of *not being Pramāṇa* belongs to Perception and the rest),—in either case what is denied or affirmed must be a *character* (and not the things themselves; or else the Genitive ending would be meaningless); and if this is admitted, then it becomes necessary to describe the form of 'Perception and the rest' as apart from their 'being Pramāṇa'; and as soon as you proceed to describe it, you render yourself open to the very same objections (that you have urged against us). Exactly the same holds good regarding the use of the Nominal affix (in '*Prāmāṇyam*').

Further, the *Pūrvapakṣin* has (in Sū. 8) put forward (as his reason) *the impossibility of connecting them with any of the three points of time*; and this is not co-substrate (with the Subject of his Proposition); as (by the said expression) the said *impossibility* subsists in the term '*traikālyāsiddhēḥ*', the *asiddhi*, 'impossibility', apparently belongs to '*traikālya*,'—and *not* to the *Pramāṇas* [which form the *subject* of the Proposition, and as such should possess what is put forward as the Probans or reason for proving something with regard to them]. If (with a view to escape from this difficulty) it be explained that—"What is meant by the term *traikālyāsiddhēḥ* is that the Pramāṇas do not serve their purpose at any of the three points of time"*,——then the Probans becomes entirely superfluous, being already implied by the Proposition itself: the meaning of your proposition also is only this that 'the

* This is precisely the interpretation that the *Vārṭika* itself has put upon the Pūrvapakṣa argument embodied in Sū. 8.

so-called Pramāṇas do not serve their purpose',—and this is exactly the same as that 'the Pramāṇas do not serve their purpose at any of the three points of time' (which, according to your second explanation is what is meant by your *Probans*, '*ṭraikālyasiḍḍhēḥ*'). Vār. P. 191.

[The *Vārṭika* now proceeds to explain the passages of the *Bhāṣya*]—It has been declared (Bhā. p. 66, l. 6) that—*It is only when apprehended by means of Pramāṇa that it is known as* '*Pramēya*'; the meaning of this is that the denial put forward by the Pūrvapakṣin cannot stand, as the name pertains to all three points of time; that is to say, the circumstances that form the basis of the names 'Pramāṇa' and 'Pramēya' are such as pertain to all three points of time'—'Pramāṇa' being the name of that by which a thing *will be* known, or *is* known, or *has been* known, and 'Pramēya' being the name of the thing that *will be* known, or *is* known or *has been* known. It is only when such is admitted to be the case that an object can be spoken of as a 'Pramēya,' 'object of cognition,' even when we have such conceptions as —'this thing will be known,' 'the apprehension of this thing will be brought about by the right causes',*; on the other hand, if such is not admitted to be the case, the said usage would be absolutely impossible; so that the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is found to be open to the objection of being contrary to usage. Specially as for one who does not admit the possibility of such names as 'Pramāṇa' and 'Pramēya' pertaining to all three points of time, such ordinary expressions as 'bring the *cook*, he *will* do the cooking' would be entirely incongruous (as explained in Bhā. P. 66, l. 13).

Further,—says the *Bhāṣya* (P. 66, l. 15)—*the assertion that* '*Perception and the rest cannot be regarded as Instruments of cognition on account of the impossibility of connecting them*

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* The Benares edition reads हेतुपपत्ते: But the *Bib. Ind.* reading is more in keeping with the words of the *Bhāṣya*, P. 66, l. 11.

with any of the three points of time' apparently denies all Pramāṇa entirely;—and what is meant to be accomplished by this denial, in regard to Perception and the rest? Is it meant to set aside their possibility? or to make known their impossibility? "What do you mean?" What we mean is that, if it is meant to set aside the possibility (of Perception and the rest), this is not right; because in the first place such denial would involve a self-contradiction, (as shown in the *Bhāṣya*), and secondly because this explanation would show that you do not understand the exact meaning of a denial: When you say that 'it sets aside the possibility of the Pramāṇas', you admit the existence of the Pramāṇas; as there can be no *setting aside* of what is an absolute non-entity *; and certainly *Denial* can have no power to make *what exists* an *absolute non-entity*. In fact what a denial does is to make known a certain fact, and not to set aside possibilities; so that what this particular denial also can do is only to make known a certain fact, and it cannot be taken as setting aside the possibility (of Pramāṇas). And, in that case, if the Denial *makes known* the impossibility (of Pramāṇas), then it itself becomes endowed with the character of a 'Pramāṇa.'

Sūtra (12).

THERE CAN BE NO DENIAL, AS IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO CONNECT IT WITH ANY OF THE THREE POINTS OF TIME. (Sū. 12).

Bhāṣya.

[P. 66, L. 21 to P. 67, L. 2].

[The Opponent having asked—"What is the harm if the Denial becomes endowed with the character of Pramāṇa?"—the answer is given by the Sūṭra]—The detailed explanation here is the same (as in the Pūrvapakṣa-Sūṭra 8) [*i. e.*, inasmuch as the Denial has become a Pramāṇa it becomes open

* The Benares edition and the *Ṭāṭparya* both read [illegible]...असतो निवृत्तिरर्थेति

to the arguments that the Pūrvapakṣin has urged against the possibility of Pramāṇas; so that] if the *Denial* [which *ex-hypothesi* is only an instrument of right negative cognition] exists before the thing *Denied*, then, what would be there that would be denied, while the thing denied [*i. e.*, the object of the negative cognition] is not in existence? On the other hand, if the Denial came after the thing *Denied*, then while the Denial is not in existence, the thing could not be 'denied'. Lastly if both the *Denial* and the *Denied* came into existence simultaneously, then as the thing will have been

Bhā. P. 67. already recognised as 'denied', the Denial would be absolutely futile.

Thus then, the assertion (of the Pūrvapakṣin) embodying, as it does, a *Denial*, being (as just shown) found to be impossible,—it becomes established that Perception and the rest are genuine *Pramāṇas.*

Vārṭika on Sū. (12).

[P. 191, L. 16 to P. 193, L. 14].

Such being the case (*i. e.* Denial becoming a Pramāṇa),—'*There can be no denial*' *&c.*—says the Sūṭra. The meaning of the Sūṭra is that the Denial (embodied in the *Pūrvapakṣa*) is not possible, in connection with all three points of time; so that the putting forward of the Denial by the Pūrvapakṣin involves a self-contradiction; as it has been admitted that the Denial—' Pramāṇas do not serve their purpose'—has the character of Pramāṇa [and the possibility of Pramāṇas having been denied, the putting forward of what is acknowledged to be a 'Pramāṇa' involves a clear self-contradiction].

Objection:—" By urging that 'Denial is not possible, as it cannot be connected with any of the three points of time,' you admit (the force of our argument and contention) that 'as they cannot be connected with any of the three points of time, Perception and the rest cannot be regarded as Pramāṇa ".

This does not affect our position, we reply; as all that we mean by urging this argument is to show that your view involves a self-contradiction on your part; what we are urging is that you are open to the charge that the reasoning

that you have put forward goes directly against your own view; and we do not admit the validity of that reasoning. "What do you mean?" What we mean is this:—When you assert that 'what cannot serve its purpose at any of the three points of time cannot be regarded as a cause',—by this your own assertion you admit that this Denial (that you are making) cannot be a cause (of any cognition). And thus you come to be in the position of a man who wishes to burn other persons by the fire in his own fingers,—he may or may not succeed in burning others, but he surely burns his own finger!

Vār. P. 192.

Further, the Denial that you make,—in the form 'Perception and the rest do not accomplish their purpose'—is this a denial of the *efficiency* of Perception and the rest? or a denial of their very *existence*? If it is a denial of their efficiency, then this would mean that Perception and the rest are not denied; inasmuch as you deny their efficiency, you have to explain what 'Perception and the rest' are; so that you become open to the same objections. If, on the other hand, your denial is of the very existence of Perception and the rest, then please explain what you mean by saying that 'Perception and the rest *do not exist*'. Do you mean the non-existence of Pramāṇas in general? or that of the particular Pramāṇas (mentioned)? If the former, then the mention of 'Perception and the rest' is entirely superfluous; your assertion should be in the form 'Pramāṇas do not exist'; and in that case, as you would have no *Pramāṇas*, there could be no reasoning in support of such denial.* If, on the other hand, the denial is of the particular Pramāṇas (and not of all Pramāṇas in general),—then this

* Your denial is in the form 'Pramāṇas do not exist'; every reasoning that you would urge would itself be a *Pramāṇa*; and the very existence of Pramāṇas having been denied, the reasoning would have its ground entirely cut off; as it will not be a 'Pramāṇa' it cannot prove your contention.

would imply that you admit of Pramāṇas other than those mentioned; for unless the existence of Pramāṇa in general is admitted, there can be no room for the denial of a few particular Pramāṇas.

Then again, there are two assertions—(1) 'Perception and the rest *cannot* be regarded as Pramāṇas because they *cannot* be connected with any of the three points of time,' and (2) 'Perception and the rest *should* be regarded as Pramāṇas, because they *are* connected with the three points of time';—now, do these two assertions mean the same thing or not? If they mean the same thing, then the form in which the assertion should be made would be the latter—that 'Perception and the rest should be regarded as Pramāṇas, because they are connected with the three points of time' [as this assertion, being without the two negative particles present in the other assertion in the words '*apramāṇyan*' and '*asiddhēḥ*,' would be so mnch simpler and briefer]. Further, by what means do you know that the two assertions mean the same thing? If you know this by means of an *Instrument of Cognition* (Pramāṇa), then your self-stultification does not cease; and if you know it by some other means, then that 'other means' also would be an *Instrument of Cognition*; and it would be a mere difference in name [when you call them *not-Pramāṇa*]. If, on the other hand, the two assertions have different meanings, then also, we ask—By what means do you know that the two terms—'because they cannot be connected with any of the three points of time' and 'because they can be connected with the three points of time'—have different meanings? [Any answer to this question involving, as before, either 'self-stultification' or the admission of 'Pramāṇa' under a different name].

Further, when you make the statement—"Perception and the rest do not exist,"—the term 'Perception and the rest,' co-ordinated as it is with the term 'do not exist,' cannot denote the absolute non-existence of Perception and the other

Pramāṇas; as a matter of fact, when the word 'jar,' is co-ordinated with the term 'does not exist' (when we say 'the jar does not exist'), it does not denote the absolute non-existence of the jar; all that it does is to deny, either the connection of the jar with a particular place, the room for instance, or its connection with a particular point of time, or the efficiency of the jar;—and analogously in the case in question also, when the term 'does not exist' is used in co-ordination with the term '*Pramāṇa*,' it cannot denote the absolute non-existence of the Pramāṇas; all that it can denote is the denial, either of such Pramāṇas as are postulated by other philosophers, or of the efficiency of the Pramāṇas, or of the existence of the Pramāṇas at a particular time;—in either case the existence of the Pramāṇas themselves would be admitted; so that being thus admitted, if it were to be held to be the subject of the denial in question, this would be a clear case of self-contradiction.

Vār P. 193.

Further, when you are propounding the non-existence of Pramāṇas, how and to whom are you propounding it? Who, too, is the propounder? "We are propounding it to one who does not know it; and the propounder is one who knows it." But how does he know it? If he knows it by means of an Instrument of Cognition, then there is self-contradiction, as *Pramāṇa* is not admitted. It he knows it by some other means, then the difficulty is that you can have no instance (to show by what other means the fact is known) [for an instance, unless it is cognised by means of a valid Pramāṇa, is absolutely futile]. There is a further self-contradiction involved in the admission of difference between the propounder and the person for whom the propounding is done: If you know that the propounder is different from the person for whom the propounding is done, you admit the existence of the Pramāṇa whereby you know that difference; and this involves 'self-contradiction' on your part. If, on the other hand, you

do not know the difference between the two persons, there is this self-contradiction or absurdity that you cannot explain *how* and *to whom* the propounding is done.

Lastly, when the Pūrvapakṣin lays down the proposition that 'Pramāṇas do not exist,' he should be met with the question—'how do you know that they do not exist'? In answer to this, if he puts forward proofs (*Pramāṇas*), he stultifies himself; and if he does not put forward proofs, he cannot accomplish his purpose.

Thus we find that the more we examine the statement of the Pūrvapakṣin, the more do we find it crumbling away.

Sūṭra (13).

BECAUSE ALL PRAMĀṆAS HAVE BEEN DENIED, THE DENIAL ITSELF CANNOT BE ESTABLISHED.* (Sū. 13).

Bhāṣya.

[P. 67, L. 4 to L. 10].

"Why (can the Denial not be established)?"†—asks the *Pūrvapakṣin*. [For the following reason, we reply]—You have put forward (in Sū. 8) as your reason, 'because it cannot be connected with any of the three points of time'; now if in support of this reason you can cite an Instance, then it behoves you to show (on the strength of perceptional or other valid cognition) that what you have put forward as your Reason (i.e. your Minor Pemiss) does hold true in the case that you cite as the corroborative Instance; and if you do this, you cannot deny the character of Pramāṇa (Proof) in regard to all Perception and the rest [as at bast one such Perception you will have employed to prove the truth of your Reason]. And if Perception and the rest were absolutely no proof, then what you would cite as an Instance would also not *prove* anything [as that also would only be a perceptional or other valid cognition]; so that your reason, in that case,

* Later Commentators—for instance the *Vṛiṭṭi* of Vishvanāṭha and the *Nyāya-suṭravivaraṇa*—do not have this as a *Sūṭra*. The *Nyāyasūchinibandha* however cites it as a *Sūṭra* and so also the *Bhāṣyachandra*, which remarks that this Sūṭra puts forward another 'self-contradiction' involved in the Pūrvapakṣa stand-point.

† According to the *Bhāṣyachandra* this '*Kaṭham*' is an attack on the opponent:—'How can you reasonably deny all Pramāṇas?'.

would be nullified by all Pramāṇas. and, as such, cease to be a proper Reason; in fact, such a Reason would be a "contradictory Reason";—that having been defined as the 'contradictory Reason or Probans' 'which contradicts a certain doctrine that has been previously admitted' (Sū. 1. 2. 6); and what is put forward by the opponent in the assertion made by him constitutes his 'doctrine'; and this assertion is that 'Perception and the rest do not prove the existence of anything,'; and yet the several reasoning factors [the Premisses &c., which represent Pramāṇas] have been put forward (in the reasoning urged in Sū. 8) with a view to prove (i.e *make known* to others) your own conclusions.*

If, on the other hand, the Instance (corroborative of the Reason put forward in support of the Denial of Pramāṇas) is not cited (as representing a *valid cognition, pramāṇa*) then you are faced by the difficulty that until you have shown the truth of your Reason, or Minor Premiss, in a certain well-known Instance, your assertion cannot prove your conclusion for you; so that the Denial of the Pramāṇas cannot be established, for the simple reason that the reason or premiss put forward does not possess the character of a really valid 'Reason'.

Vārṭika on Sū. (13).

[P. 193, L. 16, to P. 194, L. 6]

Because all Pramāṇas have been denied &c.—says the Sūtra. What we ask you is—Do you, or do you not, cite an Instance in corroboration of your Reason, 'because they cannot be connected with any of the three points of time'? If you do cite it, then you stultify yourself: inasmuch as

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* The statement of the Probans, which is the principal reasoning-factor, embodies facts ordinarily perceived—*e. g.* 'because Perception, &c., cannot be connected with any point of time' represents a number of facts perceived in ordinary experience. Now the proposition is that Perception, &c., do not prove anything; and yet the said Perception—that Perception, &c. cannot be connected with any point of time—has been urged with a view to prove the conclusion. Thus the Reason, as put forward, is entirely of contravention of the Proposition.

The *Vārṭika* in quoting this passage has प्रमाणभागात् for अवयवभागात् and the *Ṭātparya* explains प्रमाणभागात् as referring to the *Avayavas*. The *Bhāṣyachandra* reads

you admit the view that Perception and the rest cannot have the character of Proof (for you); what you cite as the instance also cannot prove anything; and as such it would be entirely futile. If, on the other hand, it does prove something, then that is a clear contradiction of what you have asserted before. If then, you do not cite the Instance,—this would mean that it is nowhere shown that what is put forward as the Reason is ever really effective in proving anything; and as a matter of fact, until its effectiveness has been shown in a well-known Instance, the Reason cannot prove anything;—so that, in this case, your Reason would be *nullified by all Pramāṇas'*, and* as such become 'annulled'.

The *Bhāṣya* (p. 67, l. 7) says—*Further such a Reason would also be 'contradictory,'* etc., etc. What is meant is that when you assert the reasoning—'Perception and the rest cannot have the character of Pramāṇa, because they cannot be connected with any of the three points of time'—you put forward certain reasoning-factors, embodying facts known by means of one or the other of the Pramāṇas, with a view to *prove* your proposition [and yet your Proposition is that no Pramāṇa can prove anything]. Then again, when you consciously pronounce a sentence, you have recourse to so many factors—*wish to speak, effort, emitting of wind, striking of the palate, &c., motion of the lips* and so forth; similarly when performing the act of walking, you avoid obstacles in the shape of pillars, thorns, snakes and so forth;—now, (everyone of the said factors representing a fact known by means of a Pramāṇa), the said uttering of the sentence as well as the walking would be absolutely impossible, if there were no Pramāṇas at all.

* Not being supported by any of those Pramāṇas that are embodied in the citing of the Instance and other reasoning-factors, it could be said to be 'annulled'—*Ṭāṭparya*. It is according to this explanation that '*viruddha*' has been translated as 'annulled'; the Reason, as described here, does not fulfil the conditions of the 'contradictory' Reason.

Sūṭra (14).

IF THE CHARACTER OF PRAMĀṆA IN THE CASE OF THE REASONING-FACTORS IS ADMITTED,—THEN YOUR DENIAL BECOMES RESTRICTED TO ONLY A FEW FROM AMONG ALL PRAMĀṆAS, [WHICH WOULD NOT BE RIGHT]* (Sū. 14).

Bhāṣya.

[P. 67, L. 12 to P. 68, L. 2].

If you admit that the 'character of Pramāṇa' really belongs† to these *Perception and the rest* that are embodied in the reasoning-factors or premises involved in your negative argument (against Pramāṇas, in Sū. 8),—then you will have to accept the 'character of Pramāṇa' also in those *Perception and the rest* that would be embodied in the reasoning-factors that might be urged (against you) by your Opponent; as there would be no difference between the two sets of 'premises'. And this would mean that you do not deny all Pramāṇas (but only some of them; for which restricted denial there can be no justification). In the term '*vipraṭiṣēḍha*' (in the Sūṭra) the prefix '*vi*' signifies *affirmation* ('*vipraṭiṣēḍha*' meaning *vishēṣēṇa praṭiṣēḍha*, denial by selection) and not *negation* (*vipratiṣēḍha*' in that case being construed as *vigaṭaḥ pratiṣēḍhaḥ negatived denial*);‡ as there can be no sense in such an expression. §

Bhāṣya P. 68.

Vārṭika on Sū. 14.

[P. 194, L. 8 to L. 17.]

If the character of Pramāṇa &c.—says the *Sūṭra*. Your position appears to be that you deny the character of

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* It appears simpler to the interpret the Sūṭra as—'the Denial does not apply to all Pramāṇas'. But the *Bhāṣya* has made capital out of the prefix वि in विप्रतिषेध; in view of which the transaction has had to be put in a roundabout fashion; though the sense remains the same.

† The reading of the printed edition भावप्रामाण्ये is wrong. Both Puri Mss. read भावे प्रामाण्ये, which is the right reading.

‡ If वि signified denial, then विप्रतिषेध: would mean 'denial of the denial', Denial being the Object of Denial; and this would be absurd as coming from the Purvapakṣin. For purposes of *denial*, one always uses the term 'na'—says the *Bhāṣyachanḍra*.

§ For in that case the expression in the Sūṭra—'*na vipraṭiṣēḍha*' would mean that 'the denial is *not negatived*,' which would be the reverse of what is intended by the Siḍḍhānṭin *Bhāṣyachanḍra*.

'Pramāṇa' to Pramāṇas other than those that are involved in your own assertion;—if that is so, then *all* Pramāṇas are not denied. But (you should bear in mind) that the same reasons that you have for admitting the character of Pramāṇa in the case of the Pramaṇas involved in your own assertion, are also available in the case of those involved in the assertion of your Opponent.

In the term *vipraṭiṣēḍha* the prefix *vi* indicates that the *praṭiṣeḍha*, denial, is *vishēṣēṇa*, by selection, and it does not signify the *denial* of the *praṭiṣēḍha*. "What is meant by this?" The meaning is that it comes to this that some Pramāṇas are denied and some are admitted,—you admit those that are involved in the assertion of your Opponent.

Lastly, the assertion that you have made (in Sū. 8) 'the character of Pramāṇa connected with any of the three points of time',—has this assertion the 'character of Pramāṇa' or not? If it has, then, there is self-contradiction on your part; if it has not, then it cannot prove anything at all; and hence becomes futile and meaningless.*

Sūṭra (15).

THERE SHOULD BE NO DENIAL (OF PRAMĀṆAS AND PRAMEYAS) IN REGARD TO ALL THREE POINTS OF TIME†; AS THEIR EXISTENCE (AS CAUSE AND EFFECT) IS PROVED IN THE SAME MANNER AS THAT OF THE MUSICAL INSTRUMENT IS PROVED BY ITS SOUND.‡—SŪ. (15).

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* The *Ṭaṭparya* remarks that hitherto the *Siḍḍhānti* has been criticising the *Pūrvapakṣa*-argument in its details; in this last sentence, it takes the argument as a whole.

† That is, it is quite possible for Pramāna and Pramēya to be related to each other as 'cause and effect' and also as 'means of Cognition' and 'object of cognition'—*Bhāṣyachanḍra*.

‡ The word त्रैकाल्याप्रतिषेधश्च is wanting in the text of the Sūṭra as found in the शुद्धपाठ attached to Puri MS. B. It reads the Sūṭra simply as शब्दादातोद्यवत्सिद्धेः; the *Bhāṣyachanḍra* reads the Sūṭra as in the printed text.

Bhāṣya.

[P. 68, L. 4 to L. 15].

[An objection is raised at the very outset]—"Why should this be repeated (in the *Sūṭra*, when it has already been stated before, in the *Bhāṣya*, p. 65, l. 12)?".*

The answer is that this serves to confirm what has been said before. That is to say, we have stated above (Bhā. P. 65, l. 12) that—'*between the cause of apprehension and the object of apprehension there is no restriction as to the former coming into existence either before or after or simultaneously with the latter, and we take each case on its own merits just as we find it, and assert accordingly*';—and the present Sūṭra serves to show that this assertion of ours had its source in this Sūṭra. [By the presence of the Sūṭra] it is made clear that the Sage (Gauṭama) himself does not admit of any restriction (as to priority &c. between the *Pramāṇa* and its *Pramēya*), and hence firmly rejects the opponent's denial—by asserting that 'the denial in regard to all three points of time is not right.'

Out of the three possibilities (of priority, posteriority and simultaneity), our Author cites the example of one—*In the*

* From what we read here, there appears to be a confusion in regard to the exact position of the Sūṭra and portions of the *Bhāṣya*. It has been remarked by several writers that the *Bhāṣya* contains certain passages, which form part of an older *Vṛiṭṭi* on the Sūṭras. The editor of the Vizianagram series has made an attempt to indicate some of these passages by printing them in thicker type. The wider aspect of this question we shall deal with in the Introduction. But in connection with the present passage, the following appears to be noteworthy.—The objector asks why this Sūṭra should be here, when what is herein said has already been said before (in Bhā. P. 65 l. 12, these lines appearing in thicker type). This question would imply that the two assertions—Sū. 15, and the Bhāṣya-passage on P. 65, l. 12,—stood on the same level, being the work of the same writer; this also would appear to be the implication of what follows in the *Bhāṣya* on the present Sūṭra (P. 68, l. 14). But the answer that the *Bhāṣya* gives to the objector's question is that the former statement (of P. 65), has its source or authority in the present Sūṭra—that is why the fact previously asserted is asserted again. Now what does this mean? It apparently means that the present declaration is a 'Sūṭra,' and the former declararion was 'Bhāṣya' which derived its authority from this Sūṭra. This is clearly stated in the *Bhāṣyachandra*, which says—'The Bhāṣya has already shown that there is no restriction as to precedence, sequence or simultaneity among Pramāṇas: and the *Sūṭra* now proceeds to show me of these three methods.' The whole question is extremely interesting and we shall wait and see to the end of the work, without adopting in favour of one view or the other. For purposes of our translation, we shall accept the text of the *Sūṭras* as fixed for us by Vāchastaṭi Mishra in his न्यायसूचीनिबन्ध.

same manner as that of the musical instrument is proved by its sound. In the case cited we find that *by means of* the Sound, which comes into existence after the musical instrument, we infer the existence of the musical instrument, which has been in existence prior to the Sound; and here the musical instrument is what is *to be made known*, and the Sound is the *means* by which it is made known [and here the *Pramāṇa*, is posterior to the *Pramēya*];—this refers to a case where the musical instrument being hidden from view, its presence is inferred, and the inference is that 'the lute is being played,' or 'the flute is being blown',—the particular instrument being inferred by the peculiarity of the Sound. Thus then, here we have a case where we apprehend the 'object of cognition' (the musical instrument) which has a prior existence, by means of the 'means of cognition' (Sound) which comes into existence after the former.

The Sūṭra has cited this one instance (of the posteriority of Pramāṇa) by way of illustration; as examples of the other two ways (priority and simultaneity of Pramāṇa and Pramēya), we may take those that have already been cited above (P. 65).

"Why are not those examples cited here (rather than there?".

We are only explaining here what has already been stated before (on P. 65). All that we have got to do is to state the facts; it does not make any difference whether it is stated here or on the previous occasion.

Vārṭika on Sū. 15.

[P. 194, L. 20 to P. 195, L. 11.]

There should be no denial &c.—says the Sūṭra; and on this the *Bhāṣya* says that this is meant to indicate the source (or authority) for what has been asserted in the *Bhāṣya* (on P. 65, L. 12).

"Why then was this *Sūṭra* read there?"

It makes no difference, whether the fact is stated here or there; all that is necessary is that the fact should be stated.

One of the methods (of the existence of Pramāṇa) is illustrated—*Just as the existence of the musical instrument is proved by its sound*;—of the other two methods the examples

are to be taken as already cited. Just as the previously existing musical instrument is inferred by means of the subsequently appearing Sound,—as when we infer that 'what is being played upon is the lute', 'what is being blown is the flute'; in this case what we perceive is that peculiar character of the sound of the lute and that of the flute, which marks them out as issuing from the lute or from the flute; and when we have perceived that character we cognise the fact that 'this is the sound of the lute', 'this is the sound of the flute';—and here the musical instrument is something that has an existence prior to that of the sound, which comes only subsequently. An example of simultaneity we have in the case where the perception of smoke gives rise to the cognition of the fire as qualified by that smoke. A example of the priority of the Pramāṇa we have in the case where the previously existing Sun renders visible the subsequently appearing things.

Bhāṣya Introductory to Sū. 15

[P. 68, L. 15 to L. 18.]

The names '*Pramāṇa*' and '*Pramēya*' are applied according to circumstances; such application depending upon certain causes that go to determine the name; such cause or circumstance, in the case in question, consists in the fact that (a) that which is the *means* of bringing about an apprehension is called '*Pramāṇa*', (b) 'that which is the object apprehended is called '*Pramēya*', and (c) 'when that which, though itself an *apprehended object*, happens to be the *means* of the apprehension of something else, then that same thing may be called '*Pramāṇa*' as well as '*Pramēya*.' This is the fact brought out in the following *Sūṭra*.

Vārṭika Introductory to Sū. 16.

[P. 195, L. 11 to L. 17.]

The names 'Pramāṇa' and 'Pramēya' are applied &c.—says the *Bhāṣya*. By 'Samāvēsha' here is meant *application*. *The application of these names *is dependent upon such causes.*

* The Benares edition reads अनियत: This is wrong; specially in view of what follows on P. 196, L. 4.

as determine the name; and the cause that determines the application of the names '*Pramāṇa*' and '*Pramēya*' consists respectively in 'being the means of apprehension' and 'being the object of apprehension'. "But how is it when one and the same thing happens to fulfil both these conditions?" Well, in that case also,—inasmuch the application of the names depends upon the circumstances mentioned,—as both circumstances would be present, the same thing would be called by both names. In order to bring out this fact we have the next Sūṭra.

Sūṭra (16).

THE WEIGHING BALANCE, WHICH IS A PRAMĀṆA, [THE MEANS OF ASCERTAINING THE WEIGHT OF THINGS], IS PRAMEYA ALSO, [AS REGARDS ITS OWN ACCURACY]† (Sū. 16.)

Bhāṣya on Sū 16.
[P. 68, L. 20 to P. 70, L. 6.]

The weighing balance is called '*Pramāṇa*' when it is the *means* of bringing about the cognition of the exact weight (of the thing weighed),—in which case the object of cognition is the weighty substance, gold and the like (which is weighed), which therefore is called '*Pramēya*';—but when the gold thus weighed is made the means of testing (ascertaining the accuracy of) another balance, then in the cognition (of the accuracy) of this other balance, it Bhā. P. 69. becomes the '*Pramāṇa*', and the other balance becomes the '*Pramēya*'.‡

* All the Mss. of the *Bhāṣya*, except one read प्रमेया; so do also the *Tāṭparya* the न्यायसूचीनिबन्ध, and the *Bhāṣyachanḍra*. But some Mss. of the *Vārṭika* and all the later commentators read प्रमेयता. With the latter reading the Sūṭra means that the character of प्रमेयता also belongs to Pramāṇas, as we find in the case of a particular Pramāṇa, the Balance. प्रमेयता च भवति, यथा तुलाख्ये प्रमाणे दृश्यते; in this case तुलाप्रामाण्यवत् is a compound word. With the reading प्रमेया the construction is तुला प्रामाण्यवत् प्रमेया च भवति, यथा द्रव्यं प्रमाणं भवति तथा प्रमेया ऽपि; in this case तुला and प्रामाण्यवत् are not taken as a compound. The purport of the Sūṭra is the same in both cases.

† When we are weighing gold, the Balance is a pure '*Pramāṇa*', being the *means* whereby we know the weight of the gold. But when doubts arise as to the accuracy of a balance, then what is done is that a piece of gold, whose weight has

What we have just said (in regard to the application of the names '*Pramāṇa*' and '*Pramēya*' depending on circumstances) applies to all topics of the *Shāstra*.* For instance, the *Soul* has been prominently mentioned among '*Pramēyas*', because it is an object of cognition; but it is '*Pramāṭṛi*', 'Cogniser', also, inasmuch as (in regard to the action of *cognising*) it is the independent agent;—similarly *Buḍḍhi*, 'Apprehension', (of Invariable concomitance, for instance) is '*Pramāṇa*', inasmuch as it is the means of cognising things; and yet it becomes '*Pramēya*', when it is itself *cognised*; and it comes to be called mere '*Pramiṭi*', 'apprehension', when it is neither the *means* nor the *object* of any cognition. Similarly, the conditions governing the application of the names in question may be applied to other particular topics (of Doubt &c.) also.

As a matter of fact the names of the several case-relations or active agencies (*Kārakas*) are applied (promiscuously) through varying causes (depending on the character of the things concerned). For instance, when we say 'the tree stands', † ('*vṛikṣaḥ ṭiṣṭhaṭi*'), the *tree*, (*vṛikṣa*) is called the 'nominative', because in regard to its own action of *standing*, it is 'independent' [thus fulfilling the condition of Pāṇini's definition of the Nominative as that which is *svaṭanṭra*, 'independent agent'];—when we say 'he sees the tree' ('*vṛikṣam pashyaṭi*'), the same tree comes to be called the 'objective', because it is that which is 'most desired' to be got at by the action of 'seeing' [thus fulfilling the condition of Pāṇini's definition of the Objective as that which is 'the most desired to be got at by the Agent];—when we say 'he indicates the Moon by (*i.e.* with the help of, *through*) the tree', the same tree is called an 'Instrument', because it is the 'principal means of accomplishment' employed by the person doing the indicating ‡ [and thus fulfills the condition of

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been already ascertained by means of a reliable balance, is weighed again in the balance of doubtful accuracy; and if the weights tally, the balance is proved accurate'; so that in regard to its accuracy, the balance becomes an 'object of cognition', 'Pramēya', the resultant cognition in this case being in the form, 'this balance is accurate'.

* 'In this passage the Author reminds us of what he has already said in the *Bhāṣya* or Sū. 1-1-1'—says *Bhāṣyachanḍra*.

† The *Bhāṣyachanḍra* takes *ṭiṣṭhati* as 'lives'.

‡ The Puri MSS. read ज्ञापकत्व for साधकत्व; but the latter gives better sense.

Pāṇini's definition as that which is the 'principal means of accomplishment'];—when we say 'he is pouring water for the tree' ('*vṛikṣāya uḍakaṁ āsiñchaṭi*'), the tree is called the 'Dative', as it is that which is 'intended to be benefited' by the water that is poured [thus fulfilling the condition of Pāṇini's definition of the Dative as what is intended to be benefited by the action];—when we say 'the leaf falls from the tree', '(*vṛikṣaṭ parṇaṁ paṭaṭi*'), the tree is the 'Ablative,' as it is 'what remains fixed while there is movement of the other thing',—such being the definition of the Ablative;—lastly when we say 'birds are on the tree' ('*vṛikṣē vayāṁsi sanṭi*'), the tree is the 'Locative,' being the receptacle (of the birds),—and the 'Locative' has been defined as 'receptacle.'

*From all this it is a clear that '*Kāraka*', 'case-relation' (or 'active agency') is a name given, not to the mere *substance* (as held by the *Māḍhyamika*), nor to the mere *action*, but to that which, while being endowed with a particular action of its own, becomes the means of the accomplishment of the other (principal) action; *e.g.* the name 'Nominative' applies, neither to the substance alone, nor to the action alone, but to that which, independently by itself (*i.e.* by its own action), becomes the means of accomplishing the act;—similarly the name 'objective' applies to that which is the most desired to be got at by the action, and not to mere substance or to action; and so with what is the 'principal means of accomplishing', and so on. In these cases we have found that, just as *in point of fact* the names of the active agencies (*Kārakas*) are applied, neither to the mere substance, nor to the mere action, but to that which, being endowed with a particular action of its own, helps in the bringing about of some other action,—so also the same follows from the definitions of the 'active agencies'; and as the words '*Pramāṇa*' and '*Pramēya*' also are expressive of active agency (case-relation; 'Pramaṇa' being the *Instrument* and '*Prameya*' the *object*, of cognition), they cannot renounce what is in the very nature of 'active agencies.'

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* According to the *Bhāṣyachanḍra*, we have a Pūrvapakṣa argument from here down to l. 6 on P. 70; and the Siḍḍhānṭin's answer begins on l. 7, with '*Asṭi bhoḥ*';—and then the *Purvapakṣa*-argument again on p. 70, l. 12, with '*So-yamupalabḍhiḥ &c.*';—while according to the *Vārṭika* and the *Ṭāṭparya*, we have here, in the passage beginning with p. 69, l. 10, to p. 70, l. 6, a statement from the Siḍḍhanṭā stand point, applying the general principle of '*Kārakas*' to the case of 'Pramāṇa and Pramēya';

Vārṭika on Sū. 16.

[P. 195, L. 19 to P. 200, L. 15.]

The weighing balance is Pramēya also &c. &c.—says the Sūṭra. What is meant is that the weighing balance, which is the means of ascertaining the weight of things, comes to be called '*Pramāṇa*', because it is the *means* by which one comes to know the exact measure of the total weight of a substance; and the same balance, when it has its own measure (of accuracy) ascertained by means of the gold (that has been weighed by another balance), becomes the *object* of a cognition, and hence called '*Pramēya*.'

Vār. P. 196.

The case of the balance has been cited only by way of an illustration; the same holds good in regard to all topics of the *Shāsṭra*. That is to say, just as the names 'Pramāṇa' and 'Prameya, so also all the names of 'active agencies' (case-relations, *Kārakas*) are applied according to circumstances. In support of this view, that one and the same thing can (under diverse circumstances) be called by the names of several 'active agencies',—the *Bhāṣya* cites an example from ordinary parlance:—In the assertion 'the tree stands' the tree is called the 'nominative', as it is independent in regard to its own action of *standing*.

"What do you mean by the 'independence' of the *tree* in regard to its own action of *standing*?"

What we mean is that it does not stand in need of any other agency. For instance, in its own *standing* the tree does not require the operation of any other agency (save

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and against this we have the Pūrvapakṣa argument beginning with p. 70, l. 7, and extending right up to Sū. 18. This latter is the more reasonable interpretation of the Bhāṣya as it stands. The *Bhāṣyachanḍra* in introducing the passage on p. 69, l. 10, which it regards as coming from the Pūrvapakṣin, says that the Pūrvapakṣin puts forward his argument under the apprehension that *Action* alone constitutes '*Kāraka*'. But we find the statement asserting distinctly न द्रव्यमात्रं कारकं न क्रियामात्रम्.

itself). Such is the case when the word 'stands' expresses *absence of motion*; when the same word is expressive of mere *existence* ('the tree stands' being used for 'the tree exists'), then also, inasmuch *existence* always implies the manifestation of the thing, the word in question means that 'the tree exists standing', 'it manifests (itself),'—and here also the *tree* is called the 'nominative' agent;—when however the word 'exists' (*i.e.* 'stands') is expressive of *connection with a particular house*,—as when Ḍēvaḍaṭṭa is spoken of as 'being (existing) in the house',—the word denotes neither mere *existence*, nor *absence of motion*, but *connection with the house*; and in this case also, the action being that of *experiencing the connection with the house*,—in which action Ḍēvaḍaṭṭa does not require the operation of any other agency save himself,—he is 'independent'; similarly when the word 'stands' denotes 'unbroken',—'the tree stands' meaning the 'tree is unbroken'—in that case also, the tree, in its own 'standing', does not require the operation of any other agency, and hence is 'independent'. In the case of such *verbs*, even though the thing may require the operation of some other agency, this agency will be in the shape of its own component parts; *e. g.* when we say 'the tree stands by its roots', 'the house stands by the pillars', and so on. 'Standing' may also mean *continuity of existence* (*lit.* being the object of cognitions at two different points of time),—*i.e.* a thing, perceived at some previous time, may be perceived again at a later time by reason of the presence of other causes of its perception,—then it forms the object of more than one perception appearing at different times; and this is what is meant by its 'standing'; (*i.e.* being *recognised* as the same thing); and in this action of *standing*, there is needed the operation of such auxiliary agencies as the Eye and the rest (which perceive the thing at different times, and so forth); and such agency is what is called the 'Instrument'; [and yet in this case also the *tree*

would be the 'nominative', as it is the tree *independently* by itself that sets into operation those auxiliary agencies; it is only when the tree presents itself before the Eye that the Eye recognises it as the same tree that had been seen before].

[The Nihilist starts a discussion on this side-issue of *Recognition* and *Continuity of Existence*]—"All notion of Recognition must be wrong; as we find in the case of the revolution of the wheel and the lamp."* If you mean by this that—"no single thing can form the object of more than one cognition at different points of time",—then we ask, how do you account for the well-known conception 'that same tree is standing'? Certainly the very first sight of a tree cannot give rise to the conception that 'this is that same tree standing'. "But we do find such a conception of *continuity of standing*, even when the two things are entirely different; *e. g.* when we speak of 'the wheel *continuing* to revolve' and 'the lamp *continuing* to burn', where the notion of *continuity* (or identity), appearing as it does with regard to *several non-continuous* revolutions and lamp-flames, must be regarded as *wrong*; as it apprehends a thing as what apparently it is not; and as the notion of identity and continuity is wrong in these cases, so must it also be in the case of the 'standing' of the tree and such other things." This conclusion cannot be accepted; as there are no proofs for it; you do not put forward any proof in support of the view that there is multiplicity in every tree and such other things that we perceive [*i. e.* that every single tree represents a number of momentary trees

Vār. P. 197.

* When a wheel is revolving, all the revolutions are so alike that there is a notion that it is one and the same revolution that is appearing; and this idea of *recognition* is apparantly wrong. Similarly when a lamp is burning there is a quick succession of numerous flames—each of which has but a momentary existence; and yet there is an idea that the *same* flame is continuing; this recognition also is wrong. Similarly with all Recognitions. The Bauddha has to lay stress upon this; for if he admits the correctness of Recognition, he will have to admit a more than momentary existence for things.

succeeding one another in rapid succession]*. Then again, as a matter of fact, all *wrong* cognitions are only imitations of *right* cognitions; and therefore you have to point out a case where the cognition of continuity of existence is right† [an imitation of which we have in the case of the tree and such other things]. "What proofs have *you* for the notion that the same thing exists at different points of time?" We have already explained the proof for this on a previous occasion, (*Bhāṣya*, P. 24, *Vārtika*, pp. 66-67), where we have explained that in the case of the cognitions of colour, taste and touch, it is found from actual Recognition that a single object forms the basis of, and is apprehended by, several cognitions. Another proof for the same (continuity of existence) is found in the well-known fact that, being the substratum of the effect the Cause must continue to exist at the time of the (manifestation of the) effect; a thing that is the substratum or receptacle of another thing is always found to exist at the time of the existence of the latter; as we find in the case of the jujube berry lying in the bowl; and as the Cause is the substratum of the effect, it follows that it should exist at the time that the effect appears. You will perhaps say that "the effect is without a substratum". You mean by this that when the effect comes into existence, it does so only after having completely modified ‡ the constitu-

* In the case of the wheel and the lamp, we actually *see* that the revolutions are different and that the flame is being actually *burnt*; so that it is clear that the notion of sameness is a mistake, due to the similarity in the revolutions and in the flames. There is no such perception available in support of the view that every tree is undergoing momentary destruction.

† This the Bauḍḍha cannot do; as he admits of no right notion of *Recognition*. So that if there is no *right* idea of Recognition, where could there be any *wrong* idea of it?

‡ Both editions read अमर्दयित्वा, in which case the translation would stand thus— the effect is produced *irrespectively* of the cause'. This could not be quite right. The *Ṭāṭparya* supplies the correct reading मर्दयित्वा, and explains it as पूर्वधर्मं निवर्त्य; the sense being that when the Jar comes into existence, the constitution of the Clay has been completely changed; so that the Clay not being present at the time, it could not be held to be the substratum of the Jar.

tion of the Cause, so that what (effect) could subsist in what (cause)? (By virtue of which the former could be held to be the substratum of the former). But it will not be right to argue thus; as there is no instance to corroborate your contention; there is no such case of any effect existing without a substratum as is admitted by both of us, which could form the corroborative instance of your argument. "But exactly the same is the case with your contention that the effect *has* a substratum, in corroboration of which also there is no universally accepted instance." Your answer that the same objection is equally applicable to my contention is not an answer at all; for it implies that you admit the force of the objection; that is, you evidently admit that there is no example available in support of your contention; and all that you urge is that there is none available in support of our contention also. "But there is self-contradiction." You perhaps mean by this as follows—"When we say that the same holds good in regard to your view, it is not that we admit the absence of examples in support of our view; what we mean to do is to urge that there is self-

Vār. P. 198.

contradiction involved in your reasoning; our meaning being that when you assert that that view is wrong in support of which there is no example, you stultify yourself by rejecting (as wrong) your own view [that *the effect has a substratum*, in support of which there is no example available]." This is not right; as you evidently have not understood the case; it is clear that you have not grasped either our view or your own. As a matter of fact, in our view, it is a well-known fact that the effect has a substratum; *

* That the container and the contained are co-existent in time is a fact vouched for by ordinary experience, which does not stand in need of a corroborative instance; and from that it follows that the cause, being the container, should exist at the time that the effect appears. On the other hand, the view that the effect has no substratum is not similarly vouched for by experience; and as such, it could be established only by reasonings; and in a reasoning you will always require a corroborative instance. So that the absence of such an instance is fatal to your view, and not to ours.

but as for your view, (that the effect is without a substratum) it goes contrary to your own assertion that colour, &c., are *effects* and have a substratum.* You have asserted that 'substance is an aggregate of *bhūṭas*, elements (earth, &c.,) and *bhauṭikas*, elementals (colour, &c.,)'; so that if you now assert that colour, &c., have no substratum, what would be the signification of the nominal affix in the term '*bhauṭika*,' as applied to 'colour, &c.'? [The only possible meaning of the affix being *bhūṭe bhavaḥ*, *subsisting in the bhūṭas*, and this *subsistence* is now denied]. Then again, your view would also militate against several other assertions of yours, such as—(*a*) 'the jewel is the *receptacle* of light, as the light follows the motion, the motion-lessness and other modifications of it,'—(*b*) 'the bowl is the *receptacle* of the jujube berry as it is by its force that the fruit does not fall off,'—(*c*) 'the sesamum seeds are the receptacle of the oil, as it is by their force that the oil does not flow away,' and so forth. Then again, if Colour, Taste, Touch &c. did not subsist in a (common) substratum, then each of them would be an independent entity by itself,—just like so many distinct substances, the sesamum, the kidney-bean, etc.; and each of them should, in that case, be perceived entirely apart from the other (the colour of the seasmum should be perceived as entirely apart from its taste, and so forth); as a matter of fact however, they are never perceived apart from one another; and from this it follows that they are dependent upon (subsistent in) something else (which is their common substratum). Thus then, the conclusion is that what is meant by a certain thing 'standing' may also be that it forms the single common object of remembrance and of the past and present cognitions of it.

* Both editions read रूपादयः कार्यं आधारवत्त्वस्य; and the translation is according to this reading. It would perhaps be better to read अनाधारवत्त्वस्य. The meaning of the passage would then be that to hold that colour, &c., are effects and yet deny them a substratum would involve a self-contradiction; for it has been held that substance is an aggregate, &c. &c.

The tree is the 'object' as it is what is desired to be got at by the seeing—says the *Bhāṣya* (P. 69, l. 6). "In what sense can the Objective be called a '*kāraka*', an active agent"?* The objective is an 'active agent' in this sense that it forms the object of the action; as a matter of fact, that is an objective which forms the object of the action; and this definition includes even those things which, even though they do not fulfil the condition of being 'the most desired', have the said character.†

What is meant by *karaṇa*, the *Instrument*, being the *most efficient cause* is that it is the most immediately antecedent (to the action). For instance, in the case of the expression 'he indicates the moon *by the tree*', the sense is that the person sees the moon *immediately after* he has seen the tree; and hence the tree comes to be called the 'Instrument'.

The Dative is that which is intended to be reached by the 'objective'; that is to say, that thing which is intended to be reached by the 'objective' comes to be called the 'Dative';

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* That alone can be called an 'active agent', which, in some way, tends towards the action denoted by the verb; the Objective, however is something that is *operated upon* by the action; how then can it be an 'active agent'?

† The Benares edition wrongly puts the words [illegible] under inverted commas. This is not a quotation.

The *Tātparya* adds:—A thing is called an 'object of action' when it bears upon itself the effects of an action not subsisting in itself; and this is exactly what forms the characteristic of the *Objective*. For instance, Devadatta sees a *tree*, the perception of the tree is produced by the action of seeing, which inheres in Devadatta, who is something other than the tree; and it is only in this sense that the perception can be said to have an object (in the shape of the tree); by which it is meant that its own characterisation or specification depends upon that object. So that inasmuch as it is necessary for the Object to have an existence anterior to the action, it can, in this sense, be called an *active agent*, a 'cause of the action'. It is only thus that we can speak of things *modified* and reached as being 'Objectives' of those actions. In the case of such things as cloth and the like, which are brought into existence by the action itself,—such for instance as the action of weaving—, the thing (cloth) cannot have an existence anterior to the action of being brought into existence, [and yet we speak of 'bringing the cloth into existence', where the cloth is the *object*],—and the component parts of the cloth, yarns, have such an anterior existence; so that it is through these parts, that the name 'objective' comes to be applied to the Cloth, indirectly. The definition of the 'Objective' now suggested is applicable to all such cases as—'he jumps over the snake', 'going to the village he avoids the tree-roots'—(where the character of *being desired* is not present). We have to add the qualification 'not inhering in itself', in view of such expressions as 'Chaitra reaches the village', where the action of *reaching* has its effect subsisting in Chaitra also; so that he would have to be regarded as the 'Objective'; but this becomes precluded by reason of the action of *reaching* being one that subsists in himself.

for instance, in the expression, '*vrikṣāya uḍakam āsiñchaṭi*', 'pours water for the tree', the 'objective', *Water*, when 'poured', reaches the *tree*; which latter therefore becomes the 'Dative'.*

The *Ablative* is that which remains fixed while something else is moving.† For instance, in the expression '*vrikṣāṭ paṭaṭi*,' 'falls *from the tree*,' the tree is called the 'Ablative,' as that which falls is moving, and while that is moving, the tree remains fixed.

Vār. P. 199.

The Locative is that which is *the cause of upholding* (*i. e.*, that which upholds or supports); when a thing is contained in (rests upon) another thing, the latter is the cause of the upholding (or supporting) of the former, and hence it comes to be called the 'Locative'. For instance, in the expression '*vrikṣē vayāmsi*,' 'the birds on the tree,' what is the cause of the counteracting of the force of gravity in the *birds* is their connection with the *tree*, which on that account, comes to be spoken of as the 'Locative.' ‡

Such being the case it is not the Substance only, or the Action only, which is the active agent—says the *Bhāṣya* (P. 69. L. 10). What is meant by this is that the term 'active agent' is applied neither to mere Substance, nor to mere Action; one does not apply the name of an active agent to a substance which he perceives merely as a substance pure and simple; nor to

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* The *Tātparya* remarks that the name सम्प्रदान is not significant; as the definition suggested shows that it is not always the *receiver of a gift* (which is what is signified by the name) that is called 'सम्प्रदान'. The definition, it says, has been given in accordance with actual usage, and also in view of Paṇini's definition.

† Construe the passage as (अस्मिन्निश्चले वस्तुनि) अपगच्छति सति यत् अवतिष्ठते तत् अपादानम्. The footnote reading would be quite contrary to the sense desired to be conveyed.

‡ This is only a particular case where 'upholding' or 'containing' is in the form of 'counteracting of gravity'; it is not the same in all cases; *e. g.* when we speak of the Substance containing a quality, the quality is *upheld* by the Substance; but there is no 'counteracting of gravity' in this case. So that the actual definition of the Locative is simply 'that which upholds.'—*Tāṭparya*.

an action when perceived merely as an action pure and simple; it is only when one perceives the action in its relationship to a substance, that he comes to speak of them by the common name 'active agent'; * the character common to all active agents is that they are the cause (source or basis) of the action; so that when one wishes to speak of only this fact of being the *cause of action*,—and he is not desirous of speaking of the particular form of the relationship to action,—the term used is the common name 'active agent'; when however, one wishes to speak of a particular form of relationship, he employs the particular names—'Nominative,' 'Objective,' 'Instrument' and the like—according as the thing is found to be qualified by such specific and mutually exclusive properties as 'independence' and the rest. Every active agent is *independent* and hence the 'nominative' in relation to its own (subsidiary) activity; and it is only in its relation to some other primary action that each of them comes to be known by the specific Kāraka-names (of 'Nominative,' 'Objective' &c) † This is what is meant by the *Shāstra* when it calls the *Kāraka* (the active agent) the 'producer', the 'accomplisher';—"of what?"—of the action; and it is according to this principle that the several names (of the *Kārakas*) are employed; hence what is said in the present context refers, not to mere action in general (such as belongs to every one of these agents concerned, individually), but to a primary action (towards whose accomplishment all the agents contribute their activity). In regard to this primary action, one thing may be affording

* The passage should be read as यदा [illegible].

† This is in anticipation of the objection that the Kāraka may be defined simply as that which *accomplishes an action*, or that which is endowed with a subsidiary activity of its own; why then have both these characteristics been emphasised? The sense is that if we defined the Kāraka simply as that only, then, inasmuch as every 'active agent' is independent in regard to its own subsidiary activity, all would be 'nominatives'; while if we combine the two characters we have this advantage that while each is the 'nominative' in relation to its own activity, it is 'objective,' or 'instrumental', &c., in relation to the other primary action.

only a remote aid, while another's aid is more approximate and immediate, while something else may be affording some sort of help in some way or other; and it is in accordance with the character of the aid afforded that the names 'Nominative' and the rest come to the applied. This is what we have already explained on a former occasion.

An objection is raised—"If the application of the Kāraka-name is due to the relation borne to an action, then the word '*pāchaka*', 'cook' (which denotes the nominative agent of the action of cooking) would apply only to one who is actually doing the cooking at that time; and you * could not have such expressions as 'the cook *will cook*' or 'the cook *has cooked*' [as at the time these expressions are used the man is not doing the act of cooking]."

This is not right; as the capacity (of acting) remains at all the three points of time; as a matter of fact, the capacity continues at all points of time; so that even with regard to past and future actions, the nominative-name—'cook' for instance—can be used in connection with the verb in all three tenses—'cooks', 'cooked' and 'will cook'.

Var. P. 200.

"If the capacity remains at all three points of time, "then it is not proper to express the three tenses at all; what "you mean is that just as the substance is there at all three "points of time so is the capacity also; hence just as the three "tenses are not used in connection with the substance, so also "they should not be used in connection with its capacity; and "in that case you could speak of a man as 'he cooks' even "when he is not doing any cooking at all [as his capacity of "cooking would still be there]; and you should never have "such expressions as 'the cook will cook', 'the cook has "cooked' [as the capacity being always *present*, it would be "wrong to connect it with the *past* or the *future*]."

This does not affect our position at all. As what brings

* The [illegible] has to be separated from [illegible]

out and manifests the existence of the capacity of a thing is its relation to an action. The word 'action' expresses what is denoted by the verbal root; and that which is the principal accomplisher of that action is the 'nominative' agent; and it is only when this nominative agent is related to the action that he brings out or manifests his capacity. "But what *is* this *Capacity*?" The *Capacity* is a property of the nominative agent, which is distinct from that agent and also from the action—such a property being in the form of *power* and of being conversant with the means (of accomplishing the action concerned); and this property is manifested by relationship to an action.* So that the kāraka-name ('cook' e. g.) is directly applicable only in a case where all the three factors are present,—the knowledge of the means, the power, and the relationship to the action; as we have in the case of the expression 'the cook is cooking'; in a case however where the relationship to an actual action is not present,—and what are there are only the *power* and the *knowledge of the means*—if the word 'cook' is used, as in the expressions 'the cook has cooked' or 'the cook will cook',—as one of the three factors is absent, such use can only be indirect or secondary.

[The exact nature of words denoting verbal relations having been expounded, the author applies it to the case in question]—The names 'Pramāṇa' and 'Pramēya' are words denoting active agency (or verbal relations). "How so?" Because they are related to a particular action; just as words like 'cook' and the like are used only in relation to a certain action, so are the words '*Pramāṇa*' and '*Pramēya*' also [which signify respectively the *instrument of the action of cognising* and the *object of the action of cognising*.]

* 'Power' and 'knowledge of means' are both essential in the Agent; even though he has the power to do an act, if he does not know the means of doing it, he cannot do it; similarly even though he may know the means, if he has not the requisite power, the action cannot be done by him.

Bhāṣya.
Introductory to Sūṭra (17).
[P. 70 L. 7 to L. 13.]

The Pūrvapakṣin urges the following argument :—

"Well, Sir, we admit that the *Kāraka*-names are used "according to their capacity; so that Perception and the rest "are '*Pramāṇa*' 'Instruments of cognition' as they are the "cause of the action of cognising, and they are also '*Pra-"mēya*', 'object of cognition', as they are the objects "of the action of cognising; thus then Perception and the "rest are *objects* of cognition as well as *instruments* of cogni-"tion;* as is vouched for by such specific assertions (met with "in ordinary parlance) as—(*a*) 'I know this *by* Perception', "'I know this *by* Inference', 'I know these *by* Analogy', "'I know this *by* Word', [where Perception &c. figure as "the *means*],—or (*b*) 'My cognition (which is apprehended) is "Perceptional', 'My Cognition is Inferential', 'my Cognition "is Verbal', where they are apprehended (as the Object "of Cognition). So also when these same, Perception "and the rest, are described by their definitions—*e. g.*, "'the cognition produced by the contact of the object "with the sense-organ' and so forth—they come to be speci-"fically *known* [in which case they themselves form the *objects* "of cognition]. Now the question arises—Is this *cogni-"tion of Perception &c.* brought about by the instrumentality "of another set of Pramāṇas? Or without other Pramāṇas, "independently of all instruments? 'What difference "would that make?' [The Pūrvapakṣin explains this "in the next Sūṭra].

Vārṭika—Introduction to Sū. 17.
[P. 200, L. 15 to L. 20.]

"*Well, Sir, &c.*,—says the *Bhāṣya* (P. 70, L. 7). When "the Pramāṇas, Perception and the rest, come to be them-"selves known, they are *objects* of cognition, and as such be-"come *Pramēyas*. And in regard to this we have to consider "this—Do these, Perception and the rest, stand in need of

* According to the *Bhāṣyachandra*, the term '*pramāṇāni*' here stands for (1) *Instruments of Cognition*, and (2) *Cognition*. Read the passage as संवेदनानि प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणानि च.

"the operation of other 'Instruments of Cognition', in regard "to their own cognition [*i. e.*, is the Cognition of Perception "&c. brought about by the instrumentality of Pramāṇas "other than Perception &c.]? Or is the cognition of the "Pramāṇas brought about without the help of any Instru- "ments?* What if it is so? [The next Sūṭra supplies "the answer from the Pūrvapakṣa stand-point.

Sūṭra (17).

"IF THE INSTRUMENTS OF COGNITION ARE COGNISED "BY MEANS OF INSTRUMENTS OF COGNITION,—THEN THIS "INVOLVES THE POSSIBILITY OF OTHER INSTRUMENTS OF "COGNITION."—(Sū. 17).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (17).

[P. 70, L. 15 to L. 17.]

"If Perception and the other Instruments of Cognition "are apprehended by means of Instruments of Cognition, "then this means that the Instrument by whose means they "are apprehended are distinct from Perception and the rest; "and this involves the postulating of other Instruments of "Cognition (distinct from Perception etc., enumerated in "Sū. 1-1-4); and this means that there would be an infinite "regress, one Instrument of Cognition being apprehended "by means of another, this latter again by means of another, "and so on and on, *ad infinitum*. And it is not right to admit "of such an infinite regress, when there is no justification "for it."

Vārṭika on Sū. 17.

[P. 201, L. 3 to L. 5.]

"*If the Instruments &c.*—says the Sūṭra. If the Cogni- "tion having the Instruments of Cognition for its object is

* Both editions read, after प्रमा॰प्र॰न्तरम्,— प्रतिपत्तौ प्रमाणं साधकं प्रमा॰प्र॰न्तरम्ऽतिरि- The editors have put this within brackets. The words are superfluous; and appear to form a *tippaṇī* on the preceding word 'प्रमाणान्तरम्'. The student learning from manuscript copies found it difficult to understand why the author should use this term, and he got the explanation that—"the Pramāṇa that would be the means of the अधिगति, of the becoming known, of Perception etc., would certainly be प्रमाणान्तर, in comparison to the said Perception etc." It very often happens that the scribes mistake the *tippaṇī* as part of the text, and insert it as such in the transcript.

" brought about by means of an Instrument of Cognition, " then this latter has to be regarded as an Instrument of " Cognition entirely distinct from the former Instruments of " Cognition, (Perception and the rest). As in such a cognition, " Perception and the rest, being the *objects*, could not them- " selves be regarded as *instruments*."

Bhāṣya on Sū. (18).

[P. 70, L. 17 to L. 21.]

" In order to avoid this it might be urged that the cogni- " tion of the Instruments of Cognition is brought about with- " out other Pramāṇas or Instruments of Cognition, indepen- " dently of all instrumentality. But in that case—

Sūṭra (18).

" IF (IN THE COGNITION OF THE INSTRUMENT OF COGNI- " TION) ANOTHER INSTRUMENT OF COGNITION IS NOT OPERA- " TIVE, THEN, JUST AS THE COGNITION OF THE INSTRUMENT OF " COGNITION WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED (WITHOUT THE OPERA- " TION OF AN INSTRUMENT OF COGNITION), SO WOULD THE " COGNITION OF THE OBJECT OF COGNITION ALSO. '

" If another Instrument of Cognition is not operative in " the cognition of Perception etc., then there should be no " operation of any Instrument of Cognition in the cognition " of the Soul and other Objects of Cognition*; as the two cases " are exactly alike. And this would mean the total abolition " of all Instruments of Cognition".

In answer to the above *Pūrvapakṣa* we have the next Sūṭra.

Vārṭika on Sū. (18).

" If it be held that the apprehension of the Instruments " of Cognition is brought about without another set of Ins- " truments of Cognition, entirely independently of all Ins- " trumentality, then *another instrument of Cognition is not* " *operative, &c.*—say the *Sūṭra.* The meaning is that just " as the Instruments of Cognition are inoperative in regard " to their own Cognition, so would they also be in regard to " that of the Objects of Cognition."

* [illegible] is the correct reading as found in the Puri Mss.

The answer to the above Purvapakṣa is given in the next Sūṭra :—

Sūṭra (19).

NOT SO; AS THE APPREHENSION OF THE INSTRUMENTS OF COGNITION IS SIMILAR TO THAT OF LAMPLIGHT. Sū. (19).

Bhāṣya.

[P. 71, L. 1 to P. 72, L. 8.]

Lamplight, being an aid to the act of Perception, is a *Pramāṇa*, an Instrument of Cognition, in the seeing of the visible object; [when *f. i.*, the object is seen with the help of the lamplight]; and yet it is itself also cognised by the instrumentality of another *Perception*, through its contact with the Eye [when, *f. i.*, the lamplight is itself seen];—similarly, knowing the fact that the presence and absence of *seeing* is in accordance with the presence and absence of the lamp, this lamp is *inferred* as the cause of the seeing (of itself as also of other objects) [where the lamplight is cognised by means of *Inference* *]; similarly, when we hear the words 'fetch a lamp in the dark,' we cognise the *lamp* by means of *Trustworthy Assertion* (Word). [Just as in the case of lamplight, we find that though it is itself an Instrument of Cognition, it is yet cognised by means of Perception and the other Instruments of Cognition]. In the same manner Perception and the other Instruments of Cognition also would be cognised by means of Perception, &c. [and not by other Instruments of Cognition]. For instance, in the case of Perception [in which there are the following factors—(*a*) the sense-organs, (*b*) the objects perceived, (*c*) the sense-object contact, and (*d*) the cognition produced by this sense-object contact] we find,—(*a*) that the sense-organs are cognised by means of Inference based on the fact of their respective objects being duly apprehended [the inference being in the form—'the sense-organ of the Eye exists, because we have cognition of *Colour*, which could not be possible except by means of the Visual Organ, and so on];—(*b*) that the Objects are cognised by the Perception itself, —(*c*) that the sense-object contacts are cognised by

* That is, the fact of the Lamplight being the cause of the seeing is inferred. —*Bhāṣyachandra*.

means of Inference based upon obstruction* [This inference being in the form, 'the Perception must be due to actual contact of the object with the sense-organ, because we find that there is absence of Perception whenever sense-object contact is absent by reason of obstructions to such contact']; †—(*d*) that the Cognition produced by the sense-object contact is apprehended, ‡ just like pleasure, &c., through its inherence in the soul as accompanied by a peculiar contact of the Mind with the cognising soul (as encased in the bodily membrane).§ Similarly may every other Instrument of Cognition be analysed [and found to have several factors apprehended by means of one or the other of the four ordinary Instruments of Cognition].

Thus then, [the meaning of the Sūtra is that] in the case of the lamplight it is found that while it is itself visible (*object* of vision), it is also the *means* of the seeing of other visible things, and thus it comes to be called the 'object,' or the 'means' of *Cognition*, according to circumstances; similarly any other thing, though an *object* of Cognition, may also be the means of the Cognition (of something else), and thus come to be called the 'object' or the 'means' of Cognition, according to circumstances. So that the Cognition of Perception and the other Instruments of Cognition also is actually found to be brought about, *not* by a different set of Instruments of Cognition, nor entirely without the aid of all instrumentality.

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*The reading of this passage is doubtful; the printed text reads सन्निकर्षतिरस्कारादर्शनेन; the Puri MS. A reads सन्निकर्षतिरस्त:दर्शनेन; and Puri MS. B reads सन्निकर्षतिरस्करादर्शनेन. The two latter do not give any sense. We have therefore adopted the reading of the printed text.

† The Eye and all its auxiliaries being present, if it is found that there is no *seeing*, and it is also found that the range of vision is obstructed by a wall which is actually seen to intervene between the Eye and the thing sought to be seen and again it is found that when the wall is not there the thing is seen all right,—these facts lead to the conclusion that in every case of *seeing* there is actual contact of the thing with the sense-organ. The *Bhāṣyachandra* formulates the *inferences* as follows:—(1) 'The Wall is actually in contact with the Eye, because it is *seen*,—what is not in contact with the Eye is not seen, as we find in the case of things hidden behind the wall';—(2) 'the Eye is in contact with the wall, because it is the instrument bringing about the perception of the wall,—whenever an organ is instrumental in bringing about the perception of a thing, it is in contact with the thing, as we find in the case of the organ of Touch;—(3) 'Sense-organs must be in contact with the object because they are instruments, like the Axe and so on.

‡ That is *perceived*—says the *Bhāṣyachandra*.

§ The Bhāṣyachandra takes संयोगविशेषात् as meaning संयोगविशिष्टात् and as qualifying आत्मसमवायात्; and the last च in the sense of emphasis only.

The Opponent might urge that "there can be no apprehension of a thing by itself"; but our answer to this will be that the argument is not right, as the things are really different from one another, and they are only similar in character. What the Opponent means to urge is that—"it is not right to hold that Perception &c. are apprehended by means of Perception &c. themselves, for a thing is always apprehended by means of something other than itself";—but this argument will not be right; as in reality there *is* difference among the individual things, which however are possessed of a similar character (by virtue of which they have a common name); so that (in the case in question, it is found that) the character of 'Perception' belongs to, and includes, several individuals (*i. e.* particular perceptions); and among these one individual (Perception) could well be apprehended by means of another individual Perception); and in this there could be no incongruity;—similarly in the case of Inference and the other Instruments of Cognition;—(to take a homely instance) we find that by means of the water brought out (of the well) we have the cognition (inferential) of water in the well itself [Where we have the apprehension of *water* by means of *water* itself]. The same we find to be the case with the cognising Soul and Mind: When we have such cognitions as 'I am happy', 'I am unhappy', we find that the cogniser (the Soul) is apprehended by himself; and in the case of Mind also we find that it has been declared that 'the non-simultaneity of cognitions is an indicative of the Mind' (Sū. 1-1-16), which means that the inference of the Mind is brought about by means of the Mind itself;—so that there is non-difference between the *cogniser* and the *cognised* (in the case of the Soul), and between the *means* of apprehension and *object** of apprehension (in the case of the Mind).

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* The printed text reads ग्राहकस्य which is evidently wrong; the Puri MSS. read ग्राह्यस्य; and this has the support of the *Tātparya* also; which has the following observations on this paragraph of the *Bhāṣya*—It is not quite right to speak of the Soul as the *objective* of the action of *cognition*; for the objective is that which bears on itself the action of something other than itself; the real objective of the cognition 'I am happy' is the *happiness*, and the Soul only appears in the cognition as the illumining factor. The Mind is certainly an instrument in the cognition of itself and is also the object; yet this does not involve the incongruity of a thing operating upon itself; because it is by its own *existence* that the Mind is the *instrument* of its own *cognition*; and certainly the *existence* of the Mind is something entirely different from the *Cognition* of the Mind.

The Opponent might urge that in the cases cited the auxiliary conditions are different; but our answer will be that so it is also in the case of Perception &c. It is true that in the case of the cognising Soul, the Soul does not cognise itself (*i. e.* becomes the *object* of cognition) except under conditions different (from those under which he is the *cogniser*),—similarly the Mind also is apprehended by means of the Mind under entirely different conditions; but precisely the same is the case with Perception and the other Instruments of Cognition; for when Perception &c. are apprehended by means of Perception &c. themselves, we are cognisant of total difference between the two* individual perceptions (the Perception cognised and the Perception by means of which it is cognised).

Bhā. P. 72.

Then again, there is no possibility of there being anything that cannot be apprehended by Perception &c. If there were any such thing as is not apprehended by Perception and the other three Instruments of Cognition, then there might be some ground for the postulating of additional Instruments of Cognition; but as a matter of fact no one can point out any such thing; for the simple reason that everything, existing as well as non-existing†, is actually found to be apprehended by Perception &c.,—as we find to be the case in ordinary experience.

Vārṭika on Sū. 19.

[P. 201, L. 12 to P. 202, L. 20].

Not so &c.—says the *Sūṭra*. The lamp-light, being an aid to the perception of such things as the jar and the like, is called a '*Pramāṇa*'; and yet it is itself apprehended by Perception &c.; and for its own operation, it does not necessitate the operation of any Pramāṇas other than Perception and the rest; it is apprehended by means of these themselves. In the same manner the Pramaṇās (Perception and the rest) also are apprehended by the same Pramāṇas. The case of lamp-light has been cited only as an instance

* The printed text wrongly retains the च when all MSS. including the two Puri MSS. have dropped it. The *Bhāṣyachandra* also has no च.

† How the non-existent thing forms the object of Pramāṇas has been shown in the Introductory *Bhāṣya*, P. 2.

(corroborative of the reasoning). "What is the reasoning (which the instance is intended to corroborate)?" We proceed to explain the reasonings as follows:—(A) For their own apprehension, Perception and the rest do not stand in need of the operation of other Pramāṇas, because they are themselves the means of bringing about the apprehension of things, *like the lamp*;—just as the lamp, being a means of bringing about the apprehension of things, does not stand in need of the operation of any other Pramāṇa (besides Perception etc.) so also do the Pramāṇas (Perception etc.),—from which it follows that these do not stand in need of the operation of other Pramāṇas;—(B) secondly, because they are endowed with generic and specific characters;—everything that is endowed with generic and specific characters is found to be such as does not, for its apprehension, stand in need of the operation of any Pramāṇas other than Perception and the rest,—as we find in the case of the *lamp*;—(C) thirdly, because they are objects of cognition,—every object of cognition is such as does not, for its apprehension stand in need of the operation of Pramāṇas other than Perception etc.,—as we find in the case of the Lamp; —(D) fourthly, because they are subsistent in something else, and because they are Instruments, like the lamp; similarly the Sense-organs and such like things also, being aids to Perception, are such as do not stand in need of the operation of any Pramāṇas other than Perception etc.

Var. P. 202.

The *Bhāṣya* (P. 71 L. 10) represents the Opponent as raising the objection that "*there can be no apprehension of a thing by itself*". By this our opponent means as follows—"If Perception etc. were apprehended by means of the same Perception etc., this would mean that a thing is apprehended by means of itself; and this is not right; as the same thing cannot be the *instrument* as also what is accomplished by that instrument". But this does not affect our position at all;

as *the things are really different from one another and they are similar only in character* (*Bhāṣya* P. 71, L. 12); that is to say, there are several things that are included in what has been described as 'Pramāṇas', and there would be nothing wrong if one of these several things were apprehended by means of the other; *just as from the water brought out of the well we infer the water in the well* (*Bhāṣya*, P. 71, L. 16);—that is, having brought out water one understands that the water in the well is also of the same kind; and yet in this case it is not said that the thing (water) is apprehended by means of itself; all that is said is that by means of the thing, which is endowed with the character (of water), we apprehend another thing which also is endowed with the same character (of water). [In the same manner by means of one instrument, which has the character of Perception, we can apprehend another instrument which also has the character of Perception]. Then again, there is no such absolute law that a thing cannot be apprehended by means of itself; as sometimes such apprehensions do happen; as for instance, in the case of Soul, we find that the same Soul is the *cogniser* as also the *cognised*, whenever a person has any cognition in regard to himself.

The Opponent urges that, "*in the cases cited the conditions are different*" (*Bhāṣya*, P. 72, L. 1.) He means by this as follows—"when the Soul is the cogniser, the conditions are entirely different from those that are present when it is the *cognised*". Exactly the same, we reply, is the case with the matter under discussion. In the case of the Soul, when one recognises himself—as 'I am happy'—'I am unhappy'—the cogniser-Soul apprehends himself *as qualified by happiness etc.* [so that the Soul is the *cognised* when qualified by unhappiness, and it is the *cogniser* independently of any such qualification];—exactly so in the case of Perception etc., these become the 'object of cognition' only *when*

apprehended by means of Pramāṇas [while when appearing as the instruments whereby something else is apprehended they become 'the Instruments of Cognition'].

Lastly—*there is no possibility of there being anything that cannot be apprehended by means of Perception &c.* (*Bhāṣya*, P. 72, L. 5). If there were any such thing as is not apprehended by means of Perception, then we could accept Pramāṇas other than Perception &c.; but one can never prove that there is any such thing; as every thing, existent as well as non-existent, is apprehended by means of Perception &c. Thus then, the conclusion is that it is by means of Perception &c. alone that the Pramāṇas themselves are apprehended.

Bhāṣya.

Introductory to Sūṭra (19 *A*.)

[P. 72, Ll. 9-11.]

Some people have taken up the example (cited in the preceding Sūṭra) by itself, quite detatched from any reasonings, —*i. e.* as proving the conclusion (that Pramāṇas are self-illumined) by itself, without reference to any particular reasoning; and they have interpreted the Sūṭra to mean that —' just as the lamplight is seen without the light of any other lamp, so also are the Pramāṇas apprehended without other Pramāṇas'.* But such an argument—

CANNOT BE CONCLUSIVE; AS IN THE CASE OF CERTAIN THINGS WE FIND THAT OTHER INSTRUMENTS ARE INOPERATIVE, WHILE IN OTHERS IT IS FOUND THAT THEY ARE NOT INOPERATIVE (SŪ. 19 A.)†

* This is the argument propounded by those who regard all Pramāṇas to be *self-illumined*—*i. e.* the Vedantins.

† This appears in the printed text as part of the *Bhāṣya*. But the *Nyāyasūchīnibanḍha* and the *Bhāṣyachanḍra* read this as a Sūṭra; and the Puri Ms. of the सूत्रपाठ as also the Sūṭra Ms. D. contains this as a Sūṭra. It is only the later commentators that have omitted it from the Sūṭras. We treat this as a Sūṭra; and in this matter we have always followed the न्यायसूचीनिबन्ध; but we number it as 19A, with a view to retain the numbering of the following Sūṭras.

Vārṭika.

[P. 202, L. 20 to P. 203, L. 1]

Introductory to Sū. 19 A.

Other old writers take the preceding Sūṭra without reference to any reasoning, and interpret it merely as putting forward an example,—the meaning (according to them) being that—'Just as the light of a lamp, so the Pramāṇās also, would be apprehended without the help of other Pramāṇas'. Against this view we have the following declaration —*Such an argument cannot be conclusive &c. &c.*

Bhāṣya.

[P. 72, L. 13 to P. 73. L. 7.]

(A) The said fact (of independence of other Pramāṇas), which is deduced from the absence of operation (of other lamps in the case of the lamp illumining things by its light), has been urged (by the writers referred to) with a view to prove similar independence in the case of the Instruments of Cognition ;—but the same fact might be urged (with equal reasonableness) to prove similar independence in the case of the Objects of Cognition also ; as there is nothing to distinguish this latter case from the former [*i. e.* just as it is argued, from the case of the lamp being independent of another lamp, that Pramāṇas are independent of other Pramāṇas, so may it also be argued, that Pramēyas also are independent of Pramāṇas,—which would mean that Pramāṇas are not necessary for anything].—(B) Further, it may be argued that so far as the cognition of the *objects of cognition* is concerned, it is found that for the apprehension of such things as the colour of a Dish and the like, one does require the operation of such aids as the light of a lamp [so that the example of the *lamp* proves the necessity of such aids in the case of the cognition of *object of cognition*]; and the same might be said in regard to the cognition of the Pramāṇas also, whose case does not differ from the former case [The argument would be that just as in the case of the apprehension of *objects of cognition* such aids as lamplight &c. are necessary, so in the case of the apprehension of the Pra-

mānas also, such other aids would be necessary].* [Thus then, the example of the Lamp as interpreted by the said writers being found to support both views—that such other aids are necessary for the apprehension of the *Objects* as well as the *Instruments* of Cognition], unless the said example is taken in reference to a particular reasoning (as we have taken it), there could be no justification for accepting its force in one case and not in the other; as there is no reason why the force of the Example should be admitted in one case and not in the other.†

On the other hand, if the Example (of the lamp) is taken in reference to a particular reasoning (as we have taken it), it is found to point to a single conclusion, and as such it is not open to the objection just mentioned.‡ That is to say, when the example is taken as bearing upon a particular reasoning, it is found to point to a single conclusion (that of one Instrument of Cognition being independent of other Instruments of Cognition); and under the circumstances, the Opponent cannot very well refuse to accept its force.§ Such being the case, this interpretation is not open to the objection that the Example is not conclusive.

Bhā. P. 73.

"But if Perception &c. were apprehended by other Perception &c., then there would be an infinite regress." Not so, we reply, as all usage could be rightly explained on the basis of the distinction that the said Perception &c. are apprehended (in one case) as the *objects* cognised and (in another case) as the *instruments* of the cognition. For instance, when we have such notions as 'I cognise the thing *by means of Perception*', 'I cognise the thing *by means of Inference*', Perception &c. are cognised as the *instruments* of cognition; and when we have such notions as 'this cognition of mine (which I now cognise)

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* According to the *Bhāṣyachandra* the meaning of this passage is as follows :— The *colour of the Dish* is perceptible by itself, and yet for being *illumined* it requires the aid of the Lamplight; so the Pramāṇas also, even though they may be self-illumined, may stand in need of other Pramāṇas.

† The two Puri MSS. read 'उभयथैव न अविशेषे दृष्टान्तः' after the word दृष्टान्तः. This is the reading adopted in the translation.

‡ The *Bhāṣyachandra* reads this as Sūtra.

§ 'अनुज्ञा' of the printed text is wrong. The Puri MSS. and the *Bhāṣyachandra* support the reading अनभ्यनुज्ञा.

is perceptional,' 'this cognition is inferential', 'this cognition is verbal', Perception &c. appear as the *objects* of cognition;—so that when we actually recognise them thus (differently in the two cases), it becomes possible for us to carry on all business for the purpose of acquiring merit, prosperity, happiness and Final Release, and also for the purpose avoiding the contraries of these. And as all business and usage can be explained on the basis of the said distinction, there is nothing to be accomplished by the infinite regress, for the accomplishment of which it would be necessary to postulate the said infinite regress (of Perception &c.).*

Vārṭika on Sū. 19 A.

[P. 203, L. 2 to P. 204, L. 2].

The argument cannot be conclusive &c. &c.—says the Sūtra. There is no ground for accepting the proposition that 'the Pramāṇas are as independent of other Pramaṇās as the light of a lamp is of other lamps' (which is the meaning of Sū. 19, according to the writers referred to),—and rejecting the other proposition that 'the Pramaṇās are as dependent upon other Pramāṇas as the colour of the Dish'. As a matter of fact, it is found that the light of the lamp is not inoperative in the illumining of the colour of the Dish; why cannot the same be said of the Pramāṇàs also (requiring the operation of other Pramāṇas)? Secondly, it would be necessary to point out the grounds for admitting the force of the example of the lamplight in the case of the cognition of Pramāṇas, and not admitting it in the case of the cognition of the *objects of cognition.* Thirdly, you have also to explain your reasons why the *lamplight* is to be accepted as a pertinent example, and not the *Dish.* From all this it is clear that, if not taken in reference to a particular reasoning the example is inconclusive both ways.

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* न चान्येन निवर्तते is the reading of the printed text, as also of the Puri MSS. But व्यवस्थैव निवर्तते appears to be the better reading, as noted in the footnote of the printed text.

On the other hand, if the Example is taken in reference to a particular reasoning, it is found to point to a single conclusion, and as such it is not open to the above objection—says the *Bhāṣya* (P. 72, L. 18). That is to say, if the example of the Lamplight is taken in connection with a particular reasoning, in reference to its illumining (other things), then it points definitely to a single conclusion, and as such cannot be objected to ; so that it does not become open to the charge of being 'inconclusive.'

"*But if Perception &c. were apprehended by Perception &c. themselves, there would be an infinite regress*' (*Bhāṣya* P. 73, L. 1). That is to say, if Perception &c. are apprehended by means Perception &c. (and not by other Pramāṇas), then these latter would have to be apprehended by another set of Perception &c.; and so on and on *ad infinitum*. And in the event of such an infinite regress, there could be no definite idea of the first *Pramāṇa* of the series ; on the other hand, if there is a limit to the series, (and the first Pramāṇa of the series is definitely known), then the cognition of this first Pramāṇa would be invalid,—not being known by means of any Pramāṇa [as *ex hypothesi* there would be no Pramāṇa whereby this first Pramāṇa would be cognised]".

Our answer to this is that what has been urged does not affect our position.—*As all usage could be rightly explained on the basis of the distinction that the said Perception &c. are apprehended (in one case) as the objects cognised and (in another case) as instruments of cognition*—says the *Bhāṣya* (P. 73, L. 1). The 'object of cognition' is '*Prámēya*' and the 'instrument of cognition' is '*Pramāṇa*'; and when the Pramāṇa and Prameya are apprehended, this is enough for purposes of all usage, in the shape of acquiring merit, prosperity, happiness and Final Release, and of avoiding the contraries of these.

There is nothing to be accomplished by the infinite regress, for the accomplishment of which it would be necessary to postu-

late the said infinite regress (*Bhāṣya*, P. 73, L. 6). Thus then, the conclusion is that it is by means of Perception &c. themselves that Perception and the rest are apprehended, and that this does not involve an infinite regress.*

THUS ENDS THE EXAMINATION OF THE INSTRUMENTS OF COGNITION IN GENERAL.

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* The whole of this discussion is thus summed up in the *Ṭāṭparya—Pūrvapakṣa* —"Is the apprehension of Perception &c. brought about by means of an Instrument or without any instrument? If the former, is it brought about by these same Perception &c? or by other instruments of Cognition? If the latter, then that would involve the postulating of more Pramāṇas than those vouched for in the Sūṭra (1. 1. 3), and also an infinite regress. If Perception &c. were apprehended by means of another Perception, this would involve an infinite regress. If one Perception were apprehended by means of itself, this would involve the absurdity of the Perception operating upon itself; certainly a sword can never cut itself. So the conclusion is that the apprehension of the Pramāṇas is brought about without the help of any instrument. And if so, the apprehension of Prameyas also might be brought about in the same manner; and there would thus be no need of any Pramāṇa at all."

Siḍḍhānṭa—Under the class 'Perception' there are a number of individual Perceptions; and one of these can very well be apprehended by means of the other; and in this there would be no necessity of either an infinite regress or any of those contingencies that have been urged in the *Pūrvapakṣa*.

Section (3).

Detailed Examination of Perception.

[Sūṭras 20—32.]

Bhāṣya on Sū. (20)

[P. 73, L. 8 to L. 10.]

The Pramāṇas have been examined in a general way; they are now going to be examined in detail.

Sūṭra (20) *

Pūrvapakṣa :—" THE STATEMENT OF THE CAUSE †(IN SU. 1-1-4.) OF SENSE-PERCEPTION IS UNTENABLE, AS IT IS AN INCOMPLETE ‡ STATEMENT."

"That is to say, another cause (of Perception)—the contact of the Mind with the Soul—has not been mentioned.§

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* On the whole of this Section a great deal of confusion has arisen as to which Sūṭra represents the *Pūrvapakṣa* and which the *Siḍḍhānṭa*. This has been due principally to the fact that the *Vārṭika* has put forward the Siḍḍhānṭa point of view along with its explanation of the Pūrvapakṣa Sūṭra, and does not wait for the coming of the Siḍḍhānṭa Sūṭra. This has been clearly put by the *Parishuḍḍhi*—' When the *Vārtika* states the Siḍḍhānṭa view in its explanation of a Sūṭra which embodies the *Pūrvapakṣa*, it does so only by way of anticipation ; it gives up the order of the *Sūṭra-Bhāṣya*, and hastens to correct the misrepresentations of the *Pūrvapakṣa*.' 'I cannot bear the thought of letting the Opponent's view stand uncontradicted, even for a moment,' says the *Ṭāṭparya*.

† There is some difficulty about the word *lakṣana* here. The *Tāṭparya*, in accordance with *Bhāṣya* and *Vārṭika*, explains it as *Kāraṇa*, *Cause*; and this explanation is thus accounted for by the *Pārishuḍḍhi*—' The Sūṭra as it stands appears to be absurd ; for a *lakṣana*, definition, to be 'untenable', or 'incomplete'. it must be either too narrow, not including *all* perceptions, or too wide, omitting to mention some necessary distinguishing feature. Neither of these deficiences is found in the *definition* of Perception that has been provided in Sū. 1-1-4 ; so that the present Sū. would be absurd, if '*lakṣaṇa*' were taken to mean 'definition.' For this reason both *Bhāṣya* and *Vārṭika* have taken it to mean 'cause,'—the *Vārṭika* accepting it in the sense of *definition* only as an alternative meaning. And it is only in this sense that the *Pūrvapakṣa* herein propounded becomes possible. The *Bhāṣyachanḍra* however takes '*lakṣaṇa*' in the sense of *definition*, and interprets the Sūṭra to mean that the definition offered in Sū. 1-1-4 is an 'impossible' one, because it omits to mention all particulars.

‡ The *Nyāyasūṭravivaraṇa* explains '*asamagra*' as *not including all kinds of Perception*.

§ What follows after this forms the *Bhāṣya* on the next Sū. Without stating the Sūṭra, the *Bhāṣya* proceeds with its explanation—says the *Ṭāṭparya*. But the *Bhāṣyachanḍra* makes it a continuation of *Bhāṣya* on Sū. 20.

Vārṭika on Sū. 20.

[P. 204, L. 3 to P. 205, L. 7].

We have seen in a general way that there are *Pramāṇas* apprehending (indicating the existence of) objects of cognition. Now proceeds the detailed Examination of the Pramāṇas that have been recognised in a general way. Perception is the first to be mentioned among the Pramāṇas; so it is Perception that is now examined.

The statement of the Cause of Perception &c. &c.—says the *Sūṭra.*

The sense of the *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—" The " account that you have provided of the cause of Percep- " tion—that *it is produced by Sense-object contact*—is incom- " plete. Why? Because there are other causes of Perception " also; and these have not been mentioned by you; for " instance, 'Mind-Soul contact' and such others. If you mean " that when you state that 'Perception is produced by " Sense-object contact' you put forward the definition (the " peculiar characteristic) of Perception [and not an exhaustive " enumeration of all its causes],—this cannot be a *definition*; " as it only mentions the cause; when it is said that Percep- " tion is produced by sense-object contact, this is only a " statement of its cause; and certainly the statement of its " cause cannot be the *definition* of a thing; for instance, " when it is said that the jar is produced from clay and so " forth, this cannot be regarded as the *definition* of the jar."

The *Siddhānṭin* replies as follows:—

The above contention is not right; neither of the two explanations of our statement is open to objection. If we take it as stating the cause of Perception, there can be no objection to it; nor can any objection be taken to it if it is taken as embodying the definition of Perception. " How so?"

[A] If it is taken as mentioning the cause of Perception,—your objection against is met by what we have already said above, that the Sūṭra (1-1-4) wherein the statement in question occurs is not meant to be an exhaustive enumeration of all the causes of Perception; it is meant to point out only that peculiar cause of it which distinguishes it from Inferential and other cognitions; and certainly this would not be the case with the *Mind-Soul contact* (which it common to *all* cognitions). "Well, in that case also, the *Mind-Sense* contact should be mentioned; if the *Sense-object contact* is mentioned on account of its being peculiar to Perception, then, for that same reason the *Mind-Sense contact* also should be mentioned." But we have already said that the Sūṭra is not meant to enumerate *all* that is peculiar to Perception; in fact Perception is sufficiently characterised and marked out by the mention of *any one* of the two causes (Mind-Sense contact and Sense-object contact) that are peculiar to it.

Vār. P. 205.

[B] Similarly, there can be no objection to our statement, when it is taken as embodying a *definition* of Perception; for the simple reason that *Sense-object contact* is something that is actually peculiar to Perception. Inasmuch as *Sense-object contact* gives rise to Perception, it can be regarded as its *cause*, and inasmuch as it distinguishes Perception from all like and unlike things, it can also be regarded as its *definition*.*

Another answer to the Opponent's contention is as follows:—The *Mind-Soul* contact and *Mind-Sense contact* also are both mentioned by implication. "How so?" Simply by reason of the appearance of Cognition. That is to say, *as a matter of fact, until an object is actually in contact, there cannot appear in it a quality that can only be produced by*

* The *Tāṭparya* remarks that the real answer is that the statement is a *definition*; and it is simply as a piece of bravado that the *Vārṭika* puts forward the possibility of its being taken as mentioning the *cause* of Perception.

contact (Bhāṣya, P. 73, L. 10) [and *Cognition* being such a quality of the Soul, its appearance necessarily implies the Soul's *contact*];—similarly (as regards *Mind Sense* contact) if the sense-organ could operate independently of Mind-contact, a simultaneous Cognition of several things would be possible; as a matter of fact however, no such simultaneous Cognition ever takes place; hence mind-contact also is a necessary factor in the cause of Perception.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (21).

[P. 73, L. 10 to L. 17.]

Pūrvapakṣa (*continued*)—"As a general rule, unless an "object is in contact with something, there cannot be pro- "duced in it any such quality as can be produced by contact;*— "and we know that the quality of 'Cognition' *is* produced in "the Soul;—so the conclusion is that the contact of this Soul "with the Mind is a cause of that Cognition. Then as re- "gards the Sense-Mind contact, if the cause of Cognition con- "sisted in Sense-object contact, independently of the Sense- "Mind contact, it would be possible for several cognitions to "appear simultaneously; and [as this is impossible; vide "Sū. 1-1-15] therefore Sense-Mind contact also should be "regarded as a cause of Perception."

What has been just said constitutes the anticipated *Bhāṣya* on the next *Sūṭra.*†

Sūṭra (21).

"PERCEPTION CANNOT BE BROUGHT ABOUT UNLESS THERE IS CONTACT OF THE SOUL AND OF THE MIND.

[*Hence of the contact of these should have been mentioned in the Suṭra* 1-1-4]."

"Just as no Perception is brought about until there is "contact of the Sense and the Object, so also no Perception "is brought about unless there is contact of the Soul and of "the Sense-organ. [Hence this latter also should be men- "tioned among the 'Causes of Perception']."‡

* *e. g.* the red colour in the jar is never produced without contact of fire—*Bhāṣya-chandra.*

† The *Bhāṣyachandra* takes the passage to mean that the argument urged by the Opponent in Sū. 20 has already been answered by the *Bhāṣya* on Sū. 1-1-4.

‡ The *Parishuḍḍhi* remarks—This Sūṭra must be taken as a *Purvāpakṣa* Sūṭra,—in the first place, because the *Bhāṣya* has explained it as such; and secondly, because if this were taken as putting forward the *Siḍḍhānṭa* view, Sūṭras 23 and 24 would be superfluous; as they would say what is already said in the present Sū. 21.

Vārtika on Sū. (21).

[P. 205, L. 7, to L. 12.]

The *Bhāṣya* on this *Sūtra* appears before the *Sūtra*.

"*Just as no perception is brought about &c. &c.* (Bhāṣya)."

There is no force in this contention either,—we reply; as the answer to this has already been given before. The answer to this contention is what we have already said above (Vār. P. 204, L. 15)—*viz.*, that the Sū. 1-1-4 is not intended to be an exhaustive enumeration of all Causes of Perception, it is intended to point what forms its distinctive cause.

Bhāṣya on Sū. 22.

[P. 73, L. 16 to P. 74, L. 6.]

[The *Pūrvapakṣa* having been stated, and the trend of the *Siddhānta* having been already indicated in Sū. 1-1-4, an interested outsider, listening to the discussion, says]—"These people assert that because Cognition is found to appear when there is sense-object contact, this latter should be regarded as the *cause* of that Cognition; [but if this reasoning were true]—

"THE SAME MIGHT BE SAID OF SPACE, PLACE, TIME AND AKĀSHA ALSO"—(Sū. 22).

"As a matter of fact, Cognition appears only when Space, &c., are present; so that these also should be *causes* of Perception. [If not, then the contact of the Mind and Soul, Mind and Sense, or Sense and Object, need not be regarded as the 'cause' of Perception]." *

[The answer to the above reasoning of the Outsider is as follows]—

Even if Space &c. are not regarded as the 'cause' of Perception, Cognition would appear during their existence, for the simple reason that the proximity or duration of Space &c. is unavoidable. That is to say, even though

* Both the *Pūrvapakṣin* and the *Siddhāntin* are agreed as to Sense-object contact being the cause of Perception. The interested Outsider thinks that the said contact is regarded as the cause of Perception simply because Perception appears when the contact is there, and from this the Outsider argues that if this were so, then Space &c. would also have to be regarded as the cause of Perception; as Perception appears *when these are present*; as there is no time or place where these three are not present. This sūtra must be taken as emanating from the Outsider, as if it emanated from the Purvapakṣin or from the Siddhāntin, it would involve self-contradiction.

Space &c. may not be regarded as 'causes' in the appearance of Cognition, yet it need not be denied that whenever the Cognition appears, it must appear while Space &c. are present; as the duration of Space &c. can never be avoided [being as they are eternal and omnipresent]. [But their existence at the time does not make them causes]. Such being the case, it would behove you to point out the reason by virtue of which you could say—'for this reason Space &c. should be regarded as causes of Cognition.'*

Vārṭika on Sū. 22.

[P. 205, L. 12 to P. 206, L 11].

[The Outsider comes forward with an objection]—" There " are people who regard one thing as the cause of another " because the latter is found to appear while the former " is present,—and they argue that, inasmuch as Cognition " appears while the sense-object contact is present, and it " does not appear while the latter is not present, the said " contact must be the cause of that Cognition. Now, for " these people, *the same may be said in regard to Space, Time* " *and Ākāsha also*—says the *Sūṭra.* That is to say,—Space, " Time and Ākāsha are present when Cognitions appear; " so that, inasmuch as Cognitions appear while these are " present, they also should be regarded as the cause of Cog- " nitions. " What reason is there by which Space &c. should " not be regarded as the cause of cognitions?' The reason lies " in our not finding any such capacity in Space &c.; that is, " as a matter of fact we do not find that Space and the rest

* The fact of the matter is that one thing cannot be regarded as the cause of another simply because it is found to appear while the other is present; the negative concomitance of the two should also be ascertained. For instance, clay is the cause of the jar, (1) because the jar appears when the clay is there, and (2) the jar does not appear while the clay is not there. Now with regard to such eternal and omnipresent substances as Space, Time and Akāsha, though we have the proposition that 'Cognitions appear while these are present', we cannot have the negative proposition 'Cognitions do not appear *while Space &c. are not present*'; as this latter term would be an impossible one. On the other hand, in regard to the contact of the Object Sense-organ, Mind and the embodied Soul,—both these propositions are available; hence their contact can be regarded as the 'cause' of Perception *Ṭāṭparya*.

" have any such capacity or power whereby Cognitions could " be produced; and for this reason they cannot reasonably " be regarded as their cause. 'But they could be so " regarded on account of mere proximity.' If what you " mean is that—'Space and the rest should be regarded as " the cause of cognitions simply by reason of their proxim- " ity'—this cannot be right; as this proximity (of Space &c.) " is something that is inevitable (everywhere and
Vār. P. 206. " always);—these are eternal and omnipresent; " and inasmuch as they are eternal and omnipresent, their " proximity can never be avoided; under the circumstances, " it is necessary for you to show some particular reasons " whereby they could be regarded as the *cause*; mere *proximity* " cannot be the ground for their being regarded as the " *cause*. 'Why'? Because we find that the hot *touch* " of light is not regarded as the cause of the perception of " its colour, even though it is present at the time; *i. e.* of the " perception of the Colour of light, what is regarded as the " cause is the particular *Colour* of the light, and its *touch* is " not so regarded simply because of its proximity; and the " reason for this lies in the fact that the touch is not found " to possess the capacity for bringing about the perception " of Colour; *Colour* on the other hand is found to possess this " capacity; as is ascertained from the fact that the presence " and absence of Colour-perception is in accordance with the " presence and absence of Colour; *i. e.* the said perception " appears when Colour is present, and it is not present when " Colour is absent; which shows that it is *Colour*, and not " *Touch*, which is the *cause* of Colour-perception. For ins- " tance, in the case of the lunar disc we find that its colour " brings about the Colour-perception, even though its hot " fiery touch is absent,*—and conversely the colour of a light

* The lunar disc, constituted as it is by Light, cannot be entirely devoid of *heat*; what is meant is that the heat, though present, is so completely suppressed by the cold, that it may be regarded as practically non-existent.—*Tātparya*.

" hidden under a cover, even though present, does not bring " about the perception of Colour. In the same manner, even " though Cognitions arise from the contact of the Soul, the " Mind, the Sense-organ and the Object, yet it cannot, merely " by reason of proximity, be held to arise from Space and the " rest; for the simple reason that these latter are found to be " entirely devoid of the necessary capacity.

Bhāṣya—Introduction to Sū. (23).

[P. 74, L. 6.]

[The side-objection of the Outsider having been answered, the *Pūrvapakṣin* turns towards the *Siḍḍhānṭin*]—" Under the circumstances (there being reasons for regarding the Contact of the embodied Soul, the Mind, the Sense-organ and the Object, as the cause of Perception), the Mind-Soul Contact should be mentioned (under Su. 1-1-4)."

In answer to this, we have the next *Sūṭra* (23).

Vārtika—Introduction to Sū. (23).

[P. 206. ll. 11-12.]

The *Pūrvapakṣin* says that the Mind-Soul Contact should be mentioned. Our answer is that this need not be mentioned, as it is already implied. The question arising—" By what is it implied?"——the answer is given in the following *Sūṭra*. †

† There is some difference of opinion in regard to the exact meaning of this introductory *Bhāṣya*, and hence of the next three *Sūṭras*. The natural meaning—the one given by the *Nyāyasūṭravivaraṇa*—appears to be as follows—The Pūrvapakṣin having propounded the view that if one thing is to be regarded as the cause of another simply because the latter appears while the former is present, then Space &c. also should be regarded as the cause of cognition,—the answer to this is that the mere fact of one thing appearing while the other is present is not sufficient reason for regarding one as the cause of another. To this the Purvapakṣin retorts (in Bha. P. 74, L. 6) that in that case *Mind-Soul* Contact also should be *rejected, denied to be the cause of Perception* (this being the sense of the term *Upasaṅkhyēyaḥ*). This is answered in Sūṭras 23 and 24: that the Soul-Contact is actually the *cause* of perception is proved by other facts (mentioned in Sū. 23), and so also the Mind-Contact (Sū. 24). Finally comes the question—if the fact of Soul-Contact and Mind-Contact being *Causes* of Perception is so surely proved, why not mention them in Sū. 1-1-4? The answer to this is given in Su. 25.

Sūtra (23).

COGNITION FORMING THE CHARACTERISTIC FEATURE OF THE SOUL, THERE CAN BE NO NON INCLUSION OF IT. * (Sū. 23.)

Bhāṣya on Sū. 23.

[P. 74, ll. 8-9.]

Cognition is a characteristic feature of the Soul, because it is its quality; † and (as has been said above, P. 73, l. 10) unless an object is in contact with something, there cannot be produced in it any such quality as can be produced by Contact. ‡ [Which shows that Soul-Contact is essential].

The *Vārṭika* explains somewhat differently: The Bhāṣya passage (P. 74, L. 6) embodies the Purvapakṣa question that—If the fact of Mind and Soul contact being a Cause of Perception is surer than that of Space &c. being so, then the said contact should be *mentioned* under Sū. 1-1-4 ('*upasankhyēyaḥ*' thus meaning 'should be mentioned'). The answer to this is that it is not necessary to mention the Contact of Mind and Soul, because they are already *implied indirectly*: how the Soul-contact is implied is shown in Su. 24; and then comes the question—"If the contact of Mind and Soul is omitted in Su. 1-1-4 because it is implied implicitly, why should we not omit the Sense-object Contact also,—this also being implicitly implied?" And the answer to this is given in Su. 25.

The Translation adopts this latter interpretation. The *Bhāṣyachandra* also supports the view accepted in the translation. It says—प्रकारान्तरमाह तद्गुणो (विना-हेतुगुणो) आत्ममनःसन्निकर्षस्योक्तिरापतिता । 'उपसंख्येयः' इत्यस्य । 'वस,' पूर्वपक्षिवचने तद्गुणस्वते ज्ञानमिति शेषः ।

* '*Ātmano' nāvarodhaḥ*' is the reading of several MSS., also the two Puri MSS. The *Nyāyasūchinibandha* and the Puri MS. of the Sūṭra-text read '*ātmano na anavarodhaḥ*.' What is meant is that *ātmā* is included (by implication); and this sense can be afforded by both readings. If we read '*na anavarodhaḥ*' we should explain it as *no non-inclusion*; and if we read simply '*anavarodhaḥ* we should explain it as *non-exclusion;* it is possible to take '*avarodhaḥ*,' as meaning *inclusion* as well as *exclusion*. The *Nyāyasūṭravivaraṇa* reads '*na anavabodhaḥ*', which also means 'there is no non-implication'; though in accordance with its own explanation of the entire Aḍhikaraṇa, the Vivarana explains it as '*na anyaṭhāsiḍḍhaṭvam*'—i.e., the presence of the Soul cannot be explained on the basis of any supposition other than that it is a Cause of Perception.

† What the Bhāṣya means by calling cognition a 'quality' of the Soul is that, inasmuch as Cognition appears only in the Soul, it must be regarded as its 'characteristic feature.'

‡ It is curious that this passage—*na chāsamyukṭē* &c.—which appears twice in the *Bhāṣya*, should be referred to as '*Sūṭra*' by the *Parishuḍḍhi*.

Vārṭika on Sū. 23.

[P. 206, L. 14 to P. 207, L. 1]

Cognition forming &c.—says the Sūṭra. It has been said above (Sū. 1-1-10) that Cognition is the characteristic feature of the Soul; in view of this fact, even though the Contact of the Soul has not been explicitly mentioned in the definition of Perception, its presence is to be inferred. Why should Cognition be regarded as a characteristic feature of the Soul? *Because it is its quality* (Bhā.) "But it is not proved that Cognition is a quality at all." What you mean is that,—When it is not proved that Cognition is a *quality*, how can it be proved that it is a quality of the Soul? But this contention of yours is not right; because as a matter of fact, Cognition (being a product) inheres in the Soul (which is an omnipresent substance), just as the qualities of Pleasure and the rest do;—and neither a Substance nor an Action can inhere in the Soul;—and it is a fact that like Pleasure &c., Cognition does inhere in the Soul;—hence Cognition (because it inheres in the Soul) cannot be either a Substance or an Action;—and it is fact that like Pleasure &c. Cognition inheres in the Soul;—hence it must be regarded as a quality, and of the Soul, not of Earth and the other substances; because it is self-apprehended (i. e. apprehended by Mental Perception);—as a matter of fact, we know that that Perception which is self-apprehended is not the quality of Earth &c., *e. g.* Pleasure, Pain &c; while that Perception which is apprehended by itself as well as by another Perception is the quality of Earth &c.; *e. g.* Colour &c.;—Cognition does not belong to this latter class;—hence it is a quality of the Soul. *

* The sense of the whole is thus explained in the *Ṭāṭparya*—Cognition is a feature of the Soul;—Cognition is a product, because, like the jar, it is ephemeral;—and because it is a product, it should, like the jar, inhere in some substance;—it cannot inhere in Earth, Water, &c., because it is amenable to mental perception, while that which inheres in Earth &c. is either not perceptible at all, or perceptible only by

Further, we have already provided the true explanation. "What explanation?" That it is not incumbent on the Sūṭra to enumerate every one of the many causes of Perception [hence the omission of Soul-contact in the Sutra 1-1-4 is not a defect]. *

Vār : P.207.

Sūṭra (24).

NOR† IS THERE A NON-INCLUSION OF THE MIND, AS THE NON-SIMULTANEITY OF COGNITIONS IS INDICATIVE OF IT. (Sū. 24).

Bhāṣya on Sū. 24.

[P. 74, ll. 11-12].

The 'non-inclusion' of the preceding *Sūṭra* is to be construed here also. It having been already declared (under Sū. 1-1-16) that the non-simultaneity of cognitions is indicative of the Mind, it follows from this that when cognition is brought about by *Sense-object contact*, the latter is dependent upon (and helped by) the *contact of Mind*.‡

Vārṭika on Sū. 24.

[P. 207, l. 1 to l. 24].

Question:—"Why is Mind-contact not mentioned in the definition of Perception?"

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means of other kinds of Perception;—Cognition is not of this latter kind;—hence it should inhere in a substance other than Earth, Water, Air, Fire, Akasha, Time, Space and Mind;—and yet that in which it subsists must be a substance, as like Ākāsha this substratum shall be the material or constituent cause of the cognition;—that this substratum should be an omnipresent Substance has already been proved in the section on *Soul*;—from all this it follows that Cognition is a quality inhering in the ninth substance, Soul;—now this Soul, unless it is in contact with something, can not produce Cognition; for if Cognition were not dependent for its appearance upon any such occasional thing as *contact*, then Cognitions would be eternal, which is absurd; hence every Cognition must stand in need of the contact with Soul. This Soul-contact, therefore, thus forming a necessary element in Cognition, is implicitly implied; and it was not found necessary to mention it explicitly in the Sūṭra—*Ṭāṭparya*.

* This is the real answer to the Pūrvapakṣa; the answer, that the omission is due to the fact that Soul-contact is implicitly implied, and hence not mentioned in the Sūṭra,—is only a second bold answer—a *praudhirāḍa*, says the *Ṭāṭparya*.

† Those MSS. that omit the *na* in Su. 23, omit it here also.

‡ The *Bhāṣya-chandra* takes the next Sūṭra as a continuation of the Bhāṣya on Sūṭra 29.

For answer we have the Suṭra—'*Nor is there non-inclusion &c.*' It has been already explained that the non-simultaneity of cognitions is the indicative of Mind; and in view of this we have the (implied) inclusion of Mind also. [And being thus implied it need not be distinctly mentioned]. "This is not right, as the Sutra that declares the non-simultaneity of cognitions to be the indicative of Mind has an entirely different meaning (and purpose). You say that,—inasmuch as the non-simultaneity of cognitions is indicative of the Mind, the Mind also is a cause of cognitions; but this is not right; because of there being another meaning; the Sutra referred to by you has an entirely different meaning; it does not mean that Mind is the cause of Cognitions." [This is not what is directly mentioned by the Sutra in question; but] it is indirectly implied;—and further, the Mind is not self-sufficient (independent).* Even though the direct meaning of the Sūṭra is something different, it clearly implies what we have asserted, by reason of the peculiar character of the 'indicative' (mentioned in the Sūtra); it is true that the fact of the Mind being the cause of Cognitions is not directly mentioned in the Sutra, yet by the force of the peculiar character of the 'indicative' therein mentioned, that fact is indirectly implied. Further, the Mind is not self-sufficient; [and hence it cannot but stand in need of the Mind as one of its causes]; nor are the Eye and other organs independent (causes of cognition) [so that these organs also stand in need of the operation of the Mind]. [These two facts go to strengthen what is already implied by the 'indicative' mentioned in the Sūṭra, *i. e.* 'the non-simultaneity of cognitions']. [Thus then as Mind-Contact is already clearly implied, there was no need of its being mentioned directly].

* As it stands the words embodying the answer are highly aphoristic; 'अन्यार्थे' and 'न हि कारणं स्वतन्त्रम्' are two phrases succinctly stating the answer; and each of these phrases is explained later on, the former in l. 9, and the latter in l. 11.

Sūṭra (25).
(The Final Siḍḍhānṭa).

INASMUCH AS IT IS ONLY* THE CONTACT OF THE SENSE-ORGAN AND THE OBJECT THAT FORMS THE (DISTINCTIVE) CAUSE (OR FEATURE†) OF PERCEPTION, IT HAS BEEN MENTIONED (IN THE SŪṬRA) BY MEANS OF WORDS DIRECTLY EXPRESSING IT.‡—Sū. (25).

Bhāṣya.
[P. 75, Ll. 1—2].

[The question now arises—" Just as Mind-contact is not mentioned directly because it is indirectly implied, in the same manner, the Sense-object contact is also implied ; and as such why should this be mentioned ?"—The answer is given in the Sūṭra, as follows]—The contact of the Mind and of the Soul is the (common) cause of Perception, as well as Inferential, Analogical and Verbal Cognitions; while the contact of the Sense-organ with the Object is the distinctive cause of *Perception only*; thus the two do not stand on the same footing; and being thus differently circumstanced from the other contacts, the Sense-object contact has been directly mentioned in the Sutra.§

Vārṭika on Sū. 25.
[P. 207, ll. 12—21.]

Question—" Why then is the Sense-object contact mentioned, and not the cȯntact of the Soul with the Mind, or that of the Sense-organ with the Mind ?"

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* '*Cha*' means 'only' says the *Bhāṣyachanḍra.*

† The *Bhāṣyachanḍra* explains '*nimiṭṭa*' as '*lakṣaṇa*'.

‡ This Sūṭra is not found in the Puri manuscript of the Sūṭra-text; but everywhere else it appears as a distinct Sūṭra ; and as it embodies the final *Siḍḍhanṭa*, and as such is the most important aphorism of the *Siḍḍhanṭa*, the omission in the Puri Ms. must be a mistake. The *Bhāṣyachanḍra* also appears to treat it as part of the *Bhāṣya.*

§The *Ṭāṭparya* adds—If nothing was mentioned, and everything was left to be implied, we would have no definition at all of Perception ; it is necessary therefore to make use of some words expressing some fact that would serve as the definition. Now it is necessary to mention the Sense-object contact, because it applies to all cases of Perception ; and the other two contacts, of the Mind and of Soul, are not mentioned, (1) because they do not apply to all Perceptions (see Sū. 26), and (2) because they apply to other kinds of cognition also. This is the final Siḍḍhānṭa on the question under discussion. [*Final—i. e.* according to the Sūṭra, adds the *Parishuḍḍhi*].

The answer is given in the *Sūṭra—Inasmuch as the contact &c. &c.* The Sense-object contact is the cause of Perception only, while that of the Mind and Soul is the cause of Perception as well as of other kinds of Cognition.

"But the Sense-Mind contact, being similar to the Sense-object contact, should have been mentioned. If the Mind-Soul contact is not mentioned simply because it is common (to Perception and other kinds of cognition),—then certainly the Mind-Sense contact should be mentioned, as this is as peculiar to Perception only as the Sense-object contact."

But we have already pointed out that the Sūṭra is not meant to be an exhaustive enumeration of *all* causes of Perception. It is not the purpose of the Sūṭra that all the causes peculiar to Perception should be mentioned; it is only this that no such cause should be mentioned as is common to other cognitions [and some such cause as is peculiar to Perception should be mentioned for the purpose of defining what Perception is].

Sūṭra (26).

ALSO BECAUSE, IN THE CASE OF PERSONS WHOSE MIND IS PREOCCUPIED, * (PERCEPTION IS HELD TO BE) BROUGHT ABOUT BY MEANS OF THE CONTACT OF THE SENSE-ORGAN AND THE OBJECT (ONLY).†— SU. 26.

Bhāṣya on Su. (26).
[P. 75, l. 5 to L. 16].

We have (in the definition of 'Perception') the mention of the Sense-object contact, and not that of Mind-Soul contact,—*also because* &c. &c. (A) Sometimes a man goes to sleep after having determined that he would wake up at a certain

* सुप्त and व्यासक्त both qualify मनस्; सुप्तमनसामिति ध्यानस्थानां व्यासक्तमनसामिति व्यापृतानाम्—Says the *Tāṭparya*. So also the *Bhaṣyachandra*, which explains the compound as follows—सुप्तं पुरीतद्वर्तिचित्तात्मसंयुक्तं 'व्यासक्तं' मनोऽन्यासक्तं येषां तेषाम्—'Whose mind is either in contact with the Soul which has retired into the innermost artery of the '*Purīṭaṭ*', or applied elsewhere.'

† Ordinarily we should have the compound in the form इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षनिमित्तत्वात्. But इन्द्रियार्थयोः is purposely separated—'in order to show that it is these alone whose contact is the *most effective of all.*'—says the *Parishuddhi*.

time,—and by force of this determination (which gives rise to the effort necessary for bringing about the requisite Mind-Soul Contact) he wakes up at that time; but sometimes it happens that during sleep he is awakened either by a very loud sound or by a forcible shaking; and in these cases the waking Cognition (of Sound and Touch) by the sleeping man is brought about (primarily) by the Contact of the Sensé-organ; so that predominance belongs, not to the contact of either the Cognising Soul or the Mind, but to the Contact of the Object with the Sense-organ; because in such cases there is no *desire to know** on the part of the Soul, to give rise to his effort which could urge the Mind and bring it into Contact with him [and it is only when this happens that Mind-Soul contact is possible]. (B) In other cases what ordinarily happens is that when the man, though having his Mind entirely occupied with the Cognition of one thing, *desires* to Cognise (think of) another thing, there appears his effort, which brings about the contact of his Mind with that thing, of which he then becomes duly Cognisant [and in this case we have the Contact of the Mind and of the Soul also]. Now in the case in which the man having his Mind entirely preoccupied, there appears in him a Cognition brought about by the (forcible, sudden) impact of the Object, without any *desire* to *cognise* or mental effort on his part,† —the contact of the Sense-organ with the *Object* is the principal cause of the Cognition; as in this case there is no *desire to cognise* on the part of the man, and hence no effort, which could urge the Mind (into Contact with the undesirable object). And because it is the principal cause, it is the Sense-object contact that should be mentioned (in the definition of Perception),—and not the Mind-Soul contact, which is only a subordinate factor.

Vārṭika on Sū. (26).

[P. 208, Ll. 1—2].

This Sūṭra is meant to show that the Sense-object contact is the predominant factor (in the causes bringing about Perception). The rest is clear in the *Bhāṣya*.

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* 'This has been added with a view to exclude God from this category; as God does urge the Mind during deep sleep,—being helped in this by the destiny of the sleeping man.'—*Bhāṣyachandra*.

† When, for instance, a man walking along the street is struck by a runaway horse.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (27).

[P. 75, ll. 15—20].

There is another reason for regarding the Sense-object contact as the predominant factor—

Sūṭra (27).

AND ALSO BECAUSE INDIVIDUAL COGNITIONS ARE NAMED AFTER THESE. (Sū. 27.)

As a matter of fact we find that individual cognitions are named after the Sense-organs and the Objects concerned. "How so?" For instance, (*a*) when one smells with the olfactory organ, his Cognition is called '*olfactory* Cognition' and 'Cognition of *smell*;' (*b*) when he sees with the Visual-organ the Cognition is called '*visual* Cognition' and 'Cognition of *colour*;' (*c*) when he tastes with the Gestatory organ, the Cognition is called '*gestatory* Cognition' and 'Cognition of *taste*.' Further, Perception is held to be of five kinds, simply because of the number of Sense-organs and that of perceptible objects being each five-fold.—And all this goes to prove that in the bringing about of Perception, the Sense-object contact is the principal cause.

Vārṭika on Sū. (26).

[P. 208, ll. 3-7].

This Sūṭra supplies another reason for regarding the Sense-object contact as the principal cause. Inasmuch as whenever Perception appears, it is named after the Sense-organ and the Object; and we have found that things are named after the most important factor; *e. g.* a certain sprout is called the 'paddy-sprout' (because the *paddy* is the predominant factor).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (27).

[P. 75, L. 20 to P. 76, L. 9].

The Opponent says:—"It has been urged by the *Siḍ-*"*ḍhānṭin* (in Sū. 26) that the mention of *Sense-object Contact* "is necessary, and not of the *Mind-soul* Contact, because "in the case of the man whose mind is asleep or pre-occu-"pied, perception is brought about by the contact of the "Sense-organ with the object (only). But this—

"IS NOT A SOUND REASONING, AS IT INVOLVES SELF-CONTRADICTION."—(Sū. 28).

*" If you do not accept Mind-Soul contact to be the cause " of any Perception, this would be contradictory to what has " been said before (in Sū. 1-1-16) to the effect that *the non-" simultaneity of cognitions is indicative of the Mind*; as in " accordance with this latter statement, it is clear that Sense-" object contact stands in need of Mind-contact; for if " Mind-contact were not necessary, it would be possible for (all " five) cognitions to appear simultaneously. If, on the other " hand, with a view to avoid this self-contradiction, it be " held that of all cognitions the contact of the Mind and the " Soul is the cause, then our objection remains in force,— " that being the cause of cognitions, the Mind-Soul contact " should be mentioned (in the definition of Perception)."

Vārṭika on Sū. (28).
[P. 208, Ll. 8-19.]

" This Sūṭra is meant to be an objection against the last " three Sūṭras :—" The three Sūṭras—25, 26, and 27— " deny the fact of Mind-Soul contact being a cause of " Perception ; and this involves a contradiction of what you " yourself have just said in *Sūṭras* 23 and 24. And further, " if cognitions were independent of Mind-contact, it would " be possible to have a number of cognitions appearing " simultaneously ; which would be contrary to the well-known " fact (of cognitions being non-simultaneous). If then, in order " to avoid this self-contradiction, it be admitted that Cogni-" tions *are* brought about by Mind-Soul contact,—this will " reduce you to the same position in which you were asked " to explain why Mind-Soul contact had not been men-" tioned in the definition of Perception."

The answer to this objection has already been given. " What is that answer ?" That the Sūṭra in question is not intended to be an exhaustive enumeration of *all* causes of Perception ; it is meant to point out only that which is peculiar to Perception.

*The opponent imposes upon the Siḍḍhānṭin the view that Mind-Soul contact has nothing to do with Perception ; though in reality all that he has held is that it is not the principal cause—*Bhāṣyachanḍra*.

Sūṭra (29).

THERE IS NO SELF-CONTRADICTION; AS THE CASE WE HAVE CITED IS DUE TO THE SPECIAL FORCE OF A PARTICULAR OBJECT.—(Sū. 29).

Bhāṣya on Sū 29.

[P. 76, ll. 11-23.]

[The answer to the Pūrvapakṣa argument in Sū. 28, is as follows]—Our view does not involve a self-contradiction; for we do not deny that Mind-Soul contact is *a cause* of Perception;—all that we mean is that Sense-object contact is *the principal cause.* [As for the instance that has been cited by us in Sū. 26]—in the case of the man whose Mind is asleep or preoccupied, the cognition that appears sometimes is entirely 'due to the force of the particular object'; the term 'particular object' denotes a certain object of sense-perception; its 'force' stands for '*ṭībraṭā*', *intensity*, and '*paṭuṭā*', *vigour*; and this * 'force of the object' affects the Sense-object contact, and not the Mind-soul contact;† which shows that Sense-object contact is the more important of the two.

[An objection is raised]—"In the case where the Mind of the "man being asleep or pre-occupied, though there is no effort "and no desire on his part, the cognition that arises from the "Sense-object contact, must also have Mind-contact for "its cause (even though a subordinate one);—now it behoves "you to explain to what this action of the Mind is due?" ‡

[The answer to the above is as follows]—Just as (in a case of ordinary cognition) what urges the Mind forward (to contact) is only that particular quality of the Soul which is called 'effort',§ and which is brought about by that cognitive Soul's Desire,—so, in all cases, what brings about the experience of the Soul is that quality of it

* The reading 'na' is wrong; '*ṭaṭ*', the reading of all other MSS., including both Puri MSS., is the correct one.

† According to the *Bhāṣyachandra*, the 'intensity' pertains to the perceived *object*, and 'vigour' to the *organ*,—both being included in the term '*arṭhariśheṣa*.'

‡ The Sense of the question is thus explained—"In a case where there is desire and consequent effort, it is these that give rise to that action in the Mind which brings about its contact; but to what is this action due, in a case where there is no effort or desire?"

§ प्रयत्नः is the correct reading, found in all MSS and also in the *Bhāṣyachandra* which adds that 'Effort' is called the 'urger' only in a figurative sense.

which is produced by the defects (of Passion &c.) in its activity [this quality being in the shape of '*Adriṣṭa*', 'Unseen Force', Destiny]; and it is by this quality that the Mind would be impelled (in cases where there is no Effort or Desire) and come into contact with the Sense-organ. If the Mind were not impelled by this quality, then (as there would be nothing else that could urge it into contact) there would be no contact of the Mind; and in the absence of such contact no cognition would appear; so that the said quality would fail to be universally effective (in regard to all Substances, Qualities and Actions);—and yet it is essential that this particular quality of the Soul (*Adriṣṭa*) should be all-effective towards Substances, Qualities and Actions; for otherwise, as their would be nothing else to give rise to the (initial) activity (motion) of the four minutely material atoms, or of the Minds (at the beginning of Creation), there would be no possibility of any such thing being produced as the Body, the Sense-organs and the Objects.*

Vārṭika on Sū. (29).

[P. 208, l. 17 to P. 209, l. 13].

Vār : P. 209.

The three *Sūṭras* (25, 26 and 27) are '*not* &c. &c.' says the Sūṭra. The meaning is that these three Sūṭras are not meant to deny the fact of Mind-Soul contact being a cause (of Perception); they simply point out the predominant character of Sense-object contact;

* According to the Nyāya theory, at the beginning of Creation in each *Kalpa*, there arises an activity among the permanent atoms of Earth, Fire, Water and Air; by virtue of which activity in the shape of *motion*, the atoms proceed to combine in various ways and thus evolve into several material objects;—similarly there is an activity in the the Minds of the Souls; and this activity brings about the several other qualities, and thence the experiences—happy and unhappy—of the Souls. And all this is due to the Unseen Force attendant on each Soul, as the effect of his good and evil deeds in the past *Kalpa*; so that each Soul becomes endowed with such bodies and organs as would lead him to undergo the happy and unhappy experiences in accordance with his past deeds. Now, if there were no such impelling force as the said Unseen Force, there would be nothing that could give rise to the said initial activity among the atoms and the Minds. And until the Mind is got at, it cannot produce either the experiences, or the objects of experience, happiness &c., or the cause of these in the shape of *cognition*. It is essential therefore that the Unseen Force should be regarded as the impelling force of the Mind in all cases. If it be held to be incapable of impelling the Mind, the Unseen Force would fail to produce any Substances, Qualities or Actions at all.

and certainly that which points out this predominance does not necessarily deny the fact of Mind-Soul contact being a cause.

The Opponent—"*It behoves you to explain to what this* "*action of the Mind is due* (Bhā. P. 76, l. 17). From what "you have said (in Sū. 26) in regard to certain cognitions "of the man who is asleep or has his Mind preoccupied "being due to the Sense-object contact, it follows that the "contact of Mind also is a cause; and it is necessary for you "to explain to what is due the action of the Mind (where its "contact is brought about)."

Our answer to the above is that what brings about the required action of the Mind is the Unseen Force,—this Force being the cause of the Soul's experiencing of pleasure and pain; that is, just as Action in the Soul is produced by a distinct quality of it, in the shape of Effort, which latter is brought about by Desire,—in the same manner there is in the Soul a Faculty called 'Merit-Demerit' (which is what constitutes the 'Unseen Force'); and it is impelled by this Faculty that the Mind comes into contact with a thing, or becomes disjoined from it. If the Mind were not impelled by this Force, then, as there would be no other cause for its action,—this Force *would fail to be universally effective.* And as a matter of fact, apart from Merit-Demerit, there can be no other cause for any action in the Mind at the beginning (of Creation). Hence it is this 'Unseen Force' (*Dharma-Adharma*, Merit-Demerit) which should be accepted as the required cause (of the action of Mind).

[*Here ends the examination of the Definition of Perception*].

[Next proceeds the Examination of the nature of Perception itself].*

* 'Having examined the nature of Perception in the light of the definitions propounded by himself, the Author now proceeds to examine it in the light of that put forward by others.—*Bhāṣyachandra.*

'The definition of Perception having been examined, we proceed to examine the nature of the object of the definition'—*Parishuḍḍhi.*

Sūṭra (30).

Pūrvapakṣa—" PERCEPTION IS ONLY INFERENTIAL COGNITION,—AS IT IS A COGNITION THAT PROCEEDS FROM THE COGNITION OF A COMPONENT PART."—(Sū. 30)*

Bhāṣya on Sū. 30.

[P. 77, L. 2 to L. 12.]

[The Pūrvapakṣin says]—" The cognition—' this is a tree' " —arising from the contact of the object and the sense-organ " is what is called (by you) ' Perception '. But (according to " us) this is only an *Inference.* How so ? Because the " (said) cognition of the *tree* proceeds from the apprehension† " of one of its parts. When the observer cognises the tree " what he actually *perceives* is only its part nearest to " himself; and certainly that *one part* is not the ' tree'. " So that (when the man cognises the ' tree ') what happens " is that there is an inference of it (from the perception of its " one part), just like the inference of *fire* from the appre- " hension of *smoke.*"

[The Siḍḍhānṭin meets the *Pūrvapakṣa* with a question]—What is that *something* different from the perceived part, which you regard as being the object of *Inference* (and *not* of *Perception*) ?

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* In place of डुपलब्धे the *Parishuḍḍhi* reads दुपलब्धे ; and so also the Puri Ms. of the Sūṭra text. Every other Ms. reads 'डु'. When we are said to *see* the tree what really happens is that we actually *see* only one of the component parts of the *tree*; and from this we *infer* the presence of the *tree* as a composite whole. So that the cognition of the ' tree ' is purely inferential.

The entire *Pūrvapakṣa* is thus summed up in the *Tāṭparya*—" There is no such thing as a *composite whole*, something different from its component parts ; it is the component parts alone that have a real existence. What happens is that we actually *see* a few of these parts, and from that we infer the existence of other component parts, which are the concomitants of those that have been perceived ; and then combining both these cognitions—the former perception being recalled by force of memory—we come to have the cognition of the 'tree' as consisting of those parts ;—So that what is called the ' perception of the tree ' is a purely inferential cognition ; and hence the classification of the Pramāṇas provided by the Sūṭra under 1-1-3 turns out to be defective."

† The *Bhāṣyachanḍra* explains *ēkaḍēshagrahaṇāṭ* as 'brought about by the *contact* of one part' ; but this will not make the Cognition 'Inference,' which is Cognition proceeding from another *Cognition*

[The Opponent answers]—"There are two views in regard "to the constitution of *Objects*: By one view an object is "only a conglomeration of certain component parts; while "by the other it is a distinct *Composite Substance* produced "(out of its component parts);—now according to the former "view, what is *inferred* from the apprehension of one part "are the other component parts (other than the one "that is perceived); while according to the other view, "what is *inferred* are those other parts as well as the Com- "posite whole made up of the parts."

[Now the *Siddhāntin* urges his real objection against the *Pūrvapakṣa* view]—(*a*) According to the view that the *object* is only a conglomeration of parts,—it would not be possible for any cognition of the 'tree' to proceed from the apprehension of any one part; for just as the perceived *part* is not the 'tree', so the *unperceived part* also is not the 'tree'. [So that the inference of the unperceived part cannot be regarded as the 'cognition of the tree', which thus becomes impossible]. "What happens is that from the apprehension of one *part* proceeds the inference of another *part*; and this is followed by a remembrance of all the conglomerated parts; which brings about the cognition of the 'tree'." In that case the 'cognition of the *tree*' can not be called *inferential* [as it would be pure *remembrance*].

(*b*) According to the other view,—that the object is a *composite substance* made of its component parts,—it would be impossible for the composite whole to be *inferred*; for (even according to you) if the composite *whole* is to be *inferred* from the apprehension of a part, there must be a previous *perception* of that whole as related * to that part [as without the perception of such relation no inference would be possible];—and if the Composite whole is *perceived*, then, being as much perceived as the *one part*, it cannot be held to be an object of *inference*.

Thus the conclusion is that the cognition of the 'tree' cannot be regarded as *inferential*.

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* सम्बद्धस्य ग्रहणात् is the better reading, as found in the *Bhāṣyachandra*, in the Puri, MSS. and in two other MSS.; it gives better sense, as translated above. The reading as found in the printed text may be explained as follows—'The relation between the whole and the part is *not perceived*; if this relation were *perceived*, the *whole* would also be *perceived*, just as the part is perceived.'

Vārṭika on Sū. 30.

[P. 209, L 14 to P.] 215, L. 15.

The objections against the definition of Perception having been answered, the Pūrvapakṣa raises the question of Perception being included under Inference—

" *Perception is only Inferential Cognition*;—i.e. the cognition in the form 'this is a tree', arising from the contact of the sense-organ and the object, is called 'Perception'; but as a matter of fact this is only Inference. Why? *As it is a cognition that proceeds from the cognition of a component part*;—i.e. it is only on perceiving a part of the tree that the observer cognises the 'tree'; and

Var. P. 210.

certainly that *part* is not the *tree*; so that, just as the cognition of one thing proceeding from the cognition of another thing is *Inferential*, so also the cognition of the tree proceeding from the cognition of the part must be regarded as *inferential*; the cognition of the *tree* proceeding from the cognition of the *part* is exactly like the cognition of *Fire* proceeding from the cognition of *smoke*."

To the above we make the following reply:—The above contention is not right; as none of the several alternatives possible under that contention is admissible. The contention is that (when one cognises the *tree*) what happens is that from the cognition of the *part* he cognises something else;—now we ask, what is this 'something else' which is cognised from the cognition of the *part*? The answer is—" *There are two views in regard to the constitution of objects; by one view the object is only a conglomeration of certain component parts, while by the other it is a distinct composite substance produced out of the parts; according to the former view what is inferred from the perception of the part would be the other component parts; while according to the other view what is inferred are the parts as well as the composite whole made*

up of those parts (*Bhāṣya*, P. 77, L. 6)". Now the meaning of this explanation can be only the following—(a) If your original contention refers to that conception of 'tree' whereby it is only a conglomeration of the several parts, then, by the explanation you have provided, the concept 'tree' would apply to the parts other than the one that happens to be perceived; and (b) if you accept the other view—whereby the 'tree' is a distinct Substance (composed of the parts), then, by your explanation, the concept 'tree' would pertain to that *distinct substance*, as also to those other parts which are hidden by (lie behind) the front part (which is perceived). Such being your meaning, we ask—what is it that is cognised from the cognition of the part (?) (A) The *other parts*? (B) Or the *distinct substance*?

[A] Now, according to the view that the object is only a conglomeration of parts, the very conception of 'tree' would be impossible; because those *other parts* are as far from being the 'tree' as the *front part* perceived; i.e. just as the *front part* is not the 'tree', so also the central and hinder parts are not the 'tree'. Such being the case, according to this view, the conception of 'tree', whenever it arises, would arise only with regard to what is *not-tree*; and as such it would be baseless. Further, there can be (for you) no such things as the 'front part' the 'middle part' and the 'hind part'; because 'part' is a name for the *component factor*, and for one who does not admit of a distinct *composite substance*, the term '*component* factor' can have no meaning, 'front part' and 'hind part' are *component* factors; and these are not possible if you deny the *composite* substance. If you urge that the name 'part' is given to *ēka-ḍēsha, one place*,—we ask, what is this 'one place'? A *place* is only a container, a receptacle; and hence in the present instance, the only thing of which the *place* could be the receptacle is the *composite substance*; so that when you deny

the composite substance, you deny also the 'one-place'. "What we mean by certain things being *component parts* is that they co-exist in one place and in constant juxta-position." What a wonderful insight into the nature of (a) words and (b) things you evince,—when you assert (b) that though not being causes and effects, they co-exist in constant juxta-position, or (a) that they do not help one another, and are yet called 'component parts'! This is certainly most wonderful !*

Some people (as the *Bhāṣya* points out, on P. 77, ll. 8-9) hold that—" when one *perceives* the front part, he *infers* from it the hind part, and then there arises the conception of 'tree' with regard to the tree,—this conception being the result of the remembrance (of the several parts perceived and inferred. But under this view any conception of 'tree' would be an impossibility. "Why?" Because neither the 'front part' nor the 'hind part' is the 'tree'; and certainly no conception of the 'tree' could ever arise from the remembrance of what is not the tree. Further, under this view, no inference is possible; *i. e.* when you say that, having perceived the front part the observer *infers* the hind part,—we fail to recognise the exact Subject of this infer-

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* Clever insight into the nature of *things* is shown when you assert that they are not causes and effects and yet they are in juxta-position, for such juxta-position is possible only in the following cases:—either when a number of causes co-operate towards a single effect,—*e.g.*, when the clay, the potter's wheel, the revolving stick &c. co-operate towards a common product in the shape of the jar,—or when a number of effects are produced by a single set of causes,—*e g.* when the colour, taste, and odour of the Jar are produced along with the Jar by the set of causes that produces the Jar,—or when of the two one is cause and the other effect,—*e.g.* in the case of fire and smoke. Hence it is an absurdity to say that certain things are neither causes nor effects and are yet in juxta-position. 'Insight into the nature of words' is shown by calling such things 'component parts.' As a matter of fact, what are *component parts* are so called because they help each other in supporting (constituting) the composite substance; when there is no such substance, there can be no such help; and in that case the things concerned cannot be called 'component parts'.—— *Tātparya.*

ence. "Why should it not be recognised?" [For the following reason]—If the inference is in the form—'this is a tree, because it has a front part'—the question arises—What is that 'tree' of which 'having the front part' is predicated as a qualification? As a matter of fact, for one who does not admit the existence of a distinct *composite whole* (apart from its component parts), all that is perceived is merely the 'front part' (which forms the qualifying predicated qualification); and certainly until the *Object* (forming the Subject of which the qualification is predicated) is perceived, no inference is possible; and our opponent can never perceive any such object; for the simple reason that he does not admit the existence of any. [Nor only is the Subject of your inference unrecognisable] It is also not possible to have any such inference as you propound; as in an Inference there is no such 'remembrance' as you assert; as a matter of fact no such remembrance is ever found in an inference; that is to say, in a case of Inference (of fire from smoke, for instance), the observer, on merely perceiving the qualifying Smoke, and not having cognised the qualified Fire, can never have any such remembrance as 'this is smoke, this is fire'* Then again, [even if such a remembrance were possible] after such a remembrance there could be no such inference as 'Fire must be here'; because such inference would be entirely unnecessary; under the circumstances you mention, the inference would be absolutely futile; as the Fire will have been already cognised as forming a factor of the said Remem-

* The *Tātparya* construes the passage thus—ज्ञातधूमः सन् धूमेन अनुपलभ्य अग्नि अनुमानेन धूमविशेषणत्वेनाग्निमपश्यन् प्रतिसन्धत्ते &c. The meaning would then be 'the observer, not knowing the Fire, and having inferred the 'Fire as qualifying the smoke, never has such a remembrance.' But it appears better to interpret the passage as in the translation; the construction in this case being simple.—ज्ञातधूमः सन् धूमम् अग्निम् (अग्निं वाऽग्निम्) अनुपलभ्य (अज्ञात्वा) केवलं धूमरूपम् अस्य विशेषणं प्रतिसन्ध (ज्ञात्वा) प्रतिसन्धत्ते.

brance.* For these reasons the conclusion is that in the Inference no such Remembrance is possible. Even if there were a Remembrance, this Remembrance could not be in regard to any *composite whole*; for instance, it could not be in regard to any such object as the 'tree'. By perceiving one *component* part the observer comes to recognise, not any *composite* whole—not any such object as 'tree'—but only the other *component* parts. "Why so?" Simply because no *composite whole*, apart from the component parts, is admitted; *i. e.*, you do not admit the existence of any *composite* whole, apart from the *component* parts. And certainly there can be no inference of a *composite* whole, which is a non-entity. Further, on perceiving the front part, what else would the observer *infer*? "The inference would be in the form—'This front part has a hind part'." No such inference would be right; as it is not possible for the *front part* to have (be possessed of) the *hind part*; certainly it is not the *front part* that

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is possessed of the *hind part*; as a part cannot belong to another part; one *part* cannot have another *part*. If you do admit of one *part* belonging to another *part*, then this latter becomes a *whole*, a *composite* (composed of that other part); so that in this case, to say (as you do) that the cognition of this *composite* is *inferential* would be wrong; as both are *perceived* (as you yourself assert); *i. e.* both, the *front* part and the *composite* (in the form of the *hind* part) are *perceived*; according to our view, it would be quite right to infer, from the perception of the *front* part, the presence of the *hind* part, as belonging to a *composite* whole (composed of both these parts); but under your view, as all that you admit of are the *component* parts only, no such inference would be possible. Further, the 'perception of the front part' (which you put forward as the basis of your inference)

* Or (according to the *Tātparya* interpretation, noted above) 'the *Fire* will have been already cognised as qualifying the smoke'.

cannot have the assistance of any remembrance of the relation (of concomitance) between the Probans and the Probandum; as there can be no perception of the 'front part' and 'the hind part' *as related to one another*; your observer can never perceive the relation between the 'front part' and the 'hind part', for the simple reason that (under your theory) the two 'parts' are not related at all [the only relation possible being through a common 'Composite' consisting of those 'parts'];—and until there is *perception* (of the relation) there can be no *remembrance* (of it); and the mere perception of the Probans (*viz.* the 'front part'), without the remembrance (of its relation to the Probandum, the 'hind part') cannot constitute 'Inference.' "But why should the man not perceive the front and hind parts as related to each other?" For the simple reason that the hind part is always hidden from view by the front part; as a matter of fact, whenever one sees a thing, he sees only its front part; the hind part is nowise seen; being, as it is, hidden by the front part. "It is true that *both* are not seen; but the two are certainly related to each other." True, they are related (we grant this for the sake of argument); but even so, your inference is impossible; as *both* are not *seen* [and hence even though it be there, the *relation* between the two can not be perceived, unless *both* the relatives are perceived]. Then again, between the front part and the hind part, there is no possibility of any such relation as that between the *Dharma*, *predicate*, and the *Dharmin*, *subject*; and hence no inference is possible; whenever there is Inference, what happens is that from the cognition of one thing as predicated of the *subject* there is an inference of another thing predicated of it; but in the case in question, the *hind part* can not be the predicate of the *front part*, nor is the *front part* the predicate of the *hind part*; hence there can be no such inference as you have propound-

ed. Then again, the Pūrvapakṣin has said (*Bhāṣya* P. 77, L. 9) that "the cognition of the *tree* proceeds from remembrance, &c. &c."; and this is not right; as the 'tree' (as a composite whole, is a thing which you hold to be wholly unknown (and non-existent); and hence no 'remembrance' of it is possible. 'Remembrance' or 'Recognition' is that cognition appearing in regard to a thing which is accompanied by a previous cognition; as for instance, one has a 'recognition' or 'remembrance' of himself in the form 'I am the person by whom the colour of this thing had been perceived and by whom its taste is now perceived'; according to your view then, *after* the *hind part* had been (previously) inferred from the perception of the *front part*, the only 'remembrance' that would be possible would be that of these two

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parts themselves,—'the front part and the hind part' [as it is these that have been apprehended previously],—whence then could there arise the Cognition of the 'tree'? * Neither the 'front part' nor the 'hind part' can be the 'tree'; so that even if the conception of 'tree' could arise in regard to the 'front part' and the 'hind part'—which are *not* the 'tree'—such a conception would be the cognition of a thing as what it is not; and such a cognition (being manifestly *wrong*) could not proceed from (valid) Inference; as Inference is a form of *Right* Cognition, and Right Cognition always apprehends things as they really are.'† Then again, every wrong cognition,—where a thing is cognised as *something*

* The 'remembrance' theory has been already refuted before (*Vārṭika*, P. 211, L. 1); but there it was shown that even though the 'tree' is there, inasmuch as the *parts* are not the 'tree,' the cognition of 'tree' could not arise from the remembrance of the parts. On the present occasion the argument is that the 'tree' being a non-entity, according to the Bauḍḍha Pūrvapakṣin, the remembrance or recognition of the 'tree' cannot pertain to the parts—*Ṭāṭparya*.

† The *Ṭāṭparya* adds—"How a mistaken Inference cannot be regarded as Pramāṇa, we have already shown in Adh. I,"—'when we explained that every one of the Inferential Factors should represent an actual *right Cognition*'—adds the *Parishuḍḍhi*.

else, which it is not,—appears in the form of (and in accordance with) the more important thing (*viz.* that 'something else' *as* which the thing is perceived); so that when the 'front part' and 'hind part' are cognised *as the* '*tree*' (which they are not), this conception of the tree forms the predominant factor; as a matter of fact however, there can be no cognition of a thing as what it is not, unless the observer has some notion of the general character (of the mistaken thing), and unless he imposes upon it a character different from its own; and for you that which forms the predominant factor is non-existent,—the 'tree' (according to you) having no existence [and hence there can be no cognition of its general character or the imposition upon it of a character other than its own]. Thus then the conclusion is that the conception of the 'tree' cannot arise from Inference and Remembrance.

For similar reasons, the notions of 'front part' and 'hind part' also should be rejected. For one who does not admit of the existence of a *composite whole* there can be no 'front *part*' or 'hind *part.*' "Why?" Because it is only when there is a large composite object within range of Perception that the side which hides from view one side of that object comes to be called the 'front part' and that which is hidden from view is called the 'hind part'; nor do you accept any such *composite* object as would, by itself (irrespectively of an object composed of it), be called 'front part' or 'hind part.'* "But the notions of the 'front part,' the hind part,' the 'tree' and the like pertain only to atoms arranged (combined) in those particular manners". Your meaning is as follows—"We do not accept any *composite* substances; but the terms 'front part,' 'hind part' and 'tree' apply to the same atoms which,

* The words '*arvāgbhāga*' and '*parabhāga* may be taken as Bahuvrīhi compounds,—'that which has the front for its part' &c. In that case the sentence should be translated as—'you do not accept any composite substance whose parts could be named as *front* and *hind.*'

by mutual juxtaposition, happen to be arranged in a particular manner in particular positions "—But this is not right; as (for you) the term 'that particular manner' can have no meaning*; in the phrase 'combined in that particular manner', the term 'that' being purely relative in its character, can be used only in connection with something previously known;—[Now what is this known thing that could be referred to by the term 'that'? Is it the mere form of the atoms? or their close juxtaposition? or a particular kind of combination? or a particular kind of production? If it refers only to the form of the atoms, then as the earth-atoms have the same form in all earthly objects, you should have the notion of 'tree' in regard to the *jar* also! If a particular form of the atoms be meant, then any particular tree would cease to be 'tree' after a moment, as, according to you, every object has but a momentary existence. Secondly, if it refers to the close juxtaposition of the atoms, you have this juxtaposition in the *jar* also, just as well as in the tree. Or, in fact, no such juxtaposition would ever be possible, as between every pair of atoms you have their odour, taste, colour and touch. Thirdly, as you do not admit of conjunction, how can there be any difference among the atoms due to that? Lastly, as for *production*, there can be no production for the *atoms* apart from their *form*] †. Then again, there is no ground for the applying to the atoms of such terms as 'front' and 'hind', as there is in the case of the *cow*, which being known, we have such expressions as 'the gavaya is of *that* form'.‡

* Read 'अनभिधानात्' according to the *Tātparya* and the Benares edition.

† This argument, from line 7 above, is merely indicated in the *Vārtika* in an aphorisitic manner; the *Tātparya* has elaborated it; this elaborated argument has been embodied in the translation.

‡ If the Bauddha had admitted of the real existence anywhere of such particular combinations as are called 'front' and 'hind,' then on the basis of that, he could say that the part of the *tree*,—front, for instance,—is of *that* (well-known) form. But he cannot admit of any such; as atoms are the only thing admitted; and these have no *parts*.—*Tātparya*.

[The second alternative noted on P. 210, l. 11, is next taken up: Is it a *distinct substance* that is cognised from the cognition of the *parts* ?]—It has thus been shown that there can be no conception of the 'tree' under the view that the *tree* is only a conglomeration of parts; now as regards the view that a distinct substance is produced (in the shape of the 'tree'), that there can be such substance can not be cognised (only) by Inference; as it is distinctly *perceptible*,— being, just as amenable to perception as the *front part* itself (from whose perception you would derive the inferential cognition of the 'tree'). That is to say, just as the 'front part,' on coming into contact with the sense-organ, is cognised by Perception, so also would the *tree*; which latter therefore cannot be held to be amenable to Inference (only). If, even though in contact with the organs of perception, the tree were known by Inference only, then, like the tree, the 'front part' also should be regarded as amenable to Inference only; and this would be a direct contradiction of what you have asserted—that 'the observer cognises the tree by inference after having *perceived* the *front part*'. If (in order to meet this difficulty) it be held that all things are amenable to Inference only, then, this would mean that no Inference is possible; as the *Subject* of the inference would not be cognised by Perception; and until the *Subject* is cognised by Perception, there can be no Inference in regard to it. People have spoken of the inference of such things as are beyond the reach of the Senses; but in fact, no such inference is possible; as no supersensuous object can ever be inferred. "Why?" Because the Subject would, in that case, be unknown, as we have already pointed out. "If every Inference must be preceded by Perception, what would be the difference between the *Sāmānyaṭodṛiṣṭa* inference and the Inference based upon Inference?" The difference between the two is this:—The Inference based on Perception appears when three things are know-

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i. e. on the perception of the Probandum, the Probans and the Subject. That is to say, the observer having previously perceived every one of the things that constitute the three terms of the subsequent inference—*i. e.* the Middle term or Probans, the Major term or Probandum and the Minor term or Subject—when he happens to perceive again the Subject and the Probans, he infers the other predicate (*i. e.* the Probandum); [*e. g.* he has previously seen the Fire, the Smoke and the Mountain, and hence when he sees the Smoke and the Mountain, he infers the Fire]; and this Inference is said to be *preceded by Perception*;—on the other hand, when the observer has perceived only two—the *Probans* and the *Subject*—and from that he infers another predicate, which is absolutely imperceptible (and never perceived before), he has what is called the '*Sāmānyatodṛiṣṭa*' Inference. [*E. g.* We have *seen* that qualities are inherent in substances; where *inhering in substance* is the Probans; we then come to perceive *Desire*, which is a quality : and from the fact of all qualities being inherent in substances, we infer the fact of Desire inhering in the substance, Soul, which is something not perceptible. *See Bhāṣya*, P. 19, L. 7-9]. Under your view (the theory of the Pūrvapakṣin), neither of these two kinds of Inference is possible; *i.e.* the cognition of the 'tree' cannot proceed either from a *Sāmānyatodṛiṣṭa* Inference, nor from an Inference preceded by Perception; as you do not admit of the existence of any such thing as would constitute the *Subject* (of the Inference), and also because you deny that there is any *perception* at all (of anything) [and it has been shown that the *perception of the Subject* is essential in both kinds of Inference].

Bhāṣya on Sū. (31).
[P. 77, L. 12 to P. 78, L. 12].

The Purvapaksin admits the cognition* of a part and then goes on to prove that Perception is only Inference; but this—

* The *Bhāṣyachandra* explains '*grahaṇa*' as 'perception'. But if the introductory sentence of the *Bhāṣya* meant that the Opponent admits the cognition to be 'perception', it would be a mere repetition of what the Sūtra says.

CANNOT BE; AS EVEN THAT COGNITION [FROM WHICH THE INFERENCE IS HELD TO PROCEED] IS ITSELF PERCEPTIONAL.* (Sū. 31).

Perceptional cognition cannot be regarded as Inferential. "Why" Because the apprehension is actually of the form of† Perception; *i. e.* the 'cognition of a component part; which has been accepted by the Pūrvapakṣin (as the basis of the inferential cognition of the object) is a cognition of the form of Perception; and that cognition could not be without an object; hence that object (the part of the tree) which would be apprehended by this cognition—being thus admitted to be *perceived*)—establishes the existence of Perception (as apart from Inference). "But what else is there apart from that object (*i. e.* the cognised component parts of the Tree) [which would be the subject of the cognition of the 'Tree'] ?" Well, there is the *composite whole*, or (if you do not accept such a *whole*) the conglomeration of the component parts. And [you cannot escape from this difficulty by holding that the initial cognition of the component part also is *inferential*; because] it is not possible to have an inferential cognition in the shape of cognition of the single component part; for the simple reason that there is no Probans whereby such an inference could be got at. [As such a Probans could only be in the form of the cognition of another part; and for proving this latter to be inferential yet another cognition would be required as the Probans, and so on *ad infinitum*; and this infinite regress makes the postulating of any such Probans impossible; so that the cognition of the component part cannot but be regarded as pure Perception].

There is yet another reason‡ why Perception cannot be regarded as Inference§; that is, because Inference is always preceded by (and based upon) Perception. As a matter of fact

* The *Tāṭparya* construes the Sū. thus—न प्रत्यक्षम् अनुमानमात्रम् (एकदेशग्रहणस्य सर्वात्मकस्य प्रत्यक्षम् एकदेशग्रहणानुपलब्धेः: प्रत्यक्षतो ग्रहणे तावदपि उपलब्धत्वात् प्रत्यक्षेण so that the 'cognition of the one part' being perceptional, this is a premiss which proves the contrary of your conclusion, which asserts that *all* Perception is Inference; while the very cognition that you put forward is perceptional! If, to escape from this, you say that there is no cognition of the part', then your premiss propounds an *unknown* Probans! You cannot escape from this dilemma!

† The *Bhāṣyachandra* explains this Instrumental in प्रत्यक्षेण as signifying अभेद *sameness*.

‡ '*Anyathā*' here stands for *anyahēṭunā*.

§ That is Perception can not be rejected on the ground of its being the same as Inference—*Bhāṣyachandra*.

Inference is preceded by Perception; for instance it is only when the observer has *perceived* fire and smoke to be related to each other, and again *perceives* smoke (in the Subject), that there is *Inference* in regard to Fire (which is not in contact with any sense-organ);—now here we find that no Inference can follow in the absence of the *perception* (in the *Example*) of the Probandum and Probans as related to each other, or in that of the (subsequent) *perception* (in the *Subject*) of the Probans by itself;*—and certainly these two *perceptions* cannot be regarded as *Inference*; for the simple reason that they are brought about by the contact of the Sense-organ with the object; and Inference does not proceed from any such contact of the object of inference with the Sense-organs. This is a great point of difference in the characters of Inference and Perception; and this cannot but be admitted.

Vārtika on Sū. (31).

[P. 214, L. 15 to P. 215, L. 11].

The Pūrvapakṣin has cited the reasoning—'as it is a cognition that proceeds from the cognition of a component part'; but the Probans here put forward is 'contradictory' (proving a contrary conclusion). "How so?" Because *that cannot be, as even that cognition &c. &c.*—says the *Sūtra*. When you say that 'Perception is Inference', you deny all Perception: and this denial is contrary to the assertion of the cognition (which is itself purely perceptional) of a component part (which is put forward as the basis of the Inference of the whole). "How?" Well, the 'cognition of a component part', which is accepted by you, is pure Perception; and this single *Perception* establishes our definition of *Perceptional Cognition*; for certainly we do not assert that everything is cognised by means of Perception; only that much is held to be the object of Perception which is apprehended by means of the contact of the Sense-organ with the object.

Vār: P. 215.

* Instead of [illegible] read [illegible] which is the reading of the Puri MSS. also. The reading adopted in the printed text is apparently wrong.

There are yet other arguments (against the *Pūrvapakṣa*): (1) Perception cannot be regarded as Inference, as there are several kinds of it; as a matter of fact we know that of Inference there are several kinds; while of Perception there are no such diverse kinds; this we have already pointed out while explaining the Sūṭra defining Inference (Sū. 1-1-5). (2) Then again, Inference pertains to all the three points of time (past, present and future); while Perception does not do so; we have Inferences with regard to objects past, present and future, while Perception pertains to objects present only.* (3) Further, Perception cannot be regarded as Inference, as Inference stands in need of the remembrance of the relation between the Probans and the Probandum; *i. e.* as a matter of fact the enunciation of the Major Premiss in reference to the Probans is brought about by the remembrance of the relation (of concomitance) between the Probans and the Probandum; in the case of Perception, on the other hand, no such remembrance is needed, for this reason Perception cannot be regarded as Inference.

(4) For the following reason also Perception cannot be regarded as Inference:—*Because Inference is always preceded by Perception* (Bhāsya, P. 78, L. 7). As a matter of fact Inference is preceded by Perception, and Perception is not preceded by Perception; this constitutes a point of difference between the two. (5) Further, Perception is connected with the Sense-organs; and that cognition which is called 'Inference' is *not* produced by the contact of Sense-organs with the object *inferred.*

Thus then it is clear that when the *Pūrvapakṣin* seeks to identify Perception and Inference, he loses sight of the above-mentioned well-ascertained points of difference between the two.

* With a view to the idea that the Yogin has direct perception of the past and future also, the *Tātparya* points out that what is meant is that while Inference pertains to things beyond the senses, Perception pertains to only those that are within their reach.

Sūṭra (32).

NOR IS THERE THE COGNITION OF ONE COMPONENT PART, AS THE COMPOSITE WHOLE IS ALSO THERE [AND THIS ALSO IS COGNISED].—SŪ.* (32)

Bhāṣya on Sū. (32).

[P. 78, L. 14 to P. 79, L. 12.]

[The *Author* points out another weak point in the *Pūrvapakṣa* argument of Sū. 30]—In no case is there a cognition of any single component part only; in fact there is cognition of one component part, and of the composite which is inseparable from (composed of) that component part. "Why so?" *Because there is the composite whole*; as a matter of fact there is the *composite whole*, which is distinct from the *component parts*: and when this *composite* occupies the same point in space as the component part, it should be amenable to all the conditions of perceptibility (to which the component part is amenable); and under the circumstances, when there is *perception* of the *component* part, it is not possible that there be no *perception* of the *composite*.†

"But there is no apprehension of all (the parts)." This is not right; as the 'one part' (of the composite whole) has no existence apart from its (constituent) cause. [The

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* This Sūṭra does not occur in the *Nyāyasūch'nibandha*. The *Sūṭra* text in the Puri Ms. makes it a Sūṭra; the *Ṭāṭparya* refers to it as '*Bhāṣya*'. The Sūṭra MS. *C* also reads it as *Sūṭra*. The *Nyāyasūṭraviviraṇa* contains a footnote by the editor wherein the theory is 'propounded that up to [illegible]' it is *Bhāṣya*, and अवयविसद्भावात् is *Sūṭra*; but there is no justification for this view available in any manuscript. Though we have all along followed the *Nyāyasūch'nibandha*, yet in the present instance, in view of the consensus of all available manuscripts of the *Sūṭra* text, we accept this as a *Sūṭra*; specially as such is the clear implication of the *Bhāṣya*-text that follows.

The *Bhāṣyachandra* takes this as Sūṭra; but it makes this Sūṭra the starting point of the next *Prakaraṇa*, that dealing with *Composite Wholes*. It takes the Sūṭra as an answer to the following theory of the *Bauḍḍha*, who denies the existence of *Composite Wholes*:—"What the Naiyāyika regards as the *composite whole* is only an *aggregate of atoms*; and as it is the atoms that are *perceived*, there is no need for the postulating of the *composite whole* as the object of Perception." The answer to this as formulated in the Sūṭra is that what is perceived is not the single component parts, but the *Whole* composed of these parts.

† *Being large* and *consisting of several component atomic molecules* constitute the conditions of perceptibility; and these are as much present in the composite as in the component part; so that it is not right to assert that while the part is *perceived* the whole is not perceived.

For [illegible] the Puri MS. B. reads [illegible] which is apparently wrong.

sense of the Purvapaksa argument now put forward is as follows]—"As a matter of fact, *all* the component parts are not perceived; some parts being hidden from view by other parts; and under the circumstances, the whole of the Composite (even if such Composite were admitted) could never be perceived; specially as the Composite does not subsist in its entirety in any of those parts that *are* perceived; so that the 'cognition of one part' still remains (as the cause of the inference of the entire Composite whole)."* But, says the Siḍḍhānṭin in answer to the above, the term 'entire' ('whole') is used only when (of several things) all are meant, and 'non-entire' (partial') is used when a few of them are left out (and only a few are meant); thus then both these terms ('entire' and 'non-entire') are applicable only to several things, which are perceived when not hidden, and are not perceived when hidden [and certainly the Composite is never hidden by its component parts]. You please answer the following question.—When the Composite is perceived, what of it is there which is not perceived, which could justify your assertion that there is cognition of only the part (and not of the *whole*)? Certainly, of the Composite whole there are no 'parts' apart from its constituent causes (its components); and it is not right to regard the *Composite* as of the same nature as the *component parts*. The character of the *Composite* is such that it is perceived as along with those parts that are perceived, and it is not perceived as along with those that are not perceived, on account of obstruction. Certainly this (perception and non-perception) does not bring about a diversity (in the Composite) †

* The argument is thus explained in the *Tātparya*—"The Siḍḍhānṭin has urged the perception of the composite whole as tending to reject the 'cognition of one part' which we have put forward as leading to the inference of the composite. But as a matter of fact, even if the composite were perceived, this would not mean that all its parts are perceived; for certain parts will remain hidden from view by certain other parts; nor can the composite itself, under the circumstances, be said to be perceived; as what are perceived are only a few of the parts; and certainly the composite does not subsist in its entirety in those parts; so that even though that much of it will be perceived which subsists in the perceived front part, there will be no perception of it in so far as it subsists in the unperceived hind part."

† The Opponent makes a distinction between the perceived and unperceived parts, and hence also between the Composite as subsisting in the perceived parts and that subsisting in the unperceived parts. But as a matter of fact, even though the composite is perceived along with the perceived parts, and not perceived along with the unperceived parts, yet this does not mean that the composite is different in the two cases; you may see a man with a sword, and not see him with a stick; but the man is the same in both cases.

[The Siddānṭin next takes up the view that the Composite is nothing but the conglomeration of component parts]—The *composite* 'Tree' (according to this view) would consist either —(a) in the entirety (multiplicity) of the components, or (b) in the conjunction (combination) of the components,—in either case apprehension of it would not be possible.* That is to say—(a) either the *composite* 'Tree' would consist in the entirety of the root, the trunk, the branch, the leaves and other components, or it would consist in the conjunction of these components; in either case any apprehension of the 'Tree' as a *composite* whole would be impossible; as, in the first place, certain parts (the back part, for instance) would always be hidden from view by the obstruction of other parts (for instance, the front part);—which would make it impossible for the parts to be apprehended *in their entirety*; and secondly, as for the *conjunction of the parts*, this also could not be apprehended, for the simple reason that all the conjuncts (parts) are not apprehended.

Thus then, the conclusion is that the cognition of the 'tree,' accompanying (and following from) the 'cognition of one part' can be explained only on the theory that the 'Tree' forms a distinct object (by itself, independently of the component parts),—and not on the theory (held by the Pūrvapakṣin) that it is a mere *conglomeration of the parts.*

Vārṭika on Sū. (32).

[P. 215, L. 13 to P. 219, L. 3.]

Nor is there the cognition of one component part, &c. &c.— says the Sūṭra. You (the Pūrvapakṣin) have asserted that the cognition of the 'tree' proceeds from the cognition of one part. This is not right; because as a matter of fact, *there is cognition of one component part and there is also the cognition of the composite composed of that part* (Bhāṣya P. 78, L. 13). When one component part is in contact with the sense-organ, the Composite also does not fail to be in contact

* According to the *Bhāṣyachandra*, up to this point we have the refutation of the view that the Tree is only an aggregate of atoms, against which it has been pointed out that under that view the perception of the Tree would never be possible; as the atoms are imperceptible;—and with the next sentence begins the refutation of the view that the Tree is an aggregate of component parts, which are not necessarily atomic or imperceptible.

with it, through that same contact; and just as the one component part is perceived by means of that sense-contact so also would the Composite be perceived by means of that same sense-contact. "How so?" Because there *is* such a thing as the *composite* whole; *as a matter of fact, there is the composite whole, which is distinct from the component part, and when this composite occupies the same point in space as the component part, it should be amenable to all the conditions of perceptibility; and under the circumstances, when there is perception of the component part, it is not possible that there be no perception of the composite.* (Bhāṣya, P. 78, ll. 14—15), "Why should this be so?" Because the conditions of perceptibility consist in being large (massive), in being composed of several component substances, in having a form and so forth; and all these are as much present in the *composite* as in the *component*; such being the case, it is not right to say that the *component* is perceived, and not the *composite*.

Vār. P. 215.

[Next follows the explanation of the *Pūrvapakṣa* argument put forward in the *Bhāṣya*, P. 78, ll. 16—19] "There "can be no perception of the *composite*; because neither "of the two alternatives possible under that theory is "admissible. For instance, when the Composite subsists in "its component parts—(A) does it all subsist in that part? or "(B) it subsists in it only in part? (A) If the Composite "subsists all-in-all in a single component part, there is no "need for the other component parts; as there is nothing "that these other parts could do for the Composite. Fur-"ther, if the Composite consisted of a simple component "part, it could never be perceived; as being massive and "*being composed of several component substances* constitute "the conditions of perceptibility. Nor again would the "destruction of such a Composite be possible, as there "would be no disruption of constituent particles,—any such

"disruption of a single constituent being impossible [and "without disruption there can be no destruction]. Further, "an object composed of a simple constituent cannot be "*massive*; as (in such a case) there would be neither mul-"tiplicity of constituents, nor voluminousness, nor aggrega-"tion (which are the conditions of *massiveness*). For these "reasons the Composite cannot subsist in its entirety in any "single component part. (B) Nor can the Composite "subsist only partially in any single component part; as a "matter of fact, of the Composite there are no 'parts' except "its constituent causes (molecules); and when a single part "is perceived, the Composite, even though perceived, is not, "*ex-hypothesi*, perceived in its entirety (subsisting according "to your view only partially in that part); so that it still "does not cease to be the *perception of a part.* * Further, "when the Composite is perceived, in what manner is it "perceived? If it is perceived in the perceived parts, then "it would have to be regarded as subsisting in its entirety "in each of these parts; and yet as a matter of fact the "entire Composite does not subsist in each of the parts; as "in that case, all the rest of the parts would be absolutely "useless, as we have already pointed out above. Nor can "there be a perception of all the parts, as the central "and hind parts would be hidden from view by the front "part. Thus then it is found that none of the alternatives "is possible in regard to the perception of the Composite; "nor can any of the alternative views in regard to the "subsistence of the Composite in the component parts be "maintained."

[The answer to the above *Pūrvapakṣa* argument is as follows]—In regard to a single thing, the terms 'entire' ('all') and 'one part' cannot be used; and hence the question

* The single part is perceived,—in that the Composite subsists only in part; so the perception of the Composite, in the perception of that one part, must still be the perception of only a part of the composite.

propounded by the Pūrvapakṣin at the very outset is an impossible one. That is to say, it is not right to put the question—'Does the Composite subsist all in all or in part?' For the Composite is neither 'all' nor 'part'; the term 'all' is applied when the whole lot of a number of things is meant, without any of them being left out; and the term 'part' is applied when, out of a number of things, only some one is meant; so that both these terms are incapable of being applied to any *single* thing.

"In what manner, then, does the Composite subsist in the components?"

It subsists in them in the relation of container and contained,—the Composite being the 'contained' and the components the 'containers.'

"What does this peculiar statement mean—that it does not subsist in them either *all in all* or *in part*, and yet it subsists in them?"

Var: P. 217.

This peculiar statement simply means that the thing is described in the form in which it actually exists; as a matter of fact the terms 'all' and 'part' do not apply to the Composite,* as this is *one* only,—as we have already explained; so that when it is said that 'the Composite subsists in the components', all that is meant is that they are related by the relation of container and contained. "But what sort of *subsistence* is this?" This *subsistence* consists in the presence of the *one* in the *many*, in the form of container and contained.

Further, the man who declares that the one subsists in the many does not render himself open to attack. "Why?" Because both the alternatives (set forth by the attack) are incompatible with the given conditions. When one asserts

* The correct reading is सर्वैकत्वात् as found in the Benares edition, and not कृत्स्नैकत्व.त् as in the *Bib. Ind.* edition.

that 'one subsists in many', he should not be attacked with the question—'does it subsist all in all or in part?'—Because both of these (alternatives propounded in the question) are incompatible with the given conditions:—If while subsisting in the many parts, the one were to subsist *all in all* (in its entirety) in each one of the many parts, then it would no longer be 'the one subsisting in the many' (which is the given condition, the hypothesis with which we have started); on the contrary it would come to be a case of 'many subsisting in the many'; so that this part of the question runs counter to and upsets the very basis of the discussion. If, on the other hand, (according to the second part of the question) while subsisting in the many, the one were to subsist only *in part* in each of the many parts, even then it would no longer be 'the one subsisting in the many'; it would be a case of 'many subsisting in the many' (*several* parts of the one subsisting in the many); and further, in this case, every one of the parts (of the Composite) that subsist in the many, would be so many independent 'composites';*—so that in this manner also it would not be the 'one subsisting in the many,' but 'many subsisting in the many'. "But what is meant by the many subsisting in the many is that 'each of the former subsists in its entirety in each of the latter'."† But even so, the very basis of the discussion [that 'the one subsists in the many') becomes set aside. The assertion that 'each of them subsists in its entirety in each of the parts' is tantamount to saying that 'many subsist in the many'; and this certainly runs counter to the very basis of the discussion (the primary postulate on which the discussion started). For such a question sets aside the whole discussion; such a question as has been put by the

* For सम समवेताः (in *Bib. Ind.* edition) read स समवेता as in the Benares edition; similarly for समस्तिन् घटे rea l समस्तिन् घट.

† In place of नैकत्र read अनेकमनेकत्र as in the Benares edition.

Opponent cuts off the very basis of the discussion. Thus then, we find that the alternatives put forward are not admissible. That is to say, the the said alternatives have no basis in fact, and as such should not be urged.

Var: P. 218.

The same fact of running counter to the very basis of the discussion may be urged against any such alternatives being put forward in regard to all such things as subsist in many substances;—such things for instance as Number, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Community and the like.

[The Vārtika next proceeds to explain the Pūrvapakṣa argument dealt with in the *Bhāṣya*, P. 79, L. 5]—" There will be diversity due to apprehension and non-apprehension, just as there is among the component parts. That is to say, just as there is diversity among those components that are perceived and those that are not perceived,—so also there will be a difference or diversity in the *Composite* as subsisting in the perceived parts and as subsisting in the unperceived parts; which shows that there can be no *single* Composite."

The answer to the above is that there can be no such diversity; as difference (due to apprehension and non-apprehension) is found also with regard to a thing that is known to be *one* only; in regard to a single thing, Ḍēvadaṭṭa for instance, we find that there is apprehension when he is perceived and there is non-apprehension when he is not perceived; and just as Ḍēvadaṭṭa, as accompanied by a certain thing, is perceived, while he is not perceived, as accompanied by another thing, and yet this does not give rise to a diversity in Ḍēvadaṭṭa himself [*i. e.* it does not turn the one Ḍēvadaṭṭa into several persons],—the same would be the case with the Composite [which will be perceived as along with the perceived parts, and un-perceived as along with the un-perceived parts]; and there would be nothing incongruous in this.

Another reason against the Opponent is that the Composite is actually apprehended. You have asserted that there is apprehension of the Composite 'Tree' due to the apprehension of one part of it and there is non-apprehension of it due to the non-apprehension of another part;—but there is no room for such duplicity; because as a matter of fact the Composite is actually apprehended. When the Composite is apprehended, as along with one component part,--what of it is *not apprehended*, by reason of which there could be any room for duplicity in regard to its being (in part) apprehended and (in part) unapprehended? "But its central and hind parts are not apprehended." There is no force in this; as these parts are something distinct from the Composite itself; as a matter of fact, the Composite whole is one thing and its central and back parts are totally different things. Hence it is only natural that the Composite being something distinct from those parts, these latter should not be apprehended [even when the Composite is apprehended]. "What is the reason (of these being not apprehended)?" The reason lies in the simple fact that the conditions necessary for their apprehension are not present. That is to say, as regards the Composite *as along with the front part*, there is present the condition necessary for its apprehension—such condition consisting in the contact of the Sense-organ;—but this condition is not present as regards the Composite as *along with the central and hind parts*; so that it is only natural that while it is *perceived* as along with the front part, it should be *not perceived* as along with the central and hind parts.

[The *Vārṭika* takes up *Bhāṣya*, P. 77, L. 7 and P. 79, L. 7]. In accordance with the view that the Composite is only 'a conglomeration of parts,' there would be absolute impossibility of any conception of the 'Tree.' Why so?" Under this theory, the 'Tree' could be either (*a*) 'the con-

glomeration of root, trunk, branches and leaves.' or (*b*) the 'conjunction' of these parts; and in either case the conception of the 'Tree' would be impossible;—(*a*) because all the parts (root, branch &c., the conglomeration of all of which is the 'Tree' under the theory under consideration) *can never* be perceived, as some of them would always be hidden from view; and (*b*) as regards the 'conjunction' of the parts, there can be no perception of the 'Conjunction,' when the conjoining members are not perceived; as a matter of fact, unless there is perception of the conjoining members, there is no perception of the *conjunction*—such perception always being in the form '*this* is in conjunction with *this*' [which presupposes the perception of the two members].

Var. P. 129.

Thus then, the conclusion is that the cognition of the 'tree,' accompanying the 'cognition of one part,' can be explained only on the theory that the 'Tree' forms a distinct object,—and not on the theory that it is a mere conglomeration of parts.

(Bhāsya, P. 79, LL. 11—12.)

Thus ends the Examination of the View that Perception is only a form of Inference.

Section (4).

Examination of the Nature of Composite Wholes.

[Sūtras 33—36.]

Sūtra (33).

Pūrvapakṣa :—" AS THE COMPOSITE WHOLE IS STILL TO BE PROVED,* THERE MUST BE A DOUBT WITH REGARD TO IT."—(Sū. 33).

Bhāṣya.

[P. 80, L. 1 to P. 81, L. 2.]

[The *Pūrvapakṣin* says]—"It has been said (in Sū. 32) "that [there can be no cognition of one part only] *because the* "*Composite Whole is also there*†;—but this is not a valid "reason‡; as the '*Composite Whole*' is still *to be proved*; that "is to say, it still remains to be proved that out of the consti-"tuent particles a distinct substance, in the shape of the 'Com-"posite Whole,' is produced;—as a matter of fact, this has "not yet been proved; and so long as it has not been proved "beyond doubt, all that can be said is that there is a *diversity* "*of opinion* in regard to it; and on account of this *diversity of* "*opinion*, there should be Doubt in regard to the subject (ac-"cording to Sū. 1-1-23)."

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*This word '*Sādhya*' has, as we shall learn from the *Vārṭika*, given rise to confusion. The real sense is thus explained by the *Tāṭparya*:—The term *Sādhya* here simply means that the Composite Whole is *a-siddha*, *not-admitted*, by the Opponent; who argues thus—"Things are to be accepted exactly as they are; An Idea can establish the existence of that only which it apprehends; and what is apprehended by the Idea is that which imparts its form to the Idea. Such being the case, as a matter of fact, in the Idea of a certain thing, we do not find any other form apart from the continuously appearing atoms of Colour &c., and no Idea is ever found to have the form of the 'Composite Whole', or any thing apart from the said atoms. Though the atoms, each by itself, are devoid of magnitude and volume, yet when they appear in a group,' they appear as having magnitude." The Opponent entertaining such notions in regard to the Composite Whole, it is only right to regard this as *not-accepted* by him; and as such open to a diversity of opinion, specially in the absence of any proofs one way or the other.

† The reading adopted in the printed text is भावात्स्माद्विनवाद्यवनेषु:—But all the manuscripts, including the two Puri ones, read भावाद्विरवयवनेषु:

‡ 'For us'—says the *Pūrvapakṣin*—*Bhāṣyachandra*.

Vārṭika on Sū. (33)

[P. 219, L. 5 to 240, L. 20.]

"That a fresh substance is produced out of the constituent particles is still *to be proved.*"

What is it that is '*to be proved*? (A) The *non-difference* (of the Composite from the Components)? or (B) the Composite itself (as being non-existent)* ?

(*B*) *If it is the Composite* that is *to be proved*, then (we say that) any proving of this (either as *existing* or as *non-existent*) would be impossible; as no proper Probans would be possible; the very Subject (the Composite) being open to difference of opinion. Specially as one who does not admit of the *Subject*, is entirely incapable of being made to accept it by any reasons [as every one of these Reasons would be baseless, the substratum, in the shape of the *Subject*, being not admitted];—nor is there any basis for a 'different opinion' in regard to tho Subject (on the basis whereof Reasons could be propounded); as there is no similarity in this case, and without some sort of similarity no 'different opinion' is possible. And the reason for this is that by 'different opinion' is meant *contrary conception*; and contrary conception consists in imposing upon a thing a character contrary to the other character,—such imposition being due to the fact of the thing being found to possess a certain degree

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* We have added the parenthetical clause advisedly; in the recapitulation on P. 240, L. 14, the *Vārṭika* says—'Thus then it is found that there is no proof establishing either the *non-existence* or the *non-difference* of the Composite'; from which it is clear that the Composite is to be proved as either *non-existent* or as *non-different* from the constituent particles. But there is no objection in taking the word "*avayavī*" of the text as it stands; the meaning being that it is still to be proved whether the Composite is an entity by itself, or non-different from the components.

The objection to the Pūrvapakṣin calling the Composite a '*sāḍhya*' 'something to be proved,' comes from the Siḍḍhāntin; and goes on to P. 240, L. 15.—and the real explanation of the term '*sāḍhya*', as given by the *Bhāṣya*, is given (in P. 240. Ll. 17-20) as the Pūrvapakṣin's answer to this objection.

of similarity (to things possessed of that other character) and to that of its differences from them not being perceived. And certainly for one who does not admit of the *Composite* there can be no *similarity* of the 'Composite'; nor can there be an imposition of a contrary character. So that the conclusion is that there can be no *vipratipatti*, *different opinion* or *contrary conception*, in regard to the Composite.

(A) If, secondly, it is the *non-difference* (of the Composite, from the Components) that is *to be proved*,—then it behoves you to state the proofs of this *non-difference*; as there can be no true cognition without proof.

(1) "Well, here is the proof required—As a matter of fact, no distinct thing can form the component part of any object; one thing cannot be the component part of any entirely different thing; *e. g.*, the *cow* is not the component of the *horse*; and yet we know that the *yarns* are the components of the composite called *cloth*; from which it follows that the composite *Cloth* is not different from the components, *Yarns*."*

This argument, as it stands, is defective, in that it does not mention the Probans; the assertion—'no distinct thing can form the component part of any object'—contains no Probans.

"But the assertion being the affirmation of the conclusion, it certainly implies the Probans, in the shape of *being the component*; the full argument being—the Yarns are not entirely different from the Cloth, *because they are its components*."

* There are no less than *thirteen* such arguments put forward in support of the non-difference of the Composite from the Components. It is interesting to note that most of these arguments are precisely those that have been put forward by Vāchaspati Mishra in his *Sānkhyatattvakaumudī* on Kārikā 9. See also Sānkhyasūtra, 1. 113 to 123. The discussion over this first argument goes on up to Text, P. 227, L. 9.

This reasoning cannot stand, as it involves a self-contradiction: As a matter of fact, if the Yarns are not something distinct from the Cloth, they cannot be called its *components*. "Why?" Because the name 'component' is relative, depending upon a corresponding '*composite*'; an object is called the *component* only in reference to a certain *composite* *; so that, when you deny the *composite*, you can have no basis for regarding anything as *component*. Then again, the name 'component' is used only in reference to things that are different from those that are so called; whereby your probans—*being components*—becomes 'contradictory' (proving a conclusion contrary to your own); as a matter of fact, the word 'component' is used only in reference to something different from it, and not in reference to what is non-different from (identical with) it; when, *e. g.* it is said, 'the component yarns are different from the jar.'

Var. P. 220.

"This argument is not admissible; as when the Components are spoken of in reference to their own *Composite*, the latter is always spoken of by a word with the genitive ending; for instance, we say '*paṭasya avayavāḥ*,' '*components of the Cloth*'; how can any such expression be used in connection with such things as the jar and the like (which are entirely different from the said components)?"

But we have already pointed out above the principal objection to your reasoning. "What have you pointed out?" That your reasoning involves self-contradiction. If the two were identical, we could not use either the term 'component' or the genitive ending; for certainly the Yarn cannot be called its own 'component'; nor can we have any sense of the genitive in such an expression as 'the yarn is the

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* Those yarns alone are called *components* which are related to, have been woven into, the Cloth; and not those that are locked-up in the work-basket of the spinning woman—*Tātparya*.

component *of the yarn.*' Then again, having admitted the yarns to be *components*, you cannot make any affirmation or denial in regard to them (except in relation to a composite); So that as you do not admit a Composite, [and hence you cannot affirm or deny anything of the components], the character of *being component* becomes 'too specific,' and hence incapable of serving as a valid Probans. Further, you state your proposition in the form 'the yarns are not different from the Cloth', where the 'yarns' form the Subject, the Minor Term;—so that when you assert your *probans* (in the Minor Premiss) in the form 'because they are *ṭaḍavayava, components of that*',—this premiss must be taken to mean that the yarns are components *of the yarns* *; and this certainly is wholly absurd! For certainly the yarns are not the component *of yarns*. If (in order to escape from this difficulty), you make 'Cloth' the Subject (stating your proposition in the form 'the Cloth is non-different from the yarns'), then your Probans becomes one that does not subsist in the Subject at all; for *being the component* is a property that subsists in the Yarns; it is a property of the *Yarns*, and not of the *Cloth*.

Further, inasmuch as the word 'component' denotes a particular kind of cause, its use, if you deny the *Composite*, involves a self-contradiction; for if you do not admit a distinct object in the shape of the Composite, of what could the Components be the cause? † Certainly the cause does not produce itself [and yet this is what it would come to, if the Composite were the same as the Components].

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* In the compound '*ṭaḍavayavaṭvāṭ*', the pronoun *ṭaṭ* must have for its antecedent the most predominant of the foregoing nouns; and certainly the 'yarns', as the subject of the main proposition is the most predominant noun.

† The former argument against the Pūrvapakṣin's use of the word 'component' was based upon the fact of the word being a merely relative term; and the present argument is based upon its being the name of a particular kind of cause. So that there is no needless repetition.—*Ṭāṭparya.*

"But for us (who hold all effects to be entities even before the operation of the Cause) there is nothing to be *produced*; (when the Cloth comes into existence) what happens is that the same yarns (which in a certain position were known as mere *yarns*), by arranging themselves in a particular position, obtain the name of 'Cloth';—which simply means that the Yarns, which were not named 'Cloth', come to be known by that name."

This is highly incongruous, we reply; for the simple reason that the most important factor in this explanation is an impossibility: as a matter of fact, there is no point of similarity between the *Cloth* and those Yarns which are *not cloth*; and in the absence of some such similarity, there can be no basis for the misconception (of the Yarns being the Cloth).* Then again, you say that the Yarns, becoming arranged in new positions, come to be called 'Cloth'; now we ask—is this new disposition of the Yarns something different from the Yarns, or not? If it is something different, you should say then what that something different is. If you fail to say this, then the assertion 'arranged into a new position' becomes meaningless. For us the new disposition is a case of Conjunction (Combination); and that is something different (from the Yarns).

Vār. P. 221.

"This cannot be; as we do not admit any such thing; and our reason is that a thing that is different from another is not called *its Combination*; for example, the *Cow* is not the *Combination* of the *Horse*; while there is a combination of two *fingers* (which both being fingers, are the same); so that Combination is not a different thing at all."

* The idea of 'Cloth' cannot rest entirely upon the Yarns; as if it did, then the Yarns locked up in the widow's spinning basket would also be conceived of as *Cloth*. Nor can the conception apply to the mere quantity of the Yarns; as *ex hypothesi*, this should be in existence even before the name 'cloth' comes to be applied. So that it any case the Yarns cannot be the same as the *Cloth*. Under the circumstances, the conception of the Yarns as 'Cloth' must be regarded as a misconception.—*Ṭāṭparya.*

This reasoning is not right; as we have already given our answer to it; we have already answered this argument of the *Pūrvapakṣin*. "What is that answer?" The argument that is in your mind may be stated thus—'Conjunction is not a different thing, *because it is conjunction*'; now here *being Conjunction* (which is your probans) is a 'too specific' term, being excluded from *different* as well as non-different things (as it subsists in nothing but Conjunction); and it also forms part of your Proposition (thus involving the fallacy of *Petitio Principii*). Further, Conjunction must be regarded as something different (from the objects conjoined), as it forms a qualification of these; *e. g.*, when one is asked to bring up 'two conjoined things' he brings up those two things which he finds to be in conjunction, and which, through that conjunction, stand differentiated from other things.

"The reason you have put forward does not prove Conjunction to be something different; as the qualification is capable of another explanation. You have asserted that when one is asked to bring up the 'conjoined things', conjunction serves as a qualification (differentia), and as such, must be regarded as something different from the things themselves. But the matter of the qualification can be explained otherwise (than on the basis of the difference of Conjunction). For instance, when two things come into such close proximity that they end in striking each other, then it is that we call it a case of *Conjunction*; *i. e.*, what we call 'Conjunction' *is not* anything different, but only that impact of two things which results from their gradually coming into closer and closer proximity."

As you do not admit of Conjunction being something different, it behoves you to provide an explanation of 'proximity' and 'impact.' As a matter of fact, 'Proximity' is only the gradually lessening extent of the conjunctions of things

(*i. e.*, points of space) with which the two are in contact*; and 'impact' is only the coming into contact of two material and corporeal substances; so that (both these conceptions involving the conception of Conjunction), it behoves one who does not admit of Conjunction to provide an adequate explanation of the conceptions of proximity' and 'impact.' Further, if Conjunction were not something different, (*a*) the *field—water—seed* would be capable of producing the plant, irrespective of their relative positions, and placed anywhere at random, apart from one another;—similarly (*b*) Fire and Fuel would be capable of accomplishing the action of cooking, irrespective of their relative position, and ever when placed apart; as the things would be the same [whether apart or together; and if Conjunction is nothing apart from the things themselves, no efficiency could attach to the various things, Field, Water and Seed being in contact with one another]! [And this is not found to be the case]. The inevitable conclusion is that that factor, of which these things stand in need, is something different from themselves; and that is called *Conjunction*. This reasoning may be formulated thus—The two sets of things—*Field, Water, Seed* and *Fire* and *Fuel*—stand in need of something, in the bringing about of the two effects, *Plant* and *Cooking*,—because they are not found to be producing such effects always,—being just like such causes as the *stick* and the like,—several such causes as stick and the like stand in need of such additional agencies as those of *Conjunction* and the like, and hence do not always produce such effects as the jar, the cloth and the like;—and as similar is the case with the Seed &c. also (which do not always produce their effects),—

* Before the hand comes into contact with the Table, there is a large number of space-points intervening between the two; and as the hand gradually comes nearer, the number of these points and their conjunctions become less and less; until they are nil, when the hand actually touches the table.

these latter also should be regarded as standing in need of additional agencies.

Our opponent has, in this connection, made the following declaration—*

"The production of the effect is without Conjunction, as we find in the case of (*a*) Sound, (*b*) Magnet and (*c*) Motion. The meaning of this is as follows—

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When Sound produces another sound, it does so without Conjunction ;—when the Magnet attracts a piece of iron, it does so without Conjunction ;—when Motion produces conjunctions and disjunctions, is does so without Conjunction ;—similarly other effects may also be produced without the agency of Conjunction."

This contention cannot be accepted ; as it is clear that you have not comprehended the significance of the probans that we have put forward; we do not propound our argument in the form—'Conjunction exists, *because we have the production of effects*'; what we say is that Field—Water—Seed and Fire-Fuel are dependent upon other agencies ; [so that our probans is the character of *being dependent upon other agencies*] ; and this reasoning could be fallible (and invalid) only if there were any such Cause as is, at all times, capable, independently by itself, of bringing about its effect; as a matter of fact however, no one can ever point to such a cause. For instance, (taking your own examples), when Sound produces another sound, it is dependent, in this, upon its proximity to that part of *Ākāsha* which is circumscribed by the causes productive of that Sound; as Sound is non-pervasive in its character (and as such it can produce its effect only in a limited space) ;—similarly when the Magnet attracts the piece of iron, it is dependent upon the proximity of the substance on which it rests (*i. e.*, upon its position in relation to the iron) ; if it were to do the attracting independently by itself,

* It would be interesting to trace this quotation. But we have not yet been able to trace it. Is it from an old *Sāṅkhya* work?

then no pieces of iron could ever be at rest (a single magnet, placed anywhere on earth, would attract all the irons on the earth); from which it follows that the Magnet is not entirely independent in its operations;—lastly, when Motion produces conjunction, it is dependent upon the proximity and forwardness of that in which it subsists; Motion does not produce conjunction either independently, or in a backward direction; if Motion by itself were to produce conjunction, then the motion originating in Dēvaḍaṭṭā residing in Pâṇdya or Maṭhurā would produce conjunction in Yajñaḍaṭṭa, residing in Ṭakṣashilā! And certainly no such phenomenon ever takes place. Then again, our proposition is not that 'Conjunction is the cause of everything;' it is only that 'when Conjunction brings about its effects, it is dependent upon other agencies'.

"But this goes against the Sūtra (of Kaṇāḍa)."

If by this you mean that—"if Motion in producing its effects, is held to be dependent upon other agencies, then this goes against the Sūṭra of the great Riṣi (Kaṇāda) which declares that 'Motion is without qualities and is the *independent* cause of conjunction and disjunction' (*Vaisheṣika-sûṭra*, 1-1-17),"—then our reply is that there is no contradiction of Kaṇāḍas' Sūṭra; you apparently have not understood the meaning of the *Sūṭra* you have quoted; it is clear that the real sense of the Sūṭra has not been grasped by you: when it is said that 'Motion is the independent cause of Conjunction and Disjunction', it does not mean that it is independent of even such things as its own substratum; all that it means is that it does not stand in need of any such agency as would come in after itself. That is to say, when a certain substance is produced (in the form of a Diad or Triad), and in its turn produces the next product (the Quartette), in doing so, it stands in need of the conjunction (of the molecules) which appears after the coming into existence of

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the former substance;—or when Conjunction produces Qualities and Motions, it stands in need of such subsequently appearing agencies as Faculty, Effort and Destiny;—or when the colour &c.; subsisting in the Cause produce the colour &c., in the Product, they stand in need of the production of the (product) substance itself, inasmuch as this product would constitute the ncessary substratum; *i. e.*, the substance produced would be the receptacle or substratum of the colour &c., to be produced;—but the case of Motion is not like these; Motion does not stand in need of any subsequently appearing agency; this is what is meant by the 'independence' of Motion spoken of in the *Sūṭra* (of Kaṇāḍa); it does not mean that Motion does not need the help of such things as its own substratum and the like.

"'In that case Motion comes to be dependent upon other agencies, in the case of Conjunction: that is to say, if by the 'independence' of Motion (as mentioned in the *Sūṭra*) it be simply meant that it does not stand in need of a subsequently appearing agency, then, in the bringing about of Conjunction, Motion would be dependent; as in this it would stand in need of Disjunction; as a matter of fact, Motion cannot bring about Conjunction except through Disjunction; so that Motion comes to be *dependent* upon Disjunction; and the contradiction of Kaṇāda's Sūṭra remains unexplained."

This is not right; as there is doubt; that is to say, it is open to doubt whether Conjunction is brought about by Motion through the agency of Disjunction, or Disjunction only serves to remove the obstacles to the Conjunction; what we say is that when Disjunction appears, it brings about the cessation of a previous Conjunction, on the cessation of which previous Conjunction, there being no further obstacle to the coming in of the next Conjunction, this latter is brought about by Motion.* A similar instance is provided

* The reasoning is thus formulated in the *Tāṭparya*—Conjunction has for its cause the Motion as independent of all else, because it is an effect of Motion;—

by the case of Gravity; Gravity has been described in the *Shāṣṭra* (*Vaisheṣika*) as the independent cause of Motion; and when the fruit falls off from its stalk, what happens is that the Disjunction of the fruit from its stalk having put an end to the conjunction of these two, Gravity becomes operative and brings about the *falling motion*. Exactly similar would be the case with Motion also (as bringing about Conjunction) Or we may look at the case from another point of view:—As regards Conjunction, we find that when it brings about a new substance (in the shape of the half-piece of Cloth), subsequent to the destruction of the original common product (the entire piece) and the several conjunctions that go to make it up,—it is an independent cause; so that it cannot be said to produce the substance through the agency of Disjunction;—and exactly in the same manner when Motion brings about Conjunction, it does not stand in need of Disjunction.*

Further, it has been asserted (by the Opponent) that "Motion brings about Conjunction without the help of Conjunction"; this also is not right; as such a statement involves self-contradiction. To say that 'there is no Conjunction' and then to say that 'Motion brings about Conjunction' is a clear case of self-contradiction; for if there is no Conjunction, the said assertion can have no meaning. Or, the self-contradiction involved may be explained in another way: You deny the existence of

P. 224. Motion, Disjunction and Conjunction; and so when you assert

like Disjunction. This being proved, all that Disjunction can do is the removal of the obstacles to the appearance of the Conjunction.

* The Text refers to the case of an entire piece of cloth being torn into two pieces. The entire piece is the 'common product' of the constituent yarns and their several conjunctions; when the entire piece is torn, there is an end to some of these conjunctions, as also to the original cloth-piece. After this destruction there comes into existence the new substance in the shape of the *Half-piece* of Cloth; and in the bringing about of this the remaining Yarn-conjunctions are the cause, independently of anything else. As for the Disjunction, all that it does is to destroy the original entire piece and a few of the yarn-conjunctions; and it does not, in any way, help in the bringing about of the new substance.—*Tāṭparya*.

that Motion produces Conjunction, you contradict yourself. You may explain that, when you urged the denial of Motion, Disjunction and Conjunction, you only referred to the conception of these as held by other persons,—and as for yourself you do not admit such things at all;—but even so you do not from escape self-contradiction: How do you comprehend the 'Conjunction', 'Disjunction' and 'Motion' as conceived by other persons? If you apprehend them by means of the Instruments of Cognition,—then why should you regard them as being 'held by others' (and not by yourself)? If on the other hand, you do not apprehend them by means of the Instruments of Cognition, in what manner then do you apprehend them? Certainly there can be no apprehension except through the Instruments of Cognition. * If you do not have any apprehension of these, then your assertion—that 'Cognition, Disjunction, and Motion are as known to other persons'—becomes nugatory (and impossible). †

You might reason thus—"What we mean is that the Conjunction, Disjunction and Motion, *as conceived by you*, do not exist; and we do not deny these entirely. Our conception of these is as follows:—(*a*) when the broken substance appears in another place, we call it a case of '*motion*'; *i.e.* when a certain series of momentary entities (as everything is held to be by the Bauḍḍha) appears, after a break, at a place other than the one occupied by it before, we regard it as a case of 'motion'—(*b*) when two such series goes on without a break between them, we call it a case of 'Conjunction'; *i.e.* when two things appear in close juxtaposition to each other, this close juxtaposition is called 'Conjunction';—(*c*) and the opposite of this 'Conjunction' is 'Disjunction'."

* The *Tatparya* adds that wrong cognitions also are dependent upon the operation of the Instruments of Cognition; even when the shell is mistaken for silver, the operation of the visual organ is there.

† You cannot make any assertion in regard to things of which you have no conception at all.

The answer to this we have already provided, when we proved the continuous existence of the 'Tree';—and our answer is that there is no proof for any such theory as you propound; that is to say, there is nothing to prove that things are only momentary entities. Then again, you have to explain the basis of such conceptions as 'broken' or 'intermittent' and 'unbroken' or 'continuous' (in connection with your 'series of momentary entities'); if you do not accept such additional agencies as Conjunction and Disjunction, you should explain what is the basis of such ideas as 'this is broken', 'this is unbroken (in close juxtaposition)'; certainly there can be no diversity in the ideas except as due to the diversity in their causes; as we find in the case of colour and such things. Even the misconceptions or wrong ideas that we have—as when we conceive of a stationary thing as 'moving', of a non-conjoined thing as 'conjoined', or of a non-disjoined thing as 'disjoined',—do not appear without some primary conception; in fact all misconceptions appear as (wrong) replicas of certain primary conceptions;—so that you have to point out the primary conception
Var. P. 225. (of which your notions of 'broken' and 'unbroken' would be wrong replicas); for no secondary replicas have ever been seen, except when there is a primray original; as we find in the case of the Man and Post, that the misconception that it is 'man' is possible only when the *post* is there, or the misconception that 'it is a post' is possible only when the *man* is there.

Then again, if Conjunction were not something different,—when we have the notion of a person being '*Kuṇḍalī*' (wearing earrings), there must be some positive basis for the conception which would be affirmed (in that conception), and some negative basis which would be denied (in that conception). The conception of '*Kuṇḍalī*' cannot be due either to the man, Devadatta himself, or to the ear-ring itself;—and yet you do not admit of any other basis besides

these; so that (according to you) in the absence of any other basis, the said conception of '*Kuṇḍalī*' must be derived somehow or other, from Devadatta and the Ear-rings themselves. [And this is not possible]. Hence it is absolutely necessary to find some basis, either positive or negative. Now if it is a negative thing (that provides the basis), then, inasmuch it is a rule that what is denied in one place must exist in some other place, you have to point out the exact nature of what is denied (by the negative thing); and [as the counterpart of this denial would be a *positive* something] it is not possible to absolutely deny the existence of Conjunction. Specially as it is Conjunction that forms the basis of the notion of 'herein': whenever this notion of 'herein' appears, it never appears without some sort of relation; *e.g.* when we have the notion 'the jujube fruit in this tub', the notion of 'in this' is based neither upon the jujube alone, nor upon the tub alone; that which forms the basis of the notion is *Conjunction* (between the two).

" If the notion of *herein* were always based upon *Conjunction*, then there would be no absence of restriction (in regard to the expression 'in this'); that is to say, if the notion of *herein* were based entirely upon Conjunction, the term 'herein' or 'in this' could not be used in cases where there is no Conjunction; but we do have such expressions as 'there are *tilaka* trees *in this* forest, and *Kimshuka* trees *in that* forest' and the like; and firstly, how could these expressions be used by persons looking at the forest from a distance, and (hence) incapable of perceiving the difference between the two kinds of trees? Secondly, there is no Conjunction in these cases."

There is no force in this contention; as the notion of 'herein' may be based upon both; as a matter as fact, there are two kinds of this notion based upon two kinds of basis—*viz*: *Conjunction* and *Absence of Disjunction*; of these two kinds, one is primary (direct) and another secondary (in-

direct) ;—that based upon *Conjunction* is real or primary, and that based upon *Absence of Disjunction* is secondary ;—this latter secondary usage follows upon the perception of some sort of similarity to the primary usage; and this does not reject the primary usage at all; for if the primary usage were rejected, no secondary usage would be possible ; nor would it be right to hold that all usages would be secondary ; as we have already pointed out that secondary usage always depends upon primary usage. Then again, as regards the assertion that—" we find the expression *herein* also in a case where there is no Conjunction ; *e. g.*, in the expression, ' there are *ṭilaka* trees in this forest, and *kimshuka* trees in that ' ",—it should be ascertained whether in such cases there is no *relation* or no *Conjunction* at all. We say that in these cases what is absent is *Conjunction*, and not *Relation*; for certainly the Forest is related to the *Ṭilaka* and other trees.

" But, what is this that you call Forest ?"

This is by no means a difficult matter to explain ; it has already been said that it consists in plurality with a qualification.*

" When two things are placed one above the other, both are conceived of as *in conjunction* ; in this case why do not we have, in regard to the upper thing, the notion of 'herein', of its being *in* the other ? Here there are two things, and between them there is the same sort of Conjunction (as in other cases) ;—for what reason then is it that the notion of *herein* does not appear in this case, as it does in other cases ?"

There is no force in this question ; as it only shows that you have not understood our meaning : What we say is that the notion of *herein* does not appear when there is not present

* Where does this description of the forest occur ? It means that when there are many trees, and they have the further qualification of forming a group by themselves, we have what is called the Forest.

some such relation as would form the basis of the said notion; and we do not say that whenever there is Conjunction the notion of *herein* must appear. Then again, the notion of *herein* is (in some cases) found to arise from mere Conjunction, regardless of the upper or lower position of the things concerned; and it does not follow that the notion is not preceded by (and based upon) Conjunction.

In connection with this the *Pūrvapakṣin* has raised the following question—"The notion—'inherence of this object is *in this*'—would not be possible; as there would be no relation in this case (to serve as the basis of the notion of *in this*). That is to say, the notion—'the cloth subists *in these* yarns',—has for its basis the relation of Inherence (between the Cloth and the Yarns); but of Inherence itself there can be no further relation of Inherence; so that there should be no such notion as 'Inherence is *in this*' (as there is no relation to serve as the basis of this conception of *in this*)."

We have already answered this objection. "What answer have you given?" The answer given by us is that such a notion (as 'there is inherence *in this*') is clearly wrong. "But in what point does *Inherence* resemble *Inherent Substances*, by reason of which ressemblance such a wrong notion is possible (in regard to Inherence)?*"

The resemblance lies in the non-perception of difference; *i. e.*, just as no difference is perceived between two Inherent substances (whole and part, for instance), so also is no difference perceived between Inherence and Inherent Substance; and this non-perception of difference forms the basis of the wrong notion of *in this* in regard to Inherence.

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* "Even this conception is based upon some resemblance; in the case in question, the view being that the notion 'Inherence is in this object' is wrong, in which such an idea is expressed in connection with Inherence as is correct only in connection with *inherent substances*;—there should then be some resemblance between Inherence and Inherent substances. What is that resemblance?"

Then again, there can be no restriction in the form of sentences, as each sentence has a distinct character of its own. That is to say, because one sentence has a certain character, it does not necessarily follow that another sentence also should have the same character. For instance, we have one sentence in the form, '*rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ gachchhaṭi*', ('the King's man is going'), where there are three terms, and each term is essential,—inasmuch as the denotation of every one of the three is necessary to make up the meaning of the sentence;—but we have another sentence in the form, '*uḍakasya bhāvo bhavaṭi*' ('the presence of water is'); and because this also is as much a *sentence* as the former, it does not necessarily follow that here also every one of the three words is essential, and serves a distinctly useful purpose in the sentence. Because what, after all, in the real meaning of the sentence, *uḍakasya bhāvo bhavoṭi*'? The words '*uḍakasya bhāvo bhavaṭi*' 'the presence of Water is' mean exactly what could be expressed by the words '*uḍakam bhavaṭi*' ('the water is'). Similarly with other sentences: when it is said, '*kuṇḍē baḍarāṇām vṛiṭṭiḥ*' ('existence of Jujubes in the tub')—where the idea of the Jujubes follows after the *existence* has been indicated by the word '*vṛiṭṭiḥ*'—it means exactly the same as the sentence '*Kuṇḍē baḍarāṇi varṭanṭē*' ('the Jujubes are in the tub');—similarly when one says—'*ḍravyē ḍravyasya samavāyaḥ* (' the inherence of substance in a substance')—it means exactly the same as the words '*ḍravyē ḍravyam varṭaṭē*' (' the substance subsists in the substance'). Thus you see that it was without understanding the real meaning of the sentence that you made the assertion that—' the notion *the inherence of this object being in this* would not be possible, as there would be no relation in this case.'

Vār. P. 227.

From all this we conclude that *Conjunction* is something different; and inasmuch as there is evidence for this, it

will not be right to hold that the conception of the 'Cloth' proceeds from the Yarns themselves as arranged in a particular disposition.

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(2) Other people [propound another argument in support of the view that the Composite is non-different from the Components, and they] explain the term '*arṭhānṭarānavayavaṭvāṭ*' (which forms the text of the first argument) to mean *avayāvayavibhāvāṭ*—"because the two are Composite and Component [they must be non-different]."

But from where do these people get at the argument as they put it? Certainly no such meaning is obtained from the expression '*arṭhānṭarānavayavaṭvāṭ*.'

"The argument is implied by the form of the Reaffirmation; that is, because the Reaffirmation is in the form—'the Yarns are the *components* and the Cloth is the *Composite*'—it follows that the intended reason is '*avayāvayavibhāvāṭ*', "because the two are composite and component."

It may be true that such is the Reason implied; but even so it is a 'contradictory' Reason. The Yarns are not the 'component and composite' of themselves; nor is the Cloth the 'component and composite' of itself. "Why so?" For the simple reason that the 'component' and 'composite' are relative terms; *i. e*., the term 'component' and also the term 'composite' are relative; so that if either of the two relatives is rejected (as the 'composite' is rejected by the Pūrvapakṣin), it should be impossible to use its relative term. Hence what has been put forward here cannot be the meaning of the aphoristic utterance ('*arṭhānṭarānavayavaṭvāṭ*).

[The Pūrvapakṣin cites the example of the use of another couple of relative terms, in refutation of what has been just urged by the *Siḍḍhānṭin*]—"But we find the relative terms 'whole' and 'part' used in connection with things that are

not different; *e. g.*, we meet with such expressions as 'the *part* of Ākāshā' [where what is spoken of as the *part* is not different from the Ākāsha itself]."

This contention will not stand; as we have answered it. We have already given our reply to this argument,—that what is meant by the word 'part' (*pradēsha*) is different from what is meant by the word 'component' (*avayava*)*

"What is meant by *component*?"

'Component' is the name of a particular kind of cause (the constituent cause), while *part* is the name of the receptacle,—called '*pradēsha*' because the whole is indicated as contained in it (*pradishyatē asmin*).

"But *Ākāsha* is never indicated as contained in anything; nor has Ākāsha any kind of cause; so that when used in connection with *Ākāsha*, neither the sense of *cause*, nor that of *receptacle* will be compatible."

In connection with the *Ākāsha*, the use of the word 'part' should be explained as due to its similarity to such things as have parts.

"What is the similarity of *Ākāsha* to things having parts?"

The similarity consists in the fact of the Conjunction of Ākāsha being as non-pervasive (not extending over the whole of it) as that of things having parts. This we shall explain later on.

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(3) [The *third* argument in support of the non-difference of the Composite from the Components is as follows]—"Because they are parts of it. That is to say, the fact that they form its parts is another reason for proving that the Com-

* The *Tātparya* construes this passage somewhat differently: 'What is signified by the word *component* is as different from the *Composite* as the *part* is different from the *whole*? But this interpretation would miss the whole point of the reasoning.

posite is not different from the Components. What is meant by this is that the following argument proves our desired conclusion :—'The Yarns, are not different things from the Cloth, —because of being called its parts;—those that are called the parts of a thing form the very essence of that thing,—as for instance, the parts of Ākāsha;—the Yarns, are actually called parts of the Cloth ;—therefore the Yarns form the very essence of the Cloth.'

Our answer to this is that as before in this reasoning also as it stands, the Probans is defective. Because, in the first place, the character of *being a part of it* is such as is found neither in any *different* thing (*Vipakṣa*) nor in any *non-different* thing (*Sapakṣa*)* So that the Probans becomes 'too specific'.—Secondly, if the term 'part', '*pradēsha*' is synonymous with '*cause*', the Probans becomes 'contradictory' (proving a contrary conclusion). †—Thirdly, as a matter of fact, the *being called its part* can have no connection with the '*yarns*' (the Subject of your inference); so that your probans becomes 'Unknown' (Impossible) also. ‡—Fourthly, the Instance that you have cited—'the part of Ākāsha'—this again is impossible ; because all that is meant by the phrase 'part of Ākāsha' is that the Conjunction of Ākāsha is non-pervading in its character ; and certainly the *non-pervading character of its conjunction* does not constitute the *essence of the Ākāsha* (which is what the instance is meant to corroborate) ; so that the Instance also turns to be an impossible one.

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(4) [The fourth reason in support the Pūrvapakṣa]— "The Composite cannot be a different thing from the Compo-

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* When two things are really identical, one is not called the *part* of the other.

† In this case, when the *Yarns* are called the 'parts' of the Cloth, it means that they are its *cause* ; and the Product must be *different* from it's Cause.

‡ The inference has been stated in the form तन्तवः पटात् न अर्थान्तरम् तत्प्रदेशव्यपदेशविषयत्वात् ; now the pronoun तत् in the last clause must refer to the तन्तवः of the preceding clause, that being the principal noun there ; and certainly the *yarns* are not called the parts *of the yarns* ; so that the तन्तव : not being तन्तुप्रदेशव्यपदेशविषय, the Probans turns out to be an impossible one.

nents, because no substance can be produced out of a totally different substance. As a matter of fact, no substance has ever been found to be produced out of totally different substances,—*e. g.*, the man is not produced out of the Cow, the Elephant and the Horse;—the Cloth however *is* produced out of the Yarns;—therefore the Cloth is not different from the Yarns."

Here also, the Probans is defective, as in the preceding argument. The Probans, as implied by the Reaffirmation (in the above statement of the argument), is '*ṭēbhyāsṭāṭpaṭṭēḥ*,' '*because of production from those*;'—and in the first place such a Probans is 'too specific', being precluded from (absent in) *different* as well as *non-different* things.—Secondly the Probans is 'contradictory', because it is found that the Cloth is actually produced from the Loom &c., which are totally different things.—Thirdly, inasmuch as *Cloth* has been made the *Subject*, the Probans is also meaningless; as the *Cloth* is not produced from the *Cloth**; if (to escape from this difficulty) the pronoun '*ṭaṭ*' (in *ṭēbhyaḥ*) be made to refer to the *Yarns*,—and certainly Cloth *is* produced from the *Yarns*,—even so the Probans becomes 'contradictory' (proving a conclusion contrary to your proposition), as the *Yarns* themselves are not produced from the *Yarns* [and this is what it would come to if the *yarns* were this same as the *cloth*; so that, inasmuch as this is not possible the Probans 'because it is produced from Yarns' must be taken to prove that the Cloth is something *different* from the Yarns; and this is contrary to the proposition of the *Pūrvapakṣin*].

Var. P 229.

(5) [The *fifth* argument of the *Pūrvapakṣin*]—"The Composite is not other than the Components, because it is

* The proposition being in the form न पटः तन्तुभ्यः अर्थान्तरम्, if the Probans be stated in the form तेभ्यस्तदुत्पत्तेः, the pronoun तद् in this last term must refer to पटः of the preceding sentence; so that the meaning of the Probans would be पटेभ्यः उत्पत्तेः पटस्य; and this would be absurd.

only the components of a totally different composite that are different from a certain composite; that is to say, as a matter of fact we find that in the world things that are different from one composite are such as are the components of another composite; *e. g.* the wheels, are the components of the *chariot*, and they are different from the *Cloth* (which is other than the Chariot); so that if the Yarns were different from the Cloth, they also should be the components of something other than the Cloth;—as a matter of fact however they are not found to be the components of anything other than the Cloth;—therefore the Yarns are not different from the Cloth."

As you put the argument, your Probans is defective and also open to the charge of being 'too specific.' The Probans intended by you must be in the form '*ṭaḍvyaṭirēkēṇa anyānavayavaṭvāṭ*,' 'because they (the Yarns) are not the components of any thing other than that (Cloth)';—and as the Yarns cannot be their own components, this Probans turns out to be 'contradictory' (proving a conclusion contrary to your proposition) *;—further as you deny the *composite* being any thing different from the *components*, you cannot have any such proposition as 'the component is the composite' [and this must be the form of the proposition, when you assert that the component is the same as the composite].† Then again, you have made the following assertion—"Those components that are different from the Composite are always the components of some other Composite, *e. g.* the wheels *of the chariot* (are different from the Cloth)." But this involves a self-contradiction on your part, in both ways: that is, (*a*) when you say 'the wheels are the components of the chariot', you

* The yarns are not the components of anything different from the cloth; this means that the thing of which the yarns are not the components must be different from the cloth;—now as the yarns cannot be the components of the yarns themselves, the yarns must be different from the Cloth!

† Such an assertion would be as meaningless as the statement—'the cloth is cloth' '*paṭaḥ paṭaḥ*'.

admit thereby the fact of the Components being different from the Composite [for the *wheels* are certainly different from the *chariot*]; (*b*) while if you do not admit this difference, what is the meaning of the sentence 'the wheels are the components of the chariot'? For the wheel etc., that are generally regarded as the components of the chariot, come to be rejected as such by you when you deny the Components being different from the Composite; so that these cease to be the 'components' of either the *Chariot* or of anything else; so that the very ground has been cut off from under the use of such terms as 'component' and 'composite.'! For these reasons your Probans cannot be accepted as valid.

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(6) [The *sixth* argument in support of the *Pūrvapakṣin*] —" The Composite is not other than the Components, *because there is no connection* with the place of production of a distinct substance*;—*i.e.* in the case of things admitted by both parties to be different, it is found that whenever one is produced, it is produced in a place different from that occupied by the other; *e.g.* the Cow is produced in a place different from that occupied by the Horse; when however the Cloth is produced it is not produced in a place other than that occupied by the Yarns;—therefore the Cloth is not different from the Yarns."

Here also the Probans, as before, is (*a*) defective and (*b*) 'too specific'; (*c*) the Probans, in simple language, being "*taddēshotpattēḥ*", "because it is produced in the place occupied by that (component)", it is clearly 'contradictory' (proving a contrary conclusion), as the Yarn itself is not produced in the place occupied (previously) by itself [so that by your reasoning the Yarn should be *different* from itself];—and (*d*) inasmuch as you deny any such substance as the *Cloth*, there can be no 'production' of it; if such a thing as

* '*Vyavachchhēda*' means *absence of avachchhēda or connection*; this is clear from what follows. The *Tātparya* passage therefore in this connection should be read as द्रव्यान्तरोत्पत्तिदेशावच्छेदेन अवच्छेदः; though the printed text reads व्यवच्छेदेन व्यवच्छेदः

the *Cloth* is not produced from the Yarns, what is the meaning of the word 'production' (in your argument)? The *production* cannot be that of the Yarn (which is already there), and there is no such thing as the *Cloth*. And certainly, when you use the term—'because there is no connection with the place of production'—it behoves you to explain the meaning of the word 'production'; and when you come to consider the signification of this word, you will find that what it signifies is the unprecedented birth of things as qualified by individuality and other such distinctive properties; and this certainly goes against your view of things.*

Var. P. 230.

(7). [The *seventh* argument in support of the *Pūrvapakṣa*]—"The Composite is not different from the Components,—*because what is found to be different from a certain set of Components is only such a thing as is composed of a different set of components*; that is to say, as a matter of fact we find that what is distinctly different from a certain set of components is a thing composed of a totally different set of components; *e.g.* the wheels etc. differ from the jar; where the jar is composed of a set of components entirely different from wheels etc., (which are the components of the chariot), and is, as such, different from those *wheels* etc;—the Cloth, on the other hand, is not composed of components other than the Yarns; hence it cannot be different from the Yarns." †

Here also the Probans, as before, is defective and 'too specific'; and further, when you speak of 'the composite composed of other components,' you admit this Composite as something different from the Components; otherwise the expression

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* If 'production' is such *birth as did not exist before*, then when you speak of the 'production of cloth out of the yarns', you admit that the cloth is something that did not already exist before,—at least in the form in which it appears when it comes to be called 'cloth', qualified by its own several distinctive properties.

† It will be noticed that this argument is the same as argument (5),—but stated conversely.

is meaningless; for if you do not admit the Composite as something different from the Components, what is the meaning of the phrase—'the Composite composed of other Components'? If the '*Composite*' is denied, no meaning can be assigned to this phrase.

(8) If the fact of *the Cloth not being a composite composed of components other than the yarns*, were put forward as the probans (in proof of the non-difference of the Composite from its Components),—this also will be open to the same objections as stated above.

(9.) [The ninth argument put up by the *Pūrvapakṣin*]—"The Composite is not different from the Components, *because only that thing can be regarded as different from a certain thing which is found, during the existence of this other thing, to be the producer of something other than this latter.* That is to say, as a matter of fact, it is found that when one thing brings into existence something totally different from a (third) thing, and this latter is existing at the time,—it is regarded as different from this latter; *e. g.*, the *yarns* are different from the *mat*;—and it is found that while the *mat* is extant, the *yarns* bring into existence the *Cloth*, which is something totally different from the *Mat*; and on this account the *Yarns* are different from the *Mat*;—as regards the *Cloth* however, it is found that while the *Cloth* is extant, the *Yarns* do not bring into existence anything different from the *Cloth*; for this reason they must be regarded as not-different from the Cloth."

In this argument, the form of the intended Probans is '*Satyanyakāraṇāt*', 'because while one thing is extant, there is production of another thing',—and this also, as before, is 'too specific' and defective: You say that 'while the Mat is extant the Yarns *produce the Cloth*', and yet you say that the 'Cloth' is not different from the 'yarns',—this is self-nugatory; for certainly the *yarns* do not produce them-

selves ? So that if the *Cloth* also were not-different from the Yarns, these could not produce the Cloth either; and thus there would be nothing that could be the object of the 'production': The Yarns do not produce themselves,—and they do not produce anything different from themselves,—so that the very object of 'production' disappears!

(10) [The *tenth* argument of the *Pūrvapakṣa*]—"The Composite is not different from the Components,—*because only that Composite is different from certain things which is produced by causes other than the Conjunction of those things*; that is to say, as a matter of fact we find that when one thing differs from another thing, it is such as is produced independently of the conjunction of that thing: *e. g.*, the *Mat* is produced independently of the Conjunction of the *Yarns*;—the *Cloth* however is never produced independently of the Conjunction of the *Yarns*,—therefore the *Cloth* cannot be different from the *Yarns*."

P. 231.

In this argument, the form of the Probans would be—*tantusamyogebhyastadutpatteḥ*, 'because it is produced from the conjunction of the yarns';*—and this Probans also is 'too specific' and 'defective', as before. When you speak of the 'production of the Cloth from the Conjunction of the Yarns', you admit that the *Cloth* and the *Conjunctions* are different from the *Yarns*; for if you do not admit this, the assertion—'because it is produced from the Conjunctions of the Yarns'—becomes meaningless.†

(11) [The *eleventh* argument of the *Pūrvapakṣa*]—"The Composite is not different from the Components, because (if it were so) it would be without qualities, in view of the fact that the qualities of a substance cannot be the cause of the

* Both editions read '[illegible]' But from the analogy of previous replies the ablative form '[illegible]' appears to be more suitable; specially as we have this ablative form in l. 6, below.

† This last sentence from [illegible] to [illegible] is not found in the Benares edition an apparent omission.

qualities of a different substance; that is to say: as a matter of fact, we find that the qualities of any particular thing are not produced from the qualities of another thing totally different from the former,—*e. g.*, the qualities of the *Horse* are not produced from the qualities of the *Cow*;—in the case of the *Cloth* however we find that the qualities of the Cloth *are* produced from the qualities of the Yarns;—therefore the Cloth cannot be different from the Yarns [For if it were something different, then as it could not have any qualities produced by the qualities of the Yarns, it would not have any qualities at all]."

Herein you propound something most unreasonable. "What is there *unreasonable* in our argument?" Well, you admit the production of the qualities of the Cloth from the qualities of the Yarns, and yet you assert that the Cloth is not different from the Yarns [and this is most unreasonable]. Then again, as the *qualities of the Yarn* cannot be produced from the *qualities of the Yarns* themselves, when you put forward the Probans that 'the qualities of the Cloth are produced from the qualities of the Yarns', it clearly becomes a 'contradictory' Probans [for the *Cloth* being the same as the *Yarns*, the production of the qualities of the former from those of the latter would be as impossible as the production of the qualities of the Yarns from the qualities of the Yarns themselves].

(12) [The *twelfth* argument of the Pūrvapakṣa]—" The Composite is not different from the Components, as otherwise it would be not-perceptible. If the Composite were something different from the Components, it would subsist in the perceptible (whole) and the imperceptible (Component atoms); and as such it would itself be imperceptible; just as the Conjunction of the Mother and the Womb is imperceptible, subsisting as it does in the perceptible (mother) and

the imperceptible (Womb);—as a matter of fact however, the Composite is perceptible;—therefore it cannot be something different from the Components."

(A) When you urge the *perceptibility* of the Composite as the Probans to prove that it is not different from the Components, your Probans is distinctly 'contradictory.' [For, the fact of the Composite being *perceptible* while the Components are imperceptible, should prove that the two are *different*]. Further, when the conjunction of the mother and womb is not perceived, is this imperceptibility due to the conjunction being produced from one perceptible and another imperceptible thing? or is it due to the Conjunction subsisting in one perceptible and another imperceptible thing? If it is the former, then the small snow-ball formed by the contact of the small snow-particles with the summits of the Himālaya should be imperceptible; as of the two things (the mountain and the smaller snow-particles) from which it is produced, only one (the mountain) is perceptible, the other (smaller snow-particles) being imperceptible.* If, on the other hand, you accept the second alternative, then *Bhāva*, 'Being', should be imperceptible; as it is something that subsists in perceptible and imperceptible things [the character of '*Being*', subsisting in all *entities*, perceptible and imperceptible alike]. † Your view is not stated in the

* The *Tāṭparya* explains that the word परमाणु in the text does not stand literally for the *atom*; as the atom is not productive of anything larger than the *Diad* (which is also imperceptible); so what the term means is only *small particles* of snow. What is meant is the *snow-ball*, which is a composite formed by the conjunction (combination) of the mountain-top and the small snow-particles. Now if the, contention of the Pūrvapakṣin were right, this snow-ball should not be perceptible.

† The Opponent might argue that—"What we mean is that just as Conjunction which depends for its recognition upon the recognition of the two conjuncts, becomes imperceptible if one of the conjuncts is imperceptible,—in the same manner, when the components are imperceptible, the composite should be imperceptible." In anticipation of this the *Siddhāntin* says that your view has not been stated in this form. But even if the view were stated in this form,—adds the *Tāṭparya*—it would not be right; as in the case of Conjunction, it is only right that it should be impercep-

form that—'the Components being imperceptible, the Composite should be imperceptible.' [Even if it were so stated] we have already explained this matter. "What has been explained?" It has been explained that the Composite is perceived along with those of its Components with which the observer's sense-organ is in contact, and it is not perceived along with those with which the sense-organ is not in contact; but this does not constitute a difference (*Bhāṣya*, P. 79, ll. 5-6). Then again, for one who declares that 'the Composite should be imperceptible because its Components are imperceptible', all things would be imperceptible; as of no object are the central (inner) and back parts ever perceived. So that (according to this view) there would be not a single object left for Perception.

Var: P. 232.

(B) Then again, when you urge the fact of *being perceptible* as the Probans, you thereby admit that the Composite is something different from the Components; because atoms (which are the components of all things) are beyond the reach of the sense-organs; and certainly they are never *perceived*. "But atoms are *not* beyond the reach of the sense-organs, for the simple reason that being endowed with Colour &c., they cannot be beyond the reach of the senses; as a matter of fact we do not find anything to be super-sensuous which is endowed with Colour &c.; on the contrary, we have found several such things as the jar and like which, being endowed with Colour &c., are perceptible by the sense-organs." What do you mean, we ask, by the assertion that "atoms are within reach of the senses"? Do you mean—(a) that they are perceptible by the 'instrumen-

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tible when the conjuncts are imperceptible, as its recognition is dependent upon the recognition of the conjuncts;—but this cannot be true of the composite; as the recognition of the Composite is not dependent upon the recognition of the components; for instance, the Triad is quite perceptible, even though its component atoms and diads are not perceptible; and we can see the forest or the Elephant from a distance, even though we cannot see their component trees or limbs.

tality of the sense-organs?—or (b) that they are related to the sense-organs? "What do you mean by this?" (a) Well, if by saying that atoms are within reach of the senses you mean that they are perceptible by the instrumentality of the sense-organs,—then that is not right; for it is not possible that the sense-organs should render cognisable one kind of things (the subtle atoms) for one set of people (the Pūrvapakṣin, *Sāṅkhya*), and another kind of things (the non-atomic gross articles only) for another set (the Naiyāyika); as the operation of the sense-organs is of only one uniform kind in all cases;—so that if Atoms are perceptible to you, they should be so to us also [and this they are not, as we know from experience]. (b) If, on the other hand, by saying that atoms are within the reach of the sense-organs you mean that they are related to the sense-organs,—then we have no objection to that; for certainly it is not true that Atoms are not related to the sense-organs. The fact of the matter is that even though related to the sense-organs, Atoms are not perceived, on account of the absence in them of that magnitude or volume (which is necessary for perception). "But how do you know that like Colour &c., the presence of *Magnitude* also is a necessary condition of perceptibility?" We learn this from the simple fact that the presence and absence of the one is in accordance with the presence and absence of the other; that is to say, as a matter of fact we find that there is perception only when there is Magnitude, and when there are Colour &c., and there is no perception, when Magnitude is absent and when Colour &c. are absent; and from this it is clear that both constitute the cause of perception. Against this the Opponent has urged the case of the *touch of light*; the sense of the argument being as follows—"as a matter of fact it is found that there is perception when there is touch of light, and there is no perception when the touch of light is absent,—and yet the *touch of light* is not regarded as the

cause of the Perception of things, to the same extent as Colour &c. are regarded." But the instance cited is not universally true; that is to say, the said Touch cannot be regarded as the cause of Perception, as it is not found to be present in all cases of Perception; while there is not a single case of Perception where Colour and Magnitude are not present; so that it is these two, Colour and Magnitude, that are regarded as the cause of Perception. This is what has been declared by the author of the *Sūtra* (Kaṇāda) in the following two Sutras—'There is not perception of the Atom because it is a substance not composed of substances (being itself the ultimate component)' [which shows that Magnitude is necessary for perception],—and again 'there is no perception of the two, because the effect of Colour is absent' (*Vaishēṣika-Sūṭra*, 4-1-7); in this latter Sūṭra the term 'effect of colour' stands for the inherence of Colour.* "But *Tangibility*† is certainly inseparable from perceptibility, just as Colour and Magnitude are; under the circumstances it should be explained why Tangibility is not regarded as a cause of Perception [and the case of the *Touch of Light* would be analogous to that of *Tangibility*‡]." It is indeed with careful thought that you assert that the case of *Touch of Light* would be analogous to that of *Tangibility*. As it has been ascertained by proofs that *Tangibility*

Var: P. 233.

* The *Vartika* apparently quotes two of Kaṇāda's Sūṭras here. But though the latter Sūṭrā we find as 4-1-7, the former is not traceable. Vaishe. Sū. 4-1-6 says—'there is perception when the thing has magnitude, being composed of several component substances, and it has colour'; and in explaining this the *Upaskāra* adds, apparently by way of illustration,—'the atom is not perceptible because it has no magnitude.' From this explanation it is clear that there was no *Sūṭra* mentioning the case of the Atom. It is possible that the former quotation is only a paraphrase of 4-1-6, the paraphrase being preferred as being more pertinent to the discussion than the general statement in the Sūṭra (4-1 6), itself.

† Having failed in regard to the '*touch of light*', the Opponent brings up the case of *Tangibility*.

‡ That such analogy is meant to be urged by the Opponent is clear from the answer that follows.

is not the cause (necessary condition) of Perceptibility ; and it is for this very reason [urged by you, that the case of 'Touch of Light' is analogous to that of 'Tangibility'] that we hold that 'Touch of Light' is not a cause (of Perceptibility). "But there is no proof to show that it is not a cause." What do you mean by this? When you say that 'the case of *Touch of Light* is analogous to that of *Tangibility*', and you are shown that *Tangibility* is not the invariable concomitant of *Perceptibility*,—this clearly puts an end to the idea of 'Touch of Light' being the cause of Perceptibility. Further, when your Opponent brings home to you certain facts as to one thing (Magnitude) being the cause of another (Perceptibility),—if you do not seek to refute this by pointing out another instance proving the absence of concomitance between the two [and simply put forward the case of something else, 'Touch of Light', for instance, as a possible cause of the same effect], your answer is incongruous, and as such no answer at all.* Further, you have argued thus—"The conjunction of supersensuous things is super-sensuous ; *e. g.*, we have seen that the contact of Mind and Soul, both of which are super-sensuous, is supersensuous ; so that if the Atoms were super-sensuous, their products also would be so [the product of atoms consisting of atom-contacts only] ; but as a matter of fact the products of atoms are found to be perceptible by the senses, from which it follows that the Atoms also are perceptible by the senses." Well, in this assertion

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* The translation adopts the reading of the Bib. Ind. edition. The Benares edition reads 'तस्य प्रतिपादयतोः' for न प्रतिपद्यसि अतो. The former may be rendered as follows —'You seek to answer that by means of an argument entirely different from the showing of the fact that there is no concomitance between what has been put forward as cause and effect ; and this is the only way in which the assertion can be met. So that this answer of yours is no answer at all'. The reading of the Benares edition can be made to yield even this sense only with difficulty. It is true that the other reading also does not quite admit of the construction put upon it ; but it is more amenable to sense.

of yours—'the conjuction of super-sensuous things is super-sensuous'—what you state is a mere example; and as such it is defective as a Reason. The following reasoning may be some how deduced from your assertion—"Such manifested entities as the Primary Substances cannot be the product of super-sensuous causes,—because they are perceptible, like the Jar,—the Jar is perceptible and is found to be the product of perceptible causes,—so also are the Primary Substances perceptible,—therefore these also should be the product of perceptible causes."—But this reasoning, being contrary to well-ascertained facts of perception, is clearly 'contradictory';—being just like the reasoning 'Fire is not hot, because it is a product *!

Some people describe the Atom as the '*ṭruṭi*', the Particle (the three-atom Molecule) seen through window-crevices†. This however is not right; as the said Molecule is capable of disintegration: As a matter of fact the Atom is that which cannot undergo any further disintegration, while the 'three-atomed Molecule' is quite liable to disintegration.‡ "How

P. 244.

* As a matter of fact we never do perceive the root-cause—Atom—of the Primary Substances; just as we never feel Fire to be not-hot! But the *Tātparya* explains as follows—The Opponent's conclusion implies that he has the perception of subtle things; and yet there is negation of such perception in the case of the subtle thing, Soul, which is not perceptible, either according to the Pūrvapakṣa or according to the Siḍḍhānṭa; and this fact—the negation of Soul's perceptibility—is opposed to the opponent's conclusion.' Now the Cognition of Negation, according to the Naiyāyika, is a kind Perception; so that in running counter to the cognition of the negation of Soul's perceptibility, the Opponent's conclusion is clearly contrary to a fact of Perception.

† This view, which, according to the *Nyāyakosha*, is held by the modern Naiyāyika and the Mimāmsaka, is as follows:—"According to the Naiyāyika, the Triad is perceptible, and is itself composed of perceptible components;—now it is this Triad which we call 'atom', as there is no proof for postulating any components of the Triad; hence it is not right to say that the Atom is supersensuous (imperceptible).'

‡ *Ṭruṭi* 'is a peculiar word; in Gautama's Sūtra 4-2-17, the 'Atom' is described as being 'beyond the *Ṭruṭi*,' where Vishvanaṭha explains the term '*ṭruṭi*', as standing for the 'three-atom molecule.' The *Shrimaḍbhāgavaṭa* says that '*Ṭruṭi* is that time which is taken up by three Triads.'

do you know that it is disintegrated ?"* We infer it from the fact that, while being a substance, it is perceived by our external organs of perception,—just like the Jar. Otherwise (if the Triad were not capable of disintegration) why should the Atom have been described as 'not capable of disintegration'? Further, inasmuch as the Triad is not eternal, it cannot be regarded as the 'Atom', (which is eternal).† And we infer the non eternality of the Triad from the fact that, while capable of being analysed into Communities and Individualities, it is perceptible by our external organs of perception. For these reasons Atoms must be regarded as supersensuous. And inasmuch as Atoms (which are the ultimate components of all things) are supersensuous, what is perceptible (*i. e.*, the Composite Substance) must be something different. So that your Probans—*because it is perceptible*, (the Composite must be not-different from the Components)'—is clearly 'contradictory' (proving the *difference*, and not *non-difference*, of the Composite).

Other philosophers again have held the view that, inasmuch as whenever production or destruction occurs, it occurs to the aggregated thing, there *is* no such thing as the disintegrated 'atom' [and what is called an 'atom' is only an 'aggregate of Colour' &c.]; they argue that 'Atom' is the name given to the disintegrated particle,—while as a matter of fact, whenever there is production or destruction, it pertains to an

* The mere fact of its becoming invisible when smashed by the finger-tips,—which the *Siddhāntin* might urge as proving the disintegration of the Triad—would be possible also if the Triad were subtle and imperceptible; this is what the questioner means.

—*Tātparya.*

†If there were no limit to the disintegration of things, all things would have to be regarded as containing endless particles; so that the number of component particles in a mountain would be the same as those in a grain of corn. Hence the root-cause of the Primary Substances must be regarded as the ultimate particle, not capable of further disintegration;—and that which cannot be broken up into further component parts, can not be liable to destruction;—so that the Atom must be eternal.

—*Tātparya.*

aggregated substance;—hence there are no such things as the disintegrated atoms.*

This view also can not be maintained; because the exact signification of the term 'aggregated' has not been explained; when you assert that 'there are no such things as the 'disintegrated atoms', it behoves you to explain the meaning of the term 'aggregated.' As a matter of fact, the name 'aggregate' is applied to a combination (conjoined existence) of several such things as are not related to one another as causes and effects [*i. e.*, such as do not form the constituent part of one another];—so that if you deny the 'disintegrated' (Atom), there will be no basis for admitting the 'aggregated substance'; as the latter is always dependent upon those things that combine to form the 'aggregate'; *i.e.*, every 'aggregate' is dependent upon the combining members; and there can be no such members if the 'disintegrated' substance is entirely denied [For at the root of every aggregate there should be a disintegrated factor]. Thus then, the assertion that 'the disintegrated Atom does not exist' involves a contradiction, and as such is absolutely nugatory; being exactly like the (absurd idea of) rejecting the *one* and admitting the *many*;—that is to say, just as some foolish person might deny *one* thing and admit *many* things, so also becomes the case of our Opponent.

(3) [The *thirteenth* argument of the *Pūrvapakṣa*]—"For the following reason also the Composite is not different from the Components:—*because of the absence of conjunction and non-proximity*; as a matter of fact, when one thing is different from another, there is (sometimes) conjunction between the two, and also (at times) non-proximity; *e. g.*, in the case of the Cow and the Horse; in the case of the Yarns and the Cloth however we find that there is no conjunction between

* Every phenomenon being explained on the basis of aggregated substances, why postulate the disintegrated *Atom* at all?

them; nor is there non-proximity between them;—therefore the Cloth cannot be different from the Yarns.'"*

In this reasoning you make the *Composite* your Subject (Minor Term), while your Probans,—'absence of conjunction and disjunction'—is such as pertains to *Conjunction and Disjunction* (and not to the Subject, the 'Composite');—wherefore it can have no connection with your Proposition.† If (in order to escape from this difficulty) it be held that what are intended to be the Probans are *asamyogiṭva, the character of being not conjoined,* and *avibhāgiṭva, the character of being not disjoined* [and these certainly pertain to the Composite],—then our answer is that the Probans are 'unknown'; as the Composite does become *conjoined* and *disjoined* [with other things; and as such the said two characters do not belong to it at all]. In order to meet this it might be urged that what is meant to be the Probans is 'the character of being not conjoined *with its Components*';—but in that case, the Probans becomes 'inconclusive'; as no conclusion, either affirmative or negative, can be deduced from it.‡ "But we have the example of the *serpent-coil*, where the Coil is not in conjunction with its cause (the Serpent) and it is non-different from it [and this example enables us to deduce the affirmative conclusion that there is non-difference where there is 'absence of conjunction and disjunction']." The force of such an example cannot be admitted; because as a matter of fact the *Serpent-coil* is something different from the *Snake*, as we have already shown before. Then again, you assert that 'the *coil* is not in con-

Var. P. 235.

* It is interesting to note that this same argument has been put forward from the side of the Sāṅkhya, by Vāchaspaṭi Mishra, in his *Taṭṭvakaumudī*, on Karika, 9.

† The Probans should pertain to the Subject; your Probans does not do so; it pertains to Conjunction and Disjunction' and not to the 'Composite.'

‡ 'Absence of conjunction and disjunction' bears the same relation to different as to non-different things; *e. g.* the yarns cannot be conjoined with or disjoined from themselves. So that of the said fact you cannot deduce either the difference or the non-difference from any two things.—*Ṭāṭparya.*

tact with its cause',—this also is open to doubt,—as to whether it is not in contact because it is a quality (of the cause, and as such subsists in it by *inherence*, and not by *conjunction*), or because it is not-different (from the cause). Our view is that it is because of its being a quality, and not because of its being non-different. As a matter of fact, the 'Serpent-coil' consists only in the peculiar conjunction (combination of the the serpent's limbs; and conjunction is a *quality*; and that the quality is something quite different from the substance to which it belongs has been already explained by us. Further (even in accordance with your doctrines) 'absence of conjunction and disjunction' is found in the case of *different* things,—which fact makes your Probans 'contradictory'. For instance, (1) according to your philosophy, '*Saṭṭva*', '*Rajas*' and '*Ṭamas*' are three *distinct* things, and yet there is neither conjunction nor disjunction among them; and (2) between '*Prakṛiṭi*' and '*Puruṣa*' there is neither conjunction nor disjunction (and yet they are held to be different entities). Thus then your Probans ('absence of conjunction and disjunction'), being found to be concomitant with both (*difference* and *non-difference*), is clearly 'contradictory.'

(14) [The *fourteenth* argument of the *Pūrvapakṣa*]—"The Composite is not different from the Components,—*because it does not bring about the effect of a different weight* [*i.e.* the lowering of the scale, which is the effect of the weight of the Composite, is not different from that which is the effect of the weight of the Components; *i.e.* the Composite weighs exactly as much as its Components]."

The form in which the Probans is stated—'because of its not producing the effect of a different weight'—, it can have no relation with the Subject of your Proposition; for where, on one side, is the Proposition—'*the Composite is not different from the Components*' and, where on the other, is the fact of *not producing the effect of a different weight*? [There can be

no sort of connection between the two]; from the *non-production of the effect of a different weight,* all that you can deduce is the negation of the *effect of a different weight,*—and not either *weight,* or *different weight,* or the *Composite*; *e.g.* from the *denial of water,* it will not be right to deduce the denial of either the *water-pot,* or the *pot-pieces.*

Some people offer the following explanation:—"What is meant by the *non-production of the effect of a different weight is the denial of the producing of any different quality,*—the denial of 'the effect of a different weight' being mentioned only by way of an illustrative example. 'How so?' The Product cannot be possessed of Colour &c. preceded (*i.e.* brought into existence) by the Colour &c., of the Cause,—for, if it did, it would have a different weight;—that is to say, if the Colour &c. of the Cause were to produce (different) Colour &c. in the product, then the *weight* of the Cause would produce in the product a different *weight* also; and in that case we could perceive an effect (in the shape of the lowering of the scale) of this different weight [*i.e.* in actual weighing, the weight of the Product should be different from that of the Cause];—as a matter of fact however, no such effect of a different weight is ever perceived by us; therefore the conclusion is that the Product is not possessed of Colour &c., produced by the Colour &c., of its Cause."

Well, it is true that in this manner you have established the connection of your Probans with the Subject of your Proposition;—but (the fact remains that) your reasoning has no force, as it goes against a well-established fact of perception. For instance, you admit the Product, and then deny the presence in it of Colour &c.; but in admitting the *Product* itself, you

P. 236. (in fact) admit what you seek to deny; for when you assert that 'the Colour &c. of the Cause do not produce the Colour &c. of the Product,' your Product should be entirely devoid of qualities;—but as a matter of

fact, no Product is found to be devoid of qualities :—so that, inasmuch as your Probans goes against a well-ascertained fact of perception, it cannot be a valid Probans. If (in order to escape this difficulty, it be held that) the Product does not exist, then the assertion—'the Product is not possessed of qualities &c. produced by the Colour &c., of the Cause'—becomes meaningless ; *e. g.*, when the water-pot is non-existent, it is not right to make the assertion that 'the water-pot is without water.' This same reasoning gets rid of the Conjunction of Colour &c.* as existent in the Product.

Then again, as a reason (for the non-difference of the Composite Product from the Component Cause), the *Pūrvapakṣin* has urged that (if the Composite were something different) it would have a different weight ;—but inasmuch as we admit this (that the weight of the Product is different from that of its Cause), the reasoning is futile ; certainly what we admit cannot be urged (against us) as an undesirable contingency.

" Well, if the Product had a different weight and also a different *colour*, then we should meet with effects of such different *weight*, just as we meet with the different effect of its different *Colour* (the latter effect being in the shape of the visibility of the coloured thing); as a matter of fact however we do not meet with the effect of its different weight ; for when two separate pieces (of clay for instance) are placed in the balance, the effect produced by their weight (in the shape of the lowering of the scale) is not different from that produced by the weight of the two pieces lumped together [which shows that the weight of the lumped-up clay, which is the Composite Product, is not different from that of the disjoined pieces, which are the

* The *Tāṭparya* adds the word निषेध्यत्वेन ; as the sentence stands, it means that the 'Conjunction of Colour &c., is rejected'; which cannot be what is meant, as that would go against the *Siddhānṭa* view. By adding निषेध्यत्वेन we get the meaning that 'there is rejection of the view that the cognition of colour &c., is to be denied.' The sense is that when the product and its Colour &c., are denied, there cannot be any denial of cognition of these in the Product.

Component Causes] ; all which goes to prove that just as the disjoined pieces, so also the conjoined pieces, do not produce any different substance."

Among people who reason as above, there are some who put forward their Proposition in the form—" The balance indicates (*lit.* possesses) no effects of a different weight "; —and in support of this they urge, as the reason, the fact that *there is absence of a different lowering of the scales.* But this reason or Probans is one that subsists elsewhere than the Subject ; for the *absence of a different lowering of the scales* is not a property of the *Balance* ; that is to say, the *absence of the different lowering* (being a *negation*) cannot be a property subsisting in the Balance ;—[in fact, *negation* being nothing more than the Receptacle itself, the said negation would be nothing apart from the Balance itself ; so that the reasoning would be tantamount to this—' the balance does not indicate the effect of a different weight, *because it is the balance* ' !]. " But we think that the reasoning would be all right if stated in the following form—' The Balance does not indicate the effect of a different weight, *because it is not the receptacle of a different lowering* ' ". But the Probans (thus stated) becomes open to the charge of being ' unknown,' as the character of *not being the receptacle of different lowering* does not (in fact) subsist in the Balance.* "This is not true ; as in reality the Balance is not found to possess a different lowering (so that our Probans is not ' unknown')." But even so, your Probans is ' inconclusive ' (not invariably concomitant with your Probandum) ; because as a matter of fact we find that in some cases, even though things of different weights fall in, the character of *not being the receptacle of a different lowering* is present; for instance, when a substance

* This is apparently a frivolous answer ; the *Tāṭparya* says that it is an answer given by one party *(Ekadeshin)* of the Siddhāntin. This answer having been successfully met by the Opponent in the next sentence, the Author supplies the true answer (the वस्त्वर्थदूषणम् as the *Tāṭparya* calls it) later on, in l. 17.

endowed with a certain weight,—in the shape of the Atom of Clay, *e. g.*,—is weighed, it is found to have a certain weight; and then there may be produced in it the Triad in the shape of the dust-molecule, and then, in due course, also the final product (in the shape of the Jar);—and though each of these latter (the Triad and the subsequent products up to the Jar) is endowed with a weight different from that of each component Atom (in which it has fallen in, of which it is composed), yet this does not produce in these Atoms, which continue to be possessed of their own simple pristine weight, a *different lowering* [So that here we have a case where even though things having different weights have fallen into a certain receptacle, the Atom, the *character of not being the receptacle of a different lowering* is present in it].* "But the Product can be either equal to, or more weighty or less weighty (than the component cause); and in any case what we have urged remains in force; that is to say, if the

P. 237. weight of the Product is equal to that of its component cause (the atom or the molecule), then, if the single molecule by itself causes a lowering of the scales similar that caused by two *palas* † (*i.e.* if it weighs two *palas*), the lowering caused by two such molecules in conjunction (i.e. the product composed of these two molecules) should be *twice* two *palas*;—secondly if the weight of the Product is greater than that of the component cause, then also there should be an excess of weight;—and lastly, if the weight of the Product is less than that of the cause, then also a difference should be perceptible. So that in any case there should

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*The argument of the Opponent is that the Balance cannot indicate the effect of a different weight because it is not the receptacle of a different lowering; which implies that there is concomitance between the *presence of things of different weights* and the *different lowering*. But in the case of the Atom it has been shown that though several things of diverse weights fall into it, yet the Atom does not become the receptacle of a different lowering; *e. g.*, the Atom is not lowered differently than before; this shows that the said concomitance is not true.

† The 'pala' is a particular weight-measure.

be difference in the weight of the Product and that of its component particles; which however is never found to be the case; —so that the conclusion is that the product has no weight of its own (apart from that of its component particles)." This is not right; because the limits of the weights of the Product and the component cause cannot be discerned; that is to say, if it could be definitely discerned that (when a certain thing is weighed) so much is the weight of the thing itself and so much of its component particles, then alone it could be said that the product can only be either equal to or weightier or less weighty (than the component cause); as a matter of fact however it is never ascertained that so much is the weight of the product and so much of the component cause. "If there is no discernment between the weights of the product and its component cause, then we could not have such a conception as 'this weighs *two palas*'—'this weighs *five palas*',—which we have when a certain thing is weighed in the balance." It is not true that we could not have the said conceptions; for what the said conception represents is the recognition of the weight of the aggregate; in the conception that you put forward—'this weighs two palas', 'this weighs five palas'—there is no discernment between the weights of the product and its component particles; what it represents is the result of the weighing of the whole aggregate, from the ultimate Atom down to the final Product (Jar);* and such being the case, no mortal man (who can never *perceive* the Atom or anything with regard to it) can say that 'so much represents the weight of the component Atoms, and so much that of the product. Nor can the 'aggregate' be regarded as the 'cause' of the Product; it is only the ultimate Atom that is its 'cause' [and certainly the weight of the Atom can never be discerned by ordinary men].

* The term '*Charama*' l. 11 stands for the *Final Product*; and the same term in l. 13 stands for the *ultimate Atom*.

Some writers have held the view that "certain Atoms *having produced* a particular product (the molecules and the smaller particles of dust for instance), those same Atoms *go on to produce* the further products (the potsherds and the Jar, for instance) [So that all Products, from the Triad down to the Jar are the direct effects of, and as such inhere directly in, the Atoms themselves]";

Against this view we have to make the following observations:—As a matter of fact, the primary and the secondary products (the clay-particles and the potsherd &c.) can never occupy the same points in space, because they are corporeal substances, like the Jar and such things [the *cow*, the horse &c. which being corporeal things, no two of them are found to occupy the same points in space]. Further details in regard to the theory of what is the cause and what its direct product we do not criticise here, as it would not be quite relevant.

"[If what you have been urging is true] then there can be no proof of there being any weight in the Product; for if the addition of things of different weights do not produce any appreciable effect in the shape of the different lowering (of the scales), how can it be known that the product has any weight at all?"

Who has said that the weight of the Product is not recognised? "If it is recognised, then what is that (by which it is recognised)?" It is the act of *falling*; of the falling of the Product there can be no other cause except its weight. From all this we conclude that the product has a weight of its own, different from that of its component parts.

These same arguments also serve to demolish the argument that "the product has no weight of its own, because we do not perceive a different lowering of the scales of the balance." Var. P. 238.

Against our reasoning you might argue as follows:—"When the product falls, it does so by reason of the

weight that belongs to its component cause; so that there is no weight of the product itself; for the simple reason that its *falling* (which has been held to be the sole indicative of its weight) is found to be due to other causes; hence we conclude that the product has no distinct weight of its own."

This however is not right; because there is no *conjunction* between the Product and its component Cause; wherever the weight of one thing is the cause of the *falling* of another thing, *Conjunction* is found to be the accessory cause; *e. g.* the conjunction of the 'scale of the balance' and the 'weighty substance' [is the cause of the falling or lowering of the scale];—there can be no such *conjunction* between the Product and its component Cause; as they are inseparable; 'separability' consists in *absence of relation*; and certainly the Product is never without relation to its component Cause; as the Product comes into existence and is related to its Cause at precisely the same moment; so that there cannot be conjunction between the Product and its component Cause. "Well, in that case, what will make the Product fall is the weight (of its component cause) as aided by the relation of Inherence (that subsists between the Cause and its product)." That cannot be; as it has not been declared to be so, and because this theory would involve an incongruity also. That is to say, what you mean is as follows—"It is true that there is no *conjunction* between the Product and its component Cause; but between them there *is* the relation of *Inherence*; and it would be this Inherence which, through the weight of the Cause, would make the Product fall; so that there is nothing to prove that there is weight in the Product itself";——but this is not right; for in the first place it has not been declared to be so; that is the author of the *Sūṭra* (Kaṇāḍa) has nowhere mentioned *Inherence* as a cause of action, as he has mentioned *Conjunction* to be, in the *Vaishēṣika-Sūṭra*—' Action in Earth is due

to propulsion, impact and conjunction of the conjoined' (5-2-1);—secondly, it is not only that Inherence has not been so mentioned, your theory also involves an incongruity: If Inherence were the Cause of action, the Colour &c. of the Cause should also *fall*, as these also *inhere* in the Cause in the same manner as the Product does. "Well, let the Colour &c. also fall,—what harm does that do to us?" This would scarcely be right; as in that case, the *weight* itself should also fall; just as the Colour &c. of the Cause falls in the wake of the Product, the weight also of the Cause would fall [as the weight inheres in it in the same manner as the Colour does]; and when the weight falls, it behoves you to explain to what the fall of this weight is due; as there is no weight in the weight itself which could make it fall;—all which leads to the conclusion that weight does not fall, nor do Colour and the rest fall. "If Colour &c. do not fall, then when the substance has fallen, they would stay in the original place; and as such these Colour &c. would subsist without any substance (for their substratum), and the thing itself would be found entirely without any Colour (which is absurd). If, on the other hand, Colour &c. do fall when the substance has fallen, Colour &c. have an action, (which also is absurd). If then Colour &c. do not either stay where they were, or fall,—then you have to face the dilemma of answering the question as to whether, when the Substance falls, its Colour &c. stay or they also fall." Do you, (we ask), know the several causes that make things right or wrong? "We do know", says the Opponent; "what is definitely known by means of the Instruments of Right Knowledge is *right*, and what is not so known is *wrong*." In that case (we say), it is *wrong* to ask the question 'whether when the substance falls, its Colour &c. stay or fall?'* This

Vār: P. 239.

* The Benares edition reads पतति पतन्ति गच्छति गच्छन्ति; the Bib. Ind. edition drops गच्छति. The latter reading is better; as this is the form in which the question has appeared on the preceding page.

was what we meant when we said—(1) that the Opponent's theory involves the postulating of another weight in weight itself,— 2) that a substance entirely without Colour &c. is never seen,—and (3) that Colour &c. without a substance are never seen. Then again, what is meant by the phrase '*the thing falls*' is that 'it abandons that with which it was in contact'; similarly the phrase 'it moves' means that 'it comes into contact with something with which it was not in contact'; and certainly Colour &c. are, by their very nature, so constituted that they never either 'abandon what they were in contact with', or 'come into contact with what they were not in contact with'. "It is not correct to say that 'Colour &c. do not come into contact with what they have not been in contact with'; because whenever two substances come into contact, their Colours also come into contact." It is not so; as it is open to doubt; that is to say it is open to doubt whether the notion of 'contact' that we have in the case cited is due to the presence of actual *contact* (between the Colours), or it is due to mere *non-perception of disjunction* (*non-contact*). Our own view is that it is due to our not perceiving their disjunction; for when one sees two substances in contact with each other, he fails to perceive the non-contact (or disjunction) between the Colours of those substances. "The same might be said in regard to the Substances themselves." You mean by this as follows—"Just as the notion of *contact* between two Colours is due to the non-perception of their disjunction, so the same notion in regard to two substances also may be due to the non-perception of their disjunction, and not to their actual contact." This, we reply, does not affect our position; as the duality of conceptions may be due to several causes; as a matter of fact, a duplicate conception (*i. e.* a conception under two distinct circumstances) is not always due to the same cause; for instance, though in the case of the image of men in pictures, even in the absence of real fear and anger in the

pictures, we have the conception of their being afraid and angry, yet from an analogy to this, it does not follow that in the case of real men also we should have the notion of their being afraid and angry, in the absence of real fear and anger in them. So that in the case under consideration also, the notion of 'contact' may, in one case, be due to actual '*contact*, and in another case to *non-perception of disjunction*. Thus it is established that Weight does not fall, nor do Colour &c. fall.

Some writers have tried to answer the Pūrvapakṣa argument by explaining that the weight of the cause is absorbed by the weight of the Product; they explain that, there is no different lowering (of scales) by the weight of the Product, as the weight of the Cause is absorbed by the weight of the Product.

We think however that this is also is not right; because, we perceive the falling of both the Product and its cause; if we found that when the Product falls, its cause re-
Var. P. 240.
mains in the original position, then we could admit that the weight of the Cause is absorbed by the weight of the Product; as a matter fact however we never find such to be the case; hence the said explanation cannot be right. Specially as if it were as is suggested, then there would be no substratum at all (for the action); that is to say, if the weight of the Cause were absorbed by the weight of the Product, then the weight of the Cause could not give rise to an action in that Cause; and the result of this would be that when the Product falls, its component Cause would not fall; so that the action (of falling) would be without its substratum (in the shape of the Cause).

This same argument serves to demolish the other explanation, that the Weight of the Cause is *destroyed* by the weight of the Product; and to this view there is this further objection that there would be no possibility of the falling of disjoined things; that is to say, if the

weight of the Cause were destroyed by the weight of the Product, then, on the destruction (and consequent disintegration) of the Product, there could be no *falling* of the disjoined component causes (particles) of that Product; and further, there would be no weight at all (in the Atoms); for if the weight of the component cause were destroyed by the weight of its Product, then there would be no weight in any component (atom) at all; as there is no Atom of which there has been no Product in the past [and the weight of each Product would have destroyed the weight of its component Atom]; so that Atoms should be entirely without weight;—and there being no weight in the Atoms, whence could there be any weight in the Products of those Atoms? Thus then, it is found that the theory that the weight of the Cause is destroyed, or absorbed, by the weight of the Product, cannot be regarded as a sound answer (to the Pūrvapakṣa argument based upon the question why the weight of the Product does not produce a lowering of the scales different from that produced by the weight of the cause). The really sound answers are—(1) that the reason propounded by the Opponent is inconclusive (as explained in the *Text*, P. 236, L. 17), and (2) that there can be no discernment between the weights of the Product and its Cause (as explained in Text, P. 237, L. 4.)

From the above [refutation of the fourteen arguments of the Pūrvapakṣin in support of the view that the Composite is not different from the Components] it is clear that there are no proofs available for establishing either the *non-existence* of the Composite [as we have proved on P. 219, Ll. 7-14], or its *non-difference* from the components [as we have proved, on Pp. 219 to 240 L. 14]; hence it is not right to assert that "there is doubt in regard to the Composite, as it is *something to be proved*" [as the Pūrvapakṣin says in the Sūtra].

For the following reason also it is not right to propound the *Pūrvapakṣa* in the form—"because the Composite is *something to be proved*, there is doubt in regard to it":—This other reason consists in non-declaration; that is to say, nowhere has the character of *being something to be proved* been declared to be a cause of Doubt*; so that there can be no Doubt in regard to a thing simply because it is *something to be proved*.

[The Pūrvapakṣin, who propounded the *Pūrvapakṣa* in the terms of the Sūṭra, 2-1-33, answers the above objections]—
"Who says that there is doubt in regard to the Composite
"*because it is something to be proved?* What we mean is
"that as it is still to be proved, there is 'diversity of opinion'
"in regard to it, and from this 'diversity of opinion' † here
"arises Doubt. Inasmuch as the 'diversity of opinion' is
"an effect of the thing being something to *be proved*, this
"latter character is imposed upon the former, and hence
"(instead of saying that 'there is doubt in regard to the
"Composite *because of the diversity of opinion* with reference
"to it') it is said that 'there is doubt in regard to the Com-
"posite, *as it is something to be proved*."

[The answer to this is given in the following *Sūṭra*.]

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* All possible causes of Doubt having been mentioned in the *Sūṭra* 1-1-23.

† 'Diversity of Opinion' being one of the principal causes of doubt as explained in Sūṭra 1-1-23.

[*Siḍḍhānṭa.*]

SŪṬRA (34).

IF THERE WERE NO COMPOSITE, THERE WOULD BE NON-APPREHENSION OF ALL THINGS.*

Su. 34.

Bhaṣya.

[P. 82, L. 2 to L. 8.]

If there is no Composite, there will be non-apprehension† of all things. " What *all things*?" Such things as Substance, Quality, Action, Community, Individuality and Inherence. " With what idea [do you say this] ?"‡ Well, as for Substance in its atomic condition, this could never be an object of perception, as atoms are beyond the reach of sense-organs ;—as for any other form of Substance,§ [this could only be a composite of atoms, and] no Composite substance exists (according to the Pūrvapakṣin), which could be the object of perception ; and yet as a matter of fact, all these, Substance and the rest, are found to be objects of perception,|| and actually apprehended as such. But if these¶ were without a substratum (in the form of the Composite), they could not be apprehended ;—and yet there *are* such apprehensions as—(*a*) 'this is a jar—(*b*) dark in colour—(*c*) one in number—(*d*) large in size—(*e*) conjoined (to something else)—(*f*) *moving*,—(*g*) *existing* and—(*h*) made of clay '; and every one of these—the quality (of colour, number) &c.,—is a property (of some Composite substance). So that, inasmuch as we have the apprehension of all these things, we conclude that there is such a thing as the *Composite*, apart from the Components.

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* The *Vārṭika* proposes another interpretation—' there would be non-apprehension by means of any Instrument of Cognition.'

† 'Non-apprehension' stands for all kinds of 'phenomenon'—*Bhāṣyachanḍra*.

‡ The *Bhāṣyachanḍra* explains *Kriṭvā*' as ' *maṭva*'.

§ The reading adopted in the printed text is not the right one ; the right reading is द्रव्यान्तरं चावयविभूतं न as found in the footnote, and also in the Puri Mss.

|| The right reading is दर्शनविषयभावमेते as in the footnote, and also in the Puri Mss.

¶ Though all Mss. read चैव, the right reading appears to be चे as found in one manuscript.

Vārṭika on Sū. (34).

[P. 241, L. 1 to L. 18].

This *Sūṭra* is meant to set aside the 'doubt' (as to the existence of the Composite, which the Pūrvapakṣin has urged in the preceding Sūṭra). [The meaning is that] there would be non-apprehension of all things, if there were no such thing as the *Composite* apart from the *Components*. "How so?" As for Atoms, these never fall within the range of perception, because they are beyond reach of the senses, as has already been explained; and as for any *composite* substances (composed of these atoms), you do not admit the existence of any such; and so long as these are not admitted, no such conception as the following would be possible—(*a*) the conception of 'substance' in the form 'there is a jar',—(*b*) or the conception of 'quality' in the form 'this is dark',—(*f*) or the conception of 'action' in the form 'it moves',—(*g*) or the conception of 'Community' (*of Being*) in the form 'it has *being* (it exists)', (*h*) or the conception of 'individuality' in the form 'this is that particular form of jar which is called a *pitcher*,'—(*i*) or the conception of 'inherence' in the form 'in this jar colour and other qualities inhere'*,—(*j*)or such other conceptions as, 'it is dark—one—large—conjoined—disjoined—separate—prior—posterior', and so forth. And yet as a matter of fact we do have the apprehension of the entire phenomenon of Substance, Quality and the rest; *so that, inasmuch as we have the apprehension of all these things, we conclude that there is such a thing as the Composite apart from the components.* (Bhāsya, P. 82; ll. 7-8).

Or [the Sūṭra being interpreted in a different manner] the phrase '*sarvāgrahaṇa*' may be explained as *sarvaiḥ pramaṇaiḥ agrahaṇam*, 'non-apprehension by means of all

* 'Inherence' is referred to in the *Bhāṣya* as in the conception 'this is made of clay,' clay being the *inherent* or Constituent cause of the jar.

Instruments of Cognition.' "How is that?" Well, (a) as regards Perception, it has for its object only such things as are present and are possessed of magnitude; that alone which is present and is possessed of magnitude can be perceived by means of the external organs; so that if you deny the existence of such composite substances as the Jar and the like (which alono are possessed of magnitude), there can be no object for Perception by means of the external organs;—(b) where there is no Perception, there can be no Inference, or other forms of Cognition [as everyone of these depends, directly or indirectly, upon Perception]. In this manner there would be a cessation of all Instruments of Cognition. And yet as a matter of fact things are actually apprehended by means of Perception and the other Instruments of Cognition. So that from the fact of there being apprehension by means of all Instruments of Cognition, we conclude that there is such a thing as the *Composite.*

This sutra is meant to point out an incongruity involved in the non-acceptance of the Composite; the sense being that the theory involves this total incongruity that it puts an end to all universally known conceptions.*

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* The *Vārṭika* here explains in what way what is urged in the Sūṭra affects the position of the Pūrvapakṣa. Even those (Idealists) who do not admit the existence of things, like Quality, Action etc., do admit the existence of the Idea or Conception of such things; and as a matter of fact all men—learned and unlearned—have the conception of Quality, Action, Substance, etc. Hence any absolute denial of these cannot be right. That such a thing as the Composite Substance is directly perceptible, we have already shown under the section of 'Perception'; and the Vārṭika has also set aside the arguments against the existence of the Composite. So that there being no valid arguments to the contrary, we cannot rightly deny the Composite, which is actually perceived as the substratum of Quality, Action etc.—such is the purport of the Sūṭra.—*Ṭāṭparya.*

On this the *Parishuḍḍhi* remarks—The *Sūṭra* is intended to show that in support of the view that there is such a thing as the *Composite*, we have the evidence of direct Perception; and instead of mentioning this fact directly, the Sūṭra has recourse to the method of indicating the incongruity involved in the opposite view.

Suṭra (35) *and Bhāṣya.*

[P. 82, L. 10 to P, 83, L. 8.]

ALSO AS THERE IS POSSIBILITY OF HOLDING AND DRAWING,—

the Composite is something actually different from the components†.*

[The Opponent objects to the reasoning as follows]—" As " a matter of fact, the *Holding and Drawing* are due to *adhe-* " *sion*,—this *adhesion* being a particular quality " (of the components themselves) which is con- " comitant with (their) *conjunction*, and which is produced " by viscidity and fluidity, through the contact of water, in " the unbaked jar, and through the contact of fire in the " baked jar. If these two (Holding and Drawing) were " due to the (fact of the thing being a) Composite, then " they could be perceived even in such things as a *heap of dust* " (which cannot be either *held* or *drawn*, simply because there " is no *adhesion* among the dust-particles); and they could " not be possible in the case of several things, like the straw, " stone and wood, packed up together by means of lac,— " where the packed up bundle does not become a new sub- " stance (different from the component *wood* etc.) [So that the " case of this bundle is not analogous to that of the Jar com-

Bhā. P. 83.

* This Sūṭra is an answer to the view that the conception of 'composite' is illusory. '*Bhūṭa*' denotes *actuality*.—*Bhāṣyachandra*.

† This completes the sentence of the Sūṭra, and according to the Vārṭika is implied by the particle च in the Sūṭra; the whole sentence being—'The Composite must be something different, because there is possibility of its being held and drawn.' The *Parishuḍḍhi* remarks that in the form in which the Probans—*possibility of drawing and holding*—is put forward, it is one that does not subsist in the Subject, 'Composite'; the proper probans should be धारणाकर्षणवत्त्वात्, 'because it is possessed of the capability of being held and drawn'. This same difficulty is avoided by the *Ṭāṭparya* by formulating the reasoning in the *negative* form—'The Jar and other things that we see, which are suspected to be mere conglomerations of atoms, *cannot be non-composites*,—because, *if they were so there would be no possibility of their being held and drawn*,—as we find that whatever is non-composite, like Cognition, is never held and drawn,—while Jar and such other things are always capable of being held and drawn,—hence these latter cannot be non-composites.'

"posed of atoms, which is held to be something different "from the component atoms; and yet the said bundle of wood "etc is capable of being *held* and *drawn*; simply because "there is *adhesion* due to the lac].*"

Vārṭika on Su. 35.

[P. 241, L. 20 to P. 243, L. 1.]

'As there are *holding* and *drawing*—*the Composite is a different substance*',—this conclusion is indicated by the particle '*cha*' in the *Sūṭra*. What is this *Holding*?" A thing is said to be *held* when one part of it is caught and it is restrained from moving to another place; that is to say, when a man catches hold of a part of a

Vār. P. 242.

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* Thus by the two examples of *Dust-Heap* and *Straw wood-bundle*, it is shown that what is invariably concomitant with Holding is *adhesion*, and not *Composite*-character.

For अवयविव्यतिरिक्ते some Mss. read अवयवव्यतिरिक्ते.

It is noteworthy that the *Bhāṣya* contents itself with this *Pūrvapakṣa* argument, and does not supply the answer to it. It would appear, from this, that the objection has the acceptance of the *Bhāṣya-kāra*. Vāchaspaṭi Misra says that this दूषणम्, objection to the reasoning of the Sutra, is परमतेन, from the standpoint of the Opponent; but in that case the answer should have been given; as it has been given in the Vārṭika. The *Bhāṣyachandra* explains that the Pupil, upon hearing the aforesaid reasonings of the opponent, puts the question embodied in the next sentence of the *Bhāṣya* as to what answer should be given to these arguments of the opponent. Then comes the answer from the stand-point of the *Siddhantin*. (See below, P. 178 L. 5 *et. seq.*)

It is well worth considering whether or not we can, in some way, interpret the *Bhāṣya* as putting forward an argument in support of the *Siḍḍhānṭa* view. We have a clue to this in the reading of some Mss., which read अवयवबहुत्वे for अवयविबहुत्वे (P. 83, L. 2). Accepting this reading we can translate the whole passage in the following manner, and thus make it an argument in support of the *Siḍḍhānṭa*—'Holding and Drawing are always found to be due to *massiveness*; this *massiveness* is a distinct quality concomitant with the *conjunction*, which is produced by viscidity and fluidity, through contact of water, in the unbaked jar, and through contact of fire, in the baked jar; if Holding and Drawing were due to the *components* themselves (and not to a *massive* substance composed of them), then they would be possible in the Dust-heap also (where the component dust-particles are present, even though there is no massive substance); and would not be possible in the case of straw-stone-and-wood bundled together with lac; as in this case (even though there is a massive substance) there is no *component* [the several heterogeneous substances not constituting one homogeneous whole, and as such not entitled to the name 'component'.]

composite substance, he catches the substance itself, and on account of this catching, the substance is restrained from moving to another place;—this is what constitutes its 'Holding'. 'Drawing' is that when, on one part of the thing being caught, the thing itself is made to move to another place. "From where do you get these meanings of the terms *Holding* and *Drawing*?" We get at them from the ordinary usage of men; as a matter of fact people employ these terms in the sense explained above.

These two, *Holding and Drawing*, prove the existence of the Composite. "How so?" For the simple reason that these are never found either in any admittedly non-composite substance (like *Ākāsha*), or in any purely component substance (like Atoms, which are always *component*, and never *composite*); as a matter of fact, *Holding and Drawing* are never found in any non-composite or purely component substance; and yet they are found (in several substances); from which it follows that they must belong to Composite substances [as Substances must be either composite or component or non-composite; so that when the said phenomena are real and are not found in the last two, they must belong to the *first*.]

In the *Bhāṣya*, the Pūrvapakṣin has put forward the following argument—' Holding and Drawing are due to *adhesion*, and not to the *Composite* character of the substance,—because they are not found in the Dust-heap, while they are found in the straw-stone-wood packed together in lac." This argument however has no force against us; as we do not put any restriction; that is to say, we do not say that in *every Composite* there *must* be 'holding' and 'drawing'; all that we say is that 'holding' and 'drawing' do not appear apart from Composites; and certainly there is no incongruity in this statement; for as a matter of fact, it is only in Composites that we find 'holding' and 'drawing'; even in the case of *the straw-stone-wood packed together in lac*, wherein we do find 'holding' and 'drawing', each and

every one of these (even singly) is a *Composite*; this case would have been incompatible with our statement, only if each of these were either *non-composite* (like *Ākāsha*) or mere *components* (like atoms). Then again, when you assert that 'Drawing' and 'Holding' are due to 'adhesion', and not to the 'composite' character of the thing,—we cannot accept this; as there is no special reason to show that Drawing and Holding are due to *adhesion*, and not to *composite* character; in fact you yourself do not put forward any such special reason.* Further, it behoves you to explain why there is no 'adhesion' in the case of the *Heap of Dust*, [which is as much a *conglomeration of substances* as the straw-stone-wood bundle]:—Whatever may be *your* reason for there being no 'adhesion' in the *Dust-Heap*, that same will be *our* reason for there being no 'Holding and Drawing' in it, even though it is as much a *composite* (as any other substance).† "What is that reason?" Well, it has already been explained (by the Opponent himself) that the reason lies in the fact that while the substance should be capable of being held by one part, there should be a particular kind of relationship (due to Viscidity and Fluidity, among the components of the Substance). And as this is not present in such things as the *Dust-heap* (where there is neither capability of being held by a part, nor the said particular relationship among the Dust-particles), there are no 'Holding' and 'Drawing' in them [just as for the the same reason there is no 'adhesion' also in them].

Var : P. 243.

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* Such a special reason would be possible only if Holding and Drawing had ever been found either in *Ākāsha* and such other admittedly non-composite substances, or in such purely component substances as Atoms; but they are never found to appear in either of such substances; hence no reason is possible.—*Tātparya*.

† The Opponent has urged that when the Dust-heap is as much a *composite* as the Jar, why is there no 'Holding and Drawing' in it, just as there is in the Jar. This is now met by the counter-question—When the Dust-heap is as much a *conglomeration* of things as the *bundle of straw, stone and wood*, why is there no 'adhesion' in it, just as there is in the latter?

The reason given in this Sūtra is a negative one; [the affirmative reason comes in the next Sūtra].

Bhāṣya on Su. (36).

[P. 83, L. 4 to P. 86, L. 16].

Question—"The man who denies the Composite, and, with a view to avoid the contingency of Perception becoming impossible, holds that what is perceived is the *conglomeration or mass of Atoms*,—what is there to urge against such a man?"*

Answer†—Such a person should be asked to explain what is the object of the unitary conception that we have in the idea of 'one thing'; the question put to him being in the form—does the Unitary Conception refer to (*i.e.* apprehend) a *non-diverse* (single) thing, or to diverse (several) things? If it be said to refer to a *non-diverse* thing, then, this view would admit the *non-diverse thing* to be something different (from the components, which are *diverse*); so that what we call the 'composite' would be duly established;—if, on the other hand, it be held to refer to *diverse* things (the many components), then, it would be a case of *many things* (Atoms) being perceived as *one*, which would be an absurdity (a case of pure misconception); as we never come across any such (right) notion as that of 'one' in regard to the *many*.

Sūtra (36).

[IN ANSWER TO WHAT HAS BEEN JUST URGED BY THE SIDDHĀNTIN, THE PŪRVAPAKṢIN MIGHT URGE THAT] "THE SAID CONCEPTION (OF 'ONE' IN REGARD TO THE MANY) WOULD BE SIMILAR TO THE NOTION THAT WE HAVE IN REGARD TO SUCH (COLLECTIVE) THINGS AS THE 'ARMY' AND THE 'FOREST'";—BUT EVEN SO THE CONCEPTION WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE; AS ATOMS ARE BEYOND THE REACH OF THE SENSES—(Sū. 36).

[Says the *Pūrvapakṣin*]—"In the case of the 'Army' and the 'Forest' it is found that when, on account of remoteness, the distinctness (and diversity) of the component factors is not perceived, the conception of their being 'one'

* This question is addressed by the Pupil who has heard the above arguments on behalf of the Pūrvapakṣa and is anxious to learn how to meet them.

† The Teacher teaches the following answer.

becomes possible; analogously, many Atoms being massed together, when their distinctness (and diversity) fail to be perceived, the notion of these being 'one' would be possible."

But in the case of the 'Army' and the 'Forest' what actually happens is that the diversity of the component factors of these is such as is ordinarily perceptible, but it fails to be perceived on account of an extraneous cause in the shape of *remoteness*;—similarly when there are several trees, the particular species to which each belongs—such as, '*Palāsha*', '*Khadira*' &c.—is such as is ordinarily perceptible,* but it fails to be perceived on account of remoteness;—similarly again in the case of such things as have their (diverse) motions ordinarily perceptible, the (diverse) motion fails to be perceived on account of remoteness, and in all these cases what happens is that the (diverse component) things themselves are perceived, but their diversity fails to be perceived on account of remoteness, which (non-perception of diversity) makes it possible for the notion of 'one' to appear in regard to them, in a secondary (indirect, figurative) sense. The case of Atoms is entirely different;—in regard to these it is not true that their diversity is ordinarily perceptible; so that it cannot be said that the figurative notion of 'one' becomes possible when, for some reason, the said diversity fails to be perceived;—this cannot be said, for the simple reason that Atoms are 'beyond the reach of senses' (and hence their diversity cannot be said to be ordinarily perceptible).

Further [the Opponent is not quite right in citing the case of the 'Army' and the 'Forest', for] what is being discussed (by us) is just this—whether or not the unitary conception refers to the 'mass of small particles'; and the 'Army' and the 'Forest' also are just such 'mass of small particles' [so that these are as much open to discussion as any other *Composite*]; and certainly it is not right to put forward as an example (in proof of a Proposition) something that is itself open to discussion; as such a thing is in the same position as what is meant to be proved (by the citing of that example).†

* The printed text reads '*agṛihyamāṇa*'; the MSS. do not show the 'a'; and in the sentence preceding and following this, we have '*gṛihyamāṇa*'; the *Vārṭika* also explains the term as '*upalabhyamānajaṭīnām*'. The translation has for these reasons adopted the reading without 'a.'

† What the *Bhāṣya* means is that no corroborative example can be available for the Opponent who denies the 'compositeness' of all things; so that for him every

It might be argued that what has been put forward is what is actually seen (by all parties).—But even so it would not be right; as what is being discussed is just what exactly forms the object of the 'seeing' or 'perception'.* That is to say, the Opponent might argue as follows: "It is a fact actually perceived that in the case of the 'Army' and the 'Forest', the distinction among the component parts not being perceived, the parts come to be looked as *non-different*,—which gives rise to the idea of these being 'one'; and certainly what is actually perceived cannot be denied." But this is not quite right; what forms the object of perception is just what is being discussed [and has still got to the ascertained]; the precise object of perception is what is being discussed, the point at issue being the notion of 'unity' that is actually perceived; has this notion for its object only the 'mass of small particles', or something different from the particles? so that (the exact object of Perception being still open to doubt), no fact of Perception could establish a conclusion one way or the other. In fact, inasmuch as the 'small particles' or 'Atoms' are *many*, if there does arise an idea of 'unity' in regard to them, by reason of their distinctness not being perceived, and hence their being regarded as non-different,—such an idea must be regarded as being a notion of something (the *many* atoms) as what it is not (*i. e. one*), just like the notion of the *Post* as a *Man*. [and as such, it must be a clearly *wrong* cognition, a misconception] † "What if it is?" Well, inasmuch as the notion of something as what it is not must be dependent upon an original prototype, the appearance of such a notion establishes the existence of such a prototype; and the basis of a misconception can consist only of true *conception*; so that the conception of the *many* as *one* proves the reality of the conception of the really *one* as *one*, which proves the existence of a really *single object*, apart from its *many* components].

Bha. P. 84.

conceivable thing has its nature and constitution entering into the subject of his reasoning; his Proposition being that "*all things* in the world are mere masses of imperceptible small particles." When 'all things' enter into this Proposition, either no corroborative instance is available; or if any were cited, such citing would be clearly wrong.—*Tātparya*.

* The right reading is यतोपलम्भविषयः, as found in Puri A, and in the *Bhāṣyachandra*, and several other manuscripts.

† The full-stop after ग्रहणम् in the printed text should be dropped.

"But what is the Prototype for the conception of the *Post* as *Man?*" This Prototype consists in the conception of the real *Man* as *Man*; it is only when there is such a conception that a conception of '*Man*' can arise in regard to the Post from the perception of certain points of similarity (between the real *Man* and *Post*). Similarly it is only if there were a true conception of what is really *one* as 'one', that there could arise the conception of 'one' in regard to the *many* atoms, from the perception of certain points of similarity * (between the *many* Atoms and what is *really* 'one'). But inasmuch as there is no possibility (for the opponent of any *true* conception (of unity) arising in regard to anything,—as there is nothing according to the Opponent that is really apprehended as *one*,—it follows that the idea of *non-difference* (unity), embodied in the unitary conception really arises in regard to a thing that is really *non-diverse* in its character.

" What forms the necessary Prototype is the notion of *non-diversity* (*i. e. unity*) that we have in the case of things perceived by other sense-organs."

This also will not be right; as until special reasons are put forward, the mere citing of an example cannot establish any conclusion. What the Opponent means is as follows—" In the case of the object preceived by the other organs—e. g. Sound, perceived by the auditory organ—we find that there is unitary conception in regard to Sounds which are non-diverse in character (even according to us) †; —and this unitary conception would be the Prototype of the unitary conception in regard to the *many* (atoms, for instance)." But even so, the mere citing of an example would not lead to any definite conclusion; for the simple reason that no special reason is adduced (in support of the conclusion . That is to say, the question being—the unitary conception that there is in regard to the massed atoms, is this a conception of something as what it is not, like the conception of Post as 'Man'? or is the actual state of things really as represented by the conception, and hence the

* The correct reading is not [illegible], but [illegible] as found in all Mss, and also in the *Bhāṣyachandra*.

† According to the Pūrvapakṣin, all sounds are one and the same and hence conceived of as *one*. This is a case of really non-diverse things conceived as one—a true unitary conception, which will supply the Prototype for the unitary conception in regard to the diverse atoms.

conception is of something as what it actually is, like the notion of 'one Sound' in regard to Sound which is really *one*?—until special reasons are adduced (in support of one view or the other), mere Examples only tend to accentuate the uncertainty. Further, as a matter of fact, the *Odour* (Sound and the rest), which are 'things perceived by other sense-organs' adduced as examples by the Opponent, also are mere *masses* or *aggregates* of (diverse) things, like the jar, and as such cannot form correct examples (of unitary conception in regard to non-diverse things). *

The (well known) conceptions of (A) magnitude', (B) conjunction, (C) motion, and (D) class (community) should also be urged against the person who denies the 'composite'; as what has been urged in connection with unitary *conception* is applicable to these conceptions also.†

‡ The unitary conception (whenever it arises), must be regarded as arising in connection with what is really *one*, being the conception of something as what it really is; the special reason for this consisting in the fact that the said conception is co-extensive with the conception of *magnitude*. As a matter of fact, the two conceptions—'this is *one*' and 'this is

* The Vaishāṣikas hold that Sound is produced, not only from Ākāsha, but also from such conglomerations of material substances as the Cloth for instance. So that according to them, Sound is only a conglomeration of diverse things. Thus the notion of '*one*' in regard to them cannot be correct, and unitary conception in regard to Sound cannot be the prototype of such conception in regard to the *many* atoms. According to the Naiyāyika also, *unity*, which is a quality, cannot belong to Sound, which itself is a quality; as no quality can subsist in a quality. So that according to both parties the unitary conception in regard to Sound is as 'secondary' or 'indirect' as that in regard to the Atoms.—*Tātparya.*

The *Parishuddhi* adds—The notion of 'number', wherever and whenever it appears, is regarded as *true* when it is not sublated by any subsequent conception; and when it is found to be so sublated, it is regarded as wrong. According to this principle the notion of '*one*' in regard to Sound, as also in regard to Atoms, must be wrong; as in both cases, there is the subsequent notion that they are *many*, not *one*.

† If you do not admit the 'composite' thing, you cannot account for such notions as (*a*)—'this thing is large', (*b*) 'this is in contact with that', (*c*) 'the horse (the individual animal that belongs to the community 'Horse) (*d*) is running'. As none of these could ever appear in regard to mere Atoms, which are imperceptible.- *Vārṭika.*

‡ This anticipates the following question—"According to you also, how do you account for the notion of *unity* in connection with the *many* trees—there being, as you say, no special reason in favour of one view or the other?"

large'—pertaining to the same object, become *co-extensive*; and from this it is known that 'that which is *large* is *one*' 'But the 'conception of magnitude' consists only in the cognising of a certain peculiarity in the *mass of Atoms*."*—

Bhā. P. 85. [The answer to this is as follows]—The said 'conception of magnitude', appearing in regard to Atoms which (by their very nature) have no magnitude, will only be a conception of something as what it is not (*i. e.* a *wrong* conception). "What if it be?" Well, the (wrong) conception of something as what it is not must be dependent upon a prototype; so that the existence of the prototype becomes established; which means that there must be a right conception of 'magnitude' in regard to something really possessed of magnitude [which conception alone could be the prototype of the wrong conception of magnitude in regard to Atoms, which have no magnitude]. [And this proves that there must be some such substance as is really possessed of magnitude, and all the world does not consist of mere atoms]. "With regard to Sound we have the conception of of 'small' and 'large', and this conception of both 'smallness' and 'magnitude' (appearing in regard to the same thing, Sound) would be the prototype of the notion of 'magnitude' in regard to the small Atoms". That cannot be; as the said conceptions (in regard to *Sound*) apprehend (*i. e.* pertain to) only *faintness* and *loudness*, for the simple reason that they do not pre-suppose the ascertainment of the exact dimension or extent of the Sound, as is done in the case of similar conceptions in regard to *substances*. That is to say, when one speaks of Sound as being 'small', what is meant is that it is weak, *faint*; and when one speaks of Sound being 'large' what is meant is that it is powerful, *loud*; —and the reason why this must be the meaning lies in the fact that the said conceptions do not pre-suppose the definite cognition of the exact extent or dimension of the Sound; for instance, when one conceives of the Sound as 'large', he does not have the idea that the Sound *extends so far*,—the idea that he has in the case of (the conception of the *largeness* of) such things as the *Badara*, the *Āmalaka* and the *Bilva* fruits (whose exact sizes are known).†

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* 'And it is not a particular kind of Dimension'—*Bhāṣyachandra*.

† The *Tātparya* remarks that the cognition of the exact extent of a thing is possible only when the size or dimension of that thing is perceptible. And certainly this is not possible in the case of either Sound or Atoms.

The conception 'these two (visible) things are in contact' involves the cognition of contact having the same substratum as Duality [*i. e.* it implies the cognition of the *contact of two things*, which proves that these two things must be *composites*, and not mere *atoms*].* "But the substratum of Contact consists of the two *masses* (of component atoms, and not of *composite substances*)" Now, what is this 'Mass'?—"The *Mass* is either (*a*) the '*prāpti*' combination, of several (components),—or (*b*) the manifold combinations of a single substance."† [As regards] (*a*) what we would urge is that, there is no cognition of the contact as subsisting in combinations; as a matter of fact, when one has the conception 'these two things are in contact', he has no idea of two 'combinations' being in contact.‡ (*b*) "In that case

* The *Bhāṣyachandra* formulates the argument thus:—"The conceptions of 'these two', must be right, because it is co-extensive with the notion of 'these are in contact,'—that which is not so co-extensive is not right notion—as the notion of 'two moons.'

† This passage of the *Bhāṣya* is not quite in keeping with what we find in the *Vārṭika*. The two alternatives as put in the *Vārṭika* are—(*a*) अनेकस्य, प्राप्तिः (which is the same as in the *Bhāṣya)* and *(b)* अनेकः समुदायो; in the *Bhāṣya*, we should have something corresponding to the latter;—now from what follows in the *Bhāṣya*, later on in l. 13, it is clear that the second alternative meant by the Bhāṣya is that the *Mass* is अनेकसमूहः—*i. e.*, simply the group of several components; and this is just what the second alternative is represented in the *Vārṭika*. The Bhāṣyachandra however explains this term as अनेकाः समूहाः: The only way in which the present passage of the *Bhāṣya* can be construed to afford the two alternatives of the *Vārṭika* is as follows—कोऽयं समुदायः। (*a*) प्राप्तिरनेकस्य or (*b*) अनेका वा। And then the Opponent accepts the former alternative,—which statement of the opponent ends with चेत्,—to which the Siddhāntin replies with प्राप्तेरग्रहणम् &c. &c. That such are the two alternatives is shown also by the Bhāṣya, P. 79, L 7. But, in this construction, a new difficulty presents itself: The words in which the Opponent accepts the first alternative are read in the printed text, as also in all Mss., as प्राप्तिरेकस्य समुदायः, while according to the explanation we have provided, they should be प्राप्तिरनेकस्य समुदायः, which is the first alternative suggested by the Siddhāntin, and which the Opponent accepts.

We have however translated the passage in accordance with the explanation provided by the *Bhāṣyachandra*; and though this is not quite in keeping with the *Vārṭika*, it is the only sense that can be deduced from the words of the *Bhāṣya* as they stand.

‡ If the *Mass* is only the 'combination of particles,' then, when one cognises *two masses in contact*, he should have the notion of two 'combinations' being in contact. As a matter of fact however, no one has any such notion.

In *Bhāṣya*, l. 11, the stop after ग्रहणम्' should be removed; the construction being प्राप्त्याश्रितायाः प्राप्तेः अग्रहणम्।

we shall define *Mass* as the manifold combinations (of a single substance).' This also cannot be accepted ; as the contact is cognised as subsisting in the same subtratum with Duality ; when we have the conception—' these two things are in contact,' we do not cognise the *contact* as subsisting in any manifold combinations of things. [The cognition being of the contact as subsisting in *two* things]. These *two things* could not be in the shape of '*two Atoms*', as no perception of 'two atoms' is possible (atoms being entirely imperceptible). From all this the conclusion is that what forms the substratum of the contact are two such substances as are possessed of magnitude and form the substratum of Duality. (*i e*, *two large substances*, not *many small atoms*).

" As a matter of fact, Conjunction is only proximity culminating in impact; it is not something different (from the objects that are in contact)." This is not true ; as Conjunction does actually serve to produce (in things) something entirely different (from those things); for instance, Conjunction is found to be the cause (productive) of sound (when the contact of the stick with the drum makes the drum sound), of colour (when the contact of the Jar with fire produces red colour in the Jar), and of motion (when the contact with the ground of the ball thrown down makes the ball rebound) ;—and unless an entirely distinct quality (in the shape of Conjunction) appeared in the two things (in contact), it could not be possible to ascertain what is the cause of the appearance of the said *sound*, *colour* and *motion* ;—from all this it follows that Conjunction is a quality, distinct (from the conjoined things); and it is also directly perceived as such *. (In common parlance) we have the denial also (of Conjunction),—for
P. 86.
instance, when we say—' the Teacher is with the ear-ing,and the Pupil is without the ear-ring ' (where the former phrase affirms and the latter denies the conjunction of the Ring) [and what is thus denied must be something different from the Pupil's ear and the Ring]; if a distinct quality (other than the two things) were not the object of the conception of ' Conjunction ', then the said denial must pertain to something else ; and in that case it behoves you to explain what it is that is denied (by the phrase ' the pupil is without the ear-ring ') ; that is to say, you should explain what is that something else (other than

**Pratyaya* stands for *pratyakṣa* says Bhāṣyachandra.

a distinct quality in the shape of Conjunction ') which you recognise in another case, where two things are in contact, and which is denied by the phrase in question (' the pupil is without the ear-ring'). [And as a matter of fact no such explanation is possible]. *

[Thus then, Conjunction being a quality, distinct from the objects in contact] whenever Conjunction is perceived, it is perceived as subsisting in two *large* substances (and never in atoms); so that it can never be regarded as subsisting in Atoms [all which goes to prove the existence of the Composites as the substratum of Conjunction].

Lastly, (to be consistent) you have to deny the existence of ' Classes ' or ' Communities ', which form the basis† of all comprehensive or inclusive conceptions; but if these were denied, you could not have such limitation to cognitions as we have [in the shape of the restriction of the conception of ' horse ' to only particular individual animals, and not to others; this restriction being possible only by the fact of those animals alone belonging to the *Community* ' Horse '].

[The existence of Communities being thus undeniable] Inasmuch as no Community could be manifested (or perceived) without a substratum, it is necessary to explain what that substratum is. If it be held that—' what forms the said substratum is only the Atoms arranged or grouped in a certain manner (and not any *Composite* substance) ',—it behoves you to explain whether the Atom to which the capability (to manifest the Community) belongs is itself in contact (with the perceiving organ) or not; that is to say, when a particular Community is cognised, is it, or is it not, cognised as subsisting in Atom-groups that are themselves in contact with the perceiving organ? If it be held that it is cognised as subsisting (and perceived) in the *unperceived* atoms,—then it would be possible to perceive even such atoms as are hidden from view; that is to say, it would be possible to perceive the Community as subsisting in atoms hidden from view. If, on the other

* If Conjunction were non-different from the conjuncts, then we would have such expressions as कुण्डलगुरुः—अकुण्डलच्छात्रो—*Bhāṣyachandra*.

† The *Bhasya* uses the term '*linga*', which the *Vartika* explains as '*nimitta*', *basis*. The *Ṭāṭparya* however explains it as 'probans'; by which the passage would mean that the existence of classes is *proved* by comprehensive cognitions.

hand, it be held that the Community is perceived as subsisting in the *perceived* atoms, then it could not be manifested in the inner and back parts (of the thing), which (not being contact with the perceiving organ) are *not perceived* (and this would be absurd). "But there would be manifestation of the Community in that much of the thing as is perceived." In that case only that much of the Atom would be the substratum (of the Community); and it would come to this that the substratum of the Community is only that much of the Atom as is perceived and in which that Community is cognised. And this would mean that when a certain *mass of atoms* is perceived, there is a diversity of things in it [that much which is perceived being one and that which is not perceived being another] ! That is to say, when a certain mass of atoms in the shape of a *Tree* is perceived, there is perceived a plurality of trees—each of those portions of the Mass wherein the community 'Tree' is perceived would be a distinct Tree ! [which is absurd].

From all this we conclude that what serves to manifest a particular community is some such entirely distinct substance as subsists in the conglomerated Atoms; and this distinct substance is the *Composite* (as something different from the component atoms).

Thus has Perception been examined.

Vārṭika on Su. (36).
[P. 243, L. 1. to P. 252, L. 13].

Now with a view to formulate the reasoning proving the existence of the *Composite*, the *Bhāṣya* starts with a question (P. 84, L. 4, *et seq.*)—"*The man who denies the Composite, and with a view to avoid the contingency of Perception becoming impossible (in that case) holds that what is perceived is the 'mass of atoms',—what is there to urge against such a man?*"—And the answer to this question is—*Such a person should be asked to explain what is the object of Unitary Conception.* That is, he should be asked—The conception that we have in the form 'this is *one substance*', does it pertain to several (diverse) things or to a non-diverse thing? If it be said that it pertains to diverse things,—then the answer

would be that this is wrong; for as a matter of fact, unitary conception is never actually found to appear in regard to several (diverse) things; and (even if it were found to so appear) the idea of 'one' in connection with *several things* could not but be wrong. If, on the other hand, it be said that unitary conception pertains to a non-diverse thing,—then in that case our answer would be that that (non-diverse thing), which forms the object of the said conception, is the *Composite*. Then again, the conceptions of 'one' and of 'many' must pertain to different objects,—because each is possessed of clearly distinctive characters—just like the conceptions of colour and other things; or (we may put the reasoning in another form)—the conception of *one* and *of many* must pertain to different objects,—because while the former pertains to an object in the aggregated form, the latter pertains to non-aggregated (disintegrated) things,—for instance, the former is referred to simply as 'this', while the latter is referred to as 'this and this'.

In answer to the above (from the standpoint of the Siḍḍhānṭin), the Pūrvapakṣin says—"*The said conception of 'one' in regard to the 'many' would be similar to the notion that we have in regard to such collective things as the 'Army' and the 'Forest'*" (Suṭra). This can only mean as follows:—"As a matter of fact, even in cases where there is no diversity in the things themselves, yet there is a difference in our conception of them, it is found that there is this distinction present* that while one thing is *single* the other is *diverse*; for instance, the conception of the 'army' is different from the conceptions of the 'elephants &c.' (constituting the army),—similarly the concep-

* Though both editions read अस्ति, it is clear that the sense demands नास्ति. If we retain the former reading the only meaning that can be assigned to the phrase —अस्ति च एकानेकभेदे would be—'the army is one and so is the elephant in it, so that the usual distinction of the composite being one and the components many is absent.' But this will not be quite in keeping with what follows, or with the context.

tions of the '*Khadira* and other trees' (constituting the Forest) are different from the conception of the 'Forest' itself; and yet either the Army or the Forest is not different from its constituent factors.* Hence the reason that the Siddhāntin has put forward is not a valid reason, being, as it is, not universally true†."

If this portion of the *Sūtra* (emanating from the Pūrvapakṣin) is meant to be a reasoning (against the *Siddhānta*), then it is incoherent, as it only states an example (and does not propound any reason). If, on the other hand, (by the citing of the instance) it is intended to show that the reasoning put forward by the *Siddhāntin* is not valid (not necessarily leading to the conclusion) [*i.e.* if the *Pūrvapakṣa* argument means that "even though the Army is conceived of as *one* and the elephants &c. as *many*, yet they are not different"],—then, in that case, what is urged is something *not admitted* at all; for who is there who holds the view that the 'Army' and the 'Forest' are *not different* (from their constituent factors‡?—In fact we have already explained that such (collective) things as the Army and the Forest are entirely different from their constituents. Even granting that there is a notion of non-difference between the Forest and its constituents, it is not right to urge this (as proving absolute non-difference), for such a notion can be due to several causes:

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* 'नर्थान्तरम्' of the Bib. Ind. Edition is a misreading for 'अर्थान्तरम्', which is found in the Benares edition.

† The argument propounded by the Siddhāntin (in the *Vārṭika*) is—'the conception of *one* and the conception of *many* must refer to distinct objects, because while the former pertains to an aggregated thing, the latter pertains to distintegraged things &c. &c.'; and this reason is not universally true; for in the case of the Forest it is found that even though the conception of the *Forest* pertains to the *single* aggregated form, and that of the *khadira &c.* pertains to the trees individually, in the non-aggregated form,—yet the two things—*Forest* and *Trees*—are not different from one another. So the reason put forward does not necessarily lead to the conclusion.

‡ The Bib. Ind. Edition reads न केन; the Benares Edition reads केन, which is better.

For instance—(*a*) there may be a notion of non-difference when the two things are really non-different, and (*b*) there may be such a notion, even when the two things perceived are really different, but their difference is not perceived: (*a*) Now out of these two, only that notion of *unity* (non-difference) which arises when the two things are actually non-different is firmly established (really true), as that alone is what is admitted by both parties. It will not be right to deny (as some people have done) that there is no really *one* thing (no case of *real non-difference*, on which all parties would be agreed); as in that case the notion of 'many' would become impossible; as the 'many' is only a collection (conglomeration, mass) of several 'ones' (unities). (*b*) In the other case, even though the things perceived are actually *diverse* (several), yet there is sometimes a notion of 'non-difference' due to the non-perception of the difference between them; this non-perception of difference being due to remoteness; for instance, in the very case of 'Army' and 'Forest', what happens is that even though the constituent factors of the Army, in the shape of the Elephants &c., and those of the Forest (in the shape of the *Khadira* and other trees), are such as have their diversity (separateness) distinctly perceived (at close quarters), yet, on account of remoteness they fail to have this diversity duly perceived (from a distance); so that even though the things are really diverse, yet there is notion of *non-diversity*, on account of the diversity being not perceived.

Var. P. 244.

[In any case, so far as Atoms are concerned, the analogy of the 'Army' and 'Forest' does not hold; for] Atoms are never perceived by any person. "Why so?" Because Atoms are supersensuous, as we have already explained before; it has already been explained by us that Atoms are beyond the reach of the sense-organs. It is only an object which is perceptible by the sense-organs and is capable of having its distinctness perceived, that can form the basis of

the notion of non-difference, when the said distinctness fails to be perceived on account of Distance :—just as *when there are a number of things and the particular species to which each belongs is ordinarily perceptible, the particular species fails to be perceived on account of remoteness ; or in the case of such things as have their diverse motions ordinarily perceptible, the diverse motion fails to be perceived on account of remoteness.* (Bhāṣya, p. 83, l. 13, *et seq*) ;—and the reason for this lies in the fact that the non-perception of a thing that is ordinarily perceived is due to other (extraneous) causes ; that is to say, whenever there is non-perception of a perceptible thing, it is due to some extraneous cause, as we find in the case of the 'Army' and 'Forest' cited by the *Pūrvapakṣin*;—the Atoms however are never perceived, being beyond the reach of the sense-organs ; hence their non-perception cannot be said to be due to any extraneous cause *; and as for the

* The author here anticipates the following argument of the *Pūrvapakṣin*—"In the case of the bundle of Straw—stone—wood packed together in shell-lac, it is found that each of the constituent things is not perceived separately, all that is seen is their mass ; and yet they do not compose something different from themselves ;—similarly, in the case of the *Jar*, the component atoms may be imperceptible as separate from one another, yet their *mass* would be perceived, without their producing something different from themselves, in the shape of the *composite*." The answer to this as given in the Text is as follows:—The mass or collection of a number of things is perceptible only when each constituent of that mass is perceptible by itself, as distinct from the other constituents ; as we find in the case of the 'Army' where the whole army is perceptible because each individual unit, Elephant, horse, &c., is perceptible by itself ; and when the constituent factors are so perceptible, if their Mass fails to be perceived, this is due to some extraneous cause, *e. g.* remoteness. Atoms however are never perceptible by themselves, being as they are extremely subtle and hence beyond the reach of all sense-organs ; so that a mere collection of Atoms should be ever imperceptible ; for instance, winds being imperceptible by the eye, no collection of winds can ever become visible by the eye. So that if the conglomeration of atoms (in the jar) does not constitute something different from themselves (in the shape of the Composite Substance, Jar), it would mean that the same atoms which are imperceptible are also perceptible ; and this would be absurd. Specially as in the case of the mass of atoms the non-perception of their diversity cannot be said to be due to distance, or any such extraneous cause as is found in the case of the Army or Forest ; the imperceptibility being inherent in the Atoms themselves.—*Tātparya.*

Atoms themselves, so long as some fresh feature is not produced in them, they could not give rise to a different conception (other than the conception of mere 'Atoms');—this constitutes a great incongruity (in the theory of those who do not admit of the Composite Jar as some thing different from the component atoms).*

The philosopher, for whom the Atoms constitute the basis of the conception of 'Jar' and such other substances, should be asked the following question—When atoms give rise to a different conception (than that of themselves *as 'atoms'*), do they do so when a fresh feature is produced in them? Or without having any such feature produced? "What do you mean by this?" Well, if they have a fresh feature produced in them, this fresh feature would be the 'Composite'; while if they have no such fresh feature produced in them, then it would come to this that those same atoms that were *imperceptible* become *perceptible*; and this would be a great incongruity. "But the *fresh feature* produced in the Atoms is *conjunction* [and it need not be anything in the form of a Composite]; that is to say, the Atoms

Var. P. 245.

(which were imperceptible before), when coming into close proximity to one another, have this Conjunction produced in them, and this Conjunction serves as the feature that renders them perceptible." This is not possible; as the Atoms are beyond the reach of the senses; and even the Conjunction of imperceptible things can never become perceptible; and (in the case of imperceptible things) there can be no

* This sentence, the *Ṭāṭparya* adds, is in answer to the following *Kārikā*—"What harm is there in our view? The many (imperceptible) atoms, having some fresh feature produced in them, could become the basis of the (previously non-existing) perceptional cognition." This Kārikā is quoted by the *Ṭāṭparya* as emanating from the 'author of the *Vārṭika*'; this *Vārṭika* must be by a Bauḍḍha writer, not *Uḍyoṭakara*, as the editor of the *Ṭāṭparya* has taken him to be. The answer has been given, says the *Ṭāṭparya* by our *Vārṭikakāra*, by mentioning the fact that there is no fresh feature produced in the atoms. This the Vārṭika explains and further discussion is carried on in the *Ṭāṭparya* and the *Parishuḍḍhi*.

such perceptional cognition as 'this is in contract with that'; for this reason Conjunction cannot be regarded as the *fresh feature* (that renders Atoms perceptible).

The Pūrvapakṣin says—"[We do not deny that there is the notion of 'one' in regard to the diverse atoms] what we mean is that whenever such a unitary conception arises in regard to what is *diverse*, it must be regarded as a wrong notion, a pure misconception".

Our answer to this is that as a matter of fact, misconceptions are due to perception of similarity and non-perception of difference; which means that the perception of similarity imposes (upon the misconceived thing) a contrary character, through the impression left on the mind (of the observer) by a previous perception of that character which does (as a matter of fact) belong to the thing.*

Now as regards Atoms, inasmuch as they are entirely imperceptible, how can there be any 'perception of similarity'? And when there is no 'perception of similarity', how can there be 'non-perception of difference'? And when there is neither 'perception of similarity', nor 'non-perception of difference', how can there be any 'imposition of contrary character'?. Thus then the cause (of misconception) being absent, the appearance of the effect in the shape of misconception would not be possible.

This same reasoning also holds respecting the views that—(*a*) "the Unitary conception in regard to atoms is secondary (indirect or figurative)",—and (*b*) that "it is merely analogical". (*a*) That upon which the secondary or figurative concep-

* For instance, when we wrongly perceive the shell as silver, what happens is that we perceive in the thing before us only those characteristics that are common to the shell and silver; and then there comes to the mind the idea of silver which has been perceived before; and through the recalling of this 'silver', the 'character of silver' which does not belong to the shell, comes to be imposed upon it by the aforesaid perception of similarity between the two things. The Benares Edition and the Tatparya read after विशेषानुपलब्धिश्च : the clause [illegible] [illegible]. This is wanting in Bib. Ind. Edition.

tion is based is '*bhakti*',—literally meaning 'that which is *divided* or *held in common* (*bhajyatē*) by two things', which stands for the *similarity* of a thing to that which it is not; for instance, when one perceives the 'dull intelligence of the ploughman,' he conceives (and speaks) of him as an 'ox' [which also has *dull intelligence*, which therefore constitutes the point of similarity between the *man* and the ox; hence the notion 'the ploughman is an ox' is regarded as *figurative*] As a matter of fact, no such perception of similarity is possible in the case of Atoms, which are imperceptible.—(*b*) Nor again will it be right to regard the notions of 'one' in regard to the *many* atoms as *analogical*, because there is no analogy (likeness) between what is really what is conceived (*i. e.* what is really *one*) and what is not really so (*i. e.* what is *many*, not *one*); analogical cognition is possible only in a case where there is some likeness between what is really what is conceived and what is not so; for instance, in the analogical conception 'the boy is a lion', where the word 'lion' stands for *behaving like the lion.* * "What is it that forms the object of analogy ?" It is bravery (that constitutes the basis of the comparison). Thus we find that in the case of Atoms, none of the three conditions of 'misconception' can be possible, for the simple reason that they are imperceptible.

*This is added, says the *Tātparya*; with a view to show that the idea of difference between the two is not completely lost in this case, as it is in the case of the 'figurative' expression; 'the man is an ox' means that he is exactly as the ox; while when only slight similarity is meant, we have the analogical expression 'the boy is a lion'. The distinction between 'figurative' and 'analogical' expressions is not quite-clearly brought; the only distinction drawn appears to be that in the figurative expression, the idea of difference is completely lost, stress being laid upon the likeness only; while in the case of analogical expression, the idea of difference is not entirely lost; the expression 'this man is an ox' means that in dullness of intelligence he is a complete ox itself; whereas the analogical expression 'this boy is a lion' simply means that he *behaves like a lion*,—the word सिंह, being explained as सिंह इव आचरति, being analysed as सिंह-हिंस्-अच् ; so that there is no identification at all of the Boy with the lion; all that the words mean being 'the boy behaves like a lion', and not that he is the lion itself.

Then again, as a matter of fact, the conception in question (of 'one' in regard to the *many* atoms) cannot be regarded as 'wrong cognition' either; for the reason that there is no such right cognition (of 'one' in regard to *many*) as could form the prototype (of such a misconception). "*What forms the necessary prototype is the notion of non-diversity that we have in the case of things perceived by other sense-organs.*" (Bhāṣya, P. 84, L. 12). If you mean by this that—"the unitary conceptions that we have in regard to such things as Sound and the rest are the (right) prototype, and in regard to things other than these the said conception is a misconception",—then our answer is that *until special reasons are adduced, the mere citing of an example cannot establish any conclusion; that even so the citing of the example would not lead to any definite conclusion, for the simple reason that no special reason is adduced in support of the conclusion.* (Bhā. P. 84 L. 13 and 14). There are two kinds of conceptions.—(1) the conception of a thing as what it is, and (2) the conception of a thing as what it is not;—now the question Vār. P. 246. is—the conception of 'one' that there is in regard to the *massed atoms*, is this a conception of atoms as what they are not? or is it not so? [And this remains doubtful, even after you have cited the instance of Sound and other things, until you adduce some special reason to prove that the said conception is as *correct* in regard to *Atoms* as it is in regard to *Sound*].* Then again, when you say that—"the notion of 'one' in regard to such objects as Sound and the like is the correct prototype (of all *unitary conceptions*), while the notion of 'one' in regard to such objects as the Jar and the like is a wrong misconception"—you admit the real existence of such things as the Jar and the like; for if the

* The case of the *massed atoms* is taken as a typical one, as those who admit the Composite as well as those who do not, both accept the *mass of atoms* as a true entity (the only difference being that according to the former the *mass* constitutes a separate single substance, while according to the latter it is only *atoms*, and nothing else)—*Tātparya.*

existence of the Jar &c., is not admitted, there can be no occasion for any such assertion as that 'similarity to Sound &c., forms the basis of the conception of *one* in regard to the *Jar*.' The Opponent might say—"We do not admit the existence of the Jar &c.; what we assert is that [the Jar &c. are nothing more than a *mass of atoms*], and the unitary conception that arises in regard to the *massed atoms* does so on the basis of the analogy (similarity) of Sound &c."—But this we have already answered, by pointing out that this would not be possible, as *Atoms are imperceptible*. Then again, (for you, *Vaibhāṣikas*) even Sound &c., which you regard as the basis of the right primary (prototypal) unitary conception, are nothing more than mere *masses* (of atoms); so that, these also being as much *massed* atoms (as the *Jar &c.*), the unitary conception in regard to them cannot be *right*.* For in regard to (Sound which is a *mass of atoms*) the notion of 'one' could arise only when there would be a cessation of the notion of its being a conglomeration (of *several* things); and as such, the said conception (being due to the cessation of a correct notion with regard to the thing concerned) could be only *figurative*, proceeding on the basis of the (supposed†) similarity (of Sound) to things really possessed of unity;—things possessed of real unity are naturally such that with regard to them there is always an absence of the notion of their being a conglomeration (of several things); so that in regard to *Sound* also, when there is similar absence of the notion of its being a *conglomeration* of several things, this constitutes a similarity between Sound and things possessed of real unity; and on the basis of this similarity, there arises the notion of 'one' in regard to Sound also; and this notion

* As for ourselves—the *Tātparya* adds—the notion of *one* in regard to *Sound* cannot be right; for according to us no quality can reside in a quality; and both *Sound* and *Number* are qualities; and *one* is only a number; so that, in our philosophy, the notion of 'one' in regard to Sound can be only *figurative*.

† The similarity being assumed, on the cessation of the notion of Sound being a mass of several atoms.

can be regarded as only *figurative*. "In the case of all things the notion of *one* might be due to the absence of the notion of their being a conglomeration of several things." If that were so, then in the case of the conception 'not-two', there could be no such doubt as to whether it is 'one' or 'several' (more than two);*—that is to say, as a matter of fact, whenever the term 'not two' is used, it gives rise to a doubt as to there being 'one' or 'more than two', the *negation of two* being common to both (*one* and *more than two*); but if 'not two' meant *the negation of conglomeration* in all cases, then it could not give rise to the doubt as to its being *one* or *more than two*; as a matter of fact, it does give rise to the said doubt; and with a view to remove this doubt, it is added—'it is *one only*', which restricts the conception of 'not two' (to *one* only); so that what gives rise to this restriction is 'one', and that which gives rise to the notions of 'three' or 'four' &c., are the numbers 'three', 'four' and the rest. Similarly (just as the notion of 'one' is due to the absence of the notion of conglomeration) with regard to *Sound*, the notions of 'two,' 'three' &c., would be due to its being a conglomeration. [Hence the case of Sound will not serve to explain the unitary notion of 'two' &c., that we have when there are two objects, the Jar and the Cloth, both being mere conglomeration of *Atoms*]. "Why so?" Because the case of Sound is similar to that of things possessed of real duality: *i. e.*, conglomeration is as much present in *Sound* as in a Substance possessing duality. "Then, in all cases (in the case of Atoms also) the notion (of 'not one') may be held

* If *Unity* consisted in the mere 'negation of the notion of conglomeration,' then, as the term 'not two', could also involve the said negation of the notion of conglomeration, it would mean '*one*' only; so that when a thing would be spoken of as '*not two*' there would be no suspicion of its being *more than two*. Nor, in that case, would any such assertion be possible as 'this is *not two*, it is *one only*'; as 'not two' itself would necessarily mean '*o[ne] only*,' which would make the adding of 'one only' entirely superfluous.

The Benares edition puts a comma between 'न' and 'द्वे'—which is not right.

to be due to the presence of the notion of conglomeration." But if that were so, then no doubt would arise from the rather vague idea produced by the term 'not one';—that is to say, if the notion of 'two' &c., were always due to the presence of conglomeration, then whenever the denial 'this is *not one*' is made, there should be no such doubt as to whether the thing is 'two', or 'three',—both of these being equally 'not one'; hence that which gives rise to the definite conception of the thing being 'two' (and not three &c.) is the presence of the number 'two' (and not mere *conglomeration*)*. A person who does not admit of the conception of 'one' or 'two' &c.,—for him there can not be either 'conglomeration' or 'negation of conglomeration', because for one who does not admit of *unity*, of *what* could there be 'conglomeration' ('conglomeration' consisting only in the being together of several unities)? And for one who does not admit of 'duality', whose denial would there be in the 'negation of conglomeration'?† Further, for one who does not admit that 'one', 'two' &c. are distinct entities by themselves, there would not be possible such conceptions of *unity* as are involved in the ideas of '*one* hundred', '*one* duality' and the like.‡

Vās. P. 247.

* The *Ṭāṭparya* does not appear to be satisfied with all this. It says—'The ultimate criterion of all things is our own notion of them; and as we have the notion of the numbers 'two' 'three' &c., these have to admitted as realities; the *Vārṭika* has carried on a series of reasonings simply with a view to show that the idea is amenable to several proofs.

† The person who denies unity, duality &c., denies a fact of well-ascertained direct apprehension; and as such an unreasonable sceptic would be equally prepared to deny the existence of well-known *single* entities,—he would have nothing that could be the substratum of the number 'one'; and as conglomeration is only a collection of *single* entities—there would be no 'conglomeration'; what then would 'duality' consist in? There being no conglomeration, no 'negation of conglomeration' would be possible; how could you account for the notion of 'one'—which according to you, is based entirely on the 'negation of conglomeration'?—*Ṭāṭparya*.

‡ If *Duality* &c. is only *conglomeration*, and the negation of conglomeration is 'one',—and 'one' and 'two' are no distinct entities,—then the idea of 'one duality' involves correlation or identification between 'one' and 'duality' which would be impossible, if the two were only mutual contradictions—'conglomeration' and 'negation of conglomeration'.

[The real matter-of-fact objection against the theory that the notion of 'one' in regard to *massed atoms* is similar to the notion of 'one' that we have in regard to such multiple things as Sound and the like is now stated]—As a matter of fact, in the case of Sound &c. the notion of 'one' is due to the non-perception of diversity; that is to say, the notion of 'one' arises in regard to Sound &c., because *when these are perceived*, their diversity is not perceived. There is no such cause in the case of Atoms, from which the notion of 'one' could arise; for the simple reason that Atoms are imperceptible, as we have already explained.

When the *Bhāṣya* says that the notion of 'one' is to be urged (against those who do not admit the existence of the 'Composite'), this is meant only to be a sample of what can be urged; as a matter of fact, the notion of 'not one', 'many,' also may be urged, just as effectively as the notion of 'one'. As a matter of fact, for one who does not admit the 'Composite' to be something different (from the components), the notion of 'many' is as impossible as the notion of 'one'. And the ordinary conceptions of 'jar' &c. also may be urged against him, in the same manner as the notions of 'many' [the conception of 'Jar' connoting something different from the component earth-atoms composing it.]

The well-known conceptions of (A) 'Magnitude', (B) 'Conjunction', (C) 'Motion', and (D) 'Community' should also be urged against the person who denies the Composite, as what has been urged in connection with 'unitary conception' is applicable to these conceptions also,—says the *Bhāṣya* (P. 84, l. 19). That is to say, if you do not admit the 'Composite' to be something different, then the conceptions—'this is large, possessed of magnitude (A),' 'this is in contact (B) with that', 'the animal Horse is moving

(C)'—would not be possible for you; for none of these conceptions can rightly apply to Atoms, which are imperceptible.

The *Pūrvapakṣin* retorts—"[It is true that these conceptions do arise]; but what is doubtful in regard to these conceptions—of 'one' &c.—is whether they pertain to the mere *mass or conglomeration of atoms*, or something different (from the atoms)? And when this doubt has arisen, it behoves you to show some special reason (for regarding them as pertaining to one, and not to the other)."

The *Siddhāntin* answers—Our *special reason* (for regarding them as pertaining to the Composite as something different from the components) consists in the co-extensiveness of these with the conception of *magnitude*; that is to say, whenever the notion of 'one' arises, it does so in regard to what is *large*, possessed of magnitude; and as a matter of fact, whenever two conceptions are found to be co-existent, the thing in regard to which the conceptions arise is found to be possessed of the characters (conceived of); *e. g.*, whenever we have the conception of 'blue' co-extensive with 'lotus'—as in the phrase 'the lotus is blue'—it means that the conception of 'blue lotus' pertains to a thing which is possessed of both characters—of *being lotus* and of *being blue*; so that when the conception of 'one' is actually found to be co-extensive with the conception of 'large', the conclusion is that what is conceived of as 'one' is what is also 'large' (and not *atomic*).

"*But the conception of 'large' consists only in the cognising of a certain peculiarity in the 'mass of atoms'*." * (*Bhāṣya*,

* Both editions read simply अणुसमूहातिशयग्रहणमिति. But in the first place, the is a quotation of the *Bhāṣya*, which reads [illegible]; and secondly that, such is the reading is clear from the explanation, that follows in the *Vārtika* (next page), of the *Pūrvapakṣa* argument involved in the passage in question. As the passage stands in the two editions it can only mean—'whenever there is notion of *one* in regard to a *large* object, there is cognition only of a peculiarity in the mass of atoms'; but this will not tally with *anuvāda* appearing on the next page.

Var. P. 248. P. 84, l. 23)—That is to say, we do not admit of the 'Composite' as something different; what happens is that, having perceived one 'mass of atoms' (which is not 'large'), if we perceive another, and find in this latter some peculiarity or difference (over the former), we have the conception of 'large' in regard to that other 'mass of atoms.' [so that, inasmuch as the conception of 'large' pertains to only atoms, the notion of 'one' also should pertain to these, and not to a distinct 'Composite']."

Well, in that case your argument becomes open to the objection urged before,—that this conception of 'large' would be a cognition of something as what it is not; that is to say, if the conception of 'large' pertains to *atoms*, or to the *mass of atoms*—neither of which is *large*—it can only be a wrong conception, being the conception of something as what it is not; and there can be no wrong conception without a prototype (in the shape of a corresponding right conception); and thus your theory remains open to the objections already urged by us.

"*With regard to Sound we have the conception of 'small' and 'large'; and this conception would be the 'prototype' required.* That is to say, we have such notions as 'sound is small,' 'sound is large',—which shows that we have the conception of 'large' and 'small' in regard to the same thing *Sound*; and this would be the prototype of similar notions of 'large' and 'small' in regard to other things [such as Atoms, which, though *small*, may be conceived of figuratively as 'large']."

[The answer to the above is]—*That cannot be;* * *as the said conceptions in regard to Sound pertain to only faintness and loudness, for the simple reason that they do not presuppose the ascertainment of the exact extent or dimension of the sound* (Bhāṣya, P. 85, L. 5);—as a matter of fact neither *largeness*

* The Benares edition has a superfluous च here.

nor *smallness* can subsist in Sound, for they are qualities [and Sound also is a quality, and no quality can subsist in a quality]. "If that be so, then the conceptions of 'large' and 'small' would not be possible in regard to Sound." Certainly they are not impossible; for they are based upon other causes. "What are these causes?" *Faintness* and *Loudness*, [i. e., when the Sound is *faint*, it is called 'small,' and when it is loud, it is called 'large']. "How do you know that this is so?" *The reason that this must be the meaning lies in the fact that the said conceptions do not presuppose the definite cognition of the exact extent or dimension of the Sound; for instance, when one conceives of a Sound as 'large', he does not have the idea that 'the Sound extends so far'* (Bhāṣya, P. 85, L. 7);—in the case of such things as the Pearl, the *Āmalaka* fruit and the *Bilva* fruit, when one thinks of these in the following manner—'the *Āmalaka* is larger then the Pearl,' 'the *Bilva* is larger than the *Āmalaka*',—he does have a definite cognition of the exact extent or dimension of each of these things; there is no such definite cognition of exact extent in the case of Sound.* "In the case of Sound also, it may be that after having heard one Sound when one comes to hear another, he has the conception that, 'this Sound is *larger* or *smaller* than that Sound.'" We do not deny the possibility of such a conception (in regard to Sound); what we are discussing is—whether this conception of 'large' or 'small' that we have in regard to Sound is based upon the actual presence in it of the *large* or *small* dimension? or it is due to other causes?—And the conclusion

* The *Ṭātparya* perceives a difficulty in this reasoning: "In the case of such things as the *Ākāsha*, whose extent or dimension is of the largest, no definite cognition of their dimension is possible. So that the 'ascertainment of dimension' that the *Bhāṣya* speaks of must be taken as referring to only such things as are amenable to sense-operation; as for such things as Ākāsha and the like,—which are not amenable to sense-perception—even though the exact dimension is not ascertained, they cannot be said to be without dimension; because the fact of their having dimension is inferred from their being *substances*."—*Ṭātparya*.

that appears to be the right one is that it is due to other causes: because one quality is never found to be possessed of another quality; as a matter of fact no quality has been found to be possessed of another quality, on the analogy of which there could be a conception of *dimension* (which is a Quality, in Sound, which also is a Quality). "From the very fact of the presence of the conception of 'largeness' in regard to Sound, it can be inferred that, like Substances, Sound also is possessed of a quality (in the shape of the *large* dimension); that is to say, when the conception of 'largeness' arises in regard to Substances, it does so by reason of the presence in it of Dimension,—and the same conception of 'largeness,' is found to arise in regard to Sound also,—so that the conception must be that because of the presence in regard to it of the conception of 'largeness,'

Var. P. 249.

Sound is possessed of Dimension." This reasoning is not right; as the premiss put forward is not universally true; for there are things which, even though they are conceived of as 'large,' are not possessed of *large dimension*; e. g., the *large dimension* itself. [That is to say, there are such conceptions as 'the dimension of the Āmalaka is *larger* than the dimension of the Pearl', which involves the conception of 'large' in connection with Dimension itself; while as a matter of fact no Dimension can belong to Dimension]. "How then do you have the conception of 'large' in connection with *Substances*? If, even in the presence of the conception of 'large' in regard to a thing, you do not admit that thing to be possessed of the *large dimension*, then how do you account for the conception that 'substance is possessed of the large dimension'?". It is not true that 'a substance is possessed of the large dimension, because it is conceived of as large'; in fact (the converse of this is true; that is) a substance is conceived of as *large*, because it is possessed of the large dimension;—and the presence of large dimension in a substance is inferred from the fact that any

distinctive conception (such as that of being *large*) in regard to a substance can never be due to mere chance [it must be due to the actual presence in that substance of a corresponding feature]*. "Well, if, in the case of substances, the presence of *large dimension* is inferred from the fact that distinctive conceptions in regard to them cannot be due to mere chance,—the same might be said in regard to *Sound* also; that is, in regard to Sound also we have the distinctive conception of its being *large*; and this conception should not be due to mere chance." Who says that in regard to Sound the said conception is due to mere chance? "To what then is the said conception due (if it is not due to mere chance)?" It is due to *faintness* and *loudness* (of Sound); *faintness* and *loudness* are properties really belonging to Sound; and it is on the basis of these that you have the notions of 'small' and 'large' in regard to Sound. "But what is this *faintness* or *loudness*?" When a Sound resembles a small substance, and is conceived of as the substratum of that resemblance, it is called 'faint'; and when it resembles a large substance, and is conceived of as the substratum of that resemblance, it is called 'loud' or 'powerful'.

Then again, the conception of '*samyuktē*', 'these two things are in contact',—which involves the cognition of contact coextensive with (having the same substratum) as *duality*—also proves the existence of the *Composite*. "How?" Well, as a matter of fact, the notions of 'largeness' and 'being in contact' must pertain to the same object,—because there is coalescence of the two,—just like the notions of 'blue' and 'lotus'; that is to say, in the case of the notions of 'blue' and 'lotus' we find that they coalesce, and as such pertain to the

* So that when a substance is conceived of as 'large', it is because it is actually possessed of the *large* dimension; this is specially so, when the said conception is such as is not sublated by subsequent experience, and is not found to be due to other causes.

same object (the characters of being 'blue' and of 'being lotus', both subsisting in the blue lotus); and we find a similar coalesence in the case of the notions of 'being large' and 'being in contact'; hence, on account of this coalescence, the two notions must be regarded as pertaining to the same objects [the character of 'being large' and 'being in contact' subsisting in the same two objects; which, therefore, cannot but be *composites*]. This same explanation holds respecting all such conceptions as '*one large* thing is *moving*', 'the Khaḍira tree' and the like [everyone of which coalescing with the conception of 'large' establishes the existence of the Composite]. In answer to the above the Opponent may urge the following—"The said conceptions (of 'largeness' and of 'two things being in contact') may be regarded as based upon (and pertaining to) two conglomerations or masses of atoms only (and not to Composites). That is to say, when the conceptions of 'large' and 'in contact' arise, they do so in regard to two *conglomerations* only; similarly such notions as 'the *one large* object is *moving*' pertain only to such *conglomerations* (and not to *Composites*)." This reasoning however is not right; as none of the several alteratives possible under such an hypothesis is tenable; for

Var: P. 250.

instance, when it is asserted—that "the conceptions of *in contact*, *large* and the like pertain to *conglomerations*",—what is it that is meant by 'Conglomeration' or 'Mass'? (*a*) Does it consist of the several components? (*b*) Or of the contact or combination of the several components? (*b*) If the *Mass* be held to consist of the contact of the several components, then (when one conceives of two 'Masses' in contact) this conception would be in the form 'two contacts are in contact'. "Why so?" Because the *Mass* is held to consist only of 'contact.' So that there could be no such conception as 'these two *objects* are in contact'. Further, even the conception of *contact* would not be possible (in the case of two things being in contact); for when one 'Mass' comes into contact

with another 'Mass', the resultant contact would itself become a 'Mass' (under the opponent's theory); so that there would be a *single* 'mass' (in the shape of the contact of the two masses); and hence there would be no idea of 'contact' at all. (*a*) If, on the other hand, the 'Mass' consists of the several *components* only, then there could be no co-ordination between 'masses' and 'duality'; that is to say, no such conception would be possible as 'these two objects are in contact', which involves the contingency of 'duality' subsisting in the same substratum as the 'Mass.' [That is under the Opponent's theory the Mass is nothing apart from the components, and these are *many*, and as such cannot be conceived of as 'two']. *From all this the conclusion is that what form the substratum of Conjunction are two such substances as are possessed of magnitude and are possessed of duality.* (Bhāṣya, P. 85, L. 15). If it be urged that there is no such thing as Conjunction,—our answer is that we have already shown that there is such a thing as Conjunction, distinct from the objects in contact.

Then again, the philosopher who holds that the Composite is nothing apart from the group or mass of components, should be asked the following question:—Such conceptions as 'Cow', 'Horse' and 'Man' as are based upon (due to) the several particular communities,—to what do these pertain? 'But there is no such thing as 'Community'; how could there be any conceptions based upon *Communities*?*" But

* The position of the philosopher who denies the very idea of 'Community' is thus explained in the *Tātparya*:—There can be no such real entity as *Community*, as whose substratum it would be necessary to accept the existence of a real substance. For instance, does any particular community subsist in a particular individual object? or in all places? If in all places, then all things would belong to the same Community, of 'cow' for instance; and all things would be cow! If, on the other hand, the Community were held to subsist in a few individual things only, then it behoves you to explain how that Community becomes related to a particular individual—a particular cow—that is newly born? For certainly before the individual came into existence at a certain place, the Community was not there, at that particular place; nor could the Community subsisting in the older individuals go over to the newborn individual; for according to the Logician, Community can have no

as matter of fact, *it is not possible to deny the existence of particular communities, which form the basis of all comprehensive or inclusive conceptions.* (Bhāṣya, P. 86, L. 4). Apart from a particular Community there can be no basis for a comprehensive cognition ; and no baseless cognition can have any footing ; and yet we have such inclusive conceptions as, for instance, 'these ear-rings' (which includes a number of ear-rings); we also have exclusive conceptions, such for instance as, 'these are not ear-rings';—for this reason the existence of particular communities cannot be denied. Thus then (as the existence of Communities cannot be denied), *inasmuch as no Community could be manifested without a substratum, it is necessary to explain what that substratum is.* (Bhāṣya, P. 86, L. 5) ;—that is to say, any particular Community can never be manifested without a substratum ; and hence it behoves the *Pūrvapakṣin* to explain what is that substratum (which manifests a particular Community). "What forms this substratum is the *group of atoms* ; that is to say, atoms, grouped in a certain manner, serve to manifest particular communities ; so that the mere necessity

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motion ; and also because if the Community did go over to the new thing, the older thing would become bereft of it ; so that the older cow would cease to be a 'cow' ! Nor will it be right to hold that when the individual is born, the Community also is born with it ; for in that case Community would be something transient. The only way in which he can extricate himself from the meshes of these difficulties is to regard the idea of 'Community' as purely illusory.

The *Tātparya* supplies the following answer to the above :—As a matter of fact there are certain well-known entities as though existing at the same time, are not related to one another ; *e. g.*, odour, taste, colour and touch ; and for our opponents also, there are several *Ideas* existing at the same time, and yet not related to one another ;—for the Vaishēṣikas, Space, Time, Ākāsha and Time, though existing at the same time, are not related to one another. In the same manner, Community also exists at the same time as other things, and is yet not related to all of them ; it is related to only those individuals that compose that Community. So that when a particular individual is born, there it is quite possible for the Community to have existed from before, though not related to anything ; and what serves to characterise and manifest the existing Community is the birth of that individual. Such being the real condition of things, we need not be afraid of the arguments urged by the opponent.

to provide a substratum for the comprehensive conception of Community does not establish the existence of the *Composite*." The answer to this has been already provided by us, when we showed that the said 'grouping' (of atoms), which is only another name for 'Conjunction' is something quite different (from the atoms themselves). Further, you think that it is the peculiar *grouping* (of the atoms) that manifests the particular Community;—now is the 'grouping,' when it manifests the Community, in contact with the Eye (*i. e.*, perceived)? or it manifests it without being itself perceived? If it be held that "when it manifests the Community, then the 'grouping' is perceived,"—then *that Community would not be manifested in the inner and back parts (of the 'group' concerned), as these parts would not be perceived* (Bhāṣya, P. 86, L. 9); that is to say, if the Community is manifested in a 'group' that is actually perceived, then, inasmuch as its inner and back parts would be hidden from view by the front part, they would not be perceived; and hence the Community could not be manifested in those parts! "*But there would be manifestation of the Community in that much of the group as is perceived.*" (Bhāṣya, P. 86, L. 10). This will not be right; as in that case that much of the group (as is not perceived) would fail to be the substratum; that is to say if you hold that—"there could be manifestation of the Community in that much of the 'Group' as is actually perceived,"—then it is only that much of the 'group' that would be the substratum of the Community (and not the whole of it); and in that case there should be diversity in the cognised thing; that is to say, when a certain 'group of atoms' is cognised as the 'tree', there should be a diversity or multiplicity in that 'tree.' "Why so?" Well, every one of those parts of the group where the Community ('Tree') would be manifested, would be a distinct *tree*; and in that case the *one tree* should be cognised as *many*; so that no conception of 'one' would be

P. 251.

possible.* Further, as the mere front part of a tree is not the 'tree' [and yet that part is all that is perceived, and in which, as such, the Community 'tree' is manifested, *ex hypothesi,*] there would be nothing in which the Community 'tree' would subsist? [What is *seen* not being the *tree* but only a part of it]. So that it behoves you to explain what is the real object of the concept 'tree.'

From all this we conclude that what serves to manifest a particular Community is some such entirely distinct substance as subsists in the grouped atoms, and this distinct substance is the Composite as something different from the component atoms. (Bhāṣya, P. 86, L. 15) This sentence is analysed as follows—(*a*) 'that of which the 'grouped atoms' (*Samuḍiṭāḥ aṇavaḥ*) are the substratum is the '*Samuḍiṭāṇusṭhānam*' ('that which subsists in the grouped atoms'),—(*b*) that 'distinct substance' (*arṭhānṭaram*) which is *samuḍiṭāṇusṭhānam* ('subsisting in the grouped atoms') is the '*samuḍiṭaṇusṭhānārṭhānṭaram*',—to this belongs the character of 'manifesting a particular community' (*Jāṭivishēṣavyakṭihēṭuṭva*),—and not to *Atoms*;—this is what establishes the existence of 'the Composite as something distinct from the component atoms.'

[The *Vārṭika* propounds a fresh argument of its own,—one not found in the *Bhāṣya*]—One who does not admit the *composite* as something different from the *components*, should explain the real signification of the term '*paramāṇu*' (atom, smallest particle). As a matter of fact, the term '*paramāṇu*' denotes the lowest stage in the descending scale (of Dimension); [and as such it is a purely relative term, im-

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* Every part that manifests the community is an independent individual of that Community. So that, just as the 'Kimshuka', 'Ashoka' and 'Champaka' are so many different trees, so the front part and the back part (of a certain tree) would be two distinct trees. If however we accept the existence of the Composite, then this absurdity does not arise; for the Composite is always recognised as equally related to every one of its parts.—Ṭāṭparya.

plying the existence of other and higher stages,]; so that unless there is a corresponding 'large' substance, the '*aṇu*' 'particle', cannot take any such qualification as '*parama-aṇu*', 'smallest particle';—that is to say, the qualification 'smallest particle' (which denotes the smallest dimension) has a meaning only if there is a corresponding higher dimension; and if there is no such higher dimension, the qualified term '*smallest* particle' becomes meaningless;—and as a matter of fact, this presence of higher dimensions is possible only if there is a *composite* [as different from the components, and possessed of that higher dimension, relatively to which the components could be called 'smallest'].

Vār. P. 252.

Some philosophers (the Sāṅkhyas) have held the view that—"the *Atom* is the smallest aggregate of *saṭṭva, rajas and ṭamas* (the three Attributes of which Primordial Matter is composed)."

This view also we do not find acceptable; as it involves a self-contradiction: That a thing should be an 'aggregate' and yet 'smallest of all' involves a contradiction in terms; for there can be no 'aggregate' unless there are congregating factors [which, as components of the 'aggregate', must be smaller than it; so that no 'aggregate' can be called 'smallest'].

[The *Vārṭika* propounds four arguments in support of the view that the Composite is something different from the components] (A) The (component) Yarns must be different from the (composite) Cloth, because they are its cause, just like the Shuttle and other things;—the Shuttle and other things, are the cause of the Cloth, and are found to be different from it;—and the Yarns also are the cause of the Cloth;—hence these also must be different from it. (B) [The Yarns are different from the Cloth] because of the difference in their capability; [the Cloth is capable of covering things, while Yarns have no such capability];—

just as *Poison* is different from *Medicine*.—(C) because they are objects of different cognitions;—just as *Colour* is the object of a cognition different from that of which *Touch* is the object. (D) Again the colour of the Yarns and that of the Cloth must have different (material) causes,—because each of these colours has a distinctive character of its own;*—just as Colour and Touch (having distinctive features of their own, have different causes). Some people, misunderstanding our argument to mean that the reason propounded for (proving the difference of the components from the composite) is in the form, 'because they are of different colours',—put forward against us the case of Atoms; and argue thus—"In a single atom also we find a diversity of colour; e. g. the same atom (of clay) which is *black* (before baking) becomes *red* (after baking)" This arguer should be met with the following argument:—What you urge is not pertinent; as it only shows that you have not understood the meaning of what we have put forward as the reason: We do not mean that the 'composite is different from the components because they are of different colours'; what we do is to propound the Proposition that 'the colour of the Yarns and the colour of the Cloth must have different causes,'—and then to bring up in proof of that proposition the reason, '*because each of those colours has a distinctive feature of its own*'. So that the objection of our Opponent does not effect our reasoning at all. A full discussion on this topic (of Composites and Components) is liable to make our work too prolix: hence we stop here.

Thus has Perception been examined (directly, and) indirectly (through an examination of its object).

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* Of the yarns, some are red, some blue, some yellow; and yet the cloth composed of these yarns is of the variegated colour, which is neither red, nor blue, nor yellow; now the constituent cause of the red &c., consists of the yarns, while of the variegated colour, the cloth is the constituent cause; even in a case where the colour of the cloth is the same as that of the yarns, some such distinction may be drawn: for instance, the *red* of the cloth would be a shade deeper than the red of the yarns individually.—*Tāṭparya*,

Adhyāya II.
Daily Lesson I.
Section (5).
Examination of Inference.
[Sūṭras 37—38.]
Bhāṣya.
[P. 86, L. 16 to P. 87, L. 2.]

We now start the examination of Inference.

Sutra (37).

Pūrvapakṣa—" INFERENCE CANNOT BE AN INSTRUMENT OF RIGHT COGNITION,—AS [IN THE PARTICULAR INSTANCES CITED OF THE THREE KINDS OF INFERENCE] THE PREMISSES ARE UNTRUE—IN VIEW OF OBSTRUCTION, DEMOLITION AND RESSEMBLANCE."—(Sū. 37.)

" The word ' *Apramāṇam* in the Sūṭra means that In- " ference cannot even once be the means of the (definite) " right cognition of anything *

" (*a*) [Under Sū. 1-1-5 the *Bhāṣya* has cited as an in- " stance of the ' *Sheṣavaṭ* ' Inference—the inference of the " fact of it having rained up the river from perceiving the river " to be full ;—now] as a matter of fact, the river may be seen " to be full also by reason of its course being blocked (by a " dam); hence from the mere perception of the fullness of the " river, to conclude that 'the Rain-god has rained in the " regions up the river' cannot be a correct Inference.

" (*b*) [As an instance of the ' *Pūrvavaṭ* ' Inference some " writers have cited the inference that ' it is going to rain ' " from perceiving the ants running away with their eggs ; " now] as a matter of fact, the running about of the ants

Bhā. P. 87. with their eggs might be due to the demolition of their nests ; so that from seeing the ants " running about with their eggs, to conclude that ' it is " going to rain ' cannot be a correct Inference.*

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* The *Ṭāṭparya* says that अविधायकम् of the *Bhāṣya* must be taken in the sense of निश्चायकम् ; because (the *Parishuddhi* adds) some sort of cognition may be brought about by even wrong premisses. The *Bhāṣyachanḍra* also explains अविधायकम् as अनिश्चितकरम्

* ' *Pūrvavaṭ* ' Inference consists in the inferring of the effect from the perception of its cause ; but as a matter of fact, the running about of the ants with the eggs cannot be regarded as the cause of rain ; for the simple reason that there is rain even without the running about of the ants. The fact however which makes the ants running about an indication of coming rain is the fact that what brings about

(c) " [Some writers have cited the inference of the *pre-*
" *sence of the peacock*—from the hearing of the peacock's
" scream ; but] as a matter of fact, a man might be mimick-
" ing the peacock's scream ; so that on account of this res-
" semblance (between the real peacock's scream and the
" man's mimicking of it), the inference of the peacock's pres-
" ence from hearing of what sounds like its scream cannot
" but be incorrect.*"

Vārṭika on Su. 37.

[P. 253, L. 14 to P. 253, L. 16.]

Now after Perception has been examined it is time for the examination of Inference, which therefore is now proceeded with. " What is *Inference* ?" What Inference is has already been explained under *Sūṭra* 1-1-5. The following are the examples of the three kinds of Inference, *Pūrvavaṭ* and the rest (enumerated under Su. 1-1-5) :—(1) The full river (leading to the cognition its having rained up the river), (2)

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rain is some sort of commotion in the elements, [in the form, for instance, of the rising of heat-waves below the earth's surface] ; but before this commotion brings on rain, it produces certain other phenomena also ; and the running about of the ants is one of these phenomena ;—the ants being turned out of their nests underground by the sudden rising of the heat-waves, and thus carrying away their eggs outside. So that the appearance of ants thus running about leads to the inference of the elemental commotion, which is the cause of rain ; and from this we go on to the inference that ' it is going to rain.' In this manner alone can we regard the instance as one of *Pūrvavaṭ* ' Inference. But it is possible that a man may infer the coming of rain, without regarding the ants running about as the *cause* of rain ; that is, it may be an act of simple inductive reasoning ; in which case this would be an instance of the *Sāmānyaṭodṛiṣṭa* Inference.

As a matter of fact the instance of *Pūrvavaṭ* Inference cited by the *Bhāṣya* under 1-1-5 is the inference of coming rain from the gathering of clouds. The case of the ants running leading to the inference of coming rain has been cited by other writers.

* The *Vārṭika* takes this third instance as the inference of the presence of the peacock ; hence we have adopted that view in the translation. But the fact appears to be, as pointed out by later commentators on the *Sūṭra*, that the inference is of the *presence of clouds* ; so that the three cases could be then of past, future and present rains. But by the *Vārṭika* interpretation also the third would be a case of inference of something *present* ; the difference being that while the other two refer to *rain*, the third refers to something else.

the running about of ants with their eggs (leading to the cognition of coming rain), and (3) the scream of the peacock (leading to the cognition of the presence of the peacock). The next *Sūṭra* is intended to point out (from the standpoint of the Opponent) the falsity of the premisses upon which these inferences are based.

" *Inference cannot be an instrument of right cognition &c.* " *&c.*—Says the *Sūṭra* (37). The word '*roḍha*', 'obstruc-" tion', stands for that which serves to stop the flow of " running water;—'*upaghāṭa*', 'demolition', for the " smashing up of the ant's nest;—*sāḍṛishya*', 'ressem-" blance", for the capability of the peacock and " that of man (mimicking the peacock) to give " rise to similar ideas (in the mind of the hearer). Inas-" much as these three vitiate the truth of the premisses on " which each of the three Inferences is based, no Inference " can ever be an instrument of right cognition. The rest is clearly put in the *Bhāṣya*."

Vār. P. 253.

[The *Vārṭika* meets this attack by the *Pūrvapakṣin*, as follows]—The proposition propounded by the *Pūrvapakṣin* is in the form "*anumānam apramāṇam*," "Inference is not an instrument of right cognition"; but this assertion is not right. *Firstly*, because the two terms of the proposition are contradictory to each other: For instance, "*Anumānam*,' 'Inference,' is the name of that relation (of concomitance) which brings about the cognition of things beyond the reach of the senses; while '*apramāṇam*', 'that which is *not* the instrument of right cognition,' is the negation of that; so that the two terms of the proposition are mutual contradictories; for one and the same thing (the character of bringing about cognition) cannot be both affirmed and denied (in regard to anything). *Secondly*, there is contradiction also between the Proposition and the Premiss (propounding the Probans or Reason); for instance, the Proposition is in the form, 'Infer-

ence is not the instrument of right cognition', and the Premiss is in the form, 'because of falsity, in view of obstruction, demolition and resemblance'; which means that that which is false (in its premisses) cannot be the instrument of right cognition, —as is found to be the case when the 'presence of horns' is adduced as a reason for a particular animal being a 'cow.' Now here, the premiss contradicts the Proposition, and the Proposition contradicts the Premiss; for when you assert that—'Inference is not an instrument of right cognition', do you mean to deny *the character of being an instrument of right cognition* in regard to *all* Inference? or only in regard to *some* Inferences? "What do you mean by this?" Well, if your Proposition is that 'all Inference is devoid of the character of being an instrument of right cognition', then, the Premiss is one that resides only in a part of the Subject; for 'all Inference' forms the Subject, and certainly 'falsity' does not belong to *all* Inferences; for instance, you certainly cannot affirm the falsity of the Inference which establishes the fact of an Inference not being an instrument of right cognition [for this is what you actually do in the Sūṭra, which propounds an *Inference* against the validity of Inferences]; so that there being no proof for the falsity of 'falsity' (as proving the invalidity of Inferences),—your Premiss (Probans) turns out to be that which is not necessarily concomitant with the whole of your Subject (*All Inferences*). If, on the other hand, (you do not intend your argument to apply to *all* Inferences, but only to a few, and) your Proposition is in the form, 'that Inference which is beset with falsity cannot be the instrument of right cognition',—then the Probaṇs ('falsity') being a qualifying factor in the Proposition, it would be necessary for you to put forward another Probans; and further, in this case your argument would be superfluous; for certainly *that which is beset with falsity* is never regarded (by any person) to be an instrument of right cognition.

Sūṭra (38 .

[Reply to the *Pūrvapakṣa Sūṭra*]—NOT SO; BECAUSE [WHAT ARE THE REAL PROBANS IN THE THREE INFERENCES CITED] ARE ENTIRELY DIFFERENT FROM—(*a*) SUCH (RISE OF WATER) AS IS RESTRICTED TO ONE PLACE, (*b*) SUCH (RUNNING ABOUT OF ANTS WITH THEIR EGGS) AS IS DUE TO FRIGHT, AND (*c*) SUCH (PEACOCK'S SCREAM) AS IS A MERE RESEMBLANCE OF IT—(Sū. 38).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (38).

[P. 87, L. 4 to L. 12.]

As a matter of fact, the 'falsity' that has been urged does not apply to Inference; it is clear that what is not an Inference has been mistaken for Inference (by the *Pūrvapakṣin*). "How so?" Well, in reality, what can be rightly regarded as the Probans of an Inference is not anything in its mere unqualified (vague, general) form. For instance [in the case of the three Inferences cited], (*a*) when one infers that 'the Rain-god has rained in the regions above the river', from the fact that the river is full, he does so, not by merely perceiving *a rise in the river*, but by perceiving that the water previously existing in the river has become qualified (augmented) by rain-water, that the velocity of the stream has increased, and that the stream is carrying along in its course flakes of foam, fruits, leaves and logs of wood;*—(*b*) when one infers 'coming rain', he does so from the fact that whole hosts of ants are running about † (calmly and peacefully) with their eggs,—and not only a few ants;—(*c*) and lastly, the third Inference (that of the presence of the Peacock from hearing the Peacock's scream) is wrong only when the scream is in reality not that of a Peacock, and the observer fails to perceive the fact that 'this what I am hearing is not the screaming of the Peacock, but some other sound ressembling it;' but when the observer hears a particular (qualified) kind of Sound (*i. e.*, a Sound in the musical tone called '*ṣadja*', in which the peacock's scream is always pitched), he realises

* All these additional ideas do not arise when the rise is due to some obstruction placed in the course of the stream.

† The *Bhāṣyachandra* explains भावस्य as प्रीतियुक्तस्य समवायस्य; 'a large number of ants running about in friendly groups.'

And when the running about is due to fright caused by the demolition of the nests, there would be only a few of them running about, distractedly, and not hosts of them calmly and peacefully.

that what he is hearing is that peculiar Sound which can emanate only from the peacock, and then what leads to the right Inference of the peacock's presence is that particular kind of Sound (pitched in the 'Ṣadja' tone, and not what merely ressembles it vaguely)*; such infallible Inference of the peacock's presence from its scream is drawn by serpents (who can never mistake any mimicking Sound to be the 'peacock's scream'). Thus then, it is clear that when a person tries to infer, from the perception of an *un-qualified* thing, something that can be inferred from the perception of a *particular qualified thing*, the fault lies with the inferring person, not with the Inference.

Vārtika on Sū. (38).

The particular instances of Inference that you have cited as being based upon false premisses,—there is, in reality, no 'falsity' at all in them; so that when you put forward the presence of 'falsity' as the Probans (in proof of Inference not being an instrument of right cognition), it is a Probans that is '*asiddha*', 'unknown'; it is this fallacy in the Probans of the *Pūrvapakṣin* that is meant to be brought out by the Sūtra—'*Not so &c.* &c.'

(*a*) It has been urged that a rise in the river is brought about also by 'obstruction' (and not only by rain); but as a matter of fact, the fact of the upper regions having received rain is inferred, *not* from a mere rise in the river, but from a particular kind of rise (which is accompanied by enhanced swiftness of the current and
Vār. P. 254.
the presence of floating flakes of foam, logs of wood &c.); and as there is no falsity in this premiss [for that particular kind of rise cannot be brought about by any other cause save *rain*], your Probans turns out to

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† So also in the *first* Inference, it would be *wrong only* if the man failed to notice that the rise in the river was due to its course having been obstructed; and the *second* Inference would be wrong *only* if the man failed to perceive that only a few ants were running about through fright caused by the destruction of a particular ant-nest.

be 'unknown' (not really pertaining to the Subject)*. (*b*) Similarly, the fact that the running about of ants with eggs is also due to the destruction of their nests can prove the falsity of only that premiss which would be based upon the perception of a few running ants,—and not of that based upon a peculiar kind of 'ant-running.' "What would be the *peculiarity* (in the running about of ants?" It is this—that the *running about* is found among such ants as are *not frightened*, which are running about *in large numbers* and are *moving on to higher ground* in large groups;—such 'running about of ants with their eggs' is never found to be unconcomitant with 'coming rain' [so that there can be no falsity in the premiss based upon the said peculiar kind of the 'running about of ants']. (*c*) Nor is there any falsity in the inference from sounds; because the inference of the presence of the Peacock is not from *mere* 'Sound';—nor is it the 'Peacock' that is meant to be inferred; the inference is from a peculiarity in the Sound heard,—such peculiarity for instance as *being pitched in the 'ṣadja' tone*; and what is inferred is the fact of the *Sound belonging to a Peacock*. Thus then, there being no falsity in any of the premisses (cited), the Probans (of the Pūrvapakṣin) turns out to be absolutely 'unknown'.

Thus has Inference been examined.

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* The Bib. Ind. Edition reads प्रतिविशेषे वा सत्याव्यभिचाराद्धेतुः; and the Benares Edition—प्रतिविशेषेण सत्व चऽव्यभिचारोऽहेतुः:—The correct reading is प्रतिविशेषेण सत्व च व्यभिचारोऽहेतुः (or सत्याव्यभिचाराद्धेतुः).

Section (6).

Examination of the nature of Time—specially the Present.

[*Sūṭras* 39—43.]

Bhāṣya on Sū. (39).

P. 87, L. 12 to L. 17.]

It has been asserted (in the *Bhāṣya*, P. 20, L. 4, under Sū. 1·1·5) that Inference is applicable to all three points of time, *because it apprehends the three points of time.* Against this also * the following objection has been raised (by the Bauḍḍha)—

Sūṭra (39.)

[*Pūrvapakṣa*]—"THERE IS NO PRESENT TIME; FOR WHEN AN OBJECT FALLS, THE ONLY POSSIBLE POINTS OF TIME ARE—THAT WHICH HAS BEEN FALLEN THROUGH, AND THAT WHICH HAS TO BE FALLEN THROUGH."† (*Sū.* 39.)

"When the fruit becomes detached from the stalk (it "falls and, comes gradually nearer and nearer to the ground; "now while it is so nearing the ground, the space above the "fruit (and below the tree) is *space traversed*; and the time "related to that *traversed* space is '*that which has been fallen* "*through*' (the *Past*); and the space below the fruit (and "above the ground) is the space *to be traversed*; and the time "related to this latter space is '*that which has to be fallen* "*through*' (the *Future*);—and (apart from these two) there is "no third space, in relation to which there could be the "notion of *being traversed*, which would give rise to the "conception of the *Present* Time. From this we conclude "that there is no such thing as *Present* Time."

Vārṭika on Sū. (39.)

[P. 255, L. 5 to L. 13.]

The existence of Time has been established; and Time being established, the following *Sūṭra* denies the existence of the *present* Time.—"*There is no Present Time* &c., &c.— "says the Sūṭra. When the fruit has become detached

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* The *Bhāṣyachanḍra* interprets the *cha* to mean that the opponent objects to the three points of time, just as he does to the three kinds of Reason (dealt with in the preceding Section).

† Dr. Satish Chandra Vidyabhusana finds in this Sūṭra a distinct reference to the माध्यमिकसूत्र. The mere mention of a doctrine however does not justify us to regard it as referring to any particular work.

" from its stalk, and begins to fall nearer and nearer to the " ground, that space which is above it—that is, from the fruit " up to the stalk—is the *traversed space*; and that which is " below it,—that is, from the fruit down to the ground—is " *space to be traversed*;—there is no third space left, with " reference to which there could be the notion that '*it is* " *being traversed*'; and yet apart from space there is nothing " that could manifest (give rise to the conception of) Time. " Hence the conclusion is that there is no such thing as " *Present Time*."*

Sūtra (40).

[Answer to the *Pūrvapakṣa*]—[IF THERE IS NO 'PRESENT' TIME] THE OTHER TWO 'PAST' AND 'FUTURE') ALSO WOULD BE INCONCEIVABLE; AS THESE ARE RELATIVE TO THAT. (Sū 40).

Bhāṣya.

[P. 87, L. 19 to P. 88, L. 6].

As a matter of fact, Time is not manifested by (conceived of in relation to) *Space*; it is manifested by *Action*†; So that we have the conception of the *time that has been fallen through* (i. e. *Past* Time) when the *action of falling*,—which is expressed by the phrase '*it falls*'—has ceased; and when that same action is *going to happen*, we have the conception of Time *that has to be fallen through* (i. e. *Future* Time); and lastly, when the *action* of the thing is perceived as *going on* at the time, we have the conception of 'Present' Time. Under the circumstances, if a person were never to perceive the *action* as 'going on' at the time, what could he conceive of as 'having ceased', or as 'going to happen'? For as a matter of fact, what is meant by 'time having been fallen through' is that the *action* of 'falling' is over, has ceased; and what is meant by 'time to be fallen through' is that the action is going

Bhā. P. 88.

* All that we have basis for are the conceptions of *Past* and *Future*,—only *two* points of Time; so that it is not right to say that Inference applies to *three* points of Time, such is the sense of the *Pūrvapakṣin*.—*Tātparya*.

† It is true Time is conceived of only in relation to some *Kriyā*, but *Kriyā* stands for *action in general*; not for mere *motion*, as the opponent has taken it.—*Bhāṣyachandra*.

to happen; so that at both these points of time (Past and Future) the object is devoid of the *action*; whereas when we have the idea that the thing 'is falling down', the Object is actually connected (imbued) with the *action*; so that what the *Present* Time apprehends (indicates) is the actual existing connection of the *Object* and the *Action*; and thus it is only on the basis of this (existing connection and the time indicated by it) that we could have the conception of the other two points of Time (Past and Future); which latter, for this reason, would not be conceivable if the 'Present' Time did not exist. [Thus then all the *three* points of Time being realities, there is nothing wrong in the idea that 'Inference is applicable to the three points of time'.].*

Vārṭika on Sū. (40).

[P. 255, L. 13, to P. 256, L. 7].

What has been urged by the Pūrvapakṣin cannot be accepted; as it involves an incongruity. When he says that "there is no such thing as *Present Time*", it implies the rejection of the two points of Time (Past and Future) which he has admitted. This is what is meant to be shown in the following Sūṭra.

The other two also are inconceivable &c. &c.—says the *Sūṭra*. As a matter of fact, the *Past* and *Future* are dependent upon (relative to) the *Present Time*; so that he for whom there is no 'Present', for him this denial of the 'Present' would render the other two points of Time also inconceivable. Specially as Time is rendered conceivable, not by *Space*, but by *Action*; that is to say, when one perceives the connection of the object with the Action,—this perception being represented by the idea 'it is falling'—the point of

* The reality of the conception 'the thing *is falling*'—on which the idea of *Present* Time is based—cannot be denied; as it is attested to by direct Perception—says the *Parishuḍḍhi*. If the *present action* were not there, what would be there that is produced by the gravity of the thing when its support has been removed (and when it falls)? whose effect would it be that the thing touches the ground? Neither the *Past* nor the Future could be the effect or the cause; as they are non-existent at the time.—*Ṭāṭparya.*

time that is characterised by this connection (of Action and Object) is called the '*Present*'; and when the said connection of the Object with the *Action* has ceased, there arises the idea of 'Past' time; and lastly, when it is perceived that the causes that tend to bring about the Action are ready, and there is nothing to obstruct their operation,—the notion appears 'the action *will* happen',—and we have the conception of the '*Future*' Time. So that if our Opponent does not admit the Action in the *Present*, whence could he have the conception of the Action as *in the Past* or as *in the Future*? As neither the *Time* (in general) is past, nor is the *Fruit* (or the result of the Falling, in the shape of the contact of the Fruit with the ground); for Time is ever extant, and the Fruit (or Result) also is there at the time. Then again, the notions—'it has fallen', 'it is falling' and 'it will fall'—are conceivable only as connected with (and qualifying) the *Action* (of *falling*); and as such they can appear only in the *Action*, and never in the Result; from which it is clear that what renders Time conceivable is *Action*, not space; for the space traversed remains the same (unchanged) at all three periods of time; that is to say, at the time that the *Action* has appeared in the Fruit (it has begun to fall), the condition of the space is precisely the same as what it was when the action had not appeared; so that the space remaining the same (in all cases), that cannot be the cause of the different periods of Time being rendered conceivable.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (41).
[P. 8S, L. 6 to L. 19].

Then again—

AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE CONCEPTIONS OF 'PAST' AND 'FUTURE' CANNOT BE MERELY RELATIVE TO EACH OTHER. (Sū. 41).

If the conceptions of 'Past' and 'Future' could be merely relative to each other,—accomplished on the basis of each

other),—then we might accept the rejection of the 'Present'. As a matter of fact however neither the conception of 'Future' can be based upon the conception of the 'Past', nor that of the 'Past' can be based upon that of the 'Future'. By what reasoning and by what means would the conception of 'Past' be obtained?—How too in relation to the notion of 'Past' would you obtain the notion of 'Future'?—Or by what means would you get at the conception of the 'Future' at all? That is to say, all this cannot be explained, if you reject the 'Present' time. It might be urged that—"there are several such pairs of relative conceptions as '*long and short*' '*ground and underground*', '*light and shade*', where one is merely relative to the other; and in the same manner the conceptions of '*past and future*' could be accomplished entirely in relation to each other." This however will not be accepted, in the absence of special reasons. That is to say, just as you have cited some examples (of relative terms), so could we also cite some counter-examples (to show that conceptions do not arise merely in relation to each other); for instance, 'just as such pairs of conceptions as '*colour and touch*', '*odour and taste*' are such in which the conceptions are not merely relative to each other, in the same manner the conceptions of '*past and future*' also could not be accomplished entirely in relation to each other. [And unless you have adduced some special reason in favour of the effectiveness of your examples, we cannot accept them in the face of these counter-examples]. [We have answered your argument after assuming that the instances you have cited are really those of purely relative conceptions]. As a matter of fact however, there can be no conceptions which are accomplished merely in relation to each other; for if one were entirely dependent upon the other, then, the negation of one would imply the negation of the other, and thus there would be negation of both; that is to say, if the existence of one were entirely dependent upon the other, then, upon what would the existence of the former be dependent?—And if the existence of the former depended upon the other, on what would the existence of this latter depend?—And thus as in the absence of the one, the other could not be possible, the result would be that both would be impossible.

Vārtika on Sū. (41).

[P. 256, L. 8 to L. 20.]

You might argue that—"Even if we do not admit the *Present* time, we can explain the notions of *Past and Future* as relative to each other." The following Sūtra is meant to be a denial of this argument.—*The conceptions of 'Past' and 'Future' cannot be merely relative to each other*—says the *Sūtra*. That is to say, the notions of 'Past' and 'Future' cannot be explained as based upon each other. "Why so?" If there is no *Present*, what is it that would be *Past*? And in what manner could it be conceived of as 'Past'? What too would be the *Future*? And in what manner could it be conceived of as 'Future'?—All this cannot be explained: *All this cannot be explained if you reject the 'Present' time*—says the *Bhāṣya* (P. 88, L. 11).

Then again, by the peculiar manner in which the denial (of the *Present*) has been put forward (in Sū. 39), the 'Present' is admitted; that is to say, the denial has been put forward in the form—"*when an object falls*, the only possible points of Time are that which has been fallen through and that which has to be fallen through" (Sū. 39);—and unless the *Present* time is admitted, the phrase 'when an object *falls*' (the present participle '*patataḥ*') has no meaning; unless you admit what is denoted by the present participial phrase, you cannot use such a phrase as 'when an object falls'; so that the incongruity involved in your reasoning is this that you deny the 'Present' time and yet make use of the present participial term '*patataḥ*', 'when an object *falls*.'

As a matter of fact however, there can be no conceptions which are accomplished merely in relation to each other—says the *Bhāṣya* (P. 88, L. 15). And the reason for this is that the negation of one would, in that case, imply the negation of the other, and hence the negation of both; that is to say, if one were dependent entirely upon the other, it would come to this that while one is absent, the other is also absent, so that both would be absent.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (42).

[P. 88, L. 18, to P. 89, L. 10.]

Further, *Present* Time is indicated by the *existence* of things;—as we find in such conceptions as 'the Substance *exists*', 'Quality *is* there', 'Motion *is* there', and so on.* So that for one who does not admit this——

THERE BEING NO 'PRESENT', THERE COULD BE NO COGNITION OF ANYTHING (BY ANY INSTRUMENT OF COGNITION), AS NO 'PERCEPTION' WOULD BE POSSIBLE.† (SŪ 42).

Perception is brought about by the contact of the sense-organ with the object;‡ and that which is not *present*—that is, (*ex-hypothesi*) which is *non-existent*—cannot be in contact with a sense-organ; and there is nothing which our Opponent accepts as *present* or *existing*; so that for him there can be no *cause of perception* (in the shape of sense-object contact), no *object of Perception* (in the shape of existing things), and no *perceptional cognition*. And there being no Perception, there could be no Inference or Verbal Cognition, as both of these are based upon Perception. Thus all Instruments of Cognition becoming impossible, there could be no cognition of anything at all.

Bha. P. 89.

Then again, as a matter of fact, the *Present* Time is actually recognised in two ways—sometimes it is indicated by the *existence of things* (*i. e.* by the mere action of *Being*),—as for instance, in the conception 'the Substance *exists*,'§—and sometimes it is indicated by a *series of actions*,—*e.g.* in such conceptions as 'he *is cooking*', 'he *is cutting*'; this 'series of actions' may consist, either in several actions bearing upon a single thing, or in a repetition of the same action (on the same thing); of the former kind is the action spoken of as 'is cooking', which consists of several actions bearing upon the same thing—the action of 'cooking' comprising the actions of *placing the pot upon the oven, pouring*

* That is to say, the Present Time is indicated, not only by the notion of *Falling*, but also by the *existence* of things,—i. e. by the action of *Being*. This is meant to be an introduction to the following *Sūtra*.—*Tātparya*.

† The actions of *Falling* and the like are such as appear and disappear [so that they do not extend over all *present* things]; but the action of *Being* is one that extends over all *present* things; so that if you deny the *Present*, which is indicated by an action (of *Being*) that extends over all things, you make 'Perception' impossible, and thence every other form of cognition also becomes impossible.—*Tātparya*.

‡ 'Which presupposes the *present* existence of the *Object*, the *Organ* and the *Contact*'—*Bhāṣyachandra*.

§ The printed text reads द्रव्यः द्रव्यः: But all Mss. read अस्ति द्रव्य

*water into the pot, putting rice into it, fetching of fuel**, *lighting the fire, stirring with the ladle, straining the gruel*, and *bringing down the pot from the oven*;—in the action of '*cutting*' on the other hand, we have a repetition of the same action; for a man is said to be 'cutting' wood when he repeatedly raises the axe and lets it fall upon the wood. Now (in both these cases) that which is *being cooked* and that which is *being cut* is that which is *being acted upon* [*i. e.* connected with an action *at the 'present' time*].

Vārṭika on Su (42.)

P. 256, L. 20 to P. 257, L. 21.

Present Time is indicated by the existence of things—as we find in such conceptions as 'the Substance exists', 'the Quality is there', 'Motion is there', and so on; so that for one who does not admit this, 'there being no Present etc' etc.—says the Bhāṣya, (P. 88, L. 18).

The Sūṭra—'there being no Present &c.'—is meant to point out an incongruity (in the *Pūrvapakṣa* theory). "But why, in the absence of *Present Time*, should Perception be impossible†?" For this reason that Perception must always have *for its substratum* or basis something existing at the present time,—because it is a product, like *milk*;—as a matter of fact, whatever is a product is always found to have for its substratum something existing at the present time, as we find in the case of Milk;—and Perception also is a product;—Perception therefore must have for it substratum something existing at the present time‡. So that if the *Present* Time is not admitted, Perception would be devoid of its substratum; and as there can be no product without a substratum, Perception, under the circumstances, would become impossible. And when Percep-

Var. P. 257.

* The fuel—fetching and fire—lighting should come first; as they do in the *Vārṭika*.

† The questioner has in view the Perception of clairvoyants, which apprehends Past and Future things also.

‡ The basis of Perception, is the sense-object contact, and also the Self; and all this must be *present* at the time that the cognition appears.

tion is impossible, there would be a disappearance of all Instruments of Cognition; and all Instruments of Cognition having disappeared, there would be an end to all cognition;—and yet as a matter of fact there are cognitions of all things; hence, inasmuch as there is cognition of things, we conclude that the '*Present*' does exist, in the shape of *the cause of Perception* (sense-object contact), the *Object of Perception* and the *Perceptional Cognition*. Thus it is that the *Present* Time becomes established.

The *Present* Time, thus established, is of two kinds—(*a*) that indicated by a mere action and (*b*) that indicated by a series of actions; (*a*) the former, that indicated by a mere action, is expressed by the phrase 'the substance exists'; (*b*) and the latter, that manifested by a series of actions, is expressed in such phrases as 'is cooking', 'is cutting'. A 'series of actions' also is of two kinds—that in which the actions are of the same kind, and that in which the actions are of diverse kinds; of the former kind is the action of *cutting*, which consists of a series of the same action of *raising and letting fall the axe*; and of the latter kind is the action of *cooking*, which consists of a series of diverse actions; these diverse actions being—the fetching of fuel, the lighting of fire, the placing of the pot on the oven, pouring water into it, putting in rice, stirring it with the ladle, straining the gruel and bringing it down from the oven; the entire series of these diverse actions is spoken of by the single word 'cooking.' And what is denoted by the term 'cooking' is the continuity (*non-cessation*) of the 'series of actions', and not either its *non-commencement*, nor its *cessation*; for when it is meant to express the *non-commencement** of the series, we have the form in the Future tense, '*pakṣyaṭi*', 'will cook',—

* The right reading is clearly [illegible], as found in the Bibl. Ind. edition; as this is what is in keeping with the sense, and also with the preceding sentence. But the *Ṭāṭparya* reads [illegible]; and it does so knowingly; as it adds that by the word '[illegible]' in this compound is meant 'wish to do'; so that there is no incompatibility with the preceding sentence. With this interpretation the sense remains the same in both readings.

when it is intended to speak of the *cessation* of the Series, we have the form in the Past tense, '*apākṣīt*', has cooked.' Now *that which is 'being cooked' 'being cut' is that which is being done* (*Bhasya*, P. 89, L. 9).

Bhāṣya on Su. (43).
[P. 89, L. 10 to P. 90, L. 2].

Inasmuch as it is only in connection with what is *being done* (being operated upon by an action) that,—

WE HAVE THE CONCEPTIONS OF 'HAS BEEN DONE' AND 'TO BE DONE'—IT FOLLOWS THAT THE IDEA (OF THE PRESENT) IS ESTABLISHED IN BOTH WAYS. (*Su* 43).

When the 'series of actions' (comprising *Cooking*) is not yet commenced, and is only intended *to be done*, it is spoken of as 'will cook'; which denotes the 'Future' Time;—when the 'series of actions' has ceased and its purpose accomplished, it is spoken of as 'has cooked'; which denotes the 'Past' Time;—and lastly, when the 'series of actions' has commenced (and has not ceased), it is spoken of as 'is cooking'; which denotes the 'Present' Time. Now of these that which has ceased is what is spoken of as 'has been done'; that which is intended (and not yet commenced) is what is spoken of as 'to be done'; and that which is going on (has been commenced and has not ended) is spoken of as 'being done.' Now we find here that the collection of the three points of time in reference to a 'series of actions' (of Cooking) is possible only when it is conceived of as 'present', being spoken of either as 'is cooking' or as 'is being cooked'; wherein what is expressed is the *continuity* of the series of actions, and not either *non-commencement* or *cessation*. This 'Present' is conceived of in both ways—*i. e.* (1) as not mixed up with the notions of Past and Future, and (2) as mixed up with them*; that conception of Present which is *unmixed* we find in such expressions as 'the substance exists', where the *Present* is indicated by the mere *existence* (continuity, of the Substance); while

P. 90. such expressions as 'is cooking', 'is cutting' and the like indicate the *Present* as involving all three points of Time, and as expressing the continuity of a *series of actions*.† There are other ways also of this

*The *Bhāṣyachandra* explains '*apavṛiktaḥ*' and '*vyapavṛiktaḥ*' as '*rahitaḥ*' and '*sahitaḥ*'

† When we say 'he is cooking', some of the actions composing the composite act of cooking have been done, while some are being done and some are yet to be done.

involved use of the Present Tense, met with in ordinary usage; —when, for instance, it is used with a view to denote proximity (to Past or Future), and such other ideas.*

From all this the conclusion is that there *is* such a thing as the 'Present' Time.

Vārṭikā on Sū. (43).

[P. 257. L. 21 to P. 258, L. 10.]

Inasmuch as it is only in connection with what is 'being done' that we have the conceptions of 'has been done', and 'to be done', it follows that the idea of the Present is established in both ways—(*Sūṭra*). The *Sūṭra* contains only the word '*grahaṇam*' Idea', and the question arises—whose idea is meant? The answer is—what is meant is the *idea of the Present.*

How is this *idea of the Present* established 'in both ways'? (1) There is the idea of the 'Present' as involving the ideas of the 'Past and Future', and (2) there is the idea of it as not involving these. "Where do you have the idea of the 'Present' as not involving the 'past' and 'future.'"? In the expressions 'the substance exists', we have the indication of the Present in its unmixed, pure, form. In such expressions as 'is cooking' and the like, on the other hand, we have the idea of the 'Present' in its mixed form. "How so?" [Among the actions constituting the act of 'cooking'] there are some that are past, there are others yet to come, and there are others that are going on at the time.

In ordinary usage, the 'Present' is used in several other senses also,—such as that of *proximity* for instance. *E. g.* sometimes the Present is used in regard to what is *past*; as when a person *has already come*, he says 'here I *come*' (in the present tense); while sometimes the Present is used in regard to what is yet to come; as when even though standing, a man says 'I *go*' (in the present tense).† Similar instances may be found of other uses also.

THUS ENDS THE EXAMINATION OF THE 'PRESENT' TIME.

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* For examples, see *Vārṭika*, below.

† In these the Present denotes the *immediate* Past and *immediate* Future respectively.

Section (7).

Examination of Analogical Cognition.

[Sūṭras 44—48.]

Sūṭra (44).

[*Pūrvapakṣa*]—"THERE CAN BE NO ANALOGY ON THE BASIS OF EITHER PERFECT OR SEMI-PERFECT OR PARTIAL RESSEMBLANCE.—"* (Sū. 44).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (44).

[P. 90, L. 4 to L. 7.]

"(A) There can be no Analogy on the basis of *perfect* "*or absolute ressemblance*; for certainly there can be no such "conception as 'as the bull so the bull' [and this would "be the sense of the sentence 'as the bull so the gavaya', "if *perfect ressemblance* between the two were meant]. (B) "Nor can Analogy be based upon *semi-perfect ressemblance* †; "for there is no such conception as 'as the bull so the "buffalo' [and this is what the sentence 'as the bull so "the *gavaya*' might mean, if the sense conveyed were that "of *semi-perfect ressemblance*; as the buffalo has many "points of ressemblance to the bull]. (C) Nor lastly "can Analogy be based upon *slight ressemblance*; for all "things cannot be conceived of as ressembling one another "[and such would be the said *Analogy*, if it were based "upon slight ressemblance, for all things are similar in some "way or the other]."

Vārṭika on Sū. (44).

[P. 258, L. 11 to L. 19.]

We now proceed to examine *Analogy*; as now comes its turn (after Inference has been examined). As to what is 'Analogy', this has been already explained under

* When one perceives the ressemblance in the animal before him, of the bull, and remembers at the same time the advice that 'as is the bull so is the gavaya',—this perception of ressemblance along with the remembrance becomes the means that accomplishes the cognition of the connection of the name 'gavaya' with the animal perceived. So that this recognition of the connection of the name is 'Analogical Cognition'; and the means by which this is brought about has been called 'Analogy.' This, the Pūrvapakṣin says, is not possible; for the advice upon which the cognition is based—'as the bull so the gavaya'—does this denote *perfect* ressemblance, or *semi-perfect* (almost perfect) ressemblance, or only *slight*, partial, ressemblance? Neither of these is possible.

† The printed text reads प्रायः but the *Sūṭra* and the Puri Mss. read simply प्राय

Sū. 1-1-6, as *that which is that means of the effect (analogical cognition) which is based upon recognised ressemblance.* The following Sūṭra formulates an objection to this—

"*There can be no Analogy* &c. (A) No Analogy can be "based upon *perfect ressemblance*; there can be no such "Analogy as 'as the bull so the bull'. (B) Nor can "Analogy be based upon *semi-perfect ressemblance*; for "there is no such conception as 'as the bull so the buffalo'. "(C) Nor lastly can Analogy be based upon *partial or slight* "*ressemblance*; for there is no such conception as 'as the "mount Mēru, so the grain of oil-seed'. And there is no "other kind of ressemblance except these. So the con- "clusion is that there can be no Analogy (and no Analogical "Cognition."

Sūtra 45.

[*Siḍḍhānṭa.*]

INASMUCH AS ANALOGY IS BASED UPON SUCH RESSEMBLANCE AS IS ACTUALLY RECOGNISED, THERE IS NO ROOM FOR THE OBJECTION THAT HAS BEEN URGED.*—Sū. (45).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (45).

[P. 90, L. 9 to L. 11.]

As a matter of fact, the Analogy (mentioned in the advisory sentence) does not proceed on the basis of either *perfect* or *semi-perfect* or *slight* ressemblance; it proceeds with reference to (*i. e.* as indicative, and on the basis of), such ressemblance as is actually recognised (from the advisory sentence), and which arises in reference to (*i. e.* as indicative

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* The exact sense conveyed by a sentence depends upon the context and such other circumstances; so that what particular sort of ressemblance is expressed by a certain sentence will be contingent upon these. *E.g.*, when the advisory sentence, 'as the bull so the gavaya', is addressed to a person who knows such animals as the buffalo and the like, *it is semi-perfect ressemblance* that is meant; so that when the man sees the *gavaya*, and finds that it has several points of ressemblance to the bull, he recognises it as the 'Gavaya'; even though there is similar ressemblance between the bull and the buffalo also, the man will not recognise the animal as a 'buffalo', for, as already pointed out, he perfectly knows what a buffalo is; then under the special circumstances of the case, the sentence 'as the bull so the gavaya', could never be understood to mean 'as the bull so the buffalo.'—*Ṭāṭparya.*

The Sūṭra speaks of 'such ressemblance as is recognised'; and the *Parishuḍḍhi* adds that what is meant is that ressemblance of which the idea is derived from the particular advisory sentence—*e. g.* 'as the bull so the gavaya'.

of, pointing to) the relation of cause and effect* [between the Analogy and the recognition of the connection of the particular name with the particular thing].† And in a case where these conditions are found to be present, Analogy cannot be denied. For this reason the objection that has been urged (in Sū. 44) is not relevant.

Vārtika on Sū. (45.)

[P. 258, L. 19 to P. 259, L. 15.]

[The answer to the above objection is as follows;]—Inasmuch as what the Opponent rejects is only such Analogy as is based upon *perfect* and the other two kinds of Ressemblance, it cannot be taken as a denial of all Analogy. That is to say, what the foregoing *Sūṭra* (44) rejects is only such Analogy as is based upon 'perfect ressemblance', or on 'semi-perfect ressemblance', or on 'slight ressemblance'; so that it does not reject *all* Analogy. Under
P. 259.
the circumstances (as you reject only *some kinds* of Analogy, and not all), it behoves you to supply some other explanation of that Analogy and its exact form (which you do not reject). If your opinion is that there is no other form of Analogy (than those based upon the three kinds of ressemblance mentioned in the Sūṭra), then, how can you make any such assertion as—"there can be no Analogy *on the basis of either perfect or semi-perfect or slight ressemblanse?*" (Sū. 44). In fact, for one who does not admit any kind of Analogy at all, the right form of denial would be—"Analogy is not an instrument of right cognition,—it does not bring about the cognition of anything."

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* 'That is, the relation subsisting between what *is known* and *what makes it known*'—*Bhāṣyachandra*.

† That is to say, there can be no restriction as to any particular sort of ressemblance upon which Analogy can be based. What happens is that when one has become cognisant of some sort of ressemblance, by means of the advisory sentence he comes to recognise the relation of cause and effect, between the *ressemblance* and the cognition of the connection of the particular thing and the particular name. And what precise sort of ressemblance is recognised will depend upon circumstances; so that there can be no such restriction as that Analogy is based upon *perfect ressemblance only*, or on *semi-perfect ressemblance only*, or on *slight ressemblance only*.—(*Ṭāṭparya* and *Parishuḍḍhi*).

Further, the objection is not applicable to the *Siḍḍhānṭa* theory; as what is held to be the basis of Analogy is such ressemblance and non-ressemblance are duly recognised; that is to say, the objection urged by you is—"there can be no Analogy on the basis of perfect ressemblance &c.";—and this is not relevant; as what is objected to is not the opinion held by us; for who has ever said that 'Analogy is based upon perfect ressemblance &c.'? What we hold is that Analogy is based upon such ressemblance as is actually recognised, and *is indicative of the relation of cause and effect.* (Bhāṣya, P. 90, L. 10). Thus the objection urged is not relevant.

Lastly, [the objection, even as it stands, is not tenable; for] as a matter of fact, (A) Analogy is found to be possible also when there is 'perfect ressemblance', even to the extent of absolute identity; when for instance, an action is compared to itself;—as we find in such descriptions as 'the battle between Rāma and Rāvaṇa is like the battle between these two heroes alone';—(B) Analogy is based on 'semi-perfect resemblance' also; for instance, when there arises a question as to the strength of a bull, there is such an analogical declaration as 'the bull is like a buffalo',—where the analogy is based upon the semi-perfect ressemblance (of the two animals);—(C) Analogy is based also upon 'slight ressemblance'; when for instance, a question arises as to the mere existence of a thing,—when, that is, there arises the question, 'what sort of existence has the Meru mountain?'—we have the answer in the form 'the existence of the Meru is like that of the grain of oil-seed'. For this reason also, the objection urged cannot be maintained.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (46).

[P. 90, L. 11 to L 15.]

[The Pūrvapakṣin says]—"In that case, Analogical Cog-"nition may be regarded as purely *inferential*;

"BECAUSE IT CONSISTS IN THE COGNITION OF WHAT "IS NOT PERCEIVED BY MEANS OF WHAT IS PERCEIVED."

(Sū. 46).

"That is to say, just as the cognition of Fire, which is "not perceived, by means of Smoke, which is perceived, is "*Inferential*,—so the cognition of the unperceived *gavaya* "by means of the perceived *bull* should be *inferential* ;—so "that Analogical Cognition does not in any way differ from "the Inferential" *

Vārṭika on Sū. (46).

[The Opponent retorts]—"*In that case Analogical "Cognition is purely inferential ;—because it consists in the "cognition* &c. &c. From the *perceived* accompaniment of "Smoke, in the shape of *its rising into the* Var. P. 260. "*sky*, we have the *inferential* cognition of the "*unperceived* accompaniment of Smoke, in the shape of "*Fire* ;—in the same manner, when from the *perceived* Bull "there arises the cognition of the *unperceived* Gavaya,—this "cognition, which is regarded as *analogical*, should be re-"garded as *inferential*, as consisting in the cognition of an "unperceived thing."

Bhāṣya on Sū. (47).

[P. 90, L. 15 to 91, L. 5].

The Siddhānṭin answers—*Analogical* Cognition does differ from the *Inferential*. "By what reasoning do you arrive at this conclusion ?". [The answer is given in the Sutra]—

Sūṭra (47).

IN REGARD TO THE 'UNPERCEIVED' GAVAYA WE DO NOT FIND ANY USE FOR THE PARTICULAR INSTRUMENT OF COGNITION CALLED ANALOGY '. - (Sū. 47).

* The sentence 'as the bull so the gavaya' describes the unperceived gavaya, through the perceived bull ; and one who has heard this sentence, when he comes to *perceive* the gavaya, he does not apprehend anything more than what he has learnt from the said sentence ; even the connection of the name 'gavaya' with the particular animal is known only from that sentence. So that in analogical cognition, the cognition of the perceived *bull* gives rise to the cognition of the *animal bearing the name of 'gavaya'*, which is not perceived. [Even though the *gavaya* is actually *perceived* when the analogical cognition appears, yet the animal *as bearing the particular name* can never be said to be *perceived* ; for the application of the name depends entirely upon the advisory sentence ; so that when the qualifying *name*, is not-perceived, even though the animal itself is *perceived*, yet *as along with the qualification*, the animal is '*not perceived*']. Thus, being the cognition of the unperceived by means of the perceived, analogical cognition is purely inferential. Such is the sense of the *Pūrvapakṣa*.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

[What actually happens in Analogical Cognition is as follows]—A person, who has seen the Bull and has been apprised of the ressemblance (between the Bull and the Gavaya), comes to *perceive* an animal (of unknown name) ressembling the Bull,* and then arrives at the cognition, 'this is *gavaya*', in which he recognises the restricted application of the name 'gavaya';—now this† certainly is not *Inference* ‡

[There is a further difference between Analogical and Inferential Cognitions]—Analogy is (propounded) for the sake of another person; that is to say, it is propounded by a person who knows both members (of ressemblance), for the benefit of another person to whom one member, the *upamēya* (the object that is described as ressembling a known thing), is not known.§

Bhā. P. 91.

Says the *Opponent*,—"If what you mean is that Analogy is for the benefit of another person, then what you say is not right; for as a matter of fact, the cognition arising therefrom belongs to the man himself; certainly, my good Sir, when the man propounds the analogy in the words, 'as the bull so the gavaya,' the cognition produced by it arises in the man himself (just as much as in another person) [so that being for one's own benefit as well as for that of another person, Analogy is exactly like Inference]."

We do not deny that the resulting cognition arises in the man also; what we mean is that the propounder's own cognition

* The sense requires the reading यथा: गवा समानधर्मं, as it is found in the Puri Mss. and the *Bhāṣyachandra*.

† All Mss. save one read न चेदमनुमानम्.

‡ The species 'gavaya' is that to which the name 'gavaya' belongs; this is not cognised by means of the sentence 'as the bull so the gavaya'; all that this sentence expresses is the ressemblance to the Bull of a certain unknown animal; nor does the word 'gavaya' as occurring in the sentence denote the said ressemblance; so that at the time that the sentence is heard, the man does not become cognisant of the connection between the name 'gavaya' and the unknown animal; and what actually happens in *analogical* cognition is that, when the particular animal comes to be actually *seen*, the species to which that animal belongs becomes *perceived*; and hence results the cognition that 'this animal belongs to the species named 'gavaya'; and this is the operation of 'analogy', which is thus found to operate upon the *perceived*, and not *unperceived*, *gavaya*].—*Tātparya*.

§ सूपमेय is the better reading as found in the Puri Mss. For अविज्ञातोपमेय also the Puri Mss. read अविज्ञातोपमेयेन; but from what follows in L. 4 below अविज्ञातोपमेय appears to be the better reading.

is not *analogical*; for 'Analogy is that which accomplishes what has to be accomplished on the basis of well-known ressemblance' (says the Sūṭra, 1-1-6); and certainly for the man to whom both members of the analogy are well-known, and as such fully *accomplished*, there can be no relation (between Analogy and the Cognition) of what is *to be accomplished* and the *means* accomplishing it.

Vārṭika on Sū. 47.

[P. 260, L. 3 to L. 13.]

Our answer to the above is that it is not right; for apparently you do not understand what Analogy is. *Then again, in regard to the unperceived Gavaya, we do not find any use for Analogy.* "What use for Analogy do you find in regard to the *perceived* Gavaya?" The use of Analogy consists in the bringing about of the cognition of the connection of a particular name with a particular object.

[Just as Analogy is not Inference] so is it not either Perception or Word. For it is neither by means of Word nor by that of Perception that the man recognises the fact of a certain animal being 'Gavaya.' As the mere cognition of *ressemblance* only (which is *perceptional*), without the Words 'the Gavaya is like the bull,' does not constitute 'Analogy' [hence Analogy is not mere Perception].—Nor, on the other hand, do the mere Words, without the cognition of ressemblance, constitute 'Analogy' [Hence Analogy cannot be the same as Word]. [Another difference between Analogy and Inference lies in the fact that] Analogy is for the benefit of another person;* and certainly this is not the case with Inference

† The proper reading appears to be to place the words परार्थत्वाच्च परार्थं चोपमानं भवति lower down in L. 10, after भविष्यतीति. For यदि यथा...... भविष्यतीति (Ll. 8-10) is clearly an amplification of the statement गवयज्ञानमात् प्रत्यक्षार्थं गवय इति प्रतिपत्तिः; with which परार्थत्वञ्च &c., has no connection. But both editions read as here; and, what is more important, the *Ṭāṭparya* also adopts the same reading; and conscious of the interruption caused by the words परार्थत्वाच्च &c., it has tried to establish some sort of connection between परार्थं चोपमानं भवति and यदि यथा &c., by introducing the latter passage as follows—"Analogy consists of

[which is both for one's own benefit and for that of others]. Thus then, the conclusion is that just as *Inference* consists in the recognition of the Probans as aided by (the remembrance of) concomitance between the Probans and the Probandum,—and that recognition of the Probans is *perceptional* [and this brings about the inferential cognition, and is called 'Inference' only when aided by the said remembrance],—in the same manner, what constitutes 'Analogy' (the means of Analogical Cognition) is the perceptional cognition of ressemblance as aided by the remembrance of the connection between the two things as (originally) learnt from Words. [Which shows that Analogy is not the same as either Inference, or Perception, or Word.]

Bhāṣya on Su. (48).
(P. 91, L. 5 to L. 8).

Further—

INASMUCH AS ANALOGY IS ALWAYS STATED IN THE FORM 'AS—SO,' IT CANNOT BE REGARDED AS NON-DIFFERENT (FROM INFERENCE)—(Sū. 48).

As a matter of fact, Analogy is always stated in the form 'as—so', by means of which the common property (constituting ressemblance) is mentioned; so that it cannot be the same as Inference. This also is what constitutes a difference between Analogy and Inference.

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the cognition of ressemblance, which is perceptional, and certainly this is not for the benefit of another person; in answer to this we have the words यदि यथा &c.; and in answer to contention that if the said Perception does not constitute Analogy, Word might constitute it, we have the words न आगम" &c. It will be noticed that even Vāchaspaṭi Mishra fails to establish a connection between this latter passage—न आगम—&c. and the fact of Analogy being for another's benefit; and the reason for this lies in the fact that if Analogy consists in Word, it is clearly for the benefit of others. For these reasons, in spite of all authorities to the contrary, we have altered the order of the sentences, and translated them accordingly.

Vārṭika on Su. (48).

[P. 260 L. 14 to L. 17].

By reason also of difference in the form of the cognitions (Analogy and Inference must be regarded as different); for instance, Inference does not appear in the form '*as* the smoke *so* the fire'; while Analogy does appear in the form '*as* the bull *so* the Gavaya'; and wherever there is difference in the form of the cognitions, the Instruments of Cognition must be different; just as Inference is different from Perception.

This same reasoning also serves to set aside the contention that "Analogy cannot be regarded as a distinct Instrument of Cognition because it does not apprehend anything not already apprehended (by means of other Instruments of Cognition)."

Thus ends the Examination of Analogy.

Section (8).

Examination of Word (in general).

Sūṭras (49—56.)

Suṭra (49.)

[*Pūrvapakṣa*]—" 'Word' is 'Inference',—(I) because its objective is such as is amenable to Inference only,—being (as it is) not apprehended (by Perception)."—(Sū. 49).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (49).

[P. 91, L. 10 to L. 13.]

(I) " Word is only Inference, and not a separate Instru-
" ment of Cognition, 'Why so?' Because the objective of
" (object cognised by means of) Word is such as is amenable
" to Inference. 'How do you know that it can be infer-
" red?' Because it is not apprehended by means of Per-
" ception. In the case of Inference what happens is that
" the *Subject*, which is not already apprehended by means
" of Perception, comes to be cognised afterwards by means
" of the already known* Probans,—such is the process of
" Inference;—and in the case of Word, also an object which
" is not already known (by means of Perception) comes to be
" cognised afterwards, by means of the already known
" Word,—such is the process of verbal cognition. Thus we
" find that 'Word' is only 'Inference' (and Verbal Cogni-
" tion is purely Inferential).†

Vārṭika on Sū. (49.)

[P. 260, L. 18 to P. 262, L. 3.]

We now proceed to examine Word, whose turn comes after Analogy. What is this 'Word'? *Word is the assertion of a reliable person* (Sū. 1-1-7). Against this (as an Instrument of Cognition) the following objection is raised:—

* 'Perceived'—says *Bhāṣyachandra*.

† The Probans put forward in the Sūṭra, is the fact of the object *not being perceptible*.—Says the *Vārṭika*. That cognition is called Inferential which apprehends an object not cognisable by Perception, and appears in the wake of Perception (of the Probans in Inference; of the Word in Verbal Cognition); and as Verbal Cognition fulfills these conditions, it is purely inferential—*Ṭaṭparya*.

[Pūrvapakṣa]—* " Word is not an Instrument of Cogni-
" tion ;—(A) *because even when present it does not bring about*
" *cognition* : even though the Word is present, if it is not
" heard, it does not give rise to any cognition ; and it is
" only what gives rise to a cognition that can be regarded
" as an Instrument of Cognition.†—(B) Because there is
" nothing that could be the object (of Word) ; that is,
" there is nothing that would be cognised by means of Word,
" apart from what is already cognised by means of Percep-
" tion and Inference : and certainly that which has no object
" cannot be an Instrument of Cognition.‡—(C) Because Word
Var. Page 261. " is not of the nature of *Cognition*, it cannot be
" regarded as an Instrument of Cognition; what-
" ever is an Instrument of Cognition is of the nature of
" Cognition, as we find in the case of Perception ; so that
" when Word is not found to be of the nature of Cognition,
" being in this respect like the Jar and such objects, it can-
" not be regarded as an Instrument of Cognition, just as Jar

* The *Sūṭra* starts off with the question as to whether or not ' Word ' is included under Inference. But before that it becomes necessary to enquire whether 'Word' is an ' instrument of Cognition ' at all. The *Vārtika* therefore takes up this preliminary question.—*Tāṭparya.*

† That alone can be regarded as an instrument of Cognition which is such that whenever it is present Cognition *must* appear, and never does it cease to appear ; because it is only an *efficient* means that can be called ' Instrument.' In the case of Word however we find that even though it is present, if it is not pronounced and heard, it does not give rise to any Cognition ; and this fact proves that it is not an *efficient* means ; and hence not an ' Instrument.'—*Tāṭparya.*

‡ It is only that which has an object, of the Cognition whereof it is the efficient means, that can be regarded as an Instrument of Cognition ; so that when it is found that there can be no such object for Word, it follows that Word is not an Instrument of Cognition. As a matter of fact, all objects are grouped under two heads, Directly Perceptible and Not directly Perceptible. All that belongs to the former group forms the object of 'perception'; and all that belongs to the latter group can be cognised only by means of something (perceptible) which is its invariable concomitant ; so that all that is *not directly perceptible* forms the object of Inference ; and, there being no other group of objects, there is nothing that could form the object of ' Word '; hence this ' absence of the object ' forms the second reason for not regarding Word as an Instrument of cognition.—*Tāṭparya.*

"&c., are not so regarded.—(D) Because Word is perceptible by an external Sense-organ, like Jar &c., it cannot be an Instrument of Cognition.—(E) Because Word does not subsist in the Soul, and as such is like Jar &c., it cannot be an Instrument of Cognition.—(F) Lastly, because Word is a quality of Ākāsha, like Number and other qualities (of Ākāsha), it cannot be an Instrument of Cognition."*

[*Siddhānta*]—[The answer to the above arguments is as follows]—(A) It has been argued that "*because when present, Word does not bring about cognition* (it cannot be an Instrument of Cognition)";—but this is not right; as the reason put forward is not true; as a matter of fact it never happens that when actually heard, Word fails to be an efficient means of cognition; and if, when not itself heard, it does fail to be an efficient means of cognition, then, in that case, it certainly cannot be an Instrument of Cognition; for that alone is an Instrument of Cognition, by means of which a thing is cognised;—and when is a thing cognised by means of it?—only when the means itself is cognised.†—(B) The second argument is—"*because the Word has no objective*";—as to this, we ask—who says that there is no object apart from what is cognised by means of Perception and

* The *Parishuddhi* says—The sense of the *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"If Word is different in its procedure from Perception and Inference, it is not an Instrument of Cognition; if it is an Instrument of Cognition, its procedure is not different; so that it would be included under the said two Instruments of Cognition. And as to under which one of the two it is included, it is shown by the Sūtras 49, *et seq.* that it is under 'Inference' that 'Word' is included.

† What we hold to be the Instrument of Verbal Cognition is not *Word* in general, pure and simple, but only such Word as is heard and whose relation to its denotation is known. And certainly, when there *is* such a Word, verbal cognition never fails to appear; that word, by which verbal cognition is *not* produced, is not regarded by any one to be an Instrument of Cognition.—*Tātparya.*

As a matter of fact, Inference also actually brings about inferential cognition only when it is itself duly apprehended in the form of the Probans; the Probans, even though present, fails to bring about inferential cognition, if it is itself not known. So that the case of Word in this respect is analogous to that of Inference; and if Word is not an Instrument of Cognition, Inference also is not so.

Inference ? Certainly there are several things that are not cognisable by means of these two; so that this reason also is *not true.* In what manner 'Word' differs from Perception and the rest we have already explained (in Adh. I).—The third, fourth and fifth arguments are—(C) "*because Word is not of the nature of Cognition,*" (D) "*because Word is perceptible by an external sense-organ*", and (E) "*because Word does not subsist in the Soul*";—all these reasons are untenable, because they are 'inconclusive' (not necessarily leading to the desired conclusion), as is proved by the instance of the Lamp; the Lamp is all this (*i. e.* it is not of the nature of Cognition, it is perceptible by an external organ, it does not subsist in the Soul), and yet, as an auxiliary to Perception, it does become an Instrument of Cognition (of things illumined by its light),—as we have already explained before; so that, it being found that all the reasons you have urged are 'inconclusive' (not concomitant with, and hence not necessarily proving, what you seek to prove), they cannot be accepted as valid. (F) The sixth argument is—"*because Word is a quality of Ākāsha*";—this also is 'inconclusive'; for we find that the Dimension of *Ākāsha* (which is its quality) is *the cause of the cognition* of 'vastness' (of the *Ākāsha*), and as such, is an 'Instrument of cognition'; so that *being a quality of Ākāsha* is not a valid reason (for Word being *not* an Instrument of Cognition).

[That 'Word' *is* an Instrument of Cognition having been established, the Opponent proceeds to show that even so it is to be included under 'Inference']—"* *Word is only "Inference,*—(a) *because it is dependent upon remembrance;* "that which depends upon remembrance is Inference;—and "Word does depend upon remembrance in the denoting "(bringing about the cognition of) its object;—hence it must

* The *Vārṭika* puts forward these three *Pūrvapakṣa* arguments, in addition to those propounded in the Sūtras 49 *et. seq.*

" be Inference.—(b) *Because Word applies to all three points* " *of time* ;—what applies to three points of time is Infer- " ence ;—so is Word also;—hence Word must be Inference. " —(c) Because it involves the notions of negative and " positive concomitance ;—that which involves notions of " negative and positive concomitance is Inference, as we find " in the case of the perception of *smoke* bringing about the " cognition of the *presence of fire* ;—and Word also is found " to bring about the cognition of its denotation only " through negative and positive concomitance,*—hence Word " is Inference.—(*d*) Lastly, for the following reason also Word " is Inference—*because its object is not perceived* (says the " Sūṭra). What the Sūṭra means to put forward as the " reason is the fact that *the object cognised by means of* " *Word is such as is not cognised by means of Perception* " (which is precisely the case with Inference)."

Bhāṣya on Su. (50).

[P. 91, L. 13 to L. 17.]

For the following reason also 'Word' is only 'Inference'—

(II) "BECAUSE COGNITIONS DO NOT INVOLVE TWO DIVERSE PROCESSES."—(Su. 50).

" When the 'Instruments of Cognition' are different " from one another, the cognition (brought about by them) " involves two distinct processes; for instance, the cognitional " process involved in the case of Inferential Cognition is " different from that involved in that of Analogical Cognition, " as has been pointed out above (by the Siḍḍhānṭin himself). " In the case of *Verbal* and *Inferential* cognitions we do not " meet with any such diversity in the cognitional process; " the process in the case of Word being the same as that " in the case of Inference. Hence, as there is nothing to " distinguish the one from the other, Word must be regard- " ed as the same as Inference."

* The inference of Fire from smoke is based upon the positive concomitance 'where smoke is there fire is', and the negative concomitance, 'where Fire is not, smoke is not'; similarly the denotation of the Jar by the word 'Ghata' is based upon the positive concomitance, 'where the word *Ghaṭa* is pronounced we have the cognition of Jar', and the negative concomitance 'where there is no cognition of Jar, the the word *Ghata* is not pronounced'.

Vārṭika on Sū. (50.)

[P. 262, L. 5 to L. 7.]

"(II) (e) Another reason why Word should be regarded " as the same as Inference consists in the fact that the pro- " cesses involved in the Cognitions *are not of two different* " *kinds*,—says the *Sūṭra*. In the case of two distinct In- " struments of Cognition we have found a diversity in the " Processes leading to the Cognition; as for instance, we " find in the case of Inference and Perception that the Per- " ceptional Cognition is of an entirely different kind from " the Inferential Cognition. Such is not found to be the " case with Word (the process involved in Verbal Cogni- " tion being similar to that involved in inferential cogni- " tion). Hence Word cannot be regarded as a distinct In- " strument of Cognition."

Sūṭra (51.)

III. " ALSO BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF RELATIONSHIP."* (Sū. 51.)

Bhāṣya on Sū. (51.)

[P. 92, L. 1 to L. 4.]

III. " The clause—'Word is the same as Inference' " (of Sū. 49) should be construed with this Sūṭra also. As a " matter of fact, we find that the Cognition of a thing by " means of a Word appears only when there is a relation- " ship between the *Word* and the thing denoted by it, and " this relationship is fully known; exactly in the same man- " ner as the Cognition of the Probandum by means of the " inferential Probans appears only when there is a relation- " ship between the Probans and the Probandum, and this " relationship is fully known."

Vārṭika on Sū. 51.)

[P. 262, L, 9 to L. 15.]

" (*f*) *Also because of the presence of relationship*—says " the Sūṭra; and the precise reason meant to be propounded " by the Sūtra is that—'*because Word renders cognisable only*

* 'That is, the relation of invariable concomitance'—*Bhāṣyachanḍra*.

"*such things as are related to it.*' We have seen that In-"ference (*i. e.*, the Probans) makes known only such " things as are related to it ; and the same is the case with " Word also."

[The *Vārṭika* proceeds to answer the above arguments of the *Pūrvapakṣa seriatim*]*—(*a.*) It has been argued that "Sound is the same as Inference, because it depends upon remembrance" ; but this is not right ; as the reasoning is 'inconclusive'; it is true that there is 'dependence upon remembrance' in the case of Inference ; but so is there also in the case of Doubtful Cognition, of Hypothetical Reasoning and of Analogical Cognition. [So that mere *dependence upon remembrance* cannot make *Verbal* Cognition *inferential*] (*b*) This same reasoning also sets aside the Pūrvapakṣa argument based upon Word (like Inference) pertaining to all three points of time—[for Hypothetical Reasoning also pertains to the past, present and future]. (*c.*) The third argument is that—" because Word involves the notion of positive and negative concomitance "; but as a matter of fact, Perception also involves the notion of positive and negative concomitance ; *e. g.*, we have perception of the Jar when the Jar is present, and we do not have its perception when the Jar is not there†. (The answers to the other arguments will appear under the follwoing *Sūṭras*).

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* And as the Pūrvapakṣa arguments A, B, and C, (in the *Vārṭika*) have been in addition to those put forward in the Sutra and the *Bhāṣya*, the *Vārṭika* answers these before taking up the answers given by the *Sūṭra* and *Bhāṣya* to the arguments mentioned therein.

† Some sort of positive and negative concomitance between certain things involved in the cognition will be found in the case of every kind of cognition. It is true that what is meant by such concomitance in the case of Inference is that which holds among the factors actually leading to the cognition, and the nature of such concomitance in the case of Word is entirely different from that in the case of Inference. For instance, in the case of Inference it is necessary that the Probans should subsist in the Subject ; while what is necessary in the case of Word is not that, but something else ; viz., that the Word should emanate from a trustworthy source (as the next Sutra 52 points out),—*Tāṭparya*.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (52).
(P. 92, L. 4 to L. 15.)

It has been urged (in Sū. 49) that—"(Word should be regarded as Inference) because its object is such as is amenable to Inference." But this is not right*; [because]

[As a matter of fact]—RIGHT COGNITION OF A THING ARISES FROM WORD ON THE STRENGTH OF THE ASSERTION OF A TRUSTWORTHY PERSON.†—Sū. 52.)

(I.) In the case of such imperceptible things as 'Heaven', the 'Celestial Nymyhs,' the 'Uṭṭara Kuru', 'the world as consisting of the Seven Continents and the Oceans‡',—the right cognition that we have does not arise from the mere Word (as the Pūrvapakṣa argument implies); it arises from the fact that the Word is pronounced by a reliable person (who cannot pronounce a word unless thereis a real thing corresponding to that word); we conclude this from the fact that there is no right cognition when the word is not known to be pronounced by a reliable person. And certainly this circumstance (connection of the reliable person) is not present in the case of Inference.

(II.) As for the argument (put forward in Sū. 50) that *the Cognitions do not involve two diverse processes*,—well, what we have just pointed out constitutes, in itself, a diversity in

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* 'तन्न' is the right reading found in the Puri Mss; and supported by the *Vārṭika* and the *Bhāṣyachandra*; which latter remarks that '*ṭanna*,' 'this is not right', is the proposition in proof of which the reason is propounded by the Sūṭra.

† Sutra MSS. A and B and also the Benares edition of the *Vārṭika* read अर्थे सम्प्रत्ययः: instead of अर्थसम्प्रत्ययः:

The *Bhāṣya* and the *Vārṭika* explain this *Sūṭra* simply to mean thatwhat is essential in Verbal Cognition is the connection of a trustworthy person; which is not necessary in the case of Inferential cognition. The *Ṭāṭparya* however, more in keeping with the form of the *Pūrvapakṣa* argument, interprets it to mean that the cognition produced by Word in regard to imperceptible things is got at, not by means of Inference, but through the injunctions of a trustworthy person; and inasmuch as these injunctions are embodied in *Words*, the result at Cognition cannot be regarded as *Inferential*. It proceeds to show that the relation between the Word and the Verbal Cognition is not the same as that between the Probans and Inferential Cognition; for in the latter the Probans must subsist in the Subject of the inferential Cognition; while Word never subsists in the subject of Verbal Cognitions. Such being the material difference between Inference and Word, what the *Bhāṣya* and *Vārṭika* have put forward the connection of Word with a reliable persons as what distinguishes it from Inference, simply by way of adding a further reasons—says the *Ṭāṭparya*.

‡ The right reading is supplied by the *Bhāṣyachandra*—सप्तद्वीपसमुद्रो लोक &c.

the processes of *inferential and verbal* cognitions; such being the points of difference between the two, it is not a valid reason that has been urged (by the Pūrvapakṣin in *Bhāṣya*, P. 91, L. 17) to the effect that *there is no difference* between them.

(III.) As regards the third *Pūrvapakṣa* argument—*because of the presence of relationship*,—what we would point out is that between the Word and its Denotation, while there is one kind of relationship that we admit, there is another that we do not admit; that is to say, we do admit that there is such relation between them as is expressed by the assertion 'such is the denotation *of the Word*', where 'word' is in the Possessive case (taking the Genitive case-ending); but we do not admit that between them there is any such relation as consists in *contact* [or *Inherence**; and it is only on the basis of some relationship of this latter kind that verbal cognition could be regarded as *inferential*]. "But why is such relation not admitted?" For the simple reason that no such relation can be recognised by means of any Instrument of Cognition.† For instance,‡ the contact between the Word and its denotation cannot be recognised by means of Inference, as it is beyond the reach of the sense-organs; that is to say, the object denoted by the Word is beyond the reach of that sense-organ by which the Word itself is apprehended; and [not only this, but] there are also many objects (of verbal cognition) that are absolutely beyond the reach of any sense-organ; and as a matter of fact, only such contact is apprehended by the sense-organs as holds between objects perceptible by the same sense-organ.§

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* '*Prāpṭiḥ samyogasamavāyānyaṭaraḥ*—' *Bhāṣyachandra*'.

† In both editions of the *Vārṭika* this is printed as a *Sūtra*. But it is not found either in the *Nyāyasūchinibandha*, or any of the Sūṭra Mss.

‡ Why the *Bhāṣya* selects for attack the relation of *contact* is thus explained by the *Ṭāṭparya*—The natural (permanent) relationship between Word and its denotation could be only one of the following kinds—(a) it might be of the nature of identity; or (b) it might consist in the relation of denoter and denoted, that which makes cognisable and that which is cognised; or (c) it might be in the nature of contact. Now, that the relation cannot be that of identity we have already shown under Sū. 1-1-4. while explaining the term '*avyapaḍēshyam*' occurring in the definition of Perception. As for (b), though we admit of this relationship, we do not admit it to be eternal, as the Mīmānsakas hold; this we shall show later on (*vide Ṭāṭparya*, P. 290, L. 18, *et. seq*). So that all that remains to be refuted is the relation of *Contact*.

§ *E. g*. We can perceive the contact between two fingers, both of which are visible.

Vārtika on Sū. 52.

[P. 262, L. 15 to P. 263, L. 12].

(I) (d) The *Pūrvapakṣin* has urged as his reason the fact that Word has for its object imperceptible things;—but though it is true that Inference also has for its object things not perceived, yet for an ordinary man, neither Perception nor Inference is applicable to such things as *Heaven*, *Apūrva* (the unseen Force set in notion by religious acts) and Deity (which are amenable to verbal cognition); in fact in regard to these things,—*Right Cognition arises from Word on the strength of the assertion of a trustworthy person*—says the *Sūtra*. That is to say, the cognition that a man has in regard to these things does not arise from the Word merely; a man derives his cognition of things like Heaven from a Word only

Vār. P. 263. when he has become convinced of its reliability by finding that it has been pronounced by a trustworthy person. Such is not the case with Inference. Hence Word cannot be regarded as Inference. Specially because such cognition as has been described* as actually found to arise from Word, and not from Inference.

(II) (e) This same reasoning holds good regarding the second argument of the *Pūrvapakṣa*, that *the cognitions do not involve two diverse processes* (Sū. 50).

III (f) *As regards the third Pūrvapakṣa argument—'because of the presence of relationship'—what we would point out is that between the Word and its denotation, while there is one kind of relationship that we admit, there is another that we do not admit,*—says the *Bhāṣya* (P. 92, L. 9); which means that we admit the relationship of *denoter and denoted*, which is expressed by the words 'such is the denotation of

* [illegible] of the Bib. Ind. edition gives better sense than [illegible] of the Benares edition.

this word '* ; but the natural (eternal) relationship, that some people have posited, we do not admit, because, as a matter of fact, there is no natural relationship between the Word and its denotation. "Why?" Because no such relationship can be cognised by any Instrument of Cognition. For instance, all that forms the denotation of 'Word' cannot be cognised by means of Perception; that is, inasmuch as imperceptible things also are denoted by words, the denotation of words cannot be said to be cognised by means of Perception.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (53).

[P. 92, L. 16 to P. 93 L. 10]

Then again, if the relation comprehended as between the Word and the thing denoted by it were in the form of 'contact', then (a) either the thing would go over to (come into juxtaposition with) the Word,—or (b) the Word would go over to the thing,—or (c) both would go over to both. Now in regard to these, we find that—

THERE CAN BE NO SUCH RELATION [BETWEEN THE WORD AND ITS DENOTATION] ALSO BECAUSE WE DO NOT FIND (ACTUAL) FILLING, BURNING AND CUTTING (a) ;—(Sū. 53).

and because the place (of utterance) and the cause (human effort) are not coexistent† (b);—this (additional argument) is what is indicated by the particle '*cha*', 'also' in the Sūṭra.‡

[It has been shown that the 'contact' between the Word and the thing denoted by it cannot be cognised by means of Perception].—(*a*) Nor can it be known by means of Inference that the thing goes over to the Word; for if it did so, it would mean that the thing goes over to the Word; and as the Word is uttered *in* the mouth § and *by* the effort (subsis-

* The Logician does not object to this relation; what he objects to is the view that this relation is eternal, something belonging to the Word by its very nature. He does not accept this view, as according to him the relation of the Word to its denotation is ordained by God, and as such has had a beginning.

† *Parasparasāmanāḍhi-karaṇyam na sambavaṭi-iṭyarṭhaḥ-Bhāṣyachandra.*

‡ The first alternative (a) is not possible, because of the reason given in the Sūṭra; the second alternative (b) is not possible, because of the reason added in the *Bhāṣya*, as implied by the particle '*cha*'. These reasons are explained by the *Bhāṣya* in the next sentence.

§ आस्यस्थान is the right reading; supported by all but three Mss. and also by the *Vārṭika*.

ting in the Soul of the Man pronouncing the word), there should be *filling* of the mouth on the utterance of the word 'Food',—*burning* in the mouth on the utterance of the word 'Fire',—and *cutting* in the month on the utterance of the word 'Sword' [as the things, *food*, *fire* and *sword*, which are denoted by the three words, would, under the theory, go over to the Word, which has appeared in the mouth]; as a matter of fact however, no such effects are perceived; so that, inasmuch as no such effects are produced, the conclusion is that there is no such relation of contact (between the Word and the thing denoted; in the sense that the thing goes over to the Word).

(*b*) As regards the second alternative—that the Word goes over to the Thing,—if this were so, then no utterance of the Word would be possible, as neither the place (of utterance) nor its cause would be co-existent (at the place where the Thing is);—the 'place' of utterance is the throat and such other parts of the body, and its 'cause' consists of the particular effort of man; and neither of these would subsist where the Thing exists*.

(*c*) Lastly, as each of the two alternatives has been found to be untenable individually, it is not possible to accept the third alternative, that both (the Word and the Thing) go over to both.

The conclusion thus is that there can be no 'contact' between the Word and the Thing.

Vārṭika on Sū. (53).

[P. 263, L. 12 to P. 265, L. 11].

The Opponent says—"The relation (of contact, between the Word and the Thing denoted by it) might be *inferred* (even if it cannot be *perceived*)." Our answer is that no such Inference could be accepted; for none of the alternative notions possible in regard to the exact nature of the said relation can be rightly maintained. For the said relation could only mean—either (*a*) that the Word goes over to the place where the Thing is, or (*b*) that the Thing goes over to the place where the Word is, or (*c*) that both

* Both—place of utterance and human effort—subsist in the man's body, while the Thing is outside.

go over to both. Now, it cannot be maintained that the thing goes over to the place where the word is, *because we do not find actual filling, burning and cutting* (says the Sūtra). [In explaining this, the Bhāṣya P. 93, L. 1 adds]—*As the Word is uttered in a part of the mouth and by effort, there should be filling in the mouth on the utterance of the word 'Food', burning in the mouth on the utterance of the word 'Fire', and cutting in the mouth on the utterance of the word 'Sword'*; that is to say, (on the utterance of the word 'food') such solid articles of food, of sweet cakes and the like would be found going over (to the mouth), just like bulls &c.; and certainly this would put an end to all usage (in the shape of the utterance of words).*

P. 264. If the second alternative be held—that the Word goes over to the place where the Thing is,—this also would be untenable; as it involves a self-contradiction. [For this theory can only mean that the Word when pronounced produces another word like itself in close contiguity to itself, and this latter produces another word, and so on and on, till the final Word is produced, which Word reaches the place where the Thing is; and] certainly it is self-contradictory to assert that 'the Word which is *eternal* goes over (to the Thing) in the form of a series of words *produced* in close contiguity'. In order to avoid this difficulty, the Opponent may say—"what is meant by the word *going over to the place where the thing is* is that it is there that it *comes into being*". But even so, the self-contradiction does not cease; for what is *eternal* cannot *come into being*! And further, as a matter of fact, the Word does *not* come into being in the place where the Thing is; as it is not possible for the 'place of utterance' and the 'effort' that gives rise to the utterance of the Word to be where the Thing is. You will perhaps

* That is, no one would care to utter such words as 'cow' for instance, if the animal were to run into his mouth!

say—"The word does not *go over*, nor does it *come into being*; what happens is that every single Word is pervasive in its character, and comes to be manifested." This also cannot be accepted; as by this it would be possible to cognise *all things* (by means of a single Word). For what your explanation means is that—"all words continue to exist eternally, in a pervasive form, and they become manifested when such causes of their manifestation are present as the action of the organ of utterance, the effort of the man and so forth;"—and if such were the case, then, it would be possible to cognise all things (when any single word is uttered); for what would lead to the manifestation of one Word would also lead to the manifestation of all words (for all words are equally pervasive in their character, *ex hypothesi*). * And if, by saying that 'Word exists in a pervasive form', you mean that 'every word pervades *over its own denotation*',—even so there will be this possibility that whenever the one word 'bull' is uttered, that word would become manifested for all persons in the world wherever they may be, and all these persons would have the cognition of all animals having the dewlap &c. "But it could be like *Community*; † that is to say, even though (according to the logician) Community pervades over *all* its own component individuals, yet it is not cognised all over the World, (but only in that particular place where the circumstances are present that render it cognisable); and similarly, even though the Word pervades over its entire denotation, there would be restrictions in regard to its manifestation (whereby it would be cognised only in particular places, and not everywhere)." This would not

* What has just been urged by the Siddhāntin is open to the objection that the effect that manifests one word is certainly not the same that manifests another word; so that the manifestation of one Word cannot involve that of all words, or the cognition of all things. Hence another objection is urged.

† The Bib Ind. edition omits the words जातिवद्व्यवस्थितं स्यात्, which are found in the Benares Edition.

be right; because in the case of Community, what leads to its manifestation is the cognition of its substratum (in the shape of an individual belonging to that Community); in the case of Word, however, there is no cognition of its substratum (whereby the Word could be manifested); * —nor again does the Word actually subsist in what it denotes (in the way that the Community subsists in its constituent individuals);—so that the instance (of Community) that you have cited bears no analogy to the subject under discussion (Word). If the Word did subsist in the thing denoted by it, in that case, whenever this thing would be perceived by anyone, he should recognise the corresponding Word also, even though he is entirely ignorant of the convention (bearing upon that Word as being expressive of that thing); just in the same manner as without knowing any convention, an observer recognises the Community ('Bull' whenever he perceives any individual *bull.*)

For these reasons we conclude that even by means of Inference we cannot derive any idea [of the eternal relationship between the Word and the Thing denoted by it]. Further, even as a matter of fact,—inasmuch as Word is a quality, it cannot bear any (eternal) relation to anything apart from where it subsists; for instance, Word can bear no inherent relationship to any such other things as the Bull and the like; as it is only in *Ākāsha* that Word subsists (and to this alone it can bear the eternal relation of inherence); nor again is it possible for the Word and the Thing denoted by it to subsist in a common substratum (in virtue of which the two could be eternally related); for the simple

* On the contrary, the only substratum of the Word consists of its denotation, which is itself made cognisable by the Word; so that when the Word along with its substratum becomes manifested, the whole of this denotation would become cognisable; as the Word is all-pervasive.

reason that there is nothing that is produced out of (constituted by) the Word and the denoted thing.

" The relation (between the Word and the denoted thing) could be cognised by means of Analogy."

That also is not possible; as no such relation can be the object of any Analogy.

" It could be cognised by means of Word." *

But this is exactly what we are considering—whether the Word and the denoted Thing are related or not related. [And until we have ascertained this, we cannot grasp the exact nature of the signification of the words constituting the said lexicographical works themselves].

[The Siḍḍantin reverts to the Pūrvapakṣa argument (a) propounded in the *Vārṭika* on P. 261, L. 15, which has already been answered before by the *Vārṭika*, on P. 262, L. 10,]—You have asserted that—" inasmuch as Word ressembles Inference in being dependent upon remembrance &c., it must be regarded as the same as Inference";—but for the very same reason that you put forward, Word cannot be the same as Inference; when one thing is the *same* as another, it is not said to *ressemble* it. Secondly, if on the ground of a single *ressemblance* in the point of being dependent on Remembrance, Word were to be regarded as the same as Inference,—then in that case, there would be only *one* Instrument of Cognition; for all Instruments of Cognition ressemble one another in the point of being the means of making things apprehended! "Let there be only one Instrument of Cognition, what harm would that do to us?" Why, it certainly does this harm to you, that it sets aside what you desire. " What is it that we desire?" You desire that *Perception* should be regarded as different from

* Such reliable 'word' as consists of the Nirukṭa and other lexicographical works which lay down the meanings of words, and thereby indicate the required relationship.

Inference. Thirdly, if you assert identity on mere ressemblance, [i. e. if your 'identity' means only 'ressemblance'], then we shall treat you with indifference (and not mind you); for in so far as the two (Word and Inference) ressemble each other, they may be regarded as the *same to that extent*;—and in so far as they do not ressemble each other, they may be regarded as *different to that extent*; and in this there would be nothing against our theory.

Lastly, Word cannot be the same as Inference, because it conveys its meaning (brings about cognition) to the man who pronounces it as well as to other persons; and certainly *Inference* is not what brings about cognition to the propounder as well as to other persons; the case of Word being like that of the Lamp: the Lamp makes known (illumines) things to the person who has lighted it, as well as to others; and so does Word also; hence it cannot be the same as Inference *

Sūṭra (54).

[*Says the Opponent*]—"FROM THE FACT OF THERE BEING A LIMITATION UPON THE DENOTATION OF WORDS, THERE CAN BE NO DENIAL (OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEM)."—(SŪ. 54.)

Bhāṣya on Sū. 54.

[P. 93, L. 8 to L. 10.]

"Inasmuch as we see that there is a limitation as to the "cognition of certain things arising from certain words, we "infer that what causes this limitation is some sort of rela-"tionship between the words and the things denoted by them; "—for if there were no such determining relation, every word "would denote every thing. For this reason there cannot "be a denial of the said relationship."

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* Such clearly is the meaning of the *Vārṭika*, which has, it seems, reproduced and paraphrased the phrase स्वपरप्रत्यायकत्वात् found in an earlier work. But as a matter of fact, Inference also conveys its cognition to both the propounder and other persons. It would therefore be better to interpret the said phrase as meaning that *Word makes known itself as also other things*, in the shape of what is denoted by it; just as the lamp makes itself visible as also other things illumined by it; while the cognition that Inference brings about is only that of the fact put forward in the proposition.

It is noteworthy that the *Tatparya* has entirely ignored this last argument of the *Vārṭika*.

Vārṭika on Sū. (54)

[P. 265, L. 13 to L. 19.]

" *From the fact* &c.—Says the *Sūṭra*. If there were no " relationship between the Word and what is denoted by it, " then there would be no such restriction as to only a certain " thing being denoted by a certain word [The argument " may be formulated thus:]—'A word denotes a thing only " when it is related to it,—because it serves to determine " a particular limited cognition,—like the Lamp;—every " thing that is found to determine a limited cognition has " been found to make a thing known only when related to " it,—as we have found in the case of Lamps;—and Word is " such a determinant;—hence Word also must denote a thing " only when related to it'. Or we might make 'conception' " the subject (or minor term of our syllogism; the reason- " ing being stated in the form,—'because there is this restric- " tion that the verbal conception of a thing appears only " when there is relation between the Word and the thing " spoken of,—just as it is found in the conception of 'the " man with the earring.'"

Bhāṣya on Sū. (55)

[P. 93, L. 10 to P. 94, L. 7.]

The answer to the above argument of the Opponent is as follows—

THE REASONING CANNOT BE ACCEPTED; AS THE COGNITION OF THE DENOTATION OF A WORD IS BASED UPON CONVENTION. (SŪ. 55)

As a matter of fact, the restriction that we find in connection with the denotation of words is due, not to any (eternal) relation between them, but to *Convention*. When we said on a previous occasion (*Vide* above P. 92, ll. 10-11.) that *we do admit that there is such relation between them as is expressed by the assertion 'such is the denotation of this Word', where Word is in the Possessive case*,—what we referred to was this

Convention. "But what is this *Convention*?" 'Convention' is the ordinance restricting the denotation of words by such injunctions as 'such and such a thing is to be denoted by such and such a word'. And as a matter of fact, it is only when this ordinance is known that there arises any cognition from the use of a word; while if the ordinance is not known, even though the word is heard pronounced, it does not give rise to any Cognition (it expresses nothing). This fact (that verbal cognition arises only when one knows that 'such and such a thing is denoted by such and such a word') cannot be denied by even one who holds that there is an (eternal) relationship between the Word and the thing denoted by it. Ordinary men come to recognise this Convention (which is the ordinance of God) bearing upon words by observing their use in ordinary parlance*; and it is for the preserving of this (God-made) Convention that we have the science of Grammar, which explains and determines that form of speech which consists of *single Words* [by showing that a word can be regarded as *correct* only when used in the form and in the sense imparted to it by God, when propounding the ordinance and thereby fixing the Convention upon that word,—and it is incorrect when used in another form or another sense]; and of that form of speech which consists of *sentences*, the on y explanation or definition pos-ible is that it is 'such collection of connected Words as expresses one complete idea.'

Bha P. 94.

Thus we conclude that there is not the slightest tittle of a reason† (or use) for the inferring of any (permanent) relationship in the form of *Contact*.‡

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* The Bhāṣyachandra explains प्रयुज्यमान as नियुज्यमान, 'the pers n to whom a direction is addressed'; the sentence, according to tɐis, would mean—'the relationship is recognised by watching the action of the man to whom the verbal direction is addressed.'

† Both Puri Mss. and the *Bhāṣyachandra* read अर्थगुणोऽपि, which gives good sense; while अर्थगुणोऽपि can be made to give some sense only by a forced construction. The *Bhāṣyachaudra* explains 'अर्थं' as प्रयोजन, *purpose, use.*

‡ Such being the case, inasmuch as there is no natural relationship between the Word and its denotation, it is not right for the Opponent to urge such relationship with a view to identify Word with Inference, which is based upon the natural relationship between the Probans and the Probandum—*Tātparya.*

Vārṭika on Sū. (55).

[P. 265, L. 21 to P. 266 L. 11].

The reasoning cannot be accepted, &c. &c.—says the *Sūṭra.* The restriction on the denotation of Words is not due to any permanent relationship, but to Convention.

Vār. P. 266.

" *What is this Convention?*"

Convention is the ordinance restricting the denotation of words—says the *Bhāṣya* (P. 93—94); it is only when people are cognisant of such an ordinance that there is any restriction as to the denotation of words. When we said that we do admit of a certain sort of relationship between Word and its denotation, we referred to this Convention.* So that the "limitation upon the denotation or words" (which the Opponent brings forward in support of his argument) being found to be capable of another explanation (than that on the basis of an eternal relationship), it cannot be accepted as a valid reason. As a matter of fact, the relationship of 'denoter and denoted' must be admitted even by one who holds that there is a natural (eternal) relationship; for the simple reason that even he cannot have any particular cognition arising on the hearing of a word unless he is cognisant of this (denotative) relationship of the word to its denotation. " But how is one to know this Convention?" It has to be learnt from the *Science of Words* and from *Usage*; this science of Conventions bearing upon Words has been composed for the purpose of preserving the right forms (and meanings) of Words. Convention has to be learnt also from Usage; † that is to say, when the child finds his

* The reading of this whole passage is defective in the Bib. Ind. Edition. The right reading is found in the Benares edition. But both editions read उपयुक्ते; and it appears better to read अभियुक्तोपयुक्ते as in the Bhāsya; and the Tāṭparya also says उपयुक्ते चार्थे इत्यर्थः:

† This is added with a view to the difficulty as to the comprehending of the exact meaning of Words composing the science itself. What our author means is that some words have their meaning known from usage; and these would enable the reader, at the outset, to comprehend the sense of the grammatical works.

mother and other elders making use of certain Words in connection with certain things, he comes to learn that a certain Word is denotative of a certain thing, and thereby himself comes to use those words similarly; and no one teaches the child this, in the manner in which he is taught the writing of the alphabet.

Sūṭra (56).

ALSO BECAUSE THERE IS NO SUCH LIMITATION (IN ACTUAL USAGE) AMONG DIFFERENT PEOPLE.* (Sū. 56).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (56)
[P. 94, L. 9 to L. 12.]

[Because there is diversity in actual usage among diverse people,] the denotation of things by words must be regarded as based upon convention, and not upon any natural relationship. As a matter of fact, we find that among such diverse people as Riṣis, Āryas and Mlēchchhas, they make use of words for expressing things in any way they choose (without any restriction); and if there were any natural relationship between Words and their denotations, no such arbitrary usage would be possible; for instance, in the case of the *light* of fire, we find that its capability of being the cause of making colour cognised (where the relationship is natural and eternal), does not fail among any particular people at all. †

Vārṭika on Sū. (56).
(P. 266, L. 13 to L. 18).

Also because there is no such limitation in actual usage among different people—the relation between Word and its

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* It is noteworthy that the word '*jāṭi*' here stands for *people*, and not *caste*; as the *Bhāṣya* paraphases the term as referring to Riṣis, Āryas and Mlēchchhas.'

†(*a*) The word '*yava*' is used by the *Āryas* to express *barley*, and by the *Mlēchchhas* to express *long-pepper*; (*b*) the word '*ṭrivṛiṭ*' is used by *Riṣis* in the sense of *nine hymns*, and the *Āryas* used it in the sense of a *particular creeper*. Such diversity of usage could not be possible if there were a natural relationship between Words and their denotations. For light, which bears a natural relation to the illumining of things and rendering colour cognisable, cannot be made to be connected with Taste or Odour by even thousands of artists. This diversity of usage in the case of Words can be explained only on the basis of Convention, which can vary among different peoples.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

denotation cannot be regarded as natural. If the relationship between Word and its denotation were natural, there would be no diversity in its usage among different peoples; as a matter of fact however, we do meet with diverse arbitrary usage among different peoples. In case of things that are naturally related to one another, on the other hand, we do not find any such diversity among different peoples; for instance, the Lamp does not illumine things as being of one kind for us, and as being of a different kind for other people.

By 'different people' here *different countries* also are meant.

Thus has been established the difference of 'Word' *from* 'Inference.'

Section (9).

On 'Word' in Particular.

[Sūṭras 57—68]

Sūṭra (57).

[*Pūrvapakṣa*]—"THAT (WORD) CANNOT BE REGARDED AS AN INSTRUMENT OF RIGHT COGNITION, BECAUSE OF SUCH DEFECTS AS (A) FALSITY, (B) CONTRADICTION AND (C) TAUTOLOGY."*—(Sū. 57).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (57).

[P. 94, L. 14 to P. 35, L. 8].

" The defects mentioned in the Sūṭra are found in the texts " dealing respectively with—(a) the *Puṭrakāma Iṣṭi* (the " sacrifice laid down for the purpose of obtaining a son),

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* If *Word* were included under *Inference*, there might be a chance of its being regarded as a true Instrument of Right Cognition; while if it is excluded from 'Inference', there is no possibility of its being so regarded. Hence the Opponent has adopted the tactics that up to Su. 56, he has led on the Siḍḍhānṭin to the denial of Word being the same as Inference; and when that has been established, he turns round with his main contention that Word cannot be regarded as an Instrument of Right Cognition.—*Tāṭparya*.

The question that arises is—Does the Sūṭra mean to deny the cognitive efficiency (*prāmāṇya*) of all Words; or that of a particular kind Word? The *Bhāṣya* says the Sūṭra refers to a particular kind of *Word*. The *Vārṭika* goes on to say that, even through the whole context deals with *Word*, yet the *Sūṭra* has added the pronoun '*ṭaṭ*', 'that'; and this shows that it is referring to a particular kind of Word—and (the *Tāṭparya* adds) the particular kind of Word meant is that which has been held to be conducive to the attainment of man's highest purpose, and which forms the subject-matter of the entire *Shāsṭra*; and such a 'word' is the Veda. The *Parishuḍḍhi* however says—It would seem that the Opponent cannot reasonably deny the *prāmāṇya* of all Word; for if he did so, such a contention would be incompatible with his own practice of making assertions and urging reasonings. But in his innermost heart what he is aiming at is the demolishing of the efficiency of *all Word*; he has put forward reasonings that directly bear upon a particular kind of word only, with the view that having demolished the cognitive efficiency of one set of words—and that set one to which the Siḍḍhānṭin attributes the highest efficiency—he will go on to attack the ether words also, on the ground that their case is analogous to those whose efficiency has been already demolished; and the principal reason against the trustwothiness of all Words lies in the fact that it is always doubtful whether they proceed from a trustworthy or an untrustworthy source.

The *Bhāṣyachanḍra* explains that the words '*anṛiṭa*' and '*punarukṭa*' stand for their abstract forms '*anṛiṭaṭva*' 'falsity' and '*punarukṭi*', 'tautology'.

" (b) the *Havana* (oblations) and (c) Repetitions.*

" The pronoun 'that' in the *Sūṭra* is meant by the revered† " author of the Sūṭra to refer to a particular kind of Word.

" Word cannot be regarded as an Instrument of Right " Cognition (*i. e.* trustworthy). Why ?

" (A) Because of the defect of *Falsity*—as found in the " case of the text dealing with the *Puṭrakāma* Sacrifice. " The text declares that, ' one who desires a son should " perform the *Puṭrēṣṭi*', and yet we find that even when the " Sacrifice has been finished, no son is born ; and thus finding " a text laying down something for a visible purpose to " be false, we naturally conclude ‡ that other texts,—which " deal with acts for invisible (transcendental) purposes— " such texts for instance, as ' one should perform the " Agnihoṭra (for the purpose of attaining heaven)'—are " also false.

" (B) Secondly, because we find the defect of *contradic-* " *tion* (by one text) of what has been enjoined (by another). " For instance, in regard to the (Agnihoṭra) Oblation, we find " such injunctions as—(a) 'the oblation should be offered *after* " *sunrise*', (b) 'the oblation should be offered *before sunrise*', (c) " 'the oblation should be offered at a time when the stars have " ceased to be visible and the sun has not become visible §';— " and after having laid down these points of time, other texts " go on to say—(a) ' if one offers the oblations *after sunrise*, " the oblations are eaten up by *Shyāva* (the Dark Brown " Dog)', (b) ' if one offers the oblations after sunrise, the " oblations are eaten up by *Shabala* (the Dog of variegated " colour)', and (c) ' if one offers the oblations at the time " when the stars have set and the sun has not risen, the

* *Puṭrēṣṭyādi bhāṣyam sapṭamtbahuvachanānṭam paḍam ḍoṣaḍhikaraṇaḍarshanārṭham.—Bhāṣyachanḍra.*

† This epithet has been added to show how the author really knows what is in the mind of the Opponent.—*Bhāṣyachanḍra.*

‡ On the ground of both texts forming part of the Veda,—says the *Bhāṣyachanḍra.*

§ The following definitions of the three points of time are quoted in the *Bhāṣyachanḍra* :—(a) ' It is called *sunrise* when the sun has risen just one line above the horizon and has shot out his rays'; (b) ' it is called *before sunrise* when the sixteenth part of night has arrived and the stars are still visible'; and (c) ' it is called *Samayādhyuṣita* when it has dawned, the stars have disappeared, but the sun has not appeared.'

" oblations are eaten up by both Shyāva and Shabala'*;—
" and as there is apparent contradiction among these (pairs
" of) texts, one or the other must be *false*.†

" (C) Lastly, because we find the defect of *tautology*,—
" in those texts that lay down repetition; in the text—'one
" should repeat three times the first verse, and three times
" the final verse', we find the defect of tautology; and cer-
" tainly a tautological assertion can proceed only from a
" demented person.‡

" From all this the conclusion is that Word is not an
" Instrument of Right Cognition (i. e. it is not *trustworthy*);
" as it is be set with such defects as 'falsity, contradiction and
" tautology'."

Vārṭika on Sū. (57).

[P. 266, L. 20 to P. 267, L. 14].

" *That (Word) cannot be regarded as an Instrument &c.*
" *&c.*—says the Sūṭra. The pronoun '*ṭaṭ*' referring to Word,
" which forms the subject-matter of the present section,
" should be taken as referring to a particular kind of Word;—

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* 'Shyāva' and 'Shabala' are the names of two ferocious dogs said to guard the realms of Death. Offerings are made to these with the manṭra which means—'This offering is made to the two dogs, Shyāva and Shabala, born of the race of the Death-God; may these cease to be ferocious.'

†The *Ṭaṭparya* remarks that the 'contradiction' does not lie among the first three injunctive texts themselves (for they may be reconciled as laying down different options); it lies between the text enjoining a particular time—*Sunrise*—and the other text which deprecates that time; so that what is meant by '*vyāghāṭa*' is not actual *contradiction*, but *incompatibility*, '*sahāsambhava*', says the *Vārṭika*. As an alternative explanation, the *Vārṭika* also suggests the 'contradiction' among the texts laying down the three points of time. But in view of the term '*anyaṭaraṭ*,' 'one or the other', in the *Bhāṣya*, it is best to take the 'contradiction' as between the two texts in each *pair* of texts as the *Ṭāṭparya* has explained.

The *Bhāṣyachandra* explains '*anyaṭaraṭ*' as '*ubhayam*,' *both*.

‡ This refers to the *Sāmiḍhēnī verses*—manṭras recited for the *kindling of fire*; the number of these verses is *eleven*, translated by Eggeling in his translation of the *Shaṭapaṭha Brāhmaṇa*, in a foot-note on P. 102. But in the course of sacrificial performance, their number is variously put down—'fifteen' (in *Shaṭapaṭha*, 1. 3. 5. 7), 'seventeen' (in 1. 3. 5. 10 and 1. 6. 2. 12) and 'twenty-one' (in 3. 3. 35. 11); and these numbers are obtained by repeating certain verses—for instance, we get 15 by reciting the first and the eleventh verses thrice over.

"the sense being that, inasmuch as, even though the fact of "the assertion referring to *Word* is already clear from the "context, yet the author has referred to it specifically, "by means of the pronoun 'that',—this indicates that "the present discussion bears upon a particular kind of "word. Otherwise (if *all* Words were meant to be included) "the wording of the Sūṭra would have been—'*Word* "cannot be &c.'

"The word '*aprāmāṇya*' in the *Sūṭra* means 'incapabil-"ity of being an Instrument of Right Cognition', and "'*anṛiṭaṭva*', consists in 'speaking of a thing as what it is "not'; * '*vyāghāṭa*' is the '*incompatibility* of two words or "sentences'; and 'tautology' consists in 'the saying of "what has already been said before.'

"Examples of these are given in the *Bhāṣya*. (A) The "*falsity* (in the text laying down the *Puṭrēṣti* sacrifice) lies "in the fact that we do not find proceeding from it the re-"sult that is said to follow from it. (B) [As regards the "Agnihoṭra] we have the text, 'one should perform the "*Agnihoṭra*', and in this [in addition to the 'incompatibi-"lity' pointed out in the *Bhāṣya*] there is the further 'incom-"patibility' that there is no time at which the performance "could take place; as the texts (quoted in the Bhāṣya) "reject the times '*after* sunrise' (which includes the whole "day), 'before sunrise' and 'at which the stars have ceased "to be visible and the sun has not appeared'; and there is "thus no time left at which the offering of the *Agnihoṭra* "could take place. Or, the '*incompatibility*' may be ex-"plained as consisting in the mutual contradiction among "the three texts laying down (severally) the three points

* So that '*aprāmāṇya*' and '*anṛiṭaṭva*' are not the same, as some people have held it to be, when objecting to the argument propounded in the *Sūṭra* on the ground that the probans, 'anṛiṭaṭva', is the same as the probandum, '*aprāmāṇya*'. —*Ṭāṭparya.*

"of time (as the one at which the *Agnihoṭra* offering should "be made) *. (C) There is 'tautology' in the repetition "of the *first* and *final* verses; as exemplified in the *Bhāṣya*.

"Taking these particular texts as examples, we can, "on the strength of these, prove that other texts also are "not instruments of right cognition, because these also are "the work of the same author (as the texts mentioned "before) †.

"Or the Sūṭra may be taken as *denying* the authority "of the texts dealing with the *Agnihoṭra* &c., on the ground "that they are *Vedic* texts, like the other texts ‡.

"The objection to the *repetition* of the same text lies in "this that only one should be mentioned, either the first "only or the second only; for what is meant to be said is "already known from one text".

* This has been added with a view to the possible objection that 'at sunrise' means the precise point of time at which the sun rises, and it does not include the *whole day*.

† It might be argued that all Vedic texts are not open to the charge of being either 'false' or 'contradictory' or 'tautological'; so that the reason put forward cannot shake the authority of *all* Vedic texts;—with a view to this the Pūrvapakṣin has added that the argument formulated in the *Sūṭra* involves two reasonings:—(1) 'The particular Vedic texts laying down the Pūṭrēṣṭi are unauthoritative, they are found to be false &c., like the false assertions met with in ordinary parlance'; and (2) 'All Vedic texts are unauthoritative, because they are Vedic texts (written by the Author of the Veda), like the texts laying down the *Pūṭreṣṭi*.'—*Ṭāṭparya*.

‡ That is to say, the Sūṭra points out the defects in three texts—those bearing on the Pūṭrēṣṭi, the Agnihoṭra and the Sāmiḍhēnī verses. Now, the reasoning may be formulated thus—'the texts bearing upon the Agnihoṭra cannot be authoritative, because it is a Vedic text, like the text bearing upon the *Pūṭrēṣṭi*'; and so on.

The *Ṭāṭparya* remarks that in the former reasoning, the conclusion is in a form in which a negative character—'unauthoritativeness'—is *affirmed* of the texts; while in the present reasoning, the conclusion is stated in a form in which a possible positive character—'authoritativeness'—is *denied* of the texts.

Sūṭra (58).

[*Siḍḍhānṭa*]—(A) NOT SO; AS THE FAILURE IS DUE TO DEFICIENCIES IN THE ACTION, THE AGENT AND THE MEANS*.—(Sū. 58.)

Bhāṣya.

[P. 95, L. 10 to 21.]

The text bearing upon the *Puṭrēṣṭi* cannot be regarded as 'false'. "Why?" Because *the failure is due to deficiencies in the Action, the Agent and the Means.* [What the text declares is that] the parents, becoming connected with the particular sacrifice (by performing it), give birth to a son; so that the *sacrifice* is the *instrument,* the 'means', the *parents* are the 'Agents', and their connection with the sacrifice is the 'Action'; and the son is born when all these three are perfect; but when they are not perfect, no son is born.

In regard to the Sacrifice itself, there is 'deficiency' in the *action,* when there is non-performance or omission of its details;—there is 'deficiency' in the *agent* when the performer happens to be illiterate and of immoral character;—there is 'deficiency' in the *means,* (*a*) when the material offered is not duly sanctified, or has been desecrated, (*b*) when the manṭras recited are shorter or longer (than their correct forms) or devoid of proper accent or the necessary syllables, or (*c*) when the sacrificial fee is such as has been acquired by unfair means, or is too small, or consists of deprecated material †.

* There are three points urged by the Opponent—(A) Falsity, (B) Contradiction, (C) Tautology. Each of these is answered in Sū. 58, 59, and 60, respectively.

† In regard to manṭras, it is said that—' if a manṭra is recited with a defective accent or drops a syllable, it is wrongly recited, and as such fails to express its meaning; it becomes a verbal thunderbolt and strikes the master of the sacrifice; just as the word '*inḍrashaṭro*' did when it was pronounced with a wrong accent'. That is to say, the compound '*inḍrashaṭro*' may be taken either as a Bahuvrīhi, when it takes one kind of accent, or as *Ṭāṭpuruṣa,* when the accent is of a totally different kind. A certain Daiṭya performed a sacrifice with the avowed purpose of obtaining a son who would kill Inḍra,—thus being '*inḍrasya shaṭruḥ*', *shāṭayiṭā, hanṭā.* But when the sacrifice was finished and the child rose out of the fire, it was addressed as '*inḍrashaṭro*' which was intended as a Ṭāṭpuruṣa compound; but the priest who pronounced the word put the Bahuvrīhi accent on it; so that instead being 'killer of Inḍra', the boy turned out to be 'one who has Inḍra for his killer.'

In regard to the act of procreation itself, there is 'deficiency' in the *act* when the method of intercourse is wrong;—there is 'deficiency' in the *agent* when there are uterine diseases (preventing conception) or defective semen; and there is 'deficiency' in the *means*, in the manner described in connection with the Sacrifice *.

In regard to ordinary actions of the world, we have the injunction, 'desiring fire one should rub together two pieces of wood'; and in connection with this, there is 'deficiency' in the *act* when the rubbing is done in the wrong manner; —there is 'deficiency' in the *agent* when there is some remissness in his knowledge or in his effort; and there is 'deficiency' in the *means* when the wood is wet and with holes (worm-eaten).

Now, when there are these deficiencies, the result is not achieved; but that does not make the said injunction ('desiring fire one should rub together two pieces of wood') *false*; as when everything is perfect, the result does become accomplished. And in no way does the case of the injunction (of the Vedic sacrifice)—'desiring son one should perform the *Puṭrēṣṭi*'—differ from the said injunction (of the worldly act of rubbing the wood-pieces for obtaining fire).

Vārṭika on Sū. (58).

[P. 267, L. 16 to P. 270, L. 8.]

Not so, the failure is due etc. etc.—says the Sūṭra. It has been argued that—"Vedic texts cannot be regarded as instruments of right cognition, because they are false, as is shown by the fact of the results therein mentioned being not obtained". Now in regard to this, the following question has to be considered—Is this *non-appearance of the result* due to the fact that the texts are not instruments of right cognition? Or to the fact that there are deficiencies in the

The sacrificial fee is 'too small' when it fails to satisfy the priests employed; and it consists of 'deprecated material', when one gives *silver*, for instance; the giving of silver is deprecated on the ground that that metal was produced out of the tears of Ruḍra, so that if a man gives that metal, tears are shed in his household before a year passes.

* In this case, the deficiency would consist in the defective reciting of manṭras at the *Garbhāḍhāna* and other rites in connection with child-bearing.

Action, the Agent and the Means? We assert that it is due to deficiencies in the action, in the agent and in the means. As a matter of fact, the non-appearance of the result always implies some imperfection (incompleteness) in the causes (productive of that result); and as the Sacrifice (of Puṭrēṣṭi) only serves to bring together the causes (directly leading to the result in the shape of obtaining a son), there is nothing incongruous in our view [that the non-appearance of the result is due to the imperfections in the causes]. That is to say, we do not regard the Sacrifice as the direct or immediate cause of the Son's birth; what we hold is that *the parents becoming connected with the sacrifice give birth to a son* (Bhāṣya);—so that [when the son fails to be born] the doubt that this fact arouses is [not whether the Sacrifice is or is not actually effective in bringing about the result it is declared to bring about, but] in the form—is this failure of the son's birth due to an imperfection in the parents, or to some imperfection in the actual working of the sacrificial act? And as there are certain Manṭras also which are employed in the accomplishment of the sacrifice, and as such are accessories to it, the idea of there being some defect in the sacrificial performance gives rise to the doubt as to whether the failure of the performance has not been due to some deficiency in the manṭras recited, or to something wrong in such details as the grass, the fuel and such other things used at it; just as when there is an excess or deficiency in the Mantras used, the Sacrifice is not properly accomplished, so also is it not accomplished when there is deficiency in such accessories as the grass, the fuel and the like. Then again, the Sacrifice fails not only by reason of deficiencies in the accessories, but also by reason of deficiencies in the Agent and the Action; as we have already pointed out that what constitutes the cause (of the result) is not the Sacrifice only, independently of its accessories and accompaniments. Thus then, it follows that if the

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birth of the son does not appear, it is not right for any human being to assert that the non-appearance of the son is due to the inefficiency of the Vedic texts (to bring about right knowledge). "But the fact that the non-accomplishment is found to be due to both causes (the deficiency in the accessories and cognitive inefficiency of the Vedic texts), will give rise to a doubt (as to the truth of the texts prescribing that performance)." This is not right; as by arguing thus you abandon your former opinion. What you mean is this—"As a matter of fact there are three causes that tend towards the son's birth; and if there is any deficiency in anyone of these three causes, the son is not born; hence just as the non-appearance of the son may be due to some defect in the parents, so may it be due also to the fact that what the texts lay down is not true; so that the efficiency of these texts* becomes doubtful."—But this reasoning of yours will not be quite right, as it involves the abandonment of the opinion held by you: What you have said before was that 'the Veda is *apramāṇa*, *unauthoritative*, not an Instrument of right cognition', and now you assert that 'the *prāmāṇya*, *efficiency*, *authoritativeness*, of the Veda is only *doubtful*'; this certainly means that you have renounced your former opinion. "This contingency is equal in both cases; that is to say, this contingency is equally present in your case also; in your case also, the doubt will be present, as to non-appearance of the son being due either to some deficiency in the Parents, or to the fact of the Vedic texts being untrue [and this doubt will vitiate the conclusion that Vedic texts are always true]." Not so, we reply; for in the present connection,

* In this context, the *Vārṭika* has been using the term 'Manṭras' in the sense of the *texts* laying down the performance of sacrifices. The *Ṭāṭparya* takes it in the sense of *manṭrasādhana karma*, 'performance carried on by means of manṭras'—*i. e.* the sacrifices. But it is simpler to take it in the sense of 'texts'; as the term '*manṭra*' is often used in the sense of *Vedic passage* in general, not necessarily of only those that are called '*Manṭra*' as distinguished from '*Brāhmaṇa*' and '*Arṭhavāda*.'

we are not seeking to prove anything; that is to say, we are not seeking to prove any proposition as to Vedic texts being *true* or *not true*; while you are actually seeking to prove a definite proposition (that the Vedic texts are not true); so that against you we point out the fact that what you have urged as your reason (Probans) is *doubtful* (and hence not necessarily leading to your conclusion), in view of the fact that the non-appearance of the Son's birth *may* have been due to deficiencies in one or the other of the several causes leading up to the result [and you could urge this *doubt* against us only if we had tried to prove the *truth of the Vedic text* on the ground that sacrifices prescribed by it do accomplish their results; but this is not what we are doing;] and certainly the said doubt does not vitiate the (Vedic) injunction, which comes in as laying down something that helps those causes; just as in the case of the rubbing of sticks (to produce fire); that is to say, the Sacrifice (laid down by the injunction) is not laid down as being itself the direct cause of Son's birth; all that it says is that 'if a man is desirous of having a son, he should perform sacrifice',—just as there is the injunction that 'if one desires fire he should rub together two sticks'; and in this case if the fire fails to appear if there is some defect either in the Agent or in the act of rubbing, the injunction is not rejected as meaningless; exactly similar is the case in question also [*i. e.* because the son's birth does not appear by reason of some defect in the Agent or in the several details of the sacrificial performance, it does not follow that the injunction of the *Puṭrēṣṭi* is either not true or meaningless]; so that the said failure of the result does not vitiate the authority of the text at all; specially as when all the details are perfect, the result is actually found to appear; *i.e.* when there is no deficiency in any of the several causes leading up to the desired result, this result is found to be actually accom-

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plished ; hence the conclusion is that no fault lies with the text.*

Lastly, the assertion (of the Opponent) is—" *Word cannot be regarded as an Instrument of Right Cognition, because of such defects as falsity, contradiction and tautology* " (Sū. 57); and inasmuch as what is made the 'Subject' here (of which falsity &c. are predicated) are all Vedic texts, the premiss is one that is not applicable to the whole of it [as all Vedic texts are not 'false', 'contradictory' and 'tantological']. If (with a view to avoid this difficulty) you have for the 'Subject' of your Proposition only those texts that do have those qualities,—then, inasmuch as these qualities (of 'falsity' &c.) would form part of the Proposition itself, it would be necessary for you to point out (other) reasons for proving the proposition that 'such texts as are false &c. are not instruments of right cognition'. If you say that—" these texts are not instruments of right cognition, *because they are false* ",—then you have to explain what you mean by 'falsity'. If you say that a word is 'false' when it speaks of a thing as what it is not,—then we should say that this is exactly what is meant by the term '*apramāṇa*' (' not the instrument of right cognition ') in your Proposition [so that your argument begs the whole question].

[All this is only by the way]—In reality your probans—'falsity'—is one that is itself, 'unknown', not true,—as we have already explained.

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* When we say that the sacrifice brings about the son's birth, we do not mean that there is any such universal and invariable relation between the son's Birth and the Sacrifice as that 'whenever the Sacrifice is performed a son is born', or 'if the Sacrifice is not performed, no son is born'. What we mean is that the fact of the Sacrifice helping the son's birth is laid down in the Veda ; so that on the strength of this Text, we can say that in cases where sons are born without the performance of the *Putrēṣṭi* Sacrifice, it must be the effect of the sacrifice performed during a previous life ;—and if, even when there is no deficiency in any factor, the performance should fail to bring about the son's birth, it should be attributed to some invisible discrepancy that deflects the force set up by the sacrificial performance.—*Tātparya.*

Sūṭra (59).

(B)—THE DEPRECATORY ASSERTION APPLIES TO THE CHANGING OF A PARTICULAR TIME AFTER HAVING (ONCE) ADOPTED IT.—Sū. (59).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (59).

[P. 96, L. 2 to L. 4].

'So that there is no *contradiction* in texts bearing upon the Agnihoṭra oblations'—this has to be supplied to the Sūṭra (in order to complete the sentence). The deprecatory text—'when a man offers the oblations after sunrise, they are eaten up by the *Shyāvu* dog'—is meant to point out that it is not right to change the time that has been once adopted; as is done when a person, having in the first instance made the offerings at one time (*e. g. before* Sunrise), changes it subsequently and makes them at another time (*e. g.. after* Sunrise). So that the text only serves to deprecate the *abandoning of the enjoined procedure* [and there is no 'contradiction' in this].

Vārṭika on Sū. (59).

[P. 269, L. 12 to P. 270, L. 8].

As regards the objection that Vedic texts are vitiated by 'contradiction', it is pointed out that—*as the deprecatory assertion applies to the changing of the time that has been once adopted*, there is no 'contradiction'. It is in connection with the kindling of Fire that we have the following injunctions laying down three points of time—'the oblation should be offered after sunrise', 'the oblation should be offered before sunrise' and 'the oblation should be offered at a time when neither the stars nor the sun is visible'; after having adopted one of these three, if the performer should come subsequently to renounce it (and make the offering at another time),—this change is what is decried in the deprecatory assertion [and this does not involve any 'contradiction']. Nor is there any 'contradiction' (among the three injunctions themselves); as no one of the injunc-

tions actually denies what has been prescribed in the other two; that is, none of them declares that '*the offering should not be made at any other time*'*;—if each of the three injunctions had denied the other two, then it would be right to urge the objection that there is 'contradiction' among them; as a matter of fact however, the injunctions in question, 'the oblation should be offered after sunrise' &c., are not negative assertions; hence the objection does not apply. Specially because, if the texts were negative, the three together would be prohibitive of the offering altogether [each prohibiting the time laid down in the other two, and there being no time apart from the three mentioned in the three texts); and under the circumstances, it would be futile to speak of the various points of time, 'sunrise' and the rest (in reference to the *Agnihoṭra*); the proper assertion in that case would be —'what has been enjoined in the text that the *Agnihoṭra should be offered* should not be done at all.' All the three texts as they stand however, become quite compatible with one another if we accept the interpretation that we have suggested,—that each of them prescribes a particular time in reference to the oblation (laid down in the text 'the Agnihotra should be offered'). "But you should show some special reason why the texts should be interpreted in this manner, and not in the manner suggested by us, whereby they are found to be incompatible with one another." These same texts constitute the special reason in favour of our interpretation. "How so?" Well, when we come to consider the question as to whether we should interpret the texts in any way we choose (as you have done), or we should interpret them as bearing upon what has been laid down (elsewhere),—

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* This appears to be the best way of construing the phrase [illegible]; though the *Tāṭparya* has construed it somewhat differently, to mean [illegible]; but the present context deals entirely with [illegible], as is shown by what follows. Hence we have adopted our own interpretation.

it certainly appears to be more reasonable to accept the latter alternative; as in so doing we do not go against any proofs. [It is found to be in conformity with all reason and authority]. Hence we conclude that there is no 'contradiction' in the texts.

Sūtra (60).

(C)—IT MAY BE RIGHTLY REGARDED AS A USEFUL REITERATION—SŪ. (60).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (60).

[P. 96, L. 6 to L. 11].

What is referred to in this Sūtra is the Pūrvapakṣa argument that the Veda is tainted with 'tautology' by reason of the repetitions that it lays down (Sū. 57). [It has to be borne in mind however, that] it is only *needless* repetition that constitutes 'tautology'; there is however repetition *with a purpose*, which is called '*anuvāda*', 'Reiteration'. Now, the repetition that is laid down in the Vedic text—' one should recite the first verse thrice and the final verse also thrice'—is of the latter kind, 'Reiteration'; as it is done *with a purpose*; the purpose being that by repeating the first and final verses thrice each, the number of the *Sāmidhēnī* verses becomes *fifteen*; and it is with reference to this that we have the following description of the 'mantra' (the 'kindling' verses)—'By means of this verbal thunderbolt with its *fifteen* spokes I attack my enemy, who hates me and whom I hate'; where the name 'mantra-thunderbolt' refers to the *fifteen* 'Sāmidhēnī' verses; and this number 'fifteen' could not be obtained without the aforesaid repetition (of the first and final verses) [the actual number of verses being only *eleven*].

Vārtika on Sūtra (60).

[P. 270, L. 8 to L. 13.].

It has been urged that Vedic texts are open to the charge of being 'tautological'; but in reality there is no 'tautology'; as *it may be rightly regarded as a useful reiteration*—says the Sūtra. A real case of 'tautology' is that when the same thing, without the addition of any further qualification, is mentioned again; but when the previously-mentioned

thing is mentioned again by means of similar words, but with additional qualifications, it is a case of 'Reiteration with a purpose'; and in this latter case there is nothing objectionable. The example has been explained in the *Bhāṣya*.

Sūṭra (61).

SPECIALLY AS A CLASSIFICATION OF THE TEXTS IS ACCEPTED ON THE BASIS OF (DIVERSITY IN THEIR) PURPOSE*,—(Sū. 61).

Bhāṣya on Sū. 61.

[P. 96, L. 13].

[*As a classification of the texts is accepted on the basis of diversity in their purpose,* therefore] Vedic texts must be regarded as 'instruments of right cognition'; just as is done in ordinary parlance [where eve y word serving a useful purpose is accepted as an instrument of Right Cognition].

Vārṭika on Sū. (61).

[P. 270, L. 13 to L. 20.]

The texts laying down the *Puṭrēṣṭi* and such sacrifices are trustworthy,—(a) because they are parts of the Veda,—like such texts as 'the Earth is a vast field' (which is a true description); (b) also because there is a restriction in regard to their word &c.,—as in such sentences as '*ḍvāḍasha māsāḥ samvaṭsaraḥ*' (where there is a limited number of

* The *Ṭāṭparya* says that, having refuted the objections urged against the trustworthy character of the Veda, the author of the *Sūṭra* now proceeds to put forward positive arguments in support of the trustworthy character of Vedic texts.

This *Sūṭra* is put forward with a view to justify the arguments propounded above, which are based upon the fact that diverse useful perposes are served by the Vedic texts that have been traduced as 'false' &c. The justification is that such diversity of purpose is a fact, and it has been accepted by all students of the Veda as the basis for the classification of Vedic texts under the several heads mentioned below in Sūṭra 62. And this classification serves to show that each and every Vedic text serves a useful purpose, and as such, is a trustworthy source of knowledge, 'instrument of right cognition'. According to the *Bhāṣyachanḍra* however, the Sūṭra is meant as an introduction to the author's view that '*Viḍhi*' and '*Arṭhavāḍa*' are not the only two heads under which all Vedic texts are included; they are to be classed under heads described in Sūṭras 63, 64 and 65.

words, and which is a true discription); (c) also because they have been asserted by a particular person,—like the assertion 'Fire is the antidote for cold' (which is quite true).* [These arguments have for their 'subject' only the particular texts attacked by the *Pūrvapakṣin*].—Taking *all Vedic texts* for our 'subject', we have the argument (propounded in the Sūṭra)—Vedic texts are trustworthy,—*because there is a classification of them on the basis of their purpose,*—just as are the texts of Manu and other writers;—in the case of the assertions of Manu etc., we find that there is a diversity in the purposes served by them, and serving such diverse purposes, these are trustworthy;—so that, inasmuch as Vedic texts also are found to be serving diverse purposes, these also should be trustworthy.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (62).

[P. 96, L. 13 to L. 16.]

The 'classification' of Vedic *Brāhmaṇa* texts† is three-fold, as follows:—

Sūṭra (62).

THE TEXTS BEING EMPLOYED AS (A) 'INJUNCTIONS', (B) 'DESCRIPTIONS' AND (C) REITERATIONS WITH A PURPOSE'.—(Sū. 62).

Vedic texts are employed in three ways—(A) as injunctive', (B) as 'descriptive' and (C) as 'reiterative',—assertions.

Vārṭika on Sū. (62).

[P. 270, L. 20 to P. 271, L. 4.]

The said 'classification' of *Brāhmaṇa* texts is three-fold: *the texts being employed as Injunctions &c. &c.*—says the *Sūṭra*. That is to say, there are three kinds of *Brāhmaṇa* texts: some are *injunctive*, some *descriptive*, and some *reiterative*.

Vār. P. 271.

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*These three arguments have been put forward by the *Vārṭika*, independently of the Sūṭra.

† The *Bhāṣyachandra* says:—It is only the classification of the *Brāhmaṇa* texts,—and not of the *Manṭra* texts—that is put forward.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (63).
[P. 96, L. 16 to L. 19.]

Of these three—

Sūṭra (63).

THE INJUNCTION IS THAT WHICH PRESCRIBES (A CERTAIN ACT).—(Sū. 63.)

That text which *prescribes* *—*i. e.* urges or incites (the Agent to activity)—is called 'Injunction', and this Injunction is either mandatory or permissive; *e. g.* such texts as 'one desiring heaven *should offer* the Agnihotra oblations' †

Vārṭika on Sū. (63).
[P. 271, L. 6 to L. 9].

Of the three mentioned in the preceding *Sūṭra*, that text which prescribes—lays down—something (not already known) is called 'Injunction'. *This Injunction is either mandatory or permissive*—says the *Bhāṣya*. That text is called 'mandatory' which enjoins, lays down, that 'one *should do* such and such an act'; while the 'permissive' text is that which simply permits the agent to have recourse to a certain course of action;—as for instance, the Agnihotra text (quoted by the *Bhāṣya*) [while being *mandatory* of the sacrifice itself] is *permissive* of those acts whereby the agent would acquire the ways and means of that performance.

Sūṭra (64).

THE DESCRIPTIONS ARE—VALEDICTORY, DEPRECATORY, ILLUSTRATIVE AND NARRATIVE.—(Sū. 64.)

Bhāṣya on Sū. (64.)
[P. 97, L. 1 to L. 12].

(a) That text which eulogises a certain Injunction by describing the (desirable) results (following from the enjoined act) is called 'Valedictory'; such a text serves

* *I. e.* Lays down something not known by other means—says the *Bhāṣyachandra*.

† The *Ṭāṭparya* remarks—Though as a matter of fact, Injunction is not always *mandatory*, actually prescribing something, it also appears in the forms of 'Entreaty', 'Invitation' and 'Advice',—yet it is only the *mandatory* injunction that has been selected here for reference.

two purposes: (1) it serves the purpose of inspiring confidence, * whereby the agent comes to have faith in what is thus eulogised (and is thereby made to perform it); (2) it also serves the purpose of persuading; whereby on knowing the result following from a certain act, the agent is persuaded to do it; e. g. such texts as—'as the gods cognised all beings by means of the *Sarvajiṭ* sacrifice, this sacrifice accomplishes the purpose of cognising all beings and obtaining all things; by means of this a man obtains all things and conquers all beings' &c., &c.

(b) The text that describes the undesirable results (following from the act enjoined) is called 'deprecatory'; it serves the purpose of dissuasion; whereby the agent may not do the act deprecated; e. g. such texts as—'That which is known as the *Jyotiṣtoma* is the foremost of all sacrifices,—one who, without performing this, performs another sacrifice, falls into a pit, the act perishes and the man is destroyed'; and so forth.

(c) That text which describes a contrary (different) method† of action adopted by a certain person is called 'illustrative'; e. g. such texts as—'Having offered the oblation, people pour out the fat, and then the mixture of ghee and coagulated milk; but the Charaka priests pour this mixture first, and they say that this mixture constitutes the very life of Agni', and so forth.

(d) [The text that describes] a method as adopted traditionally is called 'narrative'; e. g. such texts as—'Thus it is that Brahmaṇas have adopted, in their hymns, the *Bahiṣpavamāna Sāma*, thinking that in so doing they were performing the Sacrifice in its very womb', and so forth.

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*The right reading is प्रत्ययार्थं, as found in several Mss.; and this is more in keeping with प्रवर्तिका in the next sentence. Due faith and confidence are necessary before the Vedic act can be effective; says the Veda—यदेव विद्यया करोति श्रद्धयोपनिषदा तदेव वीर्यवत्तरं भवति। The *Bhāṣyachandra* adds—*Shraddhā*, Faith, is only a particular form of *inclination*—says Vyāsa, who is supported by the Brāhma-Purāṇa, which says that *Shraddhā* consists of Contemplation, Devotion and Inclination.

†This method need not be necessarily *wrong*; all that '*vyāhata*' means is that the method is contrary to, different from, the one that is enjoined by the Injunction; but which may be adopted because it has been adopted by certain priests in the past. This is clear from the *Tātparya*.

"Why should the Illustrative and Narrative texts be regarded as 'Descriptive' (and *not* 'Injunctive')*?"

These are regarded as 'Descriptive', firstly because they are connected with valedictory or deprecatory passages, and secondly because they indicate something connected with (bearing upon) some other Injunction (to which therefore they are supplementary).†

Vārṭika on Sū. (64).

[P. 271, Ll. 11—12.]

These Descriptive texts are—Valedictory, Deprecatory, Illustrative and Narrative —examples have been given in the *Bhāṣya*.

Sūṭra (65).

(C) WHEN THE INJUNCTION AND THE ENJOINED ARE MENTIONED AGAIN, IT CONSTITUTES 'REITERATION (WITH A PURPOSE)'—Sū. (65).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (65).

The compound '*viḍhiviḥiṭānuvachana*' means the '*anuvachana*', *re-mention*, of (*a*) the '*viḍhi*', *Injunction* and (*b*) the '*viḥiṭa*', *enjoined*;—the former being *verbal* 'reiteration', and the latter *material* 'reiteration'; so that just as there are two kinds of 'Repetition' so are there two kinds of 'Reiteration' also.

"Why should the *enjoined* be 'reiterated'?"

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* The sense of this *Pūrvapakṣa* question is thus explained by the *Ṭāṭparya*—'The text describing the contrary method adopted by the Charaka priests serves the purpose of *enjoining* that different method as proper for some persons; similarly, the text describing what the Brahmanas did serves the purpose of *enjoining* that act for people of the present day;—so that these are as much *Injunctive* in their character as any other Injunction. Why then should these be treated as 'Descriptive'?"

† The texts in question only describe established facts and do not contain any injunctive word;—now the question arises—should we assume an injunctive word which is not in the text? or should we construe the text along with some other direct Injunction already found in the Veda? Of these two, the latter alternative is certainly the simpler; for under the former alternative you have to assume the injunctive word, and then the connection of that word with the assertion in quest.on; while according to our view, all that has got to be assumed is the connection of this assertion with an already existing Injunction. The Illustrative and Narrative texts are classed apart from the Valedictory and Deprecatory texts, because the latter do not contain any explicit Praise or Deprecation.

It is reiterated for the purpose of *reference*; it is in reference to what is *enjoined* that we have either (*a*) praise (of the act) or (*b*) deprecation* (of the omitting of the act), or (*c*) a supplementary detail is laid down; and (*d*) sometimes Reiteration is for the purpose of indicating the sequence between two enjoined acts, and so on other purposes may be found out.†

—,,—

In ordinary parlance also, we have three kinds of assertions—*injunctive*, *descriptive* and *reiterative*. (*a*) 'One should cook rice' is an *injunction*; (*b*) 'Long life, glory, strength, pleasure, intelligence—all this resides in food' is a *description* (of the food whose cooking has been enjoined); (*c*) we have the 'reiteration' (of the enjoined cooking) in the following forms: 'cook, cook, please', where we have repetition; 'cook quickly'; 'do please cook', in the form of entreaty; and 'you must cook', for the purpose of emphasising.

Thus then, as in the case of ordinary assertions, Words are accepted as 'Instruments of Right Cognition', when it is found that they are classified according to the diverse purposes served by them,—exactly in the same manner, inasmuch as Vedic texts also are capable of being classified according to the different purposes served by them, they may be regarded as 'Instruments of Right Cognition' (as pointed out above, under Sū. 61).

Vārṭika on Sū. (65).

[P. 271, L. 14 to L. 17]

When the Injunction &c. &c.—Says the Sūṭra. That is to say, 'Reiteration' consists of the mention of Injunction, and

* According to the *Bhāṣyachanḍra* this 'deprecation' is of omitting to do the enjoined act. The example cited by the *Ṭāṭparya* however is one of deprecation of the enjoined act itself.

† Examples are given in the *Ṭāṭparya*—(*a*) The *Ashramēḍha* sacrifice having been *enjoined*, we have its 'reiteration' in the text, '*when one performs the ashvamēḍha sacrifice*, he passes beyond sin and death', wherein the sacrifice is *praised*;—(*b*) the oblation *after sunrise* having been *enjoined*, we have its 'reiteration' in the text, 'When one *offers the oblation after sunrise*, the *Shyāva* dog takes it away', where we have a *deprecation*;—(*c*) the *Homa* having been *enjoined*, we have its 'reiteration' in the text 'the Homa is to be of curds', which lays down the supplementary detail, in the shape of Curd, for the Homa;—(*d*) The Soma sacrifice and the Ḍarsha-Pūrṇamāsa sacrifices having been enjoined, we have the 'reiteration' of these in the text, 'The Soma sacrifice should be offered after the Ḍarsha-Pūrṇamāsa sacrifice'; for the purpose of laying down the proper order of sequence between the two.

also that of what has been enjoined; the former being 'verbal' and the latter 'material' Reiteration. As 'Repetition' is of two kinds, so is 'Reiteration' also; we have *verbal* 'repetition' when we say 'Sound is non-eternal, non-eternal', and we have *material* 'reiteration' when we say 'sound is non-eternal, it is liable to destruction'.

Sūṭra (66).

[THE *Opponent Says*]—"THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 'REITERATION' AND 'REPETITION'; AS BOTH CONSIST IN THE RESTATING OF THE SAME WORD."—Sū. (66).

Bhāṣya on Su. (66).
[P. 98, L. 2 to L. 4].

"As a matter of fact, no distinction is possible as that "'Repetition' is *wrong* and 'Reiteration' *right*. Because, "in both cases a word, whose meaning has been already "comprehended, is repeated; so that by reason of the same "word being repeated, both are equally *wrong*."*

Varṭika on Sū. (66).

There is no difference &c. &c.—says the *Sūṭra.* What "is the meaning of this Sūṭra? [It means that] there is "this similarity between 'Repetition' and 'Reiteration,' "that in both words, whose meaning has been already com- "prehended, are repeated; that is in Repetition, as also in "Reiteration, a word, whose meaning has been already "grasped, is mentioned over again; so that, inasmuch as in "both there is the re-mention of words whose meaning has "been already comprehended, both should be *wrong*."

Sūṭra (67).

[*Answer*]—[REITERATION IS] NOT THE SAME [AS REPETITION], AS [IN THE FORMER] THE RE-MENTION [OF THE WORDS] IS LIKE THE EXHORTATION TO GO 'MORE QUICKLY'.†—(Sū. 67.)

* This argument emanates from an opponent who has not understood what the Bhāṣya has said in connection with the useful purposes served by Reiteration.—*Ṭāṭparya.*

The *Bhāṣyachandra* explains '*asāḍhu*' as *asāḍhakam arṭhasya*, futile.

† The *Bhāṣyachandra* treats this *Sūṭra* as '*Bhāṣya*'.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (67.)
[P. 98, L. 6 to L. 13.]

'Reiteration' cannot be regarded as the same as 'Repetition';—Why?—because when the re-mention of a word serves a useful purpose, then it is 'Reiteration'; so that even though in 'Repetition' also we have the re-mention of words, the re-mention in this case is entirely useless; while 'Reiteration', serving a useful purpose, is *like the exhortation to go 'more quickly'*; that is to say, when one is exhorted in the words 'go quickly, quickly', the meaning is 'go more quickly'; so that the re-mention (of the word 'quickly)' serves the purpose of indicating a peculiarity in the act (of *going*; which purpose could not be accomplished by the single mention of the word 'quickly'). This exhortation is cited only as an instance; there are several other instances of re-mention with a purpose; e. g. when it is said 'he cooks and cooks', what is meant is that the act of cooking is unceasing; 'village upon village is pleasant' means that every village is pleasant; 'God rained round and round the Ṭrigarṭa country (the modern district of Jullundhur)' means *exception* [that rainfall avoided that country]; 'seated near and about the Wall' means *proximity*; 'there are bitters and bitters' means that there are several kinds of bitterness.

Thus then, we conclude that Reiteration is meant to be a *reference*, for the purpose of praising or deprecating, or laying down a supplementary detail, or pointing out the sequence of what has been enjoined (as explained under Sū. 65).

Varṭika on Sū. (67.)
[P. 272, L. 5 to L. 18.]

Reiteration is not the same &c. &c.—says the *Sūṭra.* In the case of such assertions as 'go more quickly', the comparative term 'more' (denoted by the affix '*ṭarap*' in '*shīghrataram*') serves the purpose of denoting a peculiarity in the act of *going*, in addition to what is expressed by the simple term 'quickly' ('*shīghram*');—in the same manner that re-mention of words which is called 'Reiteration' serves the purpose of indicating a peculiarity in the act. This argument (propounded by the *Sūṭra*) may be formulated as

follows :—' The re-mention of words in the form of Reiteration serves a useful purpose,—because it provides an additional idea,—like the exhortation to go more quickly'; so that, just as when the term 'more quickly', is used, it provides an additional idea over and above what is provided by the simple term 'quickly'; and is as such not rejected as a useless 'Repetition';—exactly in the same manner, inasmuch as the re-mention of words in the form of 'Reiteration' serves the purpose of providing additional idea, it cannot be rejected as a useless 'Repetition'. Now it remains to explain what this *additional* idea is; and this we now proceed to explain: When the word 'cook' is addressed to a person, the idea that it produces in his mind is that 'the act of cooking has got to be accomplished'; and when the word is repeated a second time—and he is addressed as 'cook, cook'—the idea that arises in his mind is either that of emphasis—'it is I that *have* to cook',—or that of continuity—'I have got to go on cooking unceasingly',—or that of entreaty—'I should, thus entreated, undertake the act at once'; these additional ideas appear in the mind of the person to whom the words are addressed; and just as these appear in the mind of the person hearing the words, so do they also in the mind of one who addresses the words. In the case of mere 'Repetition', on the other hand, no such additional ideas are obtained; so that this constitutes a great point of difference between 'Repetition' and 'Reiteration'. In the same manner we can find other instances of Reiteration in actual usage.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (68.)

[P. 98, L. 13 to P. 100, L. 5.]

"Does then the trustworthiness of Word (Veda) become established simply by setting aside the arguments against its trustworthiness"?—

[It becomes established] also by the following positive argument :—

Sūṭra (68.)

THE TRUSTWORTHINESS OF WORDS (OF THE VEDA) IS BASED UPON THE TRUSTWORTHINESS OF THE RELIABLE (VERACIOUS) EXPOSITOR,—*JUST LIKE THE TRUSTWORTHINESS* OF INCANTATIONS AND OF MEDICAL SCRIPTURES.—SŪ. (68.)

"In what does the trustworthiness of the Medical Scriptures consist?"

It consists in this fact that, when the Medical Scriptures declare that 'by doing this and this one obtains what he desires, and by avoiding this and this he escapes from what is undesirable'—and a person acts accordingly,—the result turns out to be exactly as asserted; and this shows that the said Scriptures are *true*, not *wrong*, in what they assert.

In the case of *Incantations* also it is found that whenever they are used for the purpose of averting such evils as poison, ghosts and thunderbolt, they are found effective, in bringing about that result; and this fact establishes the 'trustworthiness' of the Incantations.

"But to what is all this *trustworthiness* due?"

It is due to the trustworthiness of the veracious expositor.

"And in what does the trustworthiness of the veracious expositor consist?"

It consists in the following facts—that he has a direct cognition of the real essence of things*—he has compassion on living beings,—and he is desirous of describing things as they really exist. As a matter of fact, veracious persons (*a*) have a direct perception of the real essence of things,—that is, they know that such and such a thing should be avoided by man, and also the method of avoiding it,—that such and such a thing should be acquired by man, and also the method of acquiring it;—(*b*) they take compassion on living beings,—that is, they feel as follows:—'These poor creatures being

Bhā. P. 99.

by themselves ignorant, there is no other means, save instruction, available to them for knowing things, until they know, they cannot either perform or avoid any acts, and unless they do perform acts, it cannot be well with them, and there is no one (save myself) who would help them in

*The *Bhāṣyachandra* explains '*dharma*' as '*ṭaṭṭva*', *truth*; hence the quality meant would be that of having direct knowledge of truth; *i.e.*, the real nature of all things.

this matter;—so, well, I am going to instruct them about things as they exist and as I know them*; having listened to these instructions, these creatures will understand things, and thereby they shall avoid what should be avoided and acquire only what should be acquired.' It is on this basis that the instruction of veracious persons proceeds; and when an act is known on this threefold authority of the Veracious Expositor, and is performed accordingly, it actually accomplishes the purpose (it is meant to accomplish). From this it follows that the instruction of veracious persons is trustworthy; and this leads to the veracious expositors themselves being regarded as trustworthy.

Thus (trustworthiness having been found in) the instruction of the Veracious Expositor, in the form of the Medical Scriptures (that part of the Veda which treats of the Medical Science), which deal with visible things,—from this we infer the trustworthiness of those parts of the Veda also which deal with invisible (transcendental things; as the ground of trustworthiness—which consists in the trustworthiness of the Veracious Expositor—is equally present in both. In fact some texts of the latter section of the Veda also are found to deal with visible things, e. g., the text 'one desiring to acquire a village should perform sacrifices'; and on seeing this coming out true, we can infer, from this also, the trustworthiness of the other Vedic texts (dealing with purely invisible things).

In ordinary worldly matters also, a large amount of business is carried on on the basis of the assertions of veracious persons; and here also the trustworthiness of the ordinary veracious expositor is based upon the same three conditions—he has full knowledge of what he is saying, he has sympathy for others (who listen to him), and he has the desire to expound things as they really exist;—and on the basis of these the assertion of the veracious expositor is regarded as trustworthy.

The inference (of the trustworthiness of all Vedic texts, from that of the medical texts) proceeds on the basis of the seer and expositor being the same (in both cases). That is to say, the ommiscient† Expositor and the Seers are the same

* This constitutes the third factor of reliability—the desire to describe things as they really exist.

† The plural number is meant to indicate the superior knowledge of the expositor of the Veda.

veracious persons in the case of the Vedic texts and that of the Medical Scriptures; so that from the trustworthiness of the latter we can infer that of the latter also.

[The Mimāmsaka objects]—"Inasmuch as the trustworthiness of Vedic texts is due to their eternality, it is not right to say that their trustworthiness is *due to the trustworthiness of the Veracious Expositor.*"

But as a matter of fact, the trustworthiness or efficiency of words in the denotation of things is due to their denotative potency,—and not to their eternality; for if it were due to their eternality, then (all words being equally eternal, *ex hypothesi*) all things would be denoted by all words; and there would be no restriction as to words and their significations.

"But if words are not eternal, they cannot be expressive at all."

This is not true; ordinary words (in worldly usage) are actually found to denote their meanings * [and certainly these words are not eternal.] "These words also are eternal (just like Vedic words)." That is not possible; as in that case the disagreement with facts that we find in the case of the assertions of untruthful persons would be inexplicable; as being eternal, every word should be trustworthy (i.e. true, in equally agreement with facts). "That word can not be eternal." But you do not point out any difference; it behoves you to show cause why the assertion of the untruthful person in ordinary parlance is not eternal (while all other words are eternal). Then again, in the case of proper names, it is found that their trustworthiness depends upon their denoting the things named,—and this denotation is in accordance with the convention applying the name to a particular thing; (and as such these cannot be eternal); so that it is not right to attribute trustworthiness to eternality. † That is to say, in ordinary parlance when the proper name is denotative of the thing to which it has been fixed by convention,

Bhā. P. 100. it does so by reason of this convention, and not by reason of its eternality.

* The reading अदर्शनात् adopted in the printed text is not right; the correct reading is supplied by the Puri Mss. 'अर्थदर्शनात्'

† For यथायोगं read यथाविनियोगं as in all Mss. save one.

In fact all that can be meant by Vedas being 'eternal' is that the continuity of tradition of the texts and activity * according to them is uninterrupted through all ages, past and future†.

Thus we find that if we attribute the trustworthiness of Words to the trustworthiness of the Veracious Expositor, it meets the case of Vedic as well as ordinary words [while if we attribute it to *eternality*, it can not apply to the case of ordinary words].

Thus ends the First Daily Lesson of
the Second Discourse—in
the *Bhāṣya*.

Vārṭika on Sū. (68).

[P. 272, L. 18 to P. 276, L. 4.]

"Is then the trustworthiness of Vedic texts proved only by the rejecting of the arguments against such trustworthiness?" Certainly not. "Why so?" Because nothing can be regarded as proved, without actual positive proof. "How then do you prove the trusṭworthiness of Vedic texts?" By positive proof. "What is that proof?" The proof consists in the classification of the texts according to their diverse purposes (as pointed out in Sū. 61).‡

* The *Bhāṣyachandra* explains '*prayoga*' as 'teaching'; as this is already implied in 'tradition', it appears better to take it as referring to the actual carrying into practice of the instructions contained in the Veda.

† When Final Dissolution of the Universe comes, God re-composes the Vedas and thus keeps up the tradition.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

‡ The *Ṭāṭparya* is not satisfied with this. What is here mentioned as 'proof' only indicates the possibility of proof; and it is not a proof itself; as the said classification is found also in notoriously untrustworthy scriptures. So the actual proof is what is put forward in Sū. 68.

And yet the propounding of a reason that indicates the possibility of proof is not entirely futile; as it is only what is regarded as *possible* that can be *proved* by an argument; and not with regard to which there has been no notion of *possibility* at all.

[The Sūṭra puts forward the argument in favour of the trustworthiness of Vedic texts]—*The trustworthiness of Words is due &c., &c.* The particle '*cha*' serves the purpose of including the reasons adduced before [*i. e.* their classification according to their purpose]. [The meaning of the Sūṭra being] Just as the Incantations and the Medical Scriptures are trustworthy by reason of their having been asserted by a special Person, so also are the Vedic texts; the ground of 'trustworthiness' in both cases consisting in having been asserted by a special Person.*

Vār: P. 273.

In what does the trustworthiness of the medical scriptures consist? It consists in this fact that, when the medical scriptures declare that 'by doing this and this one obtains what he desires, and by avoiding this and this he escapes from what is undesirable',—and a person acts accordingly,—the result turns out to be exactly as asserted; and this shows that the said scriptures are true, not wrong, in what they assert. . . . . But to what is this trustworthiness of the Veracious Expositor due? And in what does the trustworthiness of veracious persons consist? It consists in the following facts—(1) *that he has a direct cognition of the essence of things*—(says the Bhāṣya); that is to say, such persons have a direct cognition of what they assert or teach;—(2) that they have compassion on creatures; that is, they have sympathy with the person to whom they impart the teaching;—(3) they have the desire to describe things exactly as they know them.† The speaker who is endowed with this threefold qualification is 'veracious' (reliable), and the assertions made by him are trustworthy.

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* The 'speciality' of this person, God, consists in his having a direct cognition of every detail of Ḍharma and other things—what should be done and what should to be avoided,—He has compassion upon all creatures,—He has the desire to describe things as they really are,—his organs of cognition are exceptionally efficient.—*Ṭāṭparya.*

The *Ṭāṭparya* (pp. 299-301) explains in detail how God is prompted to expound the Veda for the benefit of mankind.

† The Bib. Ind. edition reads यथार्थविख्यापयिषा etc. which means that he desires to teach for the purpose of making the real state of things known (to the person whom he is teaching).

Then again, when we find that certain Vedic texts that pertain to visible things are actually found to be not incompatible with facts (*i. e.* true),—from this we can infer the same in regard to the rest of the Vedic texts also;* that is to say, we have a Vedic text bearing upon vessible things; the text, for instance, that 'one desiring a village should perform the sacrifice',—[and when we find that the said sacrificial performance does bring about the acquisition of a village] from that we can draw the inference in regard to the rest of the Veda also, that these are 'trustworthy'.

In ordinary parlance also, what is actually trustworthy is the assertion of only such persons as are endowed with the above-mentioned threefold qualification.

The arguments (in support of the trustworthiness of Vedic texts) may be thus formulated: (a) 'Vedic texts are trustworthy,—because they have been asserted by a special Person,—like the Incantations and the Medical Scriptures';—or (b) we may prove the same conclusion on the ground of both (Vedic Texts and Incantations etc.) having the same (ominscient) Expositor,—after having proved this (the authorship of the Ominscient Person) in regard to Incantations and Medical Scriptures by the fact of their bearing upon supernatural things, which fact is not found in the case of other assertions (which are untrustworthy).†

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* '[illegible]' of the Bib. Ind. edition is wrong; as in the next sentence we have [illegible] as found also in the Benares edition. After [illegible], add (in the Bib. Ind. edition) [illegible].

† The words of the *Vārṭika* embodying this arugment are obscure. The *Ṭāṭparya* explains them as referring to the following argument:—'Incantations and Medical Scriptures are the work of an Omniscient Person,—because they deal with supernatural things and are accepted as authoritative by all good men,—texts not composed by an Omniscient person are not found to be so, dwelling with supernatural things and accepted by all good men, as we find in the case of the assertions of Buḍḍha.

Thus the trustworthiness of Incantations etc. having been proved on the ground of their being asserted by an Omniscient person, we can go on to prove that '*all Vedic texts*, are trustworthy, because they are the assertions of an Omniscient person,—like the Incantations and Medical Scriptures.'

[Says the Mīmānsaka]—" Inasmuch as the Veda is eternal, it cannot be true that it is expounded by any Person. That is to say, Vedic texts are eternal, and their trustworthiness is due to their eternality; hence it cannot be true that they are the assertions of a Person."

Vār : P. 274.

This cannot be accepted; for the simple reason that the reason put forward is not itself established. If the eternality of Vedic texts were an established fact, then the reasoning would be all right. But it is not an established fact; hence the reasoning cannot be accepted.*

" If the texts are not eternal, how can they be trustworthy ?"

Words are trustworthy, not because they are eternal, but because they bring about the right cognition of things (expressed by them).†

Some people meet the above reasoning (of the *Mīmāmsaka*) by declaring that—' as a matter of fact no instrument of right cognition is eternal,—so that simply because they are instruments of right cognition, Vedic texts cannot be eternal.'‡ But we do not think this is quite right; as even eternal things constitute ' instruments of Right Cognition '; *e. g.* Mind and Soul; specially as the name ' Instrument of

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In accordance with this interpretation, there should be a stop after [illegible] in the text. This is what has been adopted in the translation.

* It might be urged that if eternality is not established the fact of this being the work of an omniscient person is also not established. But what makes this latter fact a certainty is the fact that it is so accepted by all good men.—*Parishuḍḍhi.*

† For instance, our own words, which cannot be eternal, are trustworthy when what they express is in agreement with the real state of things.

‡ An Instrument of Right Cognition is that which has the very effective action of bringing about the result in the shape of Right Cognition ; while no eternal thing can have any effective action ; so that no Instrument of Right Cognition can be eternal. This is the sense of the view of ' some people ' propounded here.

—*Tāṭparya.*

Right Cognition' denotes the entire group of things that go to constitute it; as a matter of fact, the term 'Instrument of Right Cognition' is applicable to the whole *group*; so that the name 'Instrument of Right Cognition' is applied in actual usage to every one of the several components of their group, eternal as well as non-eternal; for every one of these constitutes an essential factor in the Instrument of Right Cognition; for instance, the *Lamp* also (which is non-eternal) is called an 'Instrument of Cognition'*—similarly eternal things also are Instruments of Right Cognition'; when, for instance, such eternal things as the *Atom* and the like are put forward as proving the existence of other things, these Atom &c., which are eternal, become Instruments of the Right Cognition (of those other things); so that the premiss 'what is an Instrument of Right Cognition is not eternal' is too wide. Hence the answer (given by some people to the reasoning of the Mīmāmsaka propounding the eternality of Vedic texts) is not a right answer at all.

For these reasons the right answer must be as follows:—(I) Vedic texts must be non-eternal, because they are classified according to the purpose served by them, (as pointed out in Sū. 61 *et. seq.*) just like ordinary assertions; that is to say, just as in the case of ordinary assertions we find that they are classified according to the purpose served by them, so do we find in the case of Vedic texts also; and hence these latter cannot be eternal. "Ordinary assertions also are eternal. That is to say, the ordinary assertions that are found to be classified according to the purpose served by them are also eternal."

* The lamp is not eternal; and yet it is called an 'Instrument of Cognition' when it illumines things and makes them perceived. The Soul and Mind are eternal; and yet they also enter into the constitution of every 'Instrument of Cognition; and as such have this name applied to them. So that it is not right to argue that if Vedic texts were eternal, they could not be Instruments of Right Cognition.

How even eternal things are capable of effective action, we shall show in Aḍhyaya III,—says the *Tāṭparya*.

—But in that case no classification according to purpose served would be possible; *i. e.*, if the ordinary assertions were eternal, there could be no classification of them according to the purpose served by them; but such classification is actually found. "Those assertions then may be regarded as non-eternal." In that case, you should point out some special reason; that is to say, when the same conditions are present in the case of both, Vedic Texts and Ordinary Assertions—*viz.*, both are classified according to the purpose served by them, and both are capable of expressing their meanings, —you should show some special reason why the Vedic texts should be regarded as eternal and the Ordinary Assertions as not eternal. "But the same applies to you also; you also should show some special reason why, both assertions being equally non-eternal [Vedic texts should be regarded as *trustworthy*, and not the assertions of untruthful persons]." We have already pointed out this special reason, as consisting in the fact that there is (in the case of Vedic texts and other trustworthy assertions) classification according to the purpose served by them.

(II.) For the following reason also [Vedic Texts should be regarded as non-eternal]—Because they consist of letters; ordinary assertions, consisting of letters, are found to be non-eternal; and Vedic texts also consist of letters; hence these also should be non-eternal.

(III.) For the following reason also:—Because while belonging to a Community and being possessed of specific individualities, Vedic texts are apprehended by the auditory organ,—just like ordinary assertions,—[they must be regarded as non-eternal.]

(IV.) For the following reason also:—Because Vedic texts consist of words, just like ordinary assertions [they must be regarded as non-eternal].

Var. P. 275.

[Says the Mīmāmsaka]—"But the '*ḍarshana*' is '*parārtha*': that is to say, the '*darshana*,'—*i. e.* 'utterance'—of words is for the purpose of making things known to some other person; no one ever utters a word for the purpose of his own cognition. Such being the case, cognition from a word would be possible only if it were eternal; if it were non-eternal, it would be destroyed (would disappear) as soon as produced (uttered); so that each time that a person would hear a word, it would be a new word never heard before; and certainly no cognition could arise from the hearing of an unheard of word (which cannot convey any meaning to him at all); for instance, when an inhabitant of the *Nārikela* Island hears the word 'cow,' never before heard by him, he does not derive from this any cognition of the *animal with the dewlap etc.*, (*i. e.*, the *cow*, denoted by the word). And as for one who holds Words to be non-eternal, all words would be like this (*i. e.*, heard for the first time), there could be no certainty of his deriving any cognition from words."

This reasoning is not right; as the premiss is not true (being too wide); for we find in the case of such momentary things as the Lamp, that they actually do bring about the cognition of things also when coming into existence for the first time. [Similarly words also, when heard for the first time, will bring about the cognition of their meanings.]

"But this is not possible; as the instance you have brought forward is not analogous to the case in question: That is, the *Lamp* is not unconnected*; it is through its connection with the thing lighted by it, that the Lamp renders that thing cognisable; and as Word is not so connected, it cannot bring about the cognition of anything."

But who says that the *unconnected* word expresses anything?

* Read नाप्राप्तं: as in the Benares edition.

"As no such connection (between the Word and its Denotation) is perceived (by the Siḍḍhānṭin, who denies the permanent relationship between words and their denotations, as held by the Mīmāmsaka), no connection would be possible (for him). In fact it has been declared (by the *Siḍḍhānṭin* under Su. 52) that between the Word and its denotation, there can be no such relation as that of *contact.*"

But the relation between the Word and its meaning accepted by us is that of *the denoter and the denoted*; and certainly this relation is (not eternal, but) created (by Convention); and it is known from usage; the world (and its usages) being without beginning. In fact the question [as to how this convention comes to be known and the meaning of words grasped for the first time] should be addressed to those who hold the Word to have had a beginning in time. [For us there can be no such thing as the *first* usage of a word].

"Well, if what you say is true, how do you account for the assertion (current among people) that 'Vedas* are eternal'?"

That assertion is based upon continuity of tradition. That is to say, the same Vedic texts have been handed down by a long tradition extending over several ages—through all such cycles of time as 'Manvanṭara', the 'four Yugas' and the like;—and it is in view of this that ordinary people make such assertions as 'the Vedas are eternal'; just as the assertion 'the mountains and rivers are everlasting' (which is figurative, indicating only relative, not absolute, permanence). Exactly the same is the case with the declarations of Manu and other ancient writers. "But how does it follow that the idea of 'eternality' (of the Veda) is due to the conti-

* वेदाः the reading of the Benares edition is more appropriate, and more in keeping with the *Bhāṣya* and what follows, than 'वर्णाः' of the Bib. Ind. edition.

nuity of tradition, and not to real eternality?" This follows from the fact that the arguments that we have put forward for proving the non-eternality (of Vedic texts) are unassailable; in
Vār. P. 276.
fact these arguments of mine, that have been urged in support of the non-eternality of Vedic texts, are such as cannot be assailed; and as they cannot be assailed, the conclusion is that when one speaks of the 'eternality of Vedas' it is a figurative expression,—'eternality' standing for 'continuity of tradition.'

Thus ends the First Daily Lesson of the Second Discourse of Uḍḍyoṭkara's *Vārṭika* on the *Nyāya-sūṭra*.

Discourse II.

Second Daily Lesson.

Section (1).

The Exact Number of Pramāṇas.

[Sūṭras 1—12].

Bhāṣya on Sū. (1).

[P. 100, L. 6 to L. 16.]

The Opponent, thinking that the division of 'Instruments of Right Cognition' (into Perception, Inference, Analogy and Word) is not right, urges the following objection—

Sūṭra (1).

"THE NUMBER (OF INSTRUMENTS OF RIGHT COGNITION) CANNOT BE FOUR (ONLY); AS TRADITION, PRESUMPTION, DEDUCTION AND ANTITHESIS ARE ALSO INSTRUMENTS OF COGNITION."*—Sū. 1).

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* The connection between the two Daily Lessons is thus explained by the *Parishuḍḍhi*—The First Daily Lesson having discussed the nature of the four Pramāṇas themselves, the Second Daily Lesson proceeds to discuss certain characteristics,—in the shape of their exact number &c.—of those Pramāṇas. The *Parishuḍḍhi* goes on to refer to the objection raised by a writer of the name of *Shrivaṭsa*, to the effect that the first Daily Lesson, by showing that the four Pramāṇas are mutually exclusive, has practically settled the question of their exact number also. The answer to this is that, what has been shown in the foregoing Daily Lesson is only the correctness and mutually exclusive character of the *definitions* of the *four* Pramāṇas; and nothing has been said in regard to the possibility of there being other Pramāṇas than these four.

"There are not only *four* Instruments of Cognition; "in fact there are four more, in the shape of Tradition, "Presumption, Deduction and Antithesis; why have not these "been mentioned?

"(A) When there is a regular handing down of the assertion of a certain fact, in the form 'so they say', and the "exact person who asserted the fact is not definitely known, "we have a means of cognition which is called 'Tradition.'

"(B) 'Presumption' consists in the '*āpaṭṭi*', *presuming* "(of a fact) *on the basis of another fact*, '*arṭhāṭ*';—'*āpaṭṭi*' "is *getting at*, i.e., *implication*; when a certain fact having "been asserted, another fact is *implied*, we have the means "of cognition called 'Presumption.' E.g. when it is asserted that 'there is no rain when there are no clouds', what "is *implied* is that 'there *is* rain when there are clouds.'*

"(C) When the cognition of the presence of one thing "follows from the cognition of another thing, which is invariably concomitant with the former, we have the means of "cognition called 'Deduction'; e. g.; from the cognition of "the presence of the 'Quarter Maund' follows that of the "presence of the measure of 'Two Seers and a Half'; and "from this latter there follows the cognition of the presence "of the 'Seer'.

"(D) 'Antithesis' is *contrast*, as between what *exists* "and what does *not exist*;† (we have this as a means of "cognition) when the *non-existent* action of *raining* brings "about the cognition of the *existence* of the connection of the "clouds with high winds; as it is only when there is some "such obstruction, as the connection of the cloud with high "winds, that there is no *falling* of the raindrops, which "would otherwise be there by reason of the force of gravity "in the drops."

The *Bhāṣya* has taken the argument urged in Sū. 1 as emanating from one who actually admits these additional four Pramāṇas [e. g. the *Paurāṇikas*, who alone postulate *eight* Pramāṇas]; the *Vārṭika* suggests that it may be taken simply as coming from an honest enquirer, who has seen these additional Pramāṇas being posited by others, and as such has his doubts as to the exact number of Pramāṇas.

The *Bhāṣyachandra* says that what the *sūṭra* is meant to put forward is the view that there are *eight pramāṇas*.

* The 'potency' of the cause consists in its *presence*; so when it is *not present*, the absence of the potency of the cause leads to the non-appearance of the effect—*Bhāṣyachandra*.

† So that this is not mere negation—says the *Bhāṣyachandra*.

Vārṭika on Sū. (1).

[P. 276, L. 7 to P. 276, L. 2.]

Perception, Inference, Analogy and Word are the Instruments of Cognition—says the Sūṭra (1. 1. 3); and it is this assertion that is objected to here, by the Sūtra—"*The number of Instruments of Cognition cannot be four only, as Tradition, Presumption, Deduction and Antithesis are also Instruments of Cognition.*" This is thus explained (by the *Bhāṣya*)—"*There are not only four Instruments of Cognition;* "*in fact there are four more, in the shape of Tradition, Pre*" *sumption, Deduction and Antithesis.*"

[Having briefly explained the purport of the *Section*, according to the *Bhāṣya*, the *Vārṭika* offers four other explanations]—(a) It is for the purpose of setting aside doubts on the point (of the exact number of Pramāṇas) that Tradition and the rest are put forward and then rejected; there are people who hold that Perception &c., and also Tradition &c., are *Pramāṇas*, so that an enquirer who knows this and has heard what Gauṭama has said under Sū. 1-1-3 will have doubts as to whether Gauṭama has intentionally omitted to mention *Tradition* &c., which are real Pramāṇas, or these are not real Pramāṇas at all. (b) Or the section may be taken as serving the purpose of showing that there is no deficiency in the assertion (made by Gauṭama in Sū. 1. 1. 3);—if it were a fact that Tradition and the rest, though real Pramāṇas, have been omitted (by Sū. 1-1-3), the Treatise would be wanting in the declaration of something that should be declared. (C) Or, [if Tradition &c. are not real Prāmaṇas, then] by not pointing out the imperfections in those that *are* imperfect (as Instruments of Cognition), the Treatise would be wanting in the mention of defects that should be mentioned; hence in the present section, the Author mentions these and then rejects them; if the explanation of the omission (in

Sū. 1-1-3) be that Tradition and the rest are beset with imperfections, and hence have not been mentioned (as Instruments of Cognition enumerated under Su. 1-1-3),—then it becomes necessary that these imperfections should be pointed out; if they were not pointed out, the Treatise would be deficient, in not indicating defects that should have been indicated;—and it is with a view to avoid this deficiency (of the Treatise), that the present *Section* has been propounded (by Gautama). (D) Or, the section may be taken as being for the purpose of showing that Tradition and the rest are already included under the 'Perception' &c. already mentioned; *i. e.*, to show how Tradition &c. are already included under Perception &c., the present Section is propounded for the purpose of indicating under which one of the former four (Perception &c.), each of the latter four (Tradition &c.) are included.

Vār. P. 277.

[A preliminary objection is raised against the whole section]—"As this has already been accomplished, there "should be no propounding of the present Section; that "is, the fact that the number of Instruments of Cognition is "*four* only having been already proved in the Sūṭra (1-1-3) "that has enumerated them,—there should have been no "further attempt to accomplish what has already been "accomplished."*

The further attempt is by no means superfluous; as the purpose of actually restricting (the number to four only) is accomplished by the present Section; it is in this present Section that the Author explains the reason by which it is proved that the number of Instruments of Cognition is *four* only; so that it is absolutely necessary to proceed with this section.†

* Even though the restriction of the number to four only is not found in the Sūṭra,—which only says that 'Perception &c. are Instruments of Cognition',—yet it is enough if it is implied in the Sūṭra, and brought out clearly by the commentators.—*Tāṭparya*.

† It is true that the *Sūṭra* should leave many things only implied; but sometimes the implication may not be quite explicit; and in such cases it is necessary

[Having finished with its introductory remarks on the whole Section, the *Vārṭika* proceeds to explain the *Pūrvapakṣa* propounded in Sū. 1.].—

"(A) What is 'Tradition'? When there is a regular "handing down of an assertion in the form 'so the old men "say', we have what is called 'Tradition'. (B) 'Pre-"sumption' consists in presuming something, on the "basis of a certain fact; *i. e.*, when a certain fact having "been asserted, if another fact is implied, we have 'Presump-"tion'; *e. g.* the fact having been asserted that 'when there "are no clouds there is no rain', what is implied is that "'there *is* rain when there are clouds'. (C) We have 'De-"duction', when the cognition of the presence of one thing "arises from the cognition of another thing which is invari-"ably concomitant with the former; *e. g.* when the existence "of the measure of Two Seers and a Half is deduced from "the cognition of the Quarter-Maund measure. (D) "We have 'Antithesis,' when the cognition of one thing "leads to the cognition of its contrary; *e. g.*, when there "is an obstacle in the shape of *the connection of clouds with* "*high winds*, the effect of Gravity is counteracted, and there "is no falling (due to gravity) of the rain-drops; so that "when it is found that no rain-drops fall, one recognises "the presence of its opponent in the shape of the connection "of clouds with high winds."

Bhāṣya on Sū. (2).

[P. 100, L. 16 to P. 101, L. 10].

[The answer to the above *Pūrvapakṣa* is that] it is quite true that Tradition and the rest are 'Instruments of Cognition'; but it does not follow that they are distinct Instruments of Cognition, (quite apart from those enumerated

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for the Sūṭra to bring it out clearly; specially as in such cases, it may be doubtful if the commentators will succeed in getting at what the Sūṭra implies.—*Ṭāṭparya.*

in Sū. 1-1-3). In fact the denial (in the foregoing Sūṭra) of the fourfoldness of Instruments of Cognition is based upon the assumption that Tradition and the rest are distinct (from Perception &c.) ;—and this

IS NOT A CORRECT DENIAL ; AS 'TRADITION' IS NOT DIFFERENT FROM 'WORD'; AND 'PRESUMPTION', 'DEDUCTION AND 'ANTITHESIS' ARE NOT DIFFERENT FROM 'INFERENCE.'—Sū. (2).

The said denial of fourfoldness cannot be right. "Why?" 'Word' having been defined as 'the assertion of a reliable person', this definition does not fail to include 'Tradition';* so that the *difference* (between the two, which the opponent relies upon) is found to be engulfed in *non-difference*. Then again, 'Inference' consists in the cognising, through the perceptible, of the imperceptible related to it; and precisely, the same is the case also with 'Presumption', 'Deduction' and 'Antithesis'. What happens in the case of 'Presumption' is that—on our cognising what is asserted by a certain sentence, there arises the cognition of what is not asserted by it,—this cognition being due to the relation of 'opposition', (*negative concomitance*, subsisting between what is asserted and what is not asserted); and this is only a case 'Inference'. Similarly what happens in the case of 'Deduction' is that, the Composite and the Component being related to each other by the relation of invariable concomitance, the cognition of the former gives rise to the cognition of the latter; and this is only a case of 'Inference'. Lastly, (what happens in the case of 'Antithesis' is that) it being found that of two things, while one is present the other cannot be present,—and thus the two being recognised as *contraries*,—if it is found that a certain effect does not come about (even when the necessary cause is there), we conclude that there must be something obstructing the cause (this something being what is *contrary* to the effect); and this is pure 'Inference'.

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* Unless the Tradition is known to have originally emanated from a reliable person, it is not accepted as a valid means of cognition; and when it is known to proceed from a reliable person, it is exactly on the same footing as 'Word'.—*Tāṭparya.*

Thus we conclude that the said division of the Instruments of Cognition (into *four*) is quite right.

Vārṭika on Sū. (2).

[P. 277, L. 14 to P. 279, 4].

As a matter of fact, 'Tradition' and the rest, as described by the *Pūrvapakṣin*, are included in those already mentioned (in Sū. 1-1-3); and it is for this reason that they have not been mentioned separately. Another reason why they have not been separately dealt with lies in the fact that there is no subject for these; that is to say, as a matter of fact, there is nothing, apart from what forms the subject of Perception &c., that could form the subject of Tradition and the rest; so that they cannot be regarded as distinct Instruments of Cognition. If you think that they must be distinct because they serve distinct purposes,—in that case you should reject the number *eight*; that is to say, you have held that the number of Instruments of Cognition should be *eight* (not *four*); and this will have to be rejected if you admit that the diversity of Instruments of Cognition is due to the diversity in the purposes served by them; for in the first place such a premiss would be too wide, in view of the fact that several purposes are found to be served by a *single* instrument; for instance, the eye alone brings about the apprehension of several colours, in the shape of the Blue and the rest. [So that even though the purposes served by the Instruments of Cognition be diverse, the number of those Instruments themselves may be *one* only, not *eight*];—or the organ (of the eye) would also have to be regarded as several! If you hold that diversity is due to the diversity of purposes served, a single sense-organ should be regarded as diverse.' *

* There can be no such comprehensive and water-tight classes of 'purposes' which could serve as the means of excluding one kind of Instrument of Cognition

If you argue that a sense-organ is regarded as *one* only, because of the fact that there is no diversity in the objects (perceived by its means), included as they are under a single 'community' [*i.e.*, for instance, all colours are *one*, inasmuch as they are all included under the single community of 'Colour'],—then, in that case, it is not for you to deny the fourfoldness of the Instruments of Cognition on the ground of Tradition, Presumption Deduction and Antithesis being means of cognition.*

"If Tradition &c. are not distinct Instruments of Cognition, it behoves you to point out under which Instruments of Cognition they are included".

The present Sūtra shows under what they are included :—'*Tradition' is not different from 'Word', &c. &c. &c.*—says the Sūtra. 'Tradition' is included under 'Word', as it has the same characteristics ; the characteristics of the Instrument of Cognition known as 'Word' are such as are not absent from 'Tradition'; hence the supposed *difference becomes engulfed in non-difference.* 'Presumption', 'Deduction' and 'Antithesis' are all included under 'Inference'; because they have the same character as 'Inference.' "How is Presumption included under Inference?" It is so included, for what forms the subject of Presumption is the affirmation of one thing on the basis of the denial of another thing

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from another ; so that each 'purpose' standing by itself, there should be as many Instruments as there are cognitions ; and thus their number will be not *eight*, but *endless.*—*Tātparya.*

* Just as in the case of the eye, it is regarded as one because the objects apprehended by its means are included under one comprehensive concept of 'colour', So 'Perception' would be one, as apprehending things having the common character of being in contact with sense-organs. 'Inference' would be one, as apprehending all things falling under the community of things related by concomitance ; Verbal cognition would be one, as apprehending things falling within the community of being related to words ; and Analogical cognition would be one, bearing upon things having the common character of being related by the relation of name and named. And as these four would exhaust all possible objects of Cognition, any denial of the fourfold division would be wrong.—*Tātparya.*

(the two things being mutually exclusive); that is to say, when between two things (mutually exclusive) one is denied, what is meant to be implied is the affirmation of the other; *e. g.* when there is the denial 'the man does not eat in the day,' what is implied is the affirmation 'he eats at night'.

Some people object to this example of 'Presumption'; they argue thus:—"The denial 'he does not eat in the day' does not necessarily lead to the said Presumption; because the said denial can mean two things—'he does not *only eat* in the day' and 'he does not eat in the *day only*'; and as it can mean both of these, it cannot be right to *presume*, on the basis of the said denial, that 'he eats at night.'*

This reasoning however is not right; for what is urged is an impossibility: the said denial simply cannot mean that 'he does not *only eat* in the day', for the simple reason that the fact of the man doing nothing else but eating is rejected by its sheer improbability [and as such does not stand in need of being denied at all]; it is never possible for any person to do nothing else but eat during the day; as even while the man is eating, he is not *only eating*, [he is doing many other such acts as sitting, seeing, smelling, &c.],—what to say of the time at which he is not eating? Thus then, the fact of the man not *only eating* in the day being already rejected by its sheer improbability, the denial 'he does not eat in the day' must be taken simply as denying the *time* of eating; or, if this meaning were not accepted, the denial would be absolutely meaningless; *the denial of other acts* (which would be the only other meaning possible) is rejected by its sheer improbability, and the

* If the meaning is that 'he does not eat during the day only',—in that case it would be right to presume from this that 'he eats at night.' But the other meaning is also possible—that 'he does not only eat in the day'; and this means that 'during the day he does not eat only, but he does many other things'; and certainly this does not imply that 'he eats at night.'—*Tāṭparya.*

denial of the particular time you do not accept; and so [these being the only two meanings possible] the denial becomes absolutely meaningless. "Well, let it be meaningless; what harm does that do us?" It would mean the rejection of what has been accepted by you. "What is it that has been accepted by us?" That the denial is of the negation of other acts,* and not of the particular time; and certainly if the sentence means this, it cannot be *meaningless*.

Vār. P. 279. Thus then it is found that inasmuch as Presumption consists in the affirmation of one thing on the basis of the denial of another, it is only a case of Inference. "Which kind of Inference is it?" It falls under the '*Sāmānyaṭodṛiṣṭa*' Inference.

The same reasonings are applicable to 'Deduction' and 'Antithesis' also; 'Deduction' is only Inference, and so is 'Antithesis'; as has been already explained; both of these also are included under '*Sāmānyaṭodṛiṣṭa*' Inference.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (3).
[P. 101, L. 10 to L. 14].

[Says the Opponent]—"It has been asserted (in the "Bhāṣya, P. 100, ll. 14-15) that *it is true that Tradition and* "*the rest are Instruments of Cognition; but it does not follow* "*that they are distinct Instruments of Cognition*;—now this "admits that Tradition &c. are real means of Cognition; but "this admission is not right; as

"PRESUMPTION CANNOT BE A TRUE INSTRUMENT OF "COGNITION, AS IT IS UNCERTAIN (NOT ALWAYS TRUE)". (Sū. 3).

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* The term क्रियान्तराविप्रतिषेधे: must mean 'the denial of the *negation* of other actions'; the compound as it stands, appears to have a sense quite contrary to this; hence the *Ṭāṭparya* interprets it as follows—भोजनक्रियायाः यत् 'अन्तरम्' विशेषः क्रियान्तरविशिष्टम् 'भुङ्क्ते' इति, तस्य प्रतिषेधः. The correct reading is क्रियान्तराप्रतिषेधो न कालप्रतिषेध : as in the Benares edition.

" From the assertion—' there is no rain when there are " no clouds '—it is presumed that ' there is rain when there " are clouds '; as a matter of fact however, sometimes it so " happens that even though clouds are present there is no " rain; so that Presumption is not always a true Instrument " of Right Cognition."

Vārṭika on Sū. (3).

[P. 279, L. 4 to L. 11].

" You hold* that Tradition and the rest have not been " mentioned separately because they are already included in " those already mentioned; and the *Bhāṣya* has also said that " *it is true that Tradition and the rest are Instruments of* " *Cognition &c. &c., but this admission is not right*; because " *Presumption cannot be a true Instrument of Right Cognition* " *&c. &c.*—says the Sūṭra. The Presumption which you hold " to be an Instrument of Right Cognition is not a true means " of cognition; *i. e.* at times it does not bring about the " right cognition of things; *e. g.* from the assertion—' there " is no rain when there are no clouds '—it is sought to be " presumed that 'there is rain when there are clouds'; " but as a matter of fact, sometimes it so happens that there " is no rain, even though clouds are present; so that the " presumption is not always true."

Bhāṣya on Sū. (4).

[P. 101, L. 14 to P. 102, L. 7].

[Our answer to the above objection is as follows]—There is no uncertainty attaching to Presumption;—

IT IS ON ACCOUNT OF WHAT IS NOT PRESUMPTION BEING REGARDED AS PRESUMPTION [THAT THERE ARISES THE IDEA OF ITS BEING NOT ALWAYS TRUE].

[What the particular instance of Presumption cited is meant to indicate is the general principle that] from the assertion that 'when the cause † is absent the effect is not

* Both editions read मन्यसे; and the only way to construe it is to take the Introduction to the *Pūrvapakṣa Sūṭra* as beginning with 'यदेवं.'

† The *Bhāṣyachandra* explains this as standing for the whole set of causes necessary to bring about the effect.

produced', we presume its obverse that 'when the cause is present the effect is produced'; ‡*existence* being the obverse of *non-existence*; and certainly this presumption of the production of the effect when the cause is present is never found to fail in any single case of the *presence of the cause*; that is, there is not a single case in which the effect is produced when the cause is *not present*; so that Presumption cannot be regarded as uncertain or *not always true*. As for a certain contingency under which, even when the cause (clouds) is present, the effect (rain) does not appear, by reason of the causal operation being obstructed by something (high winds, for instance),—this is a characteristic of all causes; and this is not what forms the subject of Presumption. "What is it that forms its subject?". The principle that 'the effect is produced when the cause is present'; *i. e.*, that the production of the effect is never unconcomitant with the presence of the cause,—this is what forms the subject of Presumption. Such being the fact, it is clear that when the Opponent denies the truth of Presumption, he regards as Presumption what is not real Presumption. The characteristic of all causes (mentioned above) is what is actually seen, and hence cannot be denied.

Vārṭika on Sū. (4).

[P. 279, L. 11 to P. 280, L. 6].

[Before explaining the answer given by the *Sūṭra* and the *Bhāṣya*, the *Vārṭika* offers its own answer]—If your denial is meant to apply to all Presumptions, then the 'uncertainty' (that you put forward as your reason) is such as is not present in the whole 'subject'; *i. e.*, if you make all 'Presumption' the 'subject' of your reasoning, then, as a matter of fact, it cannot be true that every Presumption is 'uncertain' [so that your premiss itself is untrue]. If, on the other hand, you have for your 'subject' only such Presumption as *is* 'uncertain',—then, in the first place, we would admit your conclusion; for we also hold that *uncertain*

‡ The *Bhāṣyachanḍra* explains '*bhāva*' and '*abhāva*' as standing for *bhūṭa* and *abhūṭa*. But it is distinctly better to take the terms in their ordinary *abstract* sense. The reading of the printed text is not right; the right reading is अभावस्यहि भावः as found in the Puri Mss. and also in *Bhāṣyachanḍra*.

Presumption ' is not a true Instrument of Right Cognition'; but as a matter of fact, in that case there will be no valid ' probans ' available for you (whereby to prove your conclusion); as what you do put forward as your probans (viz: ' uncertainty ') would form a qualifying factor of the Proposition itself; *i. e.*, your Proposition being in the form ' the *uncertain Presumption* is not a true Instrument of Right Cognition ', there is nothing that could be put forward as the Probans. So that the said assertion cannot be put forward as a ' Proposition ' either; firstly because there is no Probans to prove it, and secondly because it implies an admission that involves self-contradiction on your part; that is to say, when you assert that ' the *uncertain* Presumption is not a true Instrument of Cognition ', you admit that the *certain* Presumption *is* a true Instrument of Cognition; [which contradicts your original proposition that no Presumption is a true Instrument of Cognition]. Lastly, any such assertion as that 'the *uncertain* Presumption is not a true Instrument of Cognition ' is absolutely futile [as no one ever holds such Presumption to be a true Instrument of Cognition].

Even that particular instance of Presumption (cited in the *Bhāṣya*) which you have in mind is not *uncertain*; for there arises the idea of ' uncertainty ' because what is not Presumption is regarded as Presumption,—says the Sūtra.

Vār. P. 280. As a matter of fact, no ' uncertainty ' attaches to this Presumption. The Presumption being that ' there is rain when there are clouds '; in what way can this be ' uncertain ' ? Specially as what it means is only that ' there is rain when there are clouds'; and *not* that ' whenever there are clouds there is bound to be rain '. In cases where, even when clouds are present there is no rain, this is due to some obstruction in the operation of the cause (of rain); and certainly this does not form the object of Presumption; the subject of Presumption being that ' the effect appears

when the cause is present',—how could this be ever 'uncertain'? It could be 'uncertain', only if ever an effect appeared without its cause; but as a matter of fact such is never found to be the case; so that it can never be regarded as 'uncertain'.

Sūṭra (5).

FURTHER, THE DENIAL ITSELF IS INVALID,—BEING UNCERTAIN (NOT UNIVERSALLY TRUE).—(Sūṭra 5).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (5).

[P. 102, L. 9 to L. 11].

The denial (by the opponent) is in the form of the sentence "Presumption cannot be a true Instrument of Cognition, as it is uncertain" (Sū. 3); and what this denies is only the fact of Presumption being a true Instrument of Cognition; it does not deny the *existence* of Presumption*; and as such this denial itself becomes 'uncertain'; being 'uncertain', it is invalid; and being invalid, it cannot serve the purpose of (rightly) denying anything.†

Vārṭika on Sū. (5).

[P. 280, L. 9 to L. 13].

The denial is invalid &c. &c.—says the Sūṭra. The denial that you propound—"Presumption cannot be regarded as a true Instrument of Cognition, because it is uncertain"—is itself *uncertain*, not universally true; inasmuch as it does not deny the existence; i. e. this denial does not deny the existence of Presumption. "But, how do you know that is does not deny its existence?" We know this because it denies a particular fact in regard to Presumption, and not all Presumption itself: So that not denying the existence of Presumption (and admitting thereby that there is some *true* Presumption), the denial becomes 'uncertain'.

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* That is, not the form of 'Presumption' itself—says the *Bhāṣyachanḍra*.

† The denial would be *certain* only if it were in the form 'there is no such thing as Presumption'; but this denial of the existence of a thing, on the basis of its being 'uncertain' would not be true; for certainly what is uncertain does not cease to exist; for instance, even though 'knowability' is uncertain as proving 'eternality', it is not non-existent.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (6).
[P. 102, L. 11 to L. 16].

You might argue as follows:—"Particular assertions relate to only certain subjects; and their 'certainty' or 'uncertainty' also can be in relation to those particular subjects only; and in the case in question the mere *existence* (of Presumption) is not the subject of our denial [hence any 'certainty' relating to that *existence* cannot affect the validity of our denial]."

To this our answer would be as follows:—

Sūṭra (6).

IF THE DENIAL IS VALID, THERE CAN BE NO INVALIDITY IN PRESUMPTION.—Sū. (6).

Of Presumption also what forms the subject is the fact that 'the appearance of the effect is never inconcomitant with the existence of the cause'; and not that the said concomitance is a character of the cause [*i. e.*, it does not mean that whenever the cause is present, the effect *must appear*]; because as a matter of fact the cause does *not* produce the effect when there is an obstacle to its operation.

Vārṭika on Sū. (6).

You might argue as follows:—"Mere existence (of Presumption) is not the subject of our denial; what it denies "is the fact of Presumption being a true Instrument of "Cognition; so that when bearing upon its own subject the "denial cannot be invalid; for that alone can be regarded "as invalid which is found to be applicable to its own sub-"ject as well as to other things like that subject; and no "such invalidity can belong to the denial of the fact of "Presumption being a valid Instrument of Cognition. "Hence our denial cannot be regarded as invalid."

Our answer to this is as follows:—*If the denial is valid, there can be no invalidity in Presumption*—(says the Sūṭra). If you think that that alone is invalid which is applicable to its own subject as well as to other things like that subject, then Presumption

Vār. P. 281.

also is not invalid; as a matter of fact, no effect is ever found to be produced while its cause is non-existent [and if such were ever found to be the case, then alone could Presumption be said to be invalid].

This *Sūṭra* is simply meant to urge the self-contradiction involved (in the position of the opponent); the sense being that in making the two assertions—'that alone is invalid which subsists in things other than its own subject' and 'Presumption is invalid'—the Opponent contradicts himself.

Or, the *Sūṭra* may be taken as bringing home to the Opponent his *ignorance*; the sense being that without knowing what is meant by 'invalidity' (*not being always true*) you are making the assertion that "Presumption cannot be regarded as a valid Instrument of Cognition, as it is not always true" (Sū. 3); and such being the case, we shall treat your assertion with indifference; the rambling words of a lunatic need not be heeded.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (7).

[P. 102, L. 17 to P. 103, L. 3].

[Having failed in regard to Presumption, the Opponent next directs his attack against the validity of 'Antithesis']—"Well, then, what you have said (*Bhāṣya*, P. 100 Ll 16-17) admits the validity of 'Antithesis' as an Instrument of (Cognition); and this is not right. Why? "Because,

"ANTITHESIS CANNOT BE REGARDED AS A VALID INSTRUMENT OF COGNITION; AS THERE IS NOTHING THAT CAN BE THE OBJECT OF COGNITION BY ITS MEANS."—(Sū. 7).

[Our answer to this is as follows]—As a matter of fact there are many things that are found, in ordinary experience, to be the objects of Cognition by means of 'Antithesis'; and in view of this fact, it is through sheer audacity that you make the assertion that "Antithesis cannot be regarded as a valid Instrument of Cognition, *as there is nothing that can be the object of cognition by its means.*"

Vārṭika on Sū. (7).

[P. 281, L. 6 to L. 9.]

" Antithesis cannot be regarded as a valid Instrument of
" Cognition ; as it can have no object ; that which has no
" object cannot be an Instrument of Cognition ; *e. g.*, the
" word ' cow ' is not an Instrument of the Cognition of the
" Horse (simply because the Horse is not its object); and as
" *Antithesis* is found to have no object, it cannot be a valid
" Instrument of Cognition."

But who has ever said that *Antithesis* is an Instrument of Cognition ; what we mean is that the *conception* of *Antithesis* is an Instrument of Cognition, as by means of this conception things are cognised And when asked as to what is the object of this conception—we say ' it is Antithesis.'*

Bhāṣya on Sū. (8).

[P. 103, L. 3 to L. 9].

Of the vast number of things (cognised by means of Antithesis), a portion is exemplified:—

Suṭrā (8).

CERTAIN THINGS BEING MARKED, THOSE NOT MARKED, BEING CHARACTERISED BY THE ABSENCE OF THAT MARK, COME TO BE REGARDED AS THE OBJECT OF COGNITION BY THE SAID MEANS (OF ANTITHESIS).—SŪ. (8).

That is to say, those things become the objects of cognition by means of ' Antithesis ' or ' Negation'. " How so ? " When certain things—some pieces of cloth, which are indicated as not required—are marked, those (pieces of cloth) that are indicated as required and are not similarly marked are characterised by the absence of that mark ; *i. e.*, they are recognised by the absence of that mark. So

* So that by saying that ' Antithesis is an Instrument of Cognition what is meant is that the cognition of things is brought about by means of the conception of Antithesis. And this cannot be denied.

that when both (the marked and the unmarked pieces) are present, and a man is asked to 'bring the unmarked pieces of cloth', he recognises the unmarked pieces by the *absence* of the mark in them; and having recognised them, he brings them. And an 'Instrument of Cognition' is only that which brings about cognition [so that as bringing about the 'cognition' of the required pieces of cloth, the *negation* of marks must be regarded as an Instrument of Cognition].

Vārṭika on Sū. (8).
[P. 281, L. 9 to L. 17].

The Sūṭra (8) is meant to show just one instance out of the large number of cases where cognition is brought about by the instrumentality of Negation. *Certain things being marked* &c. &c.—says the *Suṭra*. When a man is asked to 'bring the unmarked pieces of cloth',—and he finds there both marked and unmarked pieces,—it is by means of the *absence of mark* in them that he recognises those in which he does not see the mark; and thus his cognition being in conformity with the directions he has received, he brings up the pieces he has recognised. And an 'Instrument of Cognition' is only that which is the means of a thing being cognised. From all this the conclusion is that Negation is a real Instrument of Cognition.

Sūṭra (9).

IF IT BE URGED THAT—"WHEN THE THING IS NON-EXISTENT, THERE CAN BE NO ANTITHESIS (OR NEGATION) OF IT"—OUR ANSWER IS THAT THIS IS NOT RIGHT, AS IT IS POSSIBLE FOR THE THING TO EXIST ELSEWHERE.—(SŪ. 9).

Bhāṣya on Sū. 9.
[P. 103, L. 11 to L. 14].

[The Opponent says]—"Where a certain thing, having " existed, ceases to exist, there alone its antithesis is possible; " in the case of the unmarked cloth-pieces however (where " the marks have never existed), the marks have not * ceased " to exist after having existed there; so that any antithesis " of the marks is not possible in this case."

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* The printed text reads लक्षणानि भूत्वा न भवन्ति. But the sense requires न न भवन्ति, as found in the Puri MS.

Our answer to this is that *this is not right, as it is possible for the thing to exist elsewhere.* That is to say, what happens is that the man (asked to bring the unmarked cloths) sees the presence of marks in certain pieces, and does not perceive it in others,—so that perceiving the absence (antithesis, 'previous negation', non-appearance) of the marks in these latter, he cognises, by means of this antithesis, the thing required (*i. e.*, the *unmarked* cloths).*

Vārṭika on Sū. (9).

[P. 281, L. 18 to P. 282, L. 3].

If it be urged &c.—says the Sūṭra. This is perhaps what you (the Pūrvapakṣin) mean—"Where a thing exists, there alone its antithesis is possible; in the unmarked cloths the marks have never existed; so that there can be no antithesis of them there. †"

Our answer is that this is not right; as what you urge is due to your ignorance; apparently you have
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not grasped our meaning. We do not say that a thing is non-existent where it exists; what we do say is that when the man perceives the *marked* cloths, he recognises others as characterised by the *absence of marks.* So that the objection urged by the *Pūrvapakṣin* is entirely baseless. This is what is meant when the Sūṭra says—*this is not right, as it is possible for the thing to exist elsewhere.*

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* This is what the *Pūrvapakṣin* has in view—"The idea of negation is dependent upon previous *existence*; so that where the marks have never existed, how can you conceive of their negation?" This objection proceeds on the supposition that there is only one kind of Negation—in the form of 'destruction,' where the thing ceases to exist, *after having existed.* But it is forgotten that there is also such a negation as Previous Negation, the absence of a thing *before it comes into existence*; both these negations are perceptible; for instance, when we see the milk we perceive in it the *negation of curds*, which is 'previous' negation; and when the milk has been made into curds, we perceive there the *negation of milk*, which is 'destruction'.—*Ṭāṭparya.*

† Both editions read तत्र न भवन्तीति ; but what is required is न भवतीति ; as it refers to अभावः ।

Sūṭra: (10).

[SAYS THE OPPONENT]—"THE PRESENCE OF THE MARK (IN THE UNMARKED THINGS) CANNOT BE THE MEANS (OF ANY COGNITION) IN REGARD TO THE UNMARKED THINGS." *

Bhāṣya on Sū. (10).

[P. 103, L. 16 to L. 18].

"The presence of the marks is in the *marked* cloths; "and the antithesis is not of these marks; in fact the "antithesis of those marks present in the marked cloths is "in the *unmarked* cloths; and this antithesis cannot be the "means (of any cognition). Those that are present, to speak "of the antithesis of those would involve contradiction in "terms." †

Vārṭika on Sū. (10).

[P. 282, L. 5 to L. 6].

"*The presence of the marks &c. &c.*—says the Sūṭra. "Those marks that are present in the marked cloths cannot "be non-existent ‡ for any person; and those that are pre-"sent, to speak of their negation involves contradiction in "terms."

Sūṭra (11).

THIS IS NOT RIGHT §; AS THE POSSIBILITY (OF THE COGNITION) IS IN VIEW OF THE ACTUAL PRESENCE OF THE MARKS (ELSEWHERE)—(Sū. 11).

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* This rendering is more in conformity with the wording of the Sūṭra, than the following,—which is in accordance with the construction put upon the Suṭra by the *Bhāṣya* and the *Vārṭika*—"The marks existing in the marked things, this antithesis in the unmarked things cannot be the means of any cognition." The sense remains very much the same in both cases.

This Sūṭra is not found in the Puri Sūṭra-MS.

† Where the marks are present, there you cannot conceive of their antithesis; as this would involve a contradiction in terms; while where they are never present, there it is impossible to conceive of their antithesis; as antithesis or negation presupposes previous existence. So that no such 'antithesis' being conceivable, it cannot be regarded as an Instrument of Cognition—*Ṭāṭparya*.

‡ The Benares edition rightly supplies an additional च.

§ Having omitted the preceding *Pūrvapakṣa* Sūṭra, the Puri MS. of the Sūṭra text omits this च here.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (11).

[P. 103, L. 20 to L. 22].

We do not say that there is antithesis (absence, non-existence) of those marks that are present (in that same thing where the antithesis is conceived of); what we say is that the marks being present in some and not present in other things, when a person, looking for the marks, does not find them present in these latter things, these things he comes to recognise by means of that *absence* (antithesis) of the marks. [So that the absence becomes the means of the cognition of those things]*.

Vārṭika on Sū. (11).

[P. 282, L. 9 to L. 11].

This is not right &c. &c.—says the Sūṭra. We do not say that there is antithesis of the marks in that same thing where they are present; what we say is that in view of the presence of the marks in certain things, one comes to know certain other things where the marks are absent,—and this knowledge is got at by means of the negation (of the marks).

Sūṭra (12).

THEN AGAIN, THE ANTITHESIS OF A THING IS POSSIBLE BEFORE IT COMES INTO EXISTENCE.—(SŪ. 12).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (12).

[P. 104, L. 2 to L. 4].

As a matter of fact, there are two kinds of Antithesis; one consisting in the non-existence of the thing before it has come into existence, and another consisting in its non-existence, after having come into existence, due to its destruction;—now the 'Antithesis' of the marks that there is in the *unmarked*

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*[For Antithesis being a means of cognition, all that is necessary is that there should be an idea of the Antithesis, and not that the antithesis should actually *be* there; and as a matter of fact the idea of the negation or absence of marks in one thing can very well be due to, and in relation to, the presence of those marks in something else; this idea being in this form—'the marks that [are present in *those* things over there, are not present in *these* things,—so these are the *unmarked* things that I want.'

things is that of the former kind,—that consisting in their non-existence before they have come into existence; and not of the other kind [so that the objection urged in Sū. 9 does not lie with our view at all].

Vārṭika on Sū. (12).

[P. 282, L. 14 to L. 19].

The Antithesis of a thing is possible &c. &c.—says the Sūṭra. There are two kinds of Antithesis,—that consisting in the non-existence of the thing before it comes into existence, and the other, due to the destruction of the thing, consisting in its non-existence after it has come into existence. Of these two, the Antithesis of this latter kind,—*i. e.* Destruction,—is not possible of the marks in the Cloths, where they have never existed; but the other kind is quite conceivable*.

In reality, the objections urged in Sū. 9 and 10 are both of the nature of Casuistry; the right answer to all Casuistry has been provided by us under Sū. 1-2-12 (*Vārṭika*, text, P. 179); where we have shown that if the Casuistry is urged knowingly (intentionally), it is open to the charge of being *irrelevant*†; while if it is done unknowingly, it only shows the casuist's *ignorance*; hence arguments in the form of Casuistry should never be put forward.

End of Sec. (1).

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* The *Ṭāṭparya* rightly remarks that when the *Bhāṣya* and the *Vārṭika* speak of *two kinds* of Antithesis, it is not meant that they recognise only these two kinds; for in reality there are *four* kinds of antithesis; all that is meant is that Destruction is not the only kind of Antithesis, as the opponent seems to take for granted.

† In the original passage of the *Vārṭika* on P. 179, we have the term 'अर्थान्तरं' for what here appears as असम्बद्धत्वं; though both stand for the same thing, the Clincher of 'Irrelevancy', yet the former is more in keeping with the actual name of the Clincher as mentioned in Sū. 5-2-1.

Section (2).
Non-eternality of Words.
[Sūṭras 13—38.]
Bhāṣya on Sū. (13.)
[P. 104, L. 5 to P. 106, L.]

Sūṭra 1-1-7 says '*āpṭopaḍēshaḥ shabḍaḥ*,' 'Word is the assertion of a reliable person', meaning that it is only a particularly qualified Word that can be the Instrument of Right Cognition; which implies that there are several kinds of '*Shabḍa*. Now in regard to all this '*Shabḍa*', in general we proceed to consider whether it is eternal or non-eternal.*

On this point Doubt arises, on account of there being a difference of opinion caused by such reasons being adduced as tend to produce uncertainty (in men's minds).†

[The following are the different opinions that have been held on the point]—(1) "Sound is a quality of *Ākāsha*, it is all-pervading and eternal, and it is liable to manifestation only."‡ [The *Mīmāmsaka* view.]—(2) "Sound lies latent

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* The purpose of this section is thus explained by the *Parishuḍḍhi*—When we have proved that Words are *not* immaculate self-sufficient entities, we can regard the Veda as the 'word of a reliable person', and hence an Instrument of Right Cognition. Otherwise, if the Veda were eternal, it would be open to this suspicion that it may not be reliable; as no one knows when and by whom it was propounded; and in ordinary usage, all such words as cannot have their source traced are regarded as of doubtful veracity; and further, Word—which is only a particular kind of Sound—could be a quality of *Ākāsha* only if it were non-eternal; and the fact of Sound being apprehended by the auditory organ alone can be explained only on the basis of its being a quality of *Ākāsha*.

To avoid confusion, it has to be borne in mind that our Author now proceeds to discuss the eternality or non-eternality of *Sound*, in general; as Words only represent a particular combination of *Sounds*; as is made clear by what the *Bhāṣya* says on P. 115, L. 20.

† The *Vārṭika* reads this as a Sūṭra; but neither the *Nyāysūchīnibanḍha* nor any Sūṭra Ms., reads it as such. The Puri Mss. read an additional च after विप्रतिपत्तेः; but from what follows the च would appear to be superfluous.

‡ According to this view, the air-currents set in motion by the impact (of the stick on the drums, or of the vocal chords) moves forward, until they reach the tympanum and manifest, *i. e.*, render audible, the Sound already subsisting in the *Ākāsha* enclosed in the ear-cavity.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

See *Prābhākara Mīmāmsā*, pp. 59-60.

'It is liable to manifestation only, not to production; this is the force of the affix *ka*'—says the *Bhāṣyachanḍra*.

in (five) Substances, along with, and in the same manner as, Odour and other qualities, and is liable to manifestation only."* [The *Sāṅkhya* view].—(3) " Sound is the quality of *Akāsha* liable to production and destruction." [The *Vaishēṣika* view].—(4) " Sound is produced by disturbance in the basic elemental Substances, it does not subsist in anything,—it is liable to production and also to destruction." [The *Bauḍḍha* view].

In view of this diversity of opinions, there arises a doubt as to what is the real truth.

Our answer is that *Sound is non-eternal.* " Why ?"

(A) BECAUSE IT HAS A CAUSE,†—(B) BECAUSE IT IS APPREHENDED THROUGH A SENSE-ORGAN,—AND (C) BECAUSE IT IS (CONCEIVED‡ AND) SPOKEN OF AS A PRODUCT. (Sū. 13).

(A) The term *āḍi* in the *Sūṭra* stands for *cause*,—the etymological signification of the term being ' that where from a certain thing is drawn out or produced ', *āḍiyaṭē asmāṭ*.' As a matter of fact, it is found that what has a cause is non-eternal ;—so that as Sound is *produced* by conjunction or disjunction—and as such *has a cause*—it must be *non-eternal*. " What is the meaning of the assertion that Sound *has a cause* ?" The meaning simply is that, inasmuch as Sound is liable to origination (to be produced, or brought into existence), it is *non-eternal*,—that is, after having come into existence, it ceases to exist ; that is, it is liable to destruction.

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* According to this view, Sound subsists in all such substances as the Jar &c.,—being a modification of the 'earth' and the other Elemental Substances, each of whom is the aggregate product of the five Rudimentary Elements of Sound, Colour, Touch, Odour and Taste ; and being also a product of Self-consciousness, it is all-pervading in its character ; so that when it happens to land upon a suitable place, it serves to modify the auditory organ that happens to be close by,—and it is as doing this modification that Sound becomes apprehended.—*Ṭāṭparya.*

† The *Bhāṣya* explains *ādi* as *cause.*

‡ The *Ṭāṭparya* remarks that उपचार stands not only for actual expression, but also for the idea that people entertain in regard to Sound.

The *Bhāṣyachanḍra* remarks that as the author of the Sūṭra stands in the position of a Teacher, the urging of several Reasons is not faulty.

(B) As it might be still regarded an open question, as to whether Sound is actually *produced* by conjunction and disjunction, or it is only *manifested* by them,—the *Sūtra* adds the second reason—*Because it is apprehended through a sense-organ*;—*i.e.*, it is apprehended by means of the contact of a sense-organ. [In regard to Sound, the real question at issue is]—'Is Sound *manifested* and apprehended like the qualities of Colour and the rest, in the same place as its manifester ? or, Is it that the initial Sound is *produced* by contact, and it, in its turn, gives rise to a series of Sounds, and the Sounds thus reaching the auditory organ, become apprehended ?' The answer to this is that Sound can never be apprehended in the same place as its manifester ; as it is apprehended after the conjunction or impact (which is its *manifester* or *originator*). For instance, when a piece of wood is being cut, the Sound that arises from the impact of the axe with the wood is heard by the person at a distance after that impact has ceased ;—and it is never found possible for a manifested thing to be apprehended after its manifester has ceased to exist ; so that the Impact cannot be regarded as a mere *manifester* ;—on the other hand if the Impact is the *producer* of the Sound, what happens is that the Impact having produced the initial Sound, this latter gives rise to a series of sounds, and what is apprehended is that particular Sound of the series which happens to reach the Auditory Organ : so that in this case it would be quite possible for the Sound to be apprehended after the Impact has ceased.

Bha. P. 105.

(C) For the following reason also Sound is *produced*, not *manifested*:—*Because it is conceived and spoken of as a product*. In ordinary parlance, it is only a *product* that is spoken of as 'acute', or 'dull',—as we find in such expressions as 'acute pleasure', 'dull pleasure', 'acute pain', 'dull pain' ;—and in regard to Sound also we have such expressions as 'acute Sound', 'dull Sound,' [Hence Sound must be a *product*]. "But as a matter of fact, the *acuteness* or *dullness* belongs to the *manifester*, whence arises the acuteness or dullness of the apprehension ; just as in the case of Colour &c." This cannot be ; as there is suppression. What the opponent means is as follows :—"The acuteness or dullness belongs to the manifesting Impact ; from that arises the acuteness or dullness of the apprehension of the manifested Sound, and there is no difference in the

Sound itself; just as in the case of Colour, (the Colour remaining the same), its apprehension is heightened (rendered more acute) or lowered (rendered dull) by the light that manifests it".—But this cannot be, as there is suppression (in the case of Sound); that is to say, it is only when the Sound of the drum is acute that it suppresses the duller Sound of the lute, and not when it has been deadened and dull [this well-known fact cannot be explained on the hypothesis of the opponent; for] the *suppression* could not be done by the apprehension of the Sound; and as for the Sound itself, it is the same in both cases (according to the Opponent, whether the Sound of the Drum is acute or dull, it is the same Sound that has continued all along; and hence

Bhā. P. 106. dull or acute, it should always suppress the Sound of the lute); if on the other hand, the Sound, in the two cases, be regarded as different, the said phenomenon of suppression becomes quite explicable. From this it follows that Sound is *produced*, not *manifested*.* Then again, (according to the Opponent's view) no suppression should be possible; because (according to him) the Sounds being manifested in the same place as their manifester, there could be no contact (between the two, and hence no suppression of the one by the other); so that according to the view that Sound is manifested in the same place as its manifester, no suppression would be possible; as the Sound of the lute (which is manifested in the lute) cannot be got at by the Sound of the Drum (which is manifested in the Drum). If it be urged that there could be suppression even without the one getting at the other,—then (our answer would be that) in that case there would be suppression of all Sounds. The Opponent might think that—"even though one Sound is not got at by another, there could be suppression";—but if this could be possible, then just as the drum-Sound suppresses one lute-Sound—*i. e.*, that which has its manifester near the manifester of the drum-Sound—so would it suppress all lute-Sounds,—even those whose manifesters would be at a distance from the Drum; as the condition of *not being in contact* with the drum-Sound would be the same in the case of all lute-Sounds; so that when a Drum would be sounded

* There is a long discussion in the *Ṭāṭparya* as to whether the qualities of Sound are inherent and inseparable from it, or only accidental. The conclusion is that they are inherent in it; so that if the Sound remained the same, it could not have two such contrary characters as 'acuteness' and 'dullness'.

at any one place, it should render inaudible the Sound of all the lutes that might be sounded at the time anywhere, in all regions of the world! On the other hand, (according to our view), the Series of Sounds (produced in each case) being distinct, it becomes possible for only a certain Dull Sound to be suppressed by a certain Acute Sound,—this being dependent upon their reaching the auditory organ at the same time. "What is it that you call *suppression*?" The *suppression* of a thing consists in its being not apprehended by reason of the apprehension of a similar thing; as for instance, the light of the torch,—which would be (otherwise) visible,—is suppressed by the light of the sun [so that there is suppression of one Sound by another, when, being otherwise audible, it is rendered inaudible by another Sound].*

Vārṭika on Sū. (13).

[P. 282, L. 19 to P. 295, L. 4].†

The *Bhāṣya* says—*Sūṭra* 1.1.7 *says 'apṭopadēshah shabdaḥ' (Word is the assertion of a reliable person), meaning* Vār: P. 283. *that it is only a particularly qualified word that can be the Instrument of Right Cognition; which implies that there are several kinds of 'Shabḍa.'* "How is this implied?" [It is implied by reason of the fact that] unless there is a diversity of things there can be no need for any qualifying terms,—and it is not right (for any writer) to make use of needless

* Whenever there is suppression, a thing is suppressed by another thing similar to it,—and never by itself; similarly when a piece of cloth is manifested by torch-light at midday, and also by the light of the midday sun, the cloth does not suppress itself. But if sound were only *manifested*, as it would be the same letter-Sound that would be manifested by the acute and the dull Sound, the suppression would mean that the Sound suppresses itself; which would be absurd. Hence in view of this suppression, the two Sounds should be regarded as distinct.—*Tāṭparya.*

† The Sūṭra-numbering in the *Varṭika* from this point is defective; as in both editions, a passage of the *Bhaṣya* has been treated as Sūṭra, for which there is no authority either in the *Nyāya-sūchīnibandha* or in the Sūṭra Mss. Just as in the *Bhāṣya*, there is a long introduction to Sū. 13, in the lines 5—12 of P. 104; so in the *Vārṭika* also we have a long introduction to the same *Sūṭra*, 13 extending from P. 282, L. 19 to P. 287, L. 9. We adhere to the *Sūṭra*-numbering of the printed *Bhāṣya* text.

qualifications; from this it is only right to assert, on the basis of the qualification (occurring in the Sūṭra) that *Shabḍa* is of several kinds. *Now in regard to all this 'Shabḍa' in general we proceed to consider whether it is eternal or non-eternal* (Bhā. P. 104);—by 'considering' in this passage it is meant *investigating* or examining of the question.

On this point doubt arises, on account of there being a difference of opinion caused by such reasons being adduced as tend to produce uncertainty in men's minds. (*Bhāṣya* 104-7). What the term 'difference of opinion' exactly means has already been explained (under Sū. 1-1-23).

The different opinions on the point in question are as follows:—

(1) Some people have held that *Shabḍa* (Sound), like Large Dimension, is a quality of Ākāsha, and is liable to be manifested. These people reason as follows:—"Sound is eternal,—because it is a qulity of Ākāsha and subsists in a single substance which is indestructible,—that which is a quality of *Ākāsha* and subsists in a single indestructible substance is always found to be eternal,—for example, the Large Dimension of Ākāsha,—and as Sound also is such a quality, it must be eternal; and being eternal, it is capable of being manifested; and its manifesters are Conjunction, Disjunction and Detonation.*

(2) Other philosophers have held the view that *Sound exists in substances along with, and in the same manner as, Odour and other qualities, and is liable to manifestation only.*—(*Bhāṣya*). These people reason as follows:—"Sound subsists in the same manner as Odour &c., and is also manifested

* When the drum is sounded, what manifests the sound is the *conjunction* or impact of the stick with the drum; when a piece of bamboo cracks, the resulting sound is manifested by the *disjunction* of the bamboo-fibres; 'Detonation' is added in view of such vague sounds as those of thunder and the like.

in the same manner as Odour &c.; and the manifesters of Sound consist in the impact of particular things (like the Drum and the Stick).

(3) Others again have held the view that Sound is a quality of *Ākāsha*, and is liable to production and destruction. These people declare that "Sound is non-eternal, it is a quality of *Ākāsha* and is capable of being produced and destroyed."

(4) Lastly, there are some philosophers who hold that Sound is produced by vibration in the elemental substances, —it does not subsist in anything,—and it is capable of production and destruction.

In view of this diversity of opinions there arises a doubt as to what is the real truth. (Bhāṣya).

The real truth is that Sound is *non-eternal*.

Now we proceed to consider what is this 'non-eternality'; —i. e., what is that character of *being non-eternal* by virtue of which Sound is called 'non-eternal'.

(A) Some persons have held the view that 'non-eternality' consists in *previous non-existence and destruction*; they explain that that thing is 'non-eternal' which has *previous non-existence* (i. e., has no existence prior to its being produced) and *destruction* (i. e., ceases to exist after having existed for sometime).

But this view is not tenable, for want of (necessary) relationship; as a matter of fact, no *entity*—that which exists —can have any relationship to *previous non-existence* or *destruction* *;—and further (if 'non-eternality' rested upon these) it could be attributed also to such things as have not come into existence at all, or such as have been destroyed; that

* During the time that the thing exists, there is neither its previous non-existence nor its destruction; and an existing thing can bear no relationship to what is not there. When the non-existence or destruction of the thing is there, the thing itself is not there.

is to say, if you believe that a thing is 'non-eternal', because it has 'previous non-existence' and 'destruction', then, inasmuch as the thing that has not come into existence will have the said 'previous non-existence', and after the thing has ceased to exist, it will have the said 'destruction',—this thing, which would be actually non-existent (before it comes into existence and after it has ceased to exist), would fulfil the condition of 'having previous non-existence and destruction'; and as such this non-existing thing would be conceived of as being 'non-eternal'; and certainly such a conception would be totally baseless! * Further, 'non-eternality' must be the *positive character of being non-eternal*; and certainly 'previous non-existence' and 'destruction', both being purely *negative* in their character, could
Vār. P. 284.
not be referred to by means of an abstract noun ('non-eternality', which by its very nature, must be *positive*). That is to say, when we call a certain thing 'non-eternal', what is meant is that it has not an absolute continuous existence; and it is this *positive* character (of *being* that which has not an absolute continued existence) that constitutes 'non-eternality'; while 'previous non-existence' and 'destruction' are pure negations of *existence* (of any kind); so that it is not right to speak of *negations* by means of a *positive* (abstract) term. Hence the conclusion is that the 'non-eternality' of things cannot consist in 'prior negation' and 'destruction'. Thirdly, the sense of the Genitive is not applicable; that is, the Sūṭra of Paṇini laying down the use of the abstract affixes '*ṭva*' and '*ṭal*' is in the form '*ṭasya bhāvasṭvaṭalau*' 'the affixes '*ṭva*' and '*ṭal*' denote the character *of something*'; and here we have the pronoun '*ṭasya*', 'of something', with

* It is never possible for any thing to have 'prior non-existence' and 'destruction' at the same time; so that the non-eternality of things will have to depend upon each of these separately; and the thing that has not yet come into existence may be regarded as 'non-eternal'; and that which has ceased exist may also be regarded as 'non-eternal'; and both these would be absurd.—*Ṭāṭparya.*

the Genitive ending; so that the term must denote a certain thing, a positive entity; and the *character* (denoted by the abstract affix) must belong to this positive entity; *negation* again, cannot be the character of anything; for the simple reason that at the time that the negation (of a thing) is there [*i. e.*, at the time when a thing can be said to have 'prior non-existence' or 'destruction'], the thing itself,—which is denoted by the pronoun '*tat*' in '*tasya*' of Pāṇini's Sūtra—will not be there; and certainly the Genitive cannot be applicable to what does not exist. "But what comes into existence has had no existence before (it came into existence); and after it has ceased to exist, it does not come into existence again; [and this is what is meant by the thing having 'prior non-existence' and 'destruction'; and thus the thing spoken of as such cannot be entirely non-existent]." Even so, our reasoning is not affected; we also say that what did not exist before (coming into existence) does not come into existence afterwards; but the fact remains that the sense of the Genitive is not applicable to it.* "How then do we have such expressions as (*a*) '*ghaṭasya prāgabhāvaḥ*,' 'prior non-existence *of the jar*' (*b*) '*ghaṭasya pradhvaṁsābhāvaḥ*, 'destruction *of the jar*'?" These expressions do not in reality signify any *relationship* of the Genitive [and as no relationship is signified, the use of the Genitive ending must be regarded as *figurative*]; and all that the two expressions actually mean is that—(*a*) 'the thing did not exist before, and it has come into existence now', and (*b*) 'though existing now, it will not exist after its destruction'; and it is in view of these facts that the thing is called 'non-eternal'; and the presence of this character constitutes 'non-eternality.'†

* That is to say, the fact remains that at the time that there is *non-existence* of the thing, the *thing is* not there; so that the thing is incapable of having the sense of the Genitive applied to it.

† So that at best the attributing of 'prior non-existence' and 'destruction' to a thing can be only figurative; and being so, it cannot afford a satisfactory basis for the ordinary notion of 'non-eternality.'

Fourthly, the 'non-eternality' (as explained by you) could never belong to anything existing at the present time; that is to say, if you mean that 'non-eternality' consists in 'prior non-existence' and 'destruction,' then, inasmuch as an object existing at the present time has neither 'prior non-existence' nor 'destruction', no such object could ever be spoken of as 'non-eternal.' "But it could be, like such terms as 'cook'* and the like." If you mean by this that—"Just as words like 'cook' pertain to all three points of time (the name 'cook' being applied to a man who has done cooking in the past, or is doing it in the present, or is expected to do it in the future), so would the term 'non-eternal' also pertain to the three points of time,"—our answer to this is that this (analogy) is not correct; as the affix '*ṇvul*' (with which such personal nouns as '*pāchaka*,' 'cook,' and the like are formed) does actually apply to all three points of time,† inasmuch as we do meet with such expressions as—'this man *is* a cook,' 'this man *will* be a cook,' and 'this man *was* a cook.' "Well, the affix *ṭyap*‡ (with which the word '*aniṭya*' is formed) will also apply to all three points of time." By this you apparently mean that—"the affix *ṭyap* also (like the affix '*ṇvul*') may apply to all three points of time." But this is not right; as no such use is ever found in actual usage; as a matter of fact, we do not ever find the epithet '*aniṭya*' (non-eternal) applied to a thing not existing at the time, even though it might be non-eternal (when it did exist);§ from which it is clear that it is not right to say that

The fact that there can be no relationship between *non-existence* and the *thing* is not shaken by the expressions quoted; and so long as no relationship is possible, the thing cannot take the genitive ending; and hence cannot be referred to by the term '*ṭasya*' occurring in Pāṇini's Sūṭra laying down the use of the affix '*ṭal*'; so that the form '*aniṭyaṭā*' remains inexplicable.

* The Benares edition reads पाठक (Teacher) for पाचक (cook).

† The *Bib. Ind.* edition wrongly leads ण्वुल for ण्वुल् in this passage;

‡ *Bib. Ind.* edition reads ल्यप for त्यप् in this passage.

§ So that the epithet 'aniṭya' cannot be applied to past or future objects.

the affix '*ṭyap*' is applicable to all three points of time. And from all this it follows that 'non-eternality' cannot consist in 'prior non-existence' and 'destruction.'

(B) Other philosophers have put forward the 'presence of the cause of destruction' (as the condition of *non-eternality*). These people explain that the 'non-eternality' of a thing consists in the existence (or presence) of the cause of its destruction.

Var. P. 285.

But this also is not right; as the term 'non-eternal' is actually applied to things when the cause of their destruction is not present at the time; that is to say, as a matter of fact, the epithet 'non-eternal' is applied to a thing *before* the 'existence of the cause of its destruction.' In the case of a jar wherein the *disruption of the component parts* (which disruption is the cause of the jar's destruction) has not yet come about,—the epithet 'non-eternal' could not be applied to that Jar while it existed,—if 'eternality' consisted in 'the presence of the cause of destruction'; for certainly a man is not called 'feverish' when the fever is not there. In fact, the only notion to which the 'presence of the cause of destruction' should give rise is that 'the cause of the destruction of this thing is present,' and not that 'it is *non-eternal*'; for certainly, the presence of the character of the 'cow' never gives rise to the notion of the 'horse.' You might offer the following explanation :—"That thing the cause of whose destruction is present, is *vināshavat*, *having destruction*; and that which *has its destruction* is 'non-eternal.'" But this also we do not understand, that 'the thing the cause of whose destruction is present *has destruction*'; for as a matter of fact, a thing, the cause of whose destruction is present, can be spoken of only as 'having the *cause of its destruction*' (and not as 'having its *destruction*'); for certainly the connection of one thing cannot form the basis of the concep-

tion of another thing [and *the cause of destruction* is something entirely different from *destruction*]; for instance, a man's connection with the *stick* does not afford the basis of his being conceived of 'having *ear-rings*.' "What you say cannot be right; as we do meet with such expressions as 'the body *has its destruction*' (*sharīram vināshavaṭ*.)" You mean by this that—"in actual usage we do meet with such expressions as *vināshavaṭ sharīram*, (*the body has its destruction*); and certainly such usage could not be possible if there were no relationship (with the *destruction*, *vināsha*)." But this reasoning is not right; because as a matter of fact, the possessive affix '*maṭup*' (with which the adjective '*vināshavaṭ*' is formed) is never found to be applied to things not actually existing; that is to say, the possessive affix '*maṭup* is never used in connection with things not actually existing; e.g., a man is not called '*kuṇḍali*' 'having the ear-rings,' when the ear-ring is not actually there; similarly, as no connection (of the possessive affix) could be possible unless the *destruction* were actually present, any such usage as '*vināshavaṭ sharīram*' ('the body has destruction') must be wrong. [So that you cannot prove anything on the basis of such an expression]. "But we do actually meet with such expressions in usage." You mean that—"in actual usage we do meet with such expressions as '*vināshi ēṭaṭ sharīram*,' and '*aḍhruvāḥ ēṭē viṣayāḥ*' [where the term '*vināshi*,' 'has destruction' of the former expression has the same denotation as the term '*aḍhruva*,' '*impermanent*,' of the latter]." But your reasoning is not right; as the usage you refer to is purely figurative; that is to say, when the term '*vināshi*,' 'having destruction' is applied to the Body, it is used in its secondary (figurative) sense,—the meaning being that 'the destruction will surely come about' [the actual use of the possessive in 'having destruction,' even when the destruction is not there, being purely figurative, intended

to indicate the *certainty* of destruction]; the term '*adhruva*' 'impermanent,' on the other hand, directly denotes *non-eternality* itself. From all this we conclude that 'non-eternality' cannot consist in *the presence of the cause of destruction.*

(C) There are others again (the Sāṅkhyas) who hold that a thing is called 'non-eternal' when it is found that, though the conditions of its being perceived are present, it has completely disappeared from view. These people offer the following explanation of the term 'non-eternal': —"When it is found that all the conditions of the perception of a certain thing are present, and yet in its own form the thing, having completely disappeared from view, is absolutely not
Var. P. 286. perceived,—that thing is called 'non-eternal.'"*

This assertion however is absolutely meaningless; by saying that 'having the conditions of its perception present, the thing entirely disappears from view, and is not perceived,' the Sāṅkhya goes against his own doctrine; it is his doctrine that—"there is nothing which is absolutely† not perceived."

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* That which *exists*, is an *entity*, never undergoes utter destruction; what happens is that when a thing becomes manifested, appears into view, it is said to be 'produced,' to 'come into existence'; and similarly, even though still existing, it disappears from view, it is said to 'have ceased to exist'; and this is what constitutes the *non-eternality* of that thing. This is the view of the Sāṅkhyas, who do not admit of the birth of what has not been in existence already, nor of the absolute destruction of anything.—*Tatparyā.*

† The Benares edition reads [illegible] which has been adopted in the translation. The reading of the other edition is [illegible] by which the sentence would mean—"there is nothing which, having come into existence, is ever absolutely not perceived.'

The Sankhya doctrine is that everything in the world is an evolutionary product of *Pukṛiṭi*, Primordial Matter,—and as such is non-different from that Matter. Such being the case, as a matter of fact, it is not possible that at any time no product of Primodial Matter should be perceived; some product or the other is sure to be perceived always, and as all products are non-different from the original Matter, no product can be said to be absolutely *not perceived.*—*Ṭātparya.*

The *Parishuḍḍhi* points out another self-contradiction on the part of the *Sāṅkhya*: If there is only *disappearance* of things, and not *destruction* of things, then there would

Further, we have more than once pointed out that no 'disappearance' of a thing is possible, unless some new element has been introduced into it.* From all this it is clear that this (Sāṅkhya) explanation of 'non-eternality' is not right.

(D) A fourth explanation of 'non-eternality' is as follows:—"When a thing, not having existed before, comes into existence, and after having come into existence, ceases to exist,—that thing is called *non-eternal*; and it is this condition (or character) that is expressed by the abstract affix in the term *aniṭyaṭā*', 'non-eternality.'†"

This again is not right; as the abstract affix ('*ṭal*') is never found to be used in the *reflexive* sense; as a matter of fact, no abstract affix has ever been found to have the reflexive sense. "It is so found along with such words as '*vinaya*' and the like." Not so; as we do not accept that view. "But Pāṇini by his Suṭra (5·4·34) lays down that 'the *thak* affix is added to *vinaya* and other words,' in the reflexive sense, by which the word '*vainayikam*' (*vinaya and thak*) stands for *vinaya itself*." But we do not accept this view; the *thak* affix, added according to Pāṇini's Sūṭra, does not have the *reflexive* sense; the term '*vainayikam*' denotes *the connection or presence of vinaya*, and not *vinaya itself*. Similarly in the case of all abstract affixes.‡ Even in cases where the distinction

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be no chance of Ignorance, Passion, &c., to be entirely destroyed; so that there would be a possibility of these bursting out again in the Soul that has been *released*; and thus there being no stability in the Release, this would fail to be the *summum bonum*.

* According to the *Sāṅkhya*, just as there is no utter destruction of a thing that has come into existence, so also there is no birth, or coming into existence, of what has never existed. Hence the *disappearance* of anything would be possible only if something new came to it;—now this would mean that the something fresh that has come in did not exist before the thing disappeared from view; or if this new thing was there before, the said disappearance of the former thing will also have to be admitted as being there (even before the thing actually disappeared)!—*Tāṭparya*.

† That is to say, the *ṭal*-affix has only a reflexive sense: '*aniṭyah ēva aniṭyaṭā*.'—*Ṭāṭparya*.

‡ Pāṇini's rules can be accepted as authoritative only when they are found compatible with proofs and facts. The reflexive use of the *thak*-affix is something that is

(in the denotations of the basic term and the affix) is not discernible, such distinction can always be deduced by means of Inference; that is to say, is the case of those affixes, where the distinction is not discernible,—and whom, on that account you hold to have the *reflexive* sense,—the distinction can always be inferred.

"What is that from which such distinction could be inferred?"

That which would lead to the inference is the fact that the *Genitive* always signifies difference; as a matter of fact the Genitive ending is always found to point to difference: and how the Genitive is not used in the case of the two things not different from each other, we have shown in the section dealing with Qualities and the Substratum of Qualities.*

[Now all these four explanations of 'non-eternality' having been found to be inadmissible, the question arises]—Is then the term 'non-eternal' absolutely meaningless?

It is not meaningless. As a matter of fact, it is *existence* itself which is both (*eternality* and *non-eternality*), according as it is, or is not, circumscribed by limits; that is to say, when the *existence* of a certain thing is circumscribed by

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against all proof and facts; for such reflexive use would mean that the term '*vinaya*' and the affix '*ṭhak*' are synonymous; and in that case the two should never appear in close juxtaposition; such juxtaposition of synonymous words is meaningless; as in the case of such expressions as '*vṛikṣaḥ-ṭaruḥ*.'—*Ṭātparya*.

The *Parishuddhi* formulates the argument thus—*Ṭhak* and other affixes must have a meaning different from the terms to which they are affixed,—because they are affixes,—like such other affixes as are universally admitted to have a meaning different from their bases;—and this formal reasoning is corroborated by the argument put forward by the *Ṭātparya*. Nor can this argument be objected to on the ground of its being against Pāṇini's rules; because these rules have been propounded only for the purpose of the etymological formation of words; they have no real bearing upon their denotation.

* The Genitive ending that the *Vārtika* is referring to is that found in Pāṇini's *Sūtra* laying down the use of the abstract affixes—तस्य भावस्त्वतलौ—where, it is argued, the तस् in 'तस्य' must be different from the भाव in 'भावः'

both limits, (beginning and end), this constitutes the *non-eternality* of that thing; and when the *existence* of a thing is not circumscribed by both limits, this constitutes its *eternality*. [Nor is there any incongruity in the same thing, *existence*, constituting both *eternality* and *non-eternality*; for) this is just like the case of *Inherence*; when Inherence is qualified or indicated by (*i.e.* conceived of in relation to) a *product*, it is called 'Cause'; and when it is conceived of in relation to a *cause*, it is called 'Product.' "How can this be?" Well, the notion of 'cause' cannot appear without some basis; as it is found to appear at only certain times;—then again, the notion of what is not a *Substance*, cannot be due to a substance itself [and '*Cause*' is not a substance]*; as the two are contradictory to each other;—nor again can the notion of 'cause' be due to mere *existence*; as 'cause' is something entirely different from 'existence'; the notion due to *existence* would be in the form 'this *exists*,' while the notion of 'Cause' is entirely different from the notion
Vart P. 287. of 'existence';—so that what the notion of 'Cause' is really due to is a particular kind of relation, appearing, as it does, along with the qualification of 'herein'; that is to say, the notion of 'cause' that appears (in the case of the cause of Cloth, for instance) is always in the form 'the Cloth *inheres* in these yarns', which includes the conception of (the yarns being) the *receptacle* or *container* (of the Cloth): and certainly unless there is some sort of relation (between the Cloth and the yarns) this conception of 'herein' would not be possible:—and that (relation) by reason of which the conception of 'herein' arises is called 'Inherence';—so that when the 'Inherence' (of a certain thing) is conceived of in relation to a *product*, it is regarded as 'Cause'. Then again, the (abstract) affixes '*tva*' and

* This is the only meaning we can attach to the passage as it stands in both editions. It would give better sense, if we read न च; सद्बुद्धिनिमित्तो असद्भावः:; which would mean—'the notion of an entity (such as *cause*) cannot be due to mere non-entity.'

'*tal*' are denotative of that quality by reason of whose presence in a thing people apply to that thing the terms to which those affixes are affixed; * and as people apply the term 'cause' ('*Kāraṇa*') to a thing when they find in it the presence of the 'inherence' of a product,—the '*Kāraṇatva*', *being Cause*, must consist in this 'inherence of the product.' This same explanation applies to the 'Product' or 'Effect' also; that is to say, '*Kāryatva*', *being product*, consists in that 'inherence of the cause,' to which the Product owes its very existence. Just like 'Inherence', 'Existence' also is one only; and [just as the same 'Inherence', when qualified by the *Cause*, constitutes the essence of 'Product,' and when qualified by the *Product*, it constitutes the essence of 'Cause,' so] the same 'Existence,' when related to a thing characterised by both ends, constitutes 'non-eternality'; and when it is otherwise (*i. e.* related to a thing not characterised by both ends), it constitutes 'eternality.' And it is by reason of the presence of this 'non-eternality' that Sound is regarded as 'non-eternal'.

[The reasons for Sound being regarded as *non-eternal* are propounded in the present Sūtra, 13]—*Because it has a cause, &c. &c.* (A) '*Because it has cause,*'—*the term 'ādi' in the Sūtra stands for 'cause'*—says the *Bhāṣya* (P. 104, L. 14); so that what Sūtra means is that *Sound is non-eternal because it has a cause.*

"Now, what is meant by this *having a cause*?"

A certain thing is said to *have a cause* when it is found to be characterised by birth (or production) and to conform to the variations of an efficient cause. "But no such character exists in things that are *manifested*; as a matter of fact, anything that is *manifested* is never found *to conform to the variations of an efficient cause*; on the contrary, inasmuch as the manifested thing is perceived after conjunction and disjunc-

* For example, the affix '*tva*' in '*sundaratva*' denotes the quality, on account of whose presence in the *flower*, we apply to the flower the term '*sundara*.'

tion, what you urge is always open to doubt." What you mean is this:—"As a matter of fact, Sound is perceived after conjunctions and disjunctions; and this perception after conjunction and disjunction is quite possible also in the case of the thing concerned (Sound) being *manifested* (and not actually *produced*); so that it remains still doubtful as to whether Sound is *manifested* or *produced*."*

Our answer is that Sound is not *manifested* (but *produced*), —(B) *because it is apprehended through a sense-organ*—says the *Sūṭra*. "But what do you mean by its *being apprehended through a sense-organ*?" A thing is said to be *apprehended through a sense-organ* when it is found to be perceptible by means of the proximity (contact) of an organ of perception. "But what follows from this?" What follows is that if Sound is perceptible by means of the contact of an organ of perception, and as such is *apprehended through a sense-organ*, then it cannot be said to be merely *manifested*; for if Sound were only *manifested* (and not *produced*), it would not be possible for it to come into contact with the sense-organ concerned. "Why?" Well, it is not possible for the auditory organ (of the hearer) to move up to the place (in the speaker's mouth) where the Sound appears; for the simple reason that it is incorporeal; in ordinary experience we have found that incorporeal things, like Colour for instance, are devoid of motion of any kind; and *Ākāsha* (of which the auditory organ is constituted) is incorporeal; so that it follows that it is devoid of motion.† "But from the fact that there

* Diversity in things is found to result from the variations of the *Cause* as from those of the *manifesting agency*; for instance, the reflection of the face undergoes variations according to the divergences of its reflecting media, in the form of the mirror, or a cup of water, &c. Hence it is open to doubt whether the divergence is due to the variations of a cause or to those of the manifesting agency.—*Tāṭparya*.

† *Ākāsha* encased in the ear-cavity constitutes the Auditory Organ; and even though the ear-cavity is incorporeal, yet it is never found to move up to the mouth of the speaker; it always remains in the body of the *hearer*; so that, even if the mere

Var: P. 288. inhere in it qualities productive of motion, it follows that Ākāsha *has* motion In ordinary experience we find that when a thing possesses a quality productive of motion, it has motion; *e. g.* a piece of stone (which has the falling motion by reason of such qualities as Gravity and the like); so that inasmuch as *Ākāsha* also is possessed of such qualities, it must have motion." This cannot be; as the premiss put forward is not universally true; for instance, the Soul is possessed of qualities productive of motion*, and yet is has no motion; so that your premiss is not true. Further, even though qualities productive of motion may be present in *Ākāsha*, they could not give rise to the motion† (of Ākāsha), as any such motion would be obstructed by the extensive Dimension (of *Ākāsha*); that is to say, even though Propulsion may be present in *Ākāsha*, it could not produce motion in it, because the extensive dimension of Ākāsha would not permit of such motion; as a matter of fact, the Propulsion inhering in *Ākāsha* is counteracted by the extensive Dimension which also subsists in the same (Ākāsha); and even in the case of the piece of stone itself, its Gravity (which would ordinarily bring about its falling motion) is counteracted by the contact of that same stone (with an object that supports it). "If Gravity were counteracted by Contact, then it would be only a relative (and not independent) cause. That is to say, if it be

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Ākāsha were to move up to the speaker's mouth,—inasmuch as it would be bereft of the encasement of the ear-cavity, it would not be the auditory organ. Thus in any case it is not possible for the organ to move up to the place where the Sound is *manifested.*—*Tāṭparya.*

The above difficulty affects the view that Sound is not produced, it is only manifested in the speaker's mouth. On the other hand, according to the other view, Sound is *produced* in the speaker's mouth, and the Sound waves thus produced ultimately reach the ear-cavity.

* The Soul's *effort* produces motion in the Body.

† क्रियाहेतुत्वं of the Bib-Ind. edition gives better sense than the क्रियावत्त्वं of the Benares edition.

true that Gravity, counteracted by contact, does not produce motion,—and in producing motion it is dependent upon the removal of the contact,—then this would mean that Gravity is a relative (and not independent) cause of motion; and this would be against the tenets of the *Shāsṭra*; for the *Shāsṭra* declares that 'Gravity is the independent cause of motion.'*" Certainly not; as the word 'independent' means something totally different: when Gravity is called the 'independent cause', it does not mean that 'Gravity does not stand in need of anything'; what is means is that (in bringing about motion) it does not stand in need of any such other intervening positive agency as would operate after the operation of the Gravity itself; this is what is meant by Gravity being the 'independent cause' of motion;† so that there is nothing in our view that goes against any *Shāsṭra* tenets. In fact we have the *Vaishēṣika-Sūṭra* (5-1-7) to the effect that—'Falling results from Gravity, *when contact is absent.*' Then again, *Ākāsha* is not a fit object (for motion); as a matter of fact, what brings about motion is not the mere presence of qualities productive of motion,—but the presence of *corporeality* along with qualities productive of motion; so that it is only when the object is *corporeal* that the quality productive of motion is unobstructed; and then alone motion becomes possible [and *corporeality* presupposes limitation in space; so that it can never belong to *Ākāsha*, which is all-pervading]. Thus then, no motion being possible in *Ākāsha*, it can never move (up to the speaker's mouth, where Sound appears); [hence the contact of the Auditory Organ, which is *Ākāsha*, necessary for the perception of Sound, is not possible under the theory that there is only manifestation of Sound in the speaker's mouth].

* Though the tenet referred to is held by the *Vaishēṣika*, the actual words quoted are not found in the Sūtras of Kaṇāḍa.

† The *removal of obstruction* is not a *positive* agency; hence, even though it is necessary in the successful operation of Gravity, that does not deprive Gravity of its *independence.*—*Ṭāṭparya.*

Nor again, is it possible for the Sound to move up (to the Auditory Organ): for the simple reason that it can have no motion. And unless the Sound is got at (reached by the Auditory Organ), no apprehension of it is possible; for (if such apprehension were possible,) there would be a possibility of all Sounds being apprehended by all men.

From all this it follows that the only possible hypothesis left is that (in the case of every Sound) there is a *series* of Sounds;—of this series, the first Sound is produced by conjunction and disjunction; and from that initial
Var: P. 289. Sound proceed other Sounds proceeding in all directions, like the filaments sticking out of the *Kaḍamba* flower; and from each of these latter Sounds there proceeds another, and thence another, each of these being duller than its predecessor; and this series of Sounds goes on being produced until there is an obstacle in the way of their vehicle (air); the last Sound of this series, having become too attenuated, loses the capacity of producing a further Sound, by reason of some sort of obstacle; thus it is that the series of sounds comes to an end. Of this series of Sounds, that alone which approaches the *Ākāsha* in the ear-cavity (of the hearer) becomes apprehended (heard), and none other is so apprehended. It is in view of these facts that Sound is regarded as 'apprehended through a sense-organ'; and thus Sound has to be regarded as *non-eternal*; as otherwise the said apprehension through a sense-organ would not be possible [the *production* of the series of Sounds being impossible, if Sound were *eternal*].

[The older Mīmānsakas have held that] there is only one Sound. But this view cannot be accepted; for if Sound were such, then every sound would be heard by all persons. What the Mīmāmsaka means is as follows:—"I do not admit that every sound produces a number of other sounds; what I hold is that (in each case) there is only one Sound, and it pervades over the entire *Ākāsha* [just in the same manner

as the *Extensive Dimension* pervades over the entire *Ākāsha*]; and this all-pervading Sound is heard only when it is manifested by the agency of Conjunction and Disjunction; exactly in the same manner as the Jar placed in a room is seen when manifested by the contact of lamp-light." This view however cannot be accepted; as if this were so, then every Sound would be heard by all men. That is to say, if you mean that "a single sound, pervading over the entire Ākāsha, becomes manifested by Conjunction, and thus (being heard) brings about the cognition of the thing expressed by that Sound,* for the person endowed with the requisite auditory organ,"—then, inasmuch as every sound would be manifested by conjunctions occurring anywhere in the world, it would, as such, be heard by all persons endowed with auditory organs. As a matter of fact however, no Sound is ever heard by all men;—hence the view put forward is purely imaginary. "But the manifestation of the Sound is in only one place [so that the contingency of any sound being heard by *all* men can never arise]." This also cannot be accepted; as it is not possible for the thing in question† to be regarded as either the same or different. What you mean is as follows:—"It is true that the Sound pervades over the entire *Ākāsha*; but it is only a part of this pervading sound that is manifested by a particular agency [so that there is no possibility of Sound being heard by all men, in any case]."—But this also is not right; for the thing in question cannot be regarded as the same or as different; that is to say, those (manifested) things whom you regard as 'parts' of the all-pervading Sound,—are these also of the nature of

* The discussion at this stage bears upon Sound in general, and not upon Word-sounds; so all that was necessary here was to say that the Sound is heard by the person. But the ultimate bearing of the discussion being upon Words, the *Vārṭika* goes a step farther, from the hearing of the Sound, to the cognising of the thing expressed by the Word-sound.

† '*Kimaḥ*' in the Text is a peculiar expression; the *Tāṭparya* explains it as '*prakṛtasya*'; it has therefore been translated as *the thing in question*.

'Sound'? or are they something different, not of the nature of 'Sound'? "What are you driving at?" Well, if they also are 'Sounds,' then you have several sounds (and not only *one* all-pervading Sound), and this goes against your hypothesis;—while if they are *not* 'Sounds', then it comes to this that [when a word is uttered, what is heard is only the manifested part, which, *ex-hypothesi*, is *not sound*; so that] the cognition of the thing that arises (upon the utterance of the word) arises from what is not sound at all! Under the circumstances, it behoves you to explain the exact nature of these *manifested parts*.* Then again, Sound subsists in *Akāsha* [which being all-pervading, what is manifested in it should also be all-pervading; so that the contingency of a particular Sound being heard by all men still remains].† Lastly, it has not been explained what is the meaning of the term '*ēkadēsha*' (in the assertion '*shabdasya ēkadēshaḥ abhivyajyatē*)'; the term '*ēkadēsha* is a compound, expounded as *ēkaḥ-dēshaḥ*'; the term '*dēshaḥ*' can mean either *place, receptacle*, or *component part, cause*; now in the present compound, it cannot mean *receptacle*; as Sound subsists in *Akāsha*; Sound subsists in *Akāsha*, because it is its quality; and hence there

* The translation has adopted the reading [illegible] as found in the Benares edition; the Bib. Ind. edition reads [illegible] with which the sentence means—'so that words have to relinquish their verbal character.'

† The *Parishuddhi* adds—It is not possible to hold that the all-pervading Sound, when manifested, undergoes certain modifications which are limited in extent, and not all-pervading. For Sound being a quality, there can be no possibility of any artificial modification entering into it; even if Sound were regarded as a *substance*, and not a quality, there would be no ground for assuming any such modifications. Even if such modifications were possible, these would be brought about by those same causes—Conjunction, Disjunction, &c.,—that serve to manifest the Sound; so that what is the need of postulating any such thing as 'sound' at all? We may have in its place these 'modifications' themselves; as these would subsist in *Ākāsha* and fulfil all the purposes for which Sound is postulated. This being absurd, it follows that the hypothesis of these limited and momentary 'modifications' should be relinquished, and it be admitted that it is only Sound that is manifested, and heard. And the flaw in this view has already been pointed out in the Text.

can be no other *receptacle* for Sound than *Akāsha* [so that *shabḍasya ēkaḍēshaḥ*', in this case can mean nothing]; nor can the term '*ḍēsha*' be taken as meaning *cause*; as you hold that Sound (being eternal) is not a product (brought about by any cause); having held the view that Sound is not a product, you cannot say that when you speak of the *ēkaḍēsha* of Sound, you are referring to its *cause*. And as the term cannot have any other meaning (save the two mentioned), the assertion that 'what is manifested is an *ēkaḍēsha*, a part, of Sound' becomes meaningless. Further, [even granting that the manifestation of a part of a sound is possible] no cognition of the thing denoted by the whole Sound could arise upon the manifestation of only a part (of that Sound), this 'part of Sound' being just like a single syllable of a word (which syllable can not signify the thing signified by the whole word). Then again, when it is held that all letter-sounds are all-pervading in their character, and then it is postulated that there is manifestation of part of a letter-sounds, the difficulty arises that no part of letter-sound can ever be discerned;* [when a letter is pronounced, what we hear is the whole letter-sound, and not parts of it] and if such part could be discerned, it could not give rise to the cognition of anything; for even letters themselves are not held to be denotative of things; and when letters, singly, do not signify anything, how can parts of letters do so?"

These same reasonings also serve to set aside the view that what is manifested (on the utterance of a word-sound)

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* This appears to be the sense of the *Vārṭika*, lines 6-7. But according to the *Ṭāṭparya*—whose text appears to be corrupt—the translation should run as follows:—

[Nor can that 'part' itself be held to be the Sound that signifies the thing; for] all letter-sounds are all-pervading in their character [and parts of them cannot be so]. [Nor will it be right to assert that the cognition of the denoted thing arises from the hearing of a part only of the letter-sound; for] according to the theory under consideration, what is postulated is the manifestation of a part of letter-sound; while, as a matter of fact, no such part of letter-sound can ever be discerned.

is (not a single letter-sound, which, by itself, could not signify anything, but) a number of letter-sounds; because the objections that have been pointed out in regard to the manifestation of a single all-pervading letter-sound apply with equal force to the manifestation of several such letter-sounds; and this theory (of the manifestion of several sounds) would be open to the further objection that (if the utterance of a word were accompanied by the manifestation of several letter-sounds all at once) there would be a tremendous uproar;*—that is to say, if you hold the view that several letter-sounds subsist (and are manifested) in *Ākāsha* simultaneously,—then, at the time of the operation of the agency tending towards the manifestation of one of those sounds, there should come about the manifestation of all the Sounds that are co-existent with that sound, and an uproar would be the result; just as there is where in a congregation of acrobats and dancers, there arises the clatter of several performances and diverse musical instruments are struck up. For these reasons we conclude that there cannot be several all-pervading Sounds. Specially because if there were several Sounds subsisting in the Ākāsha simultaneously, then there could be no restriction as to only one particular sound (and not the rest) being manifested, when any manifesting agency would operate; on the contrary, whenever any manifesting agency would operate, it would render manifest *all* co-existent Sounds; so that when the lute is played upon, one would hear the braying of the ass also! For in the case of things perceptible by the same sense-organ, and co-existing at a single place, [when there operates

* Some people have suggested the compromise that when it is said that 'a part of sound is manifested' what is meant is that at its utterance, the sound undergoes a certain modification, and it is this modification that is manifested; and it is this modification which, affecting only a part of the word, comes itself to be regarded as that *part*. One author points out that though this view would be free from many of the objections urged, yet it will be open to this objection that several such modifications being manifested at the same time, what would be heard would be not a single-sound, but a tremendous uproar.

a certain agency capable of manifesting them], there can be no restriction [as to only one, and not all, of those things becoming manifested]. "But when an agency is manifestive of a certain thing, it could manifest only that thing (and not other things)" This cannot be; as no such restriction is ever seen. What you mean is that,—"even when there is a commingling of several sounds, the agencies manifesting each of those sounds is different; so that in connection with each of these several manifesting agencies, there is a distinct manifestation pertaining to each sound." But this cannot be; as no such phenomenon has ever been seen: as a matter of fact, in the case of things perceptible by the same sense organ and co-existing at the same place, no res-

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triction (as to only one, and not all of them, being the manifesting agency) has ever been found; for instance, when a number of things perceptible by the eye are collected in one place, if a lamp is lighted, it does not fail to illumine all the things present*. "But it could be as in the case of Communities." That cannot be; as we do not admit such a phenomenon. What you mean is that—"When several things are collected together, the several Communities (to which the things belong) are related to all those individual things; and yet, even though each Community (out of these Communities) is related to several things, any single thing serves to manifest only one Community (to which that particular thing belongs);—and in the same manner, when a

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* All this contingency is urged against the Opponent, as there is not available for him the only explanation that is possible. This contingency is unanswerable for those who hold that Sound is *manifested*, not *produced*. As in the case of every manifestation, it is inevitable that when the manifester is present, it should manifest all such things present as are perceptible by the same sense-organ. If however we accept the view that Sound is *produced* then the necessary restriction becomes possible; as at one time, one *cause* can *produce* only one effect; for instance, even though the Jar and the Cloth are both perceptible by the Eye, yet at the time that the cause of the Jar is operating, there can be *produced* only the Jar, and not the Cloth.—*Ṭātparya*.

number of Sounds are collected together, any particular manifester will manifest only one Sound (and not all)." But this analogy does not hold; as we do not admit what has been put forward; that is, we do not admit that any single Community is related to a number of diverse things belonging to different communities; in reality the Community 'cow' subsisting only in all its own components, is related to *cows* only, not to *horses*, and the Community 'horse' is related to *horses* only, not to *cows*. So that your analogy does not hold at all.*

Then again, as a matter of fact, Sound is perceived, even when there is no *manifester*; so that it cannot be said that when it is heard, and Sound is *manifested* (and not *produced*). If you hold the view that—"Sound is heard only when it is *manifested* by conjunction and disjunction",—then (our answer is that), in that case Sound should not be heard when the conjunction (or disjunction) is absent; as a matter of fact however, the Sound of wood-cutting *is* actually heard *after* the conjunction of the Axe with the Wood has ceased to exist.† "But it is an air-current that is set up by the stroke." That

* The Opponent might urge the case of such Communities as 'entity' 'man' and 'Brāhmaṇa' as subsisting in the same individual, in which case that which manifests the *Brāhmaṇahood* does not manifest the *manhood*, and so on, what manifests the man's *existence* does not manifest *Brāhmaṇahood*. But in this case, the things cited are such as do not coexist in the same place; being as they are of unequal extension; 'entity' having a much wider extension than 'man', which again is wider than 'Brāhmaṇa.' So that in this case it is only natural that what manifests the one need not manifest the other. But the case of Sounds is different; every sound is equally all-pervading in its character; so that there could be nothing to prevent the manifestation of all Sounds.

† When we are looking from a distance at wood being cut, the Sound of the cutting is heard after the axe has ceased to be in contact with the wood. Or, when watching a game of Football, we hear the Sound of the ball-kicking a few seconds after the ball has left the kicking foot. From the point of view of the modern scientist these facts are accounted for by the fact that the velocity of the Sound is less than that of the Light, hence we *see* the ball-kicking before we *hear* the Sound. But the fact remains that the Sound is heard *after* the contact has ceased; and this is sufficient to vitiate the Opponent's view.

we have already answered. What you mean is as follows :—What happens in the case cited is that Air is produced by the stroke of the axe on the wood; this Air is produced in the form of a current; so that this Air-current reaches the *Ākāsha* in the ear-cavity; and the Sound subsisting in that *Ākāsha* becomes heard." But this we have already answered by pointing out that all sounds (which according to you are *eternal*) subsist in the *Ākāsha*; so that whatever *manifester* you may have (in the shape of the air-current, for instance) would manifest every one of those Sounds; and hence there would be the contingency of all Sounds being heard at the same moment; and there could be no restriction (as to only particular Sounds being heard).

Again, Sound cannot be held to be manifested, because we find that wherever the cause (of manifestation, according to the Opponent, and of production, according to us) is present, Sound is perceived in all places; while in the case of things that are only *manifested* (and not *produced*), no such thing is ever found to be manifested in all places, when the cause (of its perception) is present. For instance, in the case of the jar (whose *manifestation* by lamplight is admitted by both parties), we find that when people seeking the jar enter a room where the jar is not present, with a lighted lamp in their hands (so that the cause of the manifestation is present), they *do not* perceive the Jar; hence in this case all people admit that there is *manifestation* of the Jar (by the lamplight); the case of Sound however is different: whenever there is contact (of the air-current) with the vocal chord (in the mouth, in the shape of the palate &c.), [which are the *causes*, in this case] Sound does not fail to be perceived; from which it follows that Sound is not *manifested* (by the causes, but *produced*)*. You might say that (this is so

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* The lamplight is the *manifester* of the Jar; hence it fails to manifest the Jar when the Jar is not there. Similarly, if the contact of the vocal chords were only the *manifester* of Sound, it should be possible of the same being not heard, (at least in

because) Sounds exist everywhere (being all pervading, which the Jar is not). But we have already answered this. What you mean is that—" What has been urged (as to the discrepancy between the case of Sound and that of the Jar) might be effective against those for whom Sounds are limited in their extension, restricted to one particular spot; but for us Sounds are all-pervading; hence we are not effected by the discrepancy." But this we have already answered (by showing that Sounds are *not* all-pervading); so that it does not call for further answer from us. Hence the conclusion is that Sound is not *manifested* (but *produced*). [Some people have held that what manifests sound is, not Air, but a particular Quality of Air, called '*nāda*,' *Vibration*: but] *vibration* cannot be accepted as the *manifester* of Sound; because even when the Vibration is perceived by a man at a distance, he does not (even though he hears the Sound) hear or perceive it at the spot where the Vibration has been perceived.* This same reason also serves to set aside the theory that Sound is manifested by the conjunctions and disjunctions of Air.

[*C*] *For the following reason also Sound is produced, not manifested:—because it is conceived and spoken of as a product. In ordinary parlance it is only a product that is spoken of as 'acute' or 'dull',—as we find in such expressions as 'acute pleasure', 'acute pain', 'dull men'; and in regard to Sound*

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some cases), even though the contact of the vocal chords is present. Such however is never found to be the case. Whenever a person utters a Sound—and then alone is there contact of the vocal chords &c.—the Sound never fails to be heard. Hence the only conclusion is that Sound is produced, not *manifested*. The correct reading is अभिव्यक्तिं घटादीनां (as in the Benares edition) and not अभिव्यक्ता घटादीन्

* In the first place, we do not admit of any such quality of Air as 'Vibration'; but even taking for granted that there is such a quality,—Vibration being the quality of Air, it follows that wherever there is Vibration, there is Air; but when a man hears Sound at a distance, either the Air or its Vibration is not present at the place where the man is standing. Hence the conclusion is that, inasmuch as Sound is heard by persons from a distance, it cannot be regarded as *manifested* by Vibration. —*Tātparya*.

also we have such expressions as 'acute sound', dull sound.' The reasoning propounded in this passage of the *Bhāṣya* may be formulated as follows :—'Sound is non-eternal, because it is conceived of as *acute* and *dull*, like pleasure and pain.'

When the Sūṭra puts forward the reason—'*because it is conceived and spoken of as a product*',—it means to include all those reasons that go to prove *non-eternality* ;—'being conceived of as a product' having been put forward only as an example (of those reasons).

These reasons (proving non-eternality of Sound) are :—(*a*) Because appearing in the form of individualities as constituting a Community, it is perceptible by our external sense-organ ;—(*b*) because though it is perceptible, yet (at times) it fails to be perceived, even though there is nothing to prevent its being perceived (if it were present)* ;—(*c*) because being a quality, it is perceptible by our external sense-organ ; and so forth.†

[An objection is raised]—"As a matter of fact, the word 'acute' pertains to an acute *thing*, and not to *Sound* or any such thing." You mean by this that—"What is denoted by the word 'acute' is *something acute* ; and not Sound,—so that when the word pertains to one thing, it cannot denote another."—But this is not right ; when the word 'acute' is pronounced in co-ordination with (as co-extensive with) the word 'Sound' (in the phrase 'acute sound'), it certainly denotes the *acute Sound*, and not merely *something acute* ; it is true that when it is pronounced by itself, the word 'acute'

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* This, says the *Tāṭparya*, will come later on ; and the *Parishuḍḍhi* adds that it shall be explained under Sū. 18.

† The *Parishuḍḍhi* adds four more reasons—(1) because being a specific quality, it is perceptible by us ;—(2) because it is non-pervasive, not pervading over the whole of its substratum ; (3) because it is the specific quality of an all-pervading substance other than God ;—(4) because it has being, and is perceptible by our external sense-organ.

denotes a common quality that may belong to Substances, Qualities and Actions; similarly when the word 'Sound' is pronounced by itself,* it denotes *Sound* that may be possessed of several qualities; when however the two words, 'acute' and 'sound' are pronounced together,—one being used as the qualifying and the other as the qualified term—then the word 'acute' serves to set aside the other possible qualities of *Sound*, and the word 'Sound' serves to preclude the other things (Substances, Qualities and Actions) to which the quality of 'acuteness' might belong; so that when we find both words pronounced, it is clear that it is *Sound* that is meant; hence it is quite right to assert that, as it is spoken of as 'acute', Sound must be non-eternal.

"*But as a matter of fact, the 'acuteness' or 'dullness' belongs to the manifester, whence arises the acuteness or dullness of the apprehensions; just as in the case of Colour."—This cannot be; as there is suppression.*—(*Bhāṣya* P. 105, L. 11). All that is required by way of an explanation of this is given in the *Bhāṣya* itself.

"But it is the *apprehension* (and not the letter-sound) that varies with the variations in the causes."

This cannot be; for it is nowhere seen that, the thing remaining the same, its apprehension is diverse. What the Opponent means is that—"the Sound does not vary; the Sound remains the same; what does vary with the variations of the cause is the *apprehension* of that Sound [so that when one sound is believed to be suppressed by another, what is suppressed is not the *Sound*, but its *apprehension*]."—This however cannot be accepted; for, in no case has it been seen that the thing remaining the same, its apprehension is

* For शब्देन शब्द.तुपरता of the Biblio. Indica edition, the Benares edition reads शब्दाशब्दाऽप्युपरश्लेक But the correct reading should be शब्दशब्दोऽप्युपरश्लेक as is clear from what follows in the Text.

diverse ; so that if the *Sound* remains the same, there can be no diversity in its *apprehension* ; specially as we never find any diversity in the apprehension when there is no diversity in the object. [And unless there is diversity, the phenomenon of *suppression* cannot be explained]. If you still urge that—" even though the object remains the same, there may be diversity in its apprehensions",—then in that case, apprehensions would be always diverse ; and there could never be such conceptions as 'diverse' and 'non-diverse' ('different' and 'non-different') that do appear in regard to apprehensions*. And further, in this case, no *suppression* † would be possible ; for the simple reason that no two apprehensions could ever exist at the same time ; as a matter of fact (for the *Bauddha*) no two apprehensions appear simultaneously ; nor is it possible for any apprehension to suppress itself ; nor again can it be said that there *is* no suppression. From all this it follows that what differs is the Sound itself (and not the apprehension).

[As against the *Sāṅkhya* view, the *Bhāṣya*, P. 106, L. 3, says]—*Then again (according to the Opponent's view) no suppression would be possible, because (according to him) the Sounds*

* What the *Vārṭika* says here applies, in a mixed fashion to the theory of the *Sāṅkhya* and to that of the *Mīmāṃsaka*,—as remarked by the *Parishuḍḍhi* ; Hence the *Tāṭparya* proceeds to point out what is applicable to the *Sāṅkhya*, and what to the *Mīmāṃsaka* theory. The sense of the argument is as follows—If you admit of diversity in the apprehension, you must accept diversity in the object. So that if all apprehensions were different, all objects would be different also ; and there would be no *non-difference* at all ; and when there is no *non-difference*, no *difference* would be possible ; as the two are merely relative.

† This 'impossibility of suppression' is urged against the *Bauḍḍha* view, and is different from the 'impossibility of suppression' urged in the *Bhāṣya* on P. 106, L. 3, and in the *Vārṭika*, in line 12 below, which (according to the *Tāṭparya*) is urged against the *Sāṅkhya* view. The former 'impossibility of suppression' is thus explained by the *Tāṭparya* :—According to the *Bauḍḍha*, one cognition is destroyed by the appearance of another cognition ; so that as no two apprehensions could, according to this view, exist at the same moment of time, how could there be a suppression of the one by the other?

being manifested in the same place as their manifester, there could be no contact (between the two, and hence no suppression of the one or by the other); so that according to the view that Sound is manifested in the same place as its manifester, no suppression would be possible. "Why?" Because the Sound occupies the same place as its manifester; as a matter of fact, a Sound, occupying the same place as its manifester, cannot suppress another Sound, which it does not get at; for the simple reason that it does not get at it: and what does not get at another cannot suppress this latter If you hold that a Sound would suppress another Sound even without getting at it,—then in that case, the Sound of the lute would never be heard. That is to say, if the (louder) sounds emanating from the conch-shell, the ass, and such other sources were to suppress even such Sounds as are not got at by them, then the Sound of the lute (being suppressed by the louder Sounds appearing somewhere in the world) would never be heard. If (in order to escape from this absurdity) it be held that—"the Sounds exist everywhere,"—our answer would be that this would not be right, as such a view would be open to the objections pointed out before (against the view that Sounds are all-pervading). What you mean is as follows—"The absurd contingency of the lute-sound being never audible is possible only for those who hold Sound to occupy the same place as its manifester; but for us all Sounds (being all-pervading) occupy the same place; and as such our view is not open to the said absurd contingency."—But this cannot be maintained; as it does not escape from the objections pointed out above; for instance, if all Sounds occupy the same place, there can be no restriction as to only one particular sound being manifested by a particular manifester; so that any manifester that would be taken up would bring about the manifestation of all Sounds;—and from this objection your view does not escape. Further, if such diverse Sounds as

those proceeding from the lute, the flute and the conch-shell‡ occupied the same place, then, inasmuch as the Sounds of the lute and the flute would be always suppressed by that of the Conch-shell, the Sound of the lute &c., would be absolutely inaudible! All these considerations tend to the inevitable conclusion that what do differ are the Sounds themselves (and not their apprehensions only). Being diverse, those Sounds that do occupy the same place, and (as such) reach the *Ākāsha* of the tympanum at the same time, are subject to the contingency that the more forcible of them suppresses the other (which is weaker); and what is meant by a Sound being *suppressed* is that it is *not heard* by reason of the hearing of a louder Sound.

[The Sāṅkhya raises an objection against the Naiyāyika's theory of Sound and its hearing]—"If it be true that Sound, proceeding in a series, reaches the *Ākāsha* enclosed in the tympanum, and becomes heard,—then, there could be no notion of direction in regard to Sound; and yet we have such notions as 'this Sound is to the East,' and 'that Sound is to the North.' In the case of things that get at the sense-organ (for being perceived)—such as Odour, for instance,—we do not find any such notions of direction."

This is not so, we reply; as the notion of direction is due to the Source; that is to say, the notion of direction that arises in regard to Sounds, cannot refer to the Sounds themselves; for as matter of fact, what happens in the case of sound-perception is that though Sounds are produced by several causes located in the several directions—East, West, North and South,—yet what is actually heard is only a part of the Sound produced; so that the notion of direction would be the same in regard to all Sounds; [which is not the case]; hence the notion of direction cannot refer to the Sounds themselves. "If so, then it behoves you to explain to what this notion

‡ Both editions read वीणावेणुशब्दानां but the sense requires वीणावेणुशङ्खशब्दानां

is due." Well, it is due to the diversity of the sources of the Sounds; as a matter of fact, there are certain things which, as sources of Sounds, serve as aids to the direct cause of the Sounds in the shape of *Conjunction*; and these sources being located in diverse directions, there arise diverse notions of direction in regard to the Sounds also. "This may be right in the case of those Sounds whose sources are themselves perceptible; but in regard to those Sounds whose sources are not perceptible, such notions of direction would be impossible." It would be by no means impossible; for when the sound-series first reaches (the auditory organ), it does so always from the direction of its source. That iṣ to say, when a sound-series proceeds from a certain source, this source produces such Sound-series on all sides of itself; and when the first* Sound of this Series, that reaches the *Ākāsha* in a particular tympanum, is recognised as reaching that part of this *Ākāsha* which lies in the direction of the sound,—then there arises the notion of direction (in regard to the Sound itself); but in cases where this first Sound of the Series cannot be discerned (and all sounds of the series crowd in at once), no notion of direction can arise.†

Some philosophers offer the explanation that there *are* no notions of direction in regard to Sounds; and the reason that they provide is that, as a matter of fact, notions of direction arise only when the object concerned is perceptible by the Eye; for instance, persons born blind have no conception of direction in regard to Sounds. Others have

* For आदौ the *Tātparya* reads आद्य:

† Sound proceeds from such sources as the Drum, the Conch-shell and the like. A certain definite part of the Auditory Organ lies towards that source. When the first Sound produced happens to be produced in that part, we infer that the Sound has proceeded from a source located in a particular direction. That is to say, when a Sound-series, emanating from the Drum located in a particular direction, produces a Sound in the Auditory *Ākāsha*, this Sound has a particular property, from which property it is inferred that it has emanated from a source located in a particular direction.—*Tātparya.*

asserted, that, inasmuch as conceptions of direction arise in connection with things perceived by the Eye and the Ear, these two organs must be regarded as apprehending things without actually getting at them. These theories we have already refuted in the course of our explanation of the Sūṭra defining Perception (Sū. 1·1·4).

Sūṭra (14).

[Objection)—"(A) BECAUSE THE DESTRUCTION OF THE JAR IS ETERNAL,—(B) BECAUSE COMMUNITY IS ETERNAL,—AND (C) BECAUSE EVEN ETERNAL THINGS ARE CONCEIVED AND SPOKEN OF AS NON-ETERNAL, [WHAT HAS BEEN URGED IN THE PRECEDING SŪṬRA CANNOT BE ACCEPTED AS CONCLUSIVE]."—(Sū. 14).

Bhāṣya on Su. (14).

[P. 107, L. 1 to L. 8]

"(A) Sound cannot be regarded as non-eternal on the "ground of its *having a cause* (as urged in Sū. 13). 'Why?' "Because the premiss (upon which that reasoning is based) is "not universally true: In the case of the 'destruction of the "Jar' we find that even though it has a cause (and a beginning), "yet it is *eternal* [Hence the premiss that 'all that has cause "is non-eternal' is not true]. "But how do you know that "the 'destruction of the Jar' has a cause?' [We know "this from the fact that] the Jar ceases to exist only when "there is a disruption of its (component) causes (in the shape "of the clay-particles making up the Jar). 'But how do you "know that this *destruction of the Jar* is eternal?' [That "we infer from the fact that] when the Jar has once "ceased to exist on the disruption of its component causes, this "non-existence of that particular Jar is never again set aside "by its existence [i. e. the Jar that has once been destroyed "never comes into existence again.]

"(B) The second reason urged as proving the non-"eternality of Sound is that *it is apprehended through a sense-"organ*. But here also the premiss is not true; as we find "that *Community*, though eternal, is yet apprehended through "sense-organs.

"(C) The third reason urged is that Sound *is conceived "and spoken of as non-eternal*; here also the premiss is not

"true; for we find even eternal things conceived and spoken "of as non-eternal. *E. g.* just as we speak of the 'part of a tree', "and the 'part of a blanket', so also do we speak of the 'part "of Ākāsha', the 'part of Soul' [where Ākāsha and Soul, both "eternal things, are spoken of as having *parts*; which means "that they are non-eternal].'

Vārtika on Sū. (14).

[P. 295, Ll. 7-8.]

What this Sūtra is meant to show is that the reasonings propounded in the preceding Sūṭra are not valid, being based upon premises that are not true. The rest is clear in the *Bhāṣya.*

Sūṭra (15).

[Answer]—INASMUCH AS THERE IS A CLEAR DIFFERENCE AND DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE REAL (DIRECT) AND THE FIGURATIVE (INDIRECT) [DENOTATION OF THE TERM 'ETERNAL'], THE PREMISES (URGED IN Su. 13) ARE NOT UNTRUE (Sū. 15).

Bhāṣya on Su. (15).

[P. 107, L. 10 to L. 14].

When a thing is spoken of as 'eternal', what is the 'real' connotation of that term? As a matter of fact, what is meant by the thing being 'eternal' is that it is a thing* which has the character of having no beginning, and for which there is no possibility of its losing itself.† Now this connotation of the term 'eternal' cannot apply to Destruction [for Destruction, though having no end, does have a beginning]. The term could however be applied to Destruction in its 'figurative' (or indirect) connotation; that is to say, when the Jar has lost itself,—*i. e.* having existed, it has ceased to exist,—and it does not come into existence again,—this negation or destruction of the Jar comes to be spoken of as 'eternal'; which can only mean that it is *as good as eternal*‡ [because having had a

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* The right reading is [illegible] for [illegible]

† 'Being destroyed'.—*Bhāṣyachandra.* It adds that *eternality* consists in being without beginning and without end.

‡ The correct reading is [illegible] as read in several Mss.; and supported by the *Vārṭika.*

beginning, the Destruction could not be 'eternal' in the real sense of the term]. And as a matter of fact, we do not find any *product* which is similar to Sound (in having a cause and a beginning) fulfilling the said conditions of true eternality; hence the premiss (that 'what has a cause is not eternal') cannot be untrue.

Vārṭika on Su. (15).

[P. 295, L. 10 to L. 18.]

Inasmuch as &c.—says the *Sūṭra*. The *Bhāṣya* asks—*When a thing is spoken of as 'eternal', what is the real connotation of that term?* The real connotation of the term 'eternal' is that the thing has such existence as is unconditioned by both limits (beginning and end); and the contrary of this constitutes 'non-eternality'. Now the said connotation of 'eternality' does not apply to Destruction; though the term may be applied to it in its figurative or indirect connotation. The 'negation of Jar' may be spoken of as being *as good as eternal*,—and not as being *actually eternal*; and the reason for this lies in this fact that the said negation is not present at two points of time; that is Destruction (which is one kind of Negation) has not been in existence before; not is it in existence during the time that the Jar exists; and the Prior Negation (which is another kind of Negation) does not exist while the Jar exists, nor does it exist when the destruction of the Jar has come about. "Then what does it mean when Destruction is spoken of as *eternal*?" It means that it is *as good as eternal*,—and hence 'eternal', in the figurative sense. "What is the basis for this figurative application of the term?" The basis lies in the fact that Prior Negation has no cause (and beginning) and Destruction has no end; and as both these facts are found in the case of 'eternal' things also,—on the ground of this similarity to really eternal things, Negation comes to be regarded as being *as good as eternal*; but it is never actually eternal [as Prior

Negation has end, and Destruction has beginning; which facts are not compatible with true *eternality*].*

Bhāṣya on Su. (16).

[P. 107, L. 14 to L. 19].

As regards the argument of the Opponent (urged in Su. 14) that Community is eternal (and yet perceptible by the Senses),—when we urge the *sense-perceptibility* of Sound as proving its non-eternality, what we mean is that it is apprehended through sense-contact, and—

INASMUCH AS THIS IS URGED ONLY AS LEADING TO THE INFERENCE OF THE SERIES (OF SOUNDS),—(Sū. 16.)

the premisses are not untrue, in their bearing upon eternal things— this much has to be brought in from what has gone before.†

We do not mean that Sound is non-eternal simply by reason of its being apprehended by the senses; what we do mean is that the fact of Sound being apprehended through sense-contact leads to the inference that in every phenomenon of Sound, there is a series of Sounds; and this fact of there being a series of several Sounds (appearing one after the other) proves that each of these Sounds is *non-eternal*.

Vārtika on Sū. (16).

[P. 295, L. 18 to P. 296, L. 3].

What is meant by Sound being *aindriyaka* (Sū. 18) is that it is apprehended through sense-contact; and when we urge this as proving *non eternality*, all that we mean is that it leads us to infer the existence of a series of Sounds; so that our premiss is not vitiated. We do not seek to prove 'non-eternality' on the ground of *sense-perceptibility*; what we mean to do by urging this *sense-perceptibility* of Sound is to deny the possibility of its

Var: P. 297.

* The *Bhāṣya* continues itself to Destruction; the *Vārtika* includes Prior Negation also. The former appears to be more reasonable. Prior Negation is not regarded as eternal by anyone.

† The printed text reads नित्ये व्यभिचार इति प्रकृतम्. The right reading is supplied by the *Bhāṣyachandra*—नित्ये न व्यभिचार इति प्रकृतम्; it explains प्रकृतं as अनुवृत्तम्. It calls these words as पूरक, completing the Sūtra.

being regarded as merely *manifested*; for we have already explained that what is only manifested cannot be regarded as perceptible by the senses.'

Bhāṣya on Sū. (17).

[P. 107, L. 19 to P. 108, L. 11].

The second argument urged by the Opponent (in Sū 14). is that "even eternal things are conceived and spoken of as non-eternal". Now this also is not right.

BECAUSE WHAT THE TERM 'PART' REALLY DENOTES IS THE CONSTITUENT CAUSE;*—(Sū. 17).

So that in its bearing on eternal things [*Ākāsha, f. i.*, where with the word 'part' cannot be used in its real connotation; though it may be used in a figurative sense hence] the figurative use of the term 'part' cannot vitiate our premiss (that 'what is spoken of as 'product' must be non-eternal',). Now, in the expressions cited by the Opponent '*part of Ākāsha*' and "*part* of the Soul',—the term 'part' cannot be taken as denoting the *constituent cause* of Akāsha and Soul, as it is taken to mean in the case of products (like *Tree* and *Blanket*); for how could the word denote what does not exist?† That the *constituent cause* of Ākāsha or Soul does not exist we learn from the fact that no such cause can be known by any of the means of cognition. "What then does the word 'part' mean in those expressions?" [As a matter of fact, such expressions as 'part of *Ākāsha*' are used only in connection with the contact of substances with *Ākāsha*; and] in such cases all that is meant by saying that 'contact subsists in *a part of Ākāsha*' is that the contact *does not pervade over the whole Ākāsha*; the sense being that the contact of *Ākāsha* with any substance of limited extension does not extend over the entire *Ākāsha*; it subsists in it without extending over

* In the printed text, the text of the Sūṭra is lengthened by the expression नित्येष्वप्यव्यभिचारः But this expression does not appear in the body of the Sūṭra itself either in the *Nyāyasūchinibandha*, or in the Puri Sūtra MS., or in Sūtra MS. B. The *Ṭāṭparya* also quotes this Sūtra (on p. 317) as ending with भिधानात्. We have therefore taken नित्येष्वप्यव्यभिचारः as the opening words of the Bhāṣya on the *Sūtra*. The *Bhāṣyachandra* also calls these words "supplementary" to the Sūṭra.

† *The Bhāṣyachandra* takes कथन्तर्हीति &c. as a question emanating from the Opponent, extending down to निरवहिंवस्रारंभवीयते. But it is distinctly better to construe the passage as has been done in the translation.

the whole of it. And herein lies a point of similarity between *Ākāsha* and ordinary Products: the contact between two berries for instance, does not extend over the entire berries. So that it is on the basis of this similarity that we have such expressions as 'part of *Ākāsha*', where the word 'part' is used in its figurative sense (and not in its real denotation of *constituent cause*). This same explanation applies also to the expression 'part of the Soul'. Like *Contact*, Sound (in *Ākāsha*) and Cognition* (in the Soul) also subsist only partially in—not extending over the whole of—their substratum. [The instances of 'eternal things being spoken of as non-eternal', that have been urged by the Opponent have been shown to be purely figurative.] On the other hand, [when Sound is spoken of as 'acute' or 'dull'], the properties of *acuteness and dulness*, that can belong only to a non-eternal thing, are such as have been proved (Text, P. 105, L. 8) to belong to Sound in reality, and not attributed to it merely figuratively. [Hence our original reasoning remains unshaken].

"But how is it that we do not know of any Sūṭra of Gautama's to this effect [(1) that *Ākāsha* and *Soul* cannot have *parts*, in the real sense of the term, and (2) that Sound appears in a series]?"

Well; it is in the nature of the revered Gauṭama, that in many sections (he does not actually assert and prove certain facts)†; so that in the present connection also he does not actually assert and prove the said two facts; and the reason is that he thinks that the student will be able to learn these truths from the doctrine of the *Shāsṭra*;—this 'Shāsṭra-doctrine' (in the present instance) consists of inferential reasonings that the Author has put forward (under Su. 16 and 17),—these reasonings having, as they have, several ramifications] in the shape of implications; the implication of Sū. 16 being that *there are Sound-series*, and that of Sū. 17 that *Ākāsha and Soul can have no constituent parts*. And inasmuch as these facts are already implied in the said Sūṭras, the Author does not find it necessary to assert them in so many words].

Vārṭika on Su. 17.

[P. 296, L. 6 to P. 299, L. 19].

The term 'part' really denotes the constituent cause—says the Sūṭra; and certainly in the case of eternal sub-

* This includes Pleasure, Pain &c. also,—says the *Bhāṣyachandra*.

† For instance, under Sū. 3-1-1 he implies that 'Substance' is distinct from 'Quality'; but he nowhere says this in so many words—*Parishuḍḍhi*.

stances, the term 'part.' (if used) cannot mean *constituent cause.* Says the *Bhāṣya* (P. 108, L. 1).—*In the expressions,—'part of Ākāsha' and 'part of Soul'—the term 'part' cannot be taken as denoting the 'Constituent Cause', as it is taken to mean in the case of products.* "But, why cannot the word mean *constituent cause*?" For the simple reason that (in the case of eternal substances) no such *cause* exists; as a matter of fact, there exist no such things as *parts* of Ākāsha. "How do you know that they do not exist?" For this reason that no such parts are known by any means of cognition; if parts of *Ākāsha* and such other eternal things existed, they would certainly be known by some means of cognition. "But how do you know that they are not known by any means of cognition?" We know this from the fact that no alternative is admissible. For instance, the word 'part' can only signify either *cause* or *receptacle*; now *Ākāsha*, not being a product, cannot have a *cause*: inasmuch as *Ākāsha* is not a product, the word 'part' in connection with it cannot signify *cause*. Nor can it mean *receptacle*, as *Ākāsha* is not contained in anything; hence the term 'part' as applied to it cannot mean *receptacle*. "But this is incompatible with ordinary usage [in which we do meet with such expressions as 'part of *Ākāsha*']" No; as this usage is capable of another explanation. "But if you regard *Ākāsha* to be without parts, you certainly go against ordinary usage, where we meet with such expressions as 'the Sun occupies the Eastern part of *Ākāsha*.' Our view is not incompatible with such usage; as this usage can be otherwise explained. If we take the term 'part' in such expressions to signify the fact of the contact of the thing spoken of not extending over the entire *Ākāsha*, there is no incompatibility with the said usage; as the word 'part' in such cases is explained as indicating the fact that the contact does not extend over the entire *Ākāsha*. This is what constitutes the similarity of Ākāsha to things

actually consisting of *parts*. In the case of such things of limited size as two berries in regard to whose being of limited size there is no difference of opinion,—it is found that whenever there is contact between them, it never extends over the whole of the berries; and the berries are also with parts;—hence it being found that the contact of *Ākāsha* also does not extend over the whole of it,—on the ground of this similarity to things with parts, the *Ākāsha* also comes to be conceived of as 'with parts', but only in a figurative sense.

Var. P. 297.

"What is the basis of this figurative use?"

This basis consists in the similarity of things. When there are two things—one of them not quite the same as the other—and if some similarity is found between them, this similarity forms the basis of their being figuratively regarded as the same; this basis is called '*bhakti*' because it is *divided* (common)—*bhajyatē*—between the two things concerned. So that when the word 'part' is used (in connection with *Ākāsha*), the character of *part* is imposed upon what is not really a *part*,—this imposition being based upon the said similarity. That is to say, inasmuch as *Ākāsha* has some sort of similarity to things with parts,—this similarity consisting in the fact of its contact not extending over the whole of it—the word 'part' also comes to be used in connection with it. This is the explanation (of the expression 'part of *Ākāsha*'), and parts do not really belong to *Ākāsha*. "How do you know this?" Because we do not know of any parts of *Ākāsha* by any means of cognition. By your question what you mean is this:—"There is no proof for the assertion that parts are only figuratively attributed to *Ākāsha*, on the basis of its similarity to things with parts, and there are no parts in Ākāsha in reality." But this is not right; for (our proof lies in the fact that) no such parts of *Ākāsha* are ever cognised by any means of cognition;

neither Perception nor any other means of cognition is ever found to point to any *parts* of *Ākāsha*; and also because it can never be pointed out what these (parts) are. If *Ākāsha* had real parts, it would be possible to point to their forms; for instance, when one asks—what are the parts of Cloth?—it is pointed out that the yarns are its parts; similarly when it is asked what are the parts of *Ākāsha*?—it is not possible to point to any thing as being these parts. Lastly, the difficulty remains that it is not possible to define the exact nature of the parts in question,—as shown above. That is to say, you cannot answer the following question.—Those things that you regard as the *parts* of *Ākāsha*, are they of the nature of *Ākāsha*, or are they not? "What do you drive at by this question?" What we mean is that, if the parts are of the nature of *Ākāsha*, then it follows that there are several *Ākāshas*; if on the other hand, they are not of the same nature as *Ākāsha*, then it behoves you to explain what exactly their nature is; and also in what manner they are 'parts' of *Ākāsha*; that is to say, what would be the exact meaning of the assertion that 'not being of the nature of *Ākāsha*, these are *parts* of *Ākāsha*'? For instance, when one says—'the Yarns are the parts of the Cloth'—what is meant is that the Yarns are the *receptacle* and also the *constituent cause* of the Cloth; and neither of these meanings is possible in the case of the 'parts' of *Ākāsha* [neither a *receptacle* nor a *cause* being possible for *Ākāsha*.]

"If *Ākāsha* has no parts, any contact with it would be without a substratum."

Certainly it would not be without a substratum; for it would subsist in the *Ākāsha* itself. If you mean to argue that—"if *Ākāsha* has no parts, the contact with parts of *Ākāsha* would become deprived of its substratum",—our answer is that it could not be deprived of its substratum; as it subsists in the *Ākāsha*

Yar: P. 298.

itself; in fact you yourself call it as 'having *Ākāsha* for its substratum'; so that it cannot be deprived of its substratum. "But in that case all contact would coexist in the same substratum." That does not effect us; as that does not militate against our doctrine. If you mean to argue that—"If *Ākāsha* has no parts, these several contacts of material substances that come about in *Ākāsha* would all coexist in the same substratum"—our answer is that this contingency of the several contacts coexisting in the same substratum does not go against anything (recognised by us).

Thus then we conclude that the conception of 'parts of *Ākāsha*' is purely figurative—being based upon the resemblance of *Ākāsha* to things (really endowed with parts).

"If *Ākāsha* has no parts, then all Sounds which are products of *Ākāsha* would be heard by all men."

Certainly not; as the answer to this has already been given by us. What you mean is as follows:—"If *Ākāsha* is without parts,—and on that account all Sounds coexist in the same substratum—then all Sounds should be heard by all men;—as a matter of fact however, all sounds are *not* heard by all men;—hence the conclusion is that the Sounds subsist in different substrata,—because they are not heard by all men,—just as the colours of the fingers (which, not being seen by all men, are held to subsist in different substrata)." This however is not right; as this reasoning has been already answered by us. We have already pointed out that Sound, like Contact, does not subsist over the entire substratum.

Some people assert that being qualities, these must pervade over their entire substratum. These people have held that, because Sound and Contact are qualities, they must subsist in their entire substratum,—just as the colour of the finger pervades over the entire finger.

To these people the following question should be put—What is meant by *pervading* or *extending over the entire substra-*

tum? If by *pervading* you mean only *subsisting in the substratum*, then that does not militate against our doctrines. If you mean something else, then no such *pervading* is possible. According to us what is meant by the colour of the finger pervading over the finger is simply that the colour is perceived whenever its substratum (the finger) is perceived;—and certainly in the case of Sound, and other qualities of *Ākāsha*, it is not true that they are perceived whenever their substratum (*Ākāsha*) is perceived;—hence these qualities cannot be *pervasive*, in the same manner as the colour of the finger is pervasive. As a matter of fact, in the case of things subsisting in several substrata at the same time [*e.g.*, (*a*) the *genus* of 'Being,' or 'Cow' and the like, which pervade over the entire lot of their several substrata, and (*b*) *Contact*, which does not pervade over the entire lot of its several substrata], *pervasion* and *non-pervasion* consist respectively in the said things being and not being apprehended on the apprehension of even a few of the several things that constitute their substrata; * while in the case of things subsisting in a single substratum (at a time), [e.g., (*a*) Colour which pervades over its entire substratum, and (*b*) Sound which does not pervade over its entire substratum], *pervasion* or *non-pervasion* consist respectively in their being and not being apprehended on the apprehension of that substratum.†

As regards the contacts, with *Ākāsha*, of material substances with definite shapes,—some people hold some of these contacts to be such as are produced (by causes, hence non-eternal); while others are regarded as not produced (eternal). Now it is the contact of gross products that is *produced*,—

* *E.g.*, When a few cows are apprehended, the genus *Cow* is apprehended. But when only one of the two conjoined things is perceived, the conjunction or contact is not perceived. This proves that while Genus is pervasive, Contact is not so.

†*E.g.* When the Jar is seen, its colour is seen; which shows that Colour is pervasive. But Sound is not perceived whenever *Ākāsha* is apprehended; or Pleasure is not apprehended whenever the Soul is apprehended; which shows that Sound and Pleasure are *non-pervasive* qualities.

because it is actually *produced* by contact; for when the product is being produced, its contact is brought about by the contact of its constituent parts. There are others however who do not hold this contact to be brought about by action (motion);—and their reason lies in the fact that the contact lasts as long as the substance itself lasts; and as Contact can never be separate (from the conjoint things), no contact of contact is possible; so that in *Ākāsha* there can be no contact brought about by action. But these people hold that the contact of *Ākāsha* with *atoms* is such as is *produced* (and not eternal); * and the argument in support of the view that the Contact of Atoms with *Ākāsha* is a product is as follows:—'The Atom is related to *Ākāsha* by a relationship that is brought about by certain causes,—because it has shape (it is tangible and of limited extension),—like the Jar and such other things (which having shape &c. are related to *Ākāsha* by an impermanent relation).' Then again, as regards the contact with Ākāsha of the gross Products, which is the subject of dispute, we have the following argument:—'The said disputed contact with *Ākāsha*, of the gross Product, is one that cannot last as long as the said Product continues to exist,—because while having an indestructible substratum (in the shape of *Ākāsha*), and subsisting in a substance (the gross Product) which is capable of action (motion), it is one that forms the antithesis of non-contact,—just like the contact of other corporeal things'. From all this it follows that the contact of a gross Product with *Ākāsha* is one that is brought about by contact, and also by action (motion); while that of the Atom (with *Ākāsha*) is brought about only by motion. [In proof of the fact that contacts with *Ākāsha* &c. are only transitory and partial, not extending over the

Var: P. 299.

* The Benares edition reads अकृतकं; but from the next sentence it is clear that कृतकं is the correct reading.

entire *Akāsha*, we have the following argument]—'*Ākāsha* and other things under consideration are also capable of being disjoined (from things with which they are in contact)—because they are in contact with things that are capable of motion,—like Atoms;*—that is, just as the contacts of the Atom with movable things are transitory, not lasting as long as the things last, [so also are the contacts of *Ākāṣha*].'

And just as the Contacts and Sound (do not pervade over the entire *Akāsha*), so Cognition and other qualities of the Soul do not extend over the entire Soul.† And it has already been explained that Contact also with the Soul does not extend over the entire Soul.

[Hitherto it has been held that one speaks of 'part of of *Ākāsha*' because of *Ākāsha* resembling things actually composed of parts in the fact of its contacts being non-pervasive in their character. The Author points out another point of resemblance, on the basis whereof *parts* may be attributed to *Ākāsha*]—Or, when one speaks of *Ākāsha* having 'parts,' what is meant is that, while being itself one *Ākāsha* is related to several corporeal substances composed of parts; that is to say, *Ākāsha* being one, is related to several substances composed of parts, and this constitutes its similarity to things really composed of parts; as such relationship is found in the case of such well known partite things as the Jar and the like. [The Jar being 'one that is capable of being related to several corporeal partite things.]

[The *Bhāṣya* asks]—"*But how is it that we do not know of any Sūṭra of Gauṭama's to this effect?*" To what effect do you mean? "To the effect that *Akāsha is without parts and Soul is without parts.*" The answer to this is that we have no separate Sūṭra asserting these facts, as they

* In regard to this reasoning, the *Ṭāṭparya* remarks that it is found only in a few manuscripts of the *Vārṭika*.

† The reading of this passage is corrupt. We have adopted the reading of the Bib-Ind edition, which provides the best sense.

are already implied by other facts; *i. e.* inasmuch as these facts are already implied by other facts (that have been asserted), the Author did not compose a Sūṭra to this effect. Or, the question may be taken as referring to the direct assertion of the doctrine of *the Series of Sounds*;—and the answer to this also would be the same:—*viz.* we have no Sūṭra directly asserting this doctrine as it is already implied by other facts. Or, the facts in question might be learnt from the doctrines of the *Shāsṭra*; this '*Shāsṭra-doctrine*' *in the present case consisting of the inferential reasonings that the Author has put forward (under Su.* 16 & 17,*)*—these *reasonings having several ramifications*, by means of which what is not directly asserted is also implied; and what is thus already implied is not again directly asserted by a *Sūṭra*.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (18).

[P. 108, L. 11 to P. 109, L. 10.]

Further we ask—How is it to be known that a certain thing exists and another thing does not exist? "Well, when a thing is apprehended by means of an Instrument of Cognition [it is recognised as *existing*], and when it is not apprehended by means of an Instrument of Cognition [it is recognised as non-existing]'.' In that case *your Sound would have to be regarded as non-existent,*—*

BEFORE IT IS UTTERED; BECAUSE IT IS NOT APPREHENDED, AND WE DO NOT FIND ANY OBSTRUCTION (THAT COULD EXPLAIN THE NON-APPREHENSION OF THE SOUND. (Sūṭra 18).

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* Those who regard Sound as eternal are asked to explain how it is to be ascertained whether or not a certain thing exists or not. Their answer naturally would be that when a thing is apprehended it is recognised as existing, and when it is not apprehended it is recognised as non-existing. By this criterion, the Siḍḍhānṭin rejoins, Sound will have to be regarded as non-existing before it is uttered, because of the reasons put forward in the following Sūṭra (18).

The *Varṭika* suggests another introduction to the Sūṭra. The Siḍḍhānṭin asks—When you regard the Jar as non-eternal, how do you know that it is non-eternal? The answer of the Opponent would be—"We know that the Jar is non-eternal because (at times) it is not apprehended by means of any Instrument of Cognition." Thereupon the Siḍḍhantin rejoins—Exactly for this same reason Sound also should be regarded as non-eternal; for reasons put forward in the Sūṭra.

That is to say, prior to its utterance, Sound does not exist. "How do you know that?" *Because it is not apprehended.* "But even an existing thing may fail to apprehended on account of the presence of obstructions.' This explanation is not possible in the case in question. "Why?" Because we do not find any such obstructions as would account for the non-apprehension of Sound. As a matter of fact, we do not find any such causes of non-apprehension as—(1) that 'Sound is *not* apprehended because it is rendered imperceptible by such an obstruction',—or (2) that 'it is not close to the perceiving sense organ',—or (3) that '(even though close to it) there is something intervening between the Sound and the sense-organ'*. Hence the conclusion is that until it is uttered, *Sound does not exist.*

Bha. P. 109.

"The utterance serves as a manifester (of the Sound); that is the reason why, prior to utterance, Sound (even though existing) fails to be apprehended."

But what do you mean by the *utterance* (of Sound)?

"When there is a desire (to speak, on the part of a person), this desire gives rise to an effort on his part,—this effort raises the wind in the man's body,—this wind on rising strikes certain parts of the mouth, in the shape of the throat, the palate and the like,—this impact of the wind with particular spots of the mouth brings about the manifestation of particular letter-sounds;—this is what is meant by *utterance.*"

But this 'impact is only a form of *Conjunction*; and it has been shown (in the *Bhāṣya*, on Sū. 13) that *Conjunction* cannot be the *manifester* (of Sound). Consequently the non-apprehension of Sound cannot be said to be due to the absence of the *manifester*; it is due in fact, to the sheer *non-existence* of the Sound (at the time). Thus then, the fact that Sound is heard only when it is uttered leads us to the inference that when the Sound is heard, it comes into existence after having been non-existent† (prior to the utterance);—and that when, *after* having been uttered, it is not heard,‡ what happens is that having come into existence, it ceases to exist; so that its not being heard is always due to its sheer *non-existence* [in the former case to *prior non-existence*, and in the latter case, to *destruction* or *cessation of existence*].'

* व्यवधानाद्वेन्द्रियार्थयोरिति is the right reading supplied by the Puri Mss.

† अनुच्चार्य is the right reading; supported by the Puri Mss. also by the *Bhāṣya-chandra.*

‡ The right reading is चोच्चार्य न श्रूयते supported by Puri Mss. also.

"But how do you know that this is so?"

We know this from the fact that *we do not find any obstruction &c.*—as the *Sūtra* says.

From all this the conclusion is that Sound is capable of *being produced* and of *ceasing to exist.*

Vārṭika on Sū. 18.

[P. 299, L. 19 to P. 300, L. 16].

Says the *Bhāṣya* (P. 108, L. 11)—*How is it to be known that a certain thing exists and another thing does not exist*"? Now, what is the object of this attack? The object of attack —what is meant to be denied—is the existence of what is not apprehended;—the sense (of the *Bhāṣya*) being that those persons who hold Sound to be eternal should be asked—How do you know that a certain thing exists and another thing does not exist?—and thus questioned, they would naturally reply that—"*when a thing is apprehended by means of an Instrument of Cognition, it is recognised as existing, and when it is not apprehended by means of an Instrument of Cognition, it is recognised as non-existing.*"

[Now if such be the case],—*Your Sound will have to be regarded as non-existent—prior to utterance; because it is not apprehended* &c. &c.—says the Sūṭra.

Then again, there are certain things—the Jar for instance —which are regarded by both parties to be non-eternal; and on the basis of these things, the Opponent (who regards Sound to be eternal) should be asked the following question—The Jar and such other things as you regard to be non-eternal,—how do you know that they are non-eternal? Thus questioned, when they state their reason for regarding the Jar to be non-eternal, that same reason will be shown to be applicable to the case of Sound also. This is what the Sūṭra is meant to show;—the sense of the Sūṭra being that,

when a certain entity is found to be such as fails to be apprehended, at a certain time,—even when there is nothing to prevent its being apprehended—it has to be regarded as *non-eternal*,—and as Sound *is* such an entity, it must be regarded *as non-eternal.* The rest of this argument is clearly set forth in the *Bhāṣya.*

"But the non-apprehension of Sound may be due to the absence of a manifester."

That cannot be ; as we have already answered this. What you mean is as follows—" *Utterance* being the manifester of Sound, when Sound fails to be apprehended, it is because its manifester is absent ; hence the condition—*when there is nothing to prevent its being apprehended*—is not fulfilled in this case [the *cause of non-apprehension* being actually present, in the shape of the *absence of the manifester*]."

[In answer to this, the *Bhāṣya* says]—*What do you mean by 'utterance'?* " *When there is desire to speak, this desire gives rise to an effort,—this effort raises the wind in the man's body—this wind on rising strikes certain parts of the mouth, in the shape of the throat &c.*"—If this is what is meant by '*utterance*', our answer is that your argument is not tenable ; as it has already been refuted. For the said impact or *striking* of the wind can only mean the *conjunction* of the wind with the Palate &c., brought about by the force of the wind (issuing from the body),—and it has already been shown that *Conjunction* cannot be the manifester of Sound.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (19).
[P. 109, L. to L. 18].

Such being the actual state of things, the Opponent, throwing dust, as it were, upon the truth, urges the following argument—

Sutra (19).

" AS THERE IS NON-APPREHENSION OF THE NON-APPREHENSION OF OBSTRUCTION,—THIS PROVES THE EXISTENCE OF THE OBSTRUCTION." (Sū. 19).

"If the non-existence of the obstruction is deduced from "the simple fact of its not being apprehended,—then, inasmuch as the non-apprehension of the obstruction also "is not apprehended, we should deduce, from this latter "non-apprehension, the non-existence of the 'non-apprehension of obstruction'; and this 'non-existence of the non-"apprehension of obstruction' sets aside the denial of the "'obstruction.'* 'But how do you prove that the *non-apprehension of obstruction* is not apprehended?' What is there "to be proved in this? This fact is realised by everyone "intuitively by himself; just as in all similar cases; that "is to say, as a matter of fact, when a man fails to apprehend an *obstruction*, he intuitively realises that *he does not "apprehend an obstruction*,—just as (in the reverse case) "when he actually finds that a certain thing is hidden behind "a wall, he intuitively realises that he apprehends an obstruction; and just as he knows that there is *apprehension "of obstruction*, he should also know that there is *non-apprehension of obstruction* [but as he does not know that there is "*non-apprehension of obstruction*, it follows that there is *no "apprehension* of the non-apprehension]."

Vārṭika on Sū. (19).

[P. 300, L. 16 to P. 301, L. 4].

Such being the actual state of things, the Opponent, throwing dust as it were, upon the truth, urges the following argument—says the *Bhāṣya*.—What does this passage mean? It means that the Opponent meets us with an argument that is called 'Futile Rejoinder.' This Futile Rejoinder is as follows:—"*As there is non-apprehension of the non-apprehension of obstruction &c., &c.*"

* The 'non-apprehension of obstruction,' being 'non-apprehension', no 'apprehension' or perception of it is possible. Hence all that can be postulated of the 'non-apprehension' is that it is *not-apprehended*; and (according to the reasoning propounded by the Siḍḍhānṭin himself in Sū. 18) when the 'non-apprehension of obstruction' is *not-apprehended*, it follows that the 'non-apprehension of obstruction' does not exist; which means that the 'obstruction' *is apprehended*; which again proves that the 'Obstruction' exists; for when we have the conception of the 'apprehension of obstruction', this conception cannot be entirely groundless.

—*Ṭāṭparya*.

What is the sense of this assertion?

The sense is as follows :—"The reasoning urged by the *Siḍḍhānṭin* (in Sū. 18) is based upon 'non-apprehension of obstructions',—and this is *not conclusive*; that is to say, just as the 'non-apprehension of obstruction' (upon which the Siḍḍhānṭin relies) *exists*, even though it is *not apprehended*, in the same manner the *obstruction* also might be *existing*, even though it is *not apprehended*; so that the mere *non-apprehension* of a thing cannot be accepted as conclusively proving its *non-existence*. Thus then, if it is admitted that because it is *not-apprehended*, the 'non-apprehension of obstruction' does not exist,—then, from the non-existence of this 'non-apprehension of obstruction' it follows that there *is* '*apprehension* of obstruction'; and as there can be no apprehension of what does not exist, it follows that the *Obstruction* does exist. '*How do you prove that the non-apprehension of obstruction is not apprehended?' What is there to be proved in this? This fact is realised by everyone intuitively* :—As a matter of fact, the non-apprehension, as well as the apprehension, of obstruction is realised by everyone intuitively."

Bhāṣya on Sū. (20).

[P. 109, L. 17 to P. 110, L. 2]

[To the above argument, the *Siḍḍhānṭin* replies.]—If what you say is true, then that knocks the bottom completely out of the rejoinder urged by you.*

The Opponent accepts, for the sake of argument, what the *Siḍḍhānṭin* has just said, and then proceeds with the following reasoning :—

Sūṭra (20).

"IF (AS YOU SAY), EVEN THOUGH THERE IS 'NON-APPREHENSION OF OBSTRUCTION,' YET THIS 'NON-APPRE-

* The Opponent has declared that the 'non-apprehension of obstruction' can be realised intuitively.—If that be so, then that demolishes the whole Rejoinder put up by him; as this rejoinder based itself entirely upon the *non-apprehension* of the 'non-apprehension of obstruction.' The term '*uṭṭaravākyam*' in the *Bhāṣya* stands for '*jaṭyuṭṭara*', the Futile Rejoinder contained on Sū. 19. —*Ṭāṭparya*.

HENSION OF OBSTRUCTION' EXISTS,—THEN, IN THAT CASE, THE MERE NON-APPREHENSION OF 'OBSTRUCTION' CANNOT PROVE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE 'OBSTRUCTION'."—(Sū. 20).

"That is to say, just as (according to you) the 'non-appre-
"hension of obstruction' exists, even though it is not appre-
"hended, exactly in the same manner, the 'obstruction' also
"exists, (as urged by me) even though it is not apprehended.
"Now if you admit that, 'even though not apprehended,*—
"the *non-apprehension of obstruction* exists',—and having ad-
"mitted this, still go on to argue (as you have done in Sū. 18)
"that 'as non-obstruction is apprehended, it does not exist',—
"then, under such a system of confession (and counter-
"confession), there can be no certainty as to any particular
"view being held by any person."†

Vārṭika on Sū. (20).

[P. 301, L. 4, to L. 10].

If what you say is true, then that knocks the bottom completely out of the rejoinder; that is to say, the rejoinder cannot arise in that case.

Admitting this, the Opponent argues—"*If, even though &c. &c.* (*Sūṭra*)." This Sūṭra is meant to show the *inconclusive* character of the fact of anything being *not-apprehended* (as proving its non-existence).

Suṭra (21).

[REPLY TO SŪ. 19 AND 20]—INASMUCH AS THE 'NON-APPREHENSION (OF OBSTRUCTION)' IS OF THE NATURE OF 'NEGATION OF APPREHENSION (OF OBSTRUCTION)', THE REASON (PUT FORWARD IN SŪ. 19) IS NOT A TRUE ONE. (Sū. 21).

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* The printed text reads, in the last line of the page, नानुपलभ्यमाना; this is not right; the correct reading अनुपलभ्यमाना as found in the Puri Ms. A.

† Sutras 19 and 20 are meant to point out that the reasoning urged by the *Siḍḍhānṭin* in Su. 18 is *non-conclusive*. —*Ṭāṭparya.*

For '*praṭipaṭṭiniyamaḥ*' in the *Bhāṣya*, the *Bhāṣyachanḍra* reads '*praṭiniyamaḥ*', and explains it as *maṭpakṣapraṭiṣēḍhaniyamaḥ*; according to this the passage means—'*it does not necessarily follow that it is our view that is wrong, and not yours.*'

Bhaṣya on Sū. (21).

[P. 110, L. 4 to L. 7].

As a matter of fact, that which is *apprehended* (by means of a *positive* Instrument of Cognition) is accepted as *existing*, while that which is *not-apprehended* (i. e., apprehended only by means of a *negative* Instrument of Cognition) is regarded as *non-existent*. Such being the case, that which is of the nature of the 'negation of apprehension' should be regarded (by all parties) as a *non-entity*. Now [turning to the case in question] 'non-apprehension' is merely the 'negation of apprehension'; and being purely negative in its character (and as such having no positive form), it cannot be apprehended (by means of any *positive* Instrument of Cognition). On the other hand, inasmuch as *obstruction* is (according to you) an *existent* (positive) entity, there should be *apprehension* of it;—as a matter of fact however, it is *not-apprehended*;—hence the conclusion is that it is *non-existent*. Under the circumstances,* it is not right to assert that 'the non-apprehension of obstruction cannot prove the non-existence of the obstruction' (as urged by the Opponent in Sū. 20).†

Vārṭika on Sū (21).

[P. 301, L. 12 to L. 22].

Inasmuch as the non-apprehension &c. &c.—says the Sūṭra. What has been put forward by the Opponent is a Futile Rejoinder; because what is urged in answer is not analogous to the case in question. As a matter of fact, nothing that is similar to Sound—which is held to be *non-eternal*—has ever been found to be *eternal*. And further, we have already explained. "What have you explained?" Well, we have already explained that 'eternality' consists in such existence as is free from both extremities (*beginning* and *end*). [And as nothing similar to Sound has ever been found to have such existence] what has been urged is not quite pertinent; and hence it does not deserve any consideration.

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* तथा is the right reading for यथा.

† This assumption of the Opponent cannot be right; because, as just shown, the non-apprehension of an *entity* does prove its non-existence.

[The *Vārṭika* propounds a number of reasonings directly bearing upon the *non-eternality of Sound*]—Sound is non-eternal;—(*a*) because being a quality, it is perceived by our sense-organs, like Cognition; and (*b*) because being non-pervasive in its character, it inheres in a pervasive substance (*Ākāsha*) [and does not inhere in a non-pervasive substance*], and is perceptible, like Pleasure. And, that *Ākāsha* is impartite (without parts) is proved by the following reasons:—*Ākāsha* is without parts; (*a*) because it is pervasive, like the Soul; and (*b*) because being a substance, it is ever incorporeal, like the Soul. And because it is pervasive, *Ākāsha* cannot be a product. That it is *pervasive* is proved by the fact that it pervades over substances and is ever incorporeal. The same reasonings apply to *Space* and *Time* (two other eternal Substances)†. Thus by means of reasonings bearing directly upon Sound itself, it is proved that Sound is *non-eternal*.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (22).

[P. 19, L. 7 to L. 10].

[The Siḍḍhānṭin‡ asks]—When you declare Sound to be eternal, on what grounds do you base this declaration?

[The Opponent answers]—

(A) "BECAUSE OF INTANGIBILITY."—(Sūṭra 22).

"We have seen that *Ākāsha*, which is intangible, is eternal; hence it follows that Sound is also so."

Vārṭika on Sū. (22).

[P. 302, L. 1 to L. 7].

When you declare Sound to be eternal &c. &c.—Says the *Bhāṣya*. The question is put by the Bhāṣya with a view to

* The *Ṭāṭparya* adds this further qualification, with a view to exclude the *unity* of the Soul, which *is eternal*, though non-pervasive and inhering in the pervasive substance, Soul.

† So that everything that is eternal is pervasive; and as Sound is not pervasive, it follows that it cannot be eternal.

‡ The *Bhāṣyachanḍra* wrongly attributes this question to the '*Shiṣya*', *pupil*. It is clearly addressed to the Opponent by the *Siḍḍhānṭin*.

ascertain if there is any reasonable ground upon which the Opponent's view is based; for every diversity of view should have some basis for it. There is 'diversity of opinion' when in regard to the same thing two persons entertain two contradictory notions; but no such diversity of opinion is proper except when there is some reason lending support to each of the two ideas entertained; hence when the *Pūrvapakṣin* regards Sound to be eternal, it behoves him to say what reasons he has for regarding it so.

[Thus questioned, the Opponent answers]—"Sound is eternal, *because it is intangible* (Sū. 22),—like *Ākāsha*."

Bhāṣya on Sūṭras (23) and (24).

[P. 110, 2-7 to P. 11, 1].

The reason put forward by the Pūrvapakṣin, is 'inconclusive' (non-concomitant with the Probandum) in both ways; for (1) the Atom is *tangible* and yet *eternal* [which shows that *intangibility* is not the invariable concomitant of eternality], and (2) Motion is *intangible* and yet *non-eternal* [which shows that *eternality* is not always concomitant with *intangibility*]. Against the reasoning "because Sound is intangible, therefore it is eternal"—we have the next Sūtra pointing out an instance to the contrary (Motion), which is similar to the Subject (Sound, in being 'intangible')—

THE REASONING IS NOT RIGHT, BECAUSE MOTION (WHICH IS 'INTANGIBLE') IS 'NON-ETERNAL'—(*Suṭrā* 23).

And the next *Sūṭra* cites another instance to the contrary (the Atom), which is dissimilar to the Subject (Sound, in being *tangible*)—

THE REASONING IS NOT RIGHT, BECAUSE THE ATOM (WHICH IS 'TANGIBLE') IS 'ETERNAL'*—(Sūṭra 24).

Both these examples (cited in Sū. 23 and 24) show that the reasoning—'because Sound is intangible (it should be ete'nal)'—is not valid.

* The printed text of the *Sūṭra* नाणुर्नित्यत्वात्, which is accepted by the *Bhāṣyachandra* also, is wrong. It gives no sense. The right reading is नाणुनित्यत्वात् as found is the *Nyāyasūchīnibandha* and ..lso in all Mss.

Vārṭika on Sū. (23) and (24).

[P. 302, L. 7 to L. 10].

The person who urges 'intangibility.' as the reason for 'eternality' and cites the case of '*Ākāsha*' as the corroborative instance, is apparently one who has failed to perceive the presence of 'intangibility' along with the Reverse of the Probandum (*eternality*). And the next two *Sūṭras* (23 and 24) are meant to point out the fact that what is urged as the reason is *not* necessarily concomitant (with *eternality*). The rest is made clear in the *Bhāṣya*.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (25).

[P. 111, L. 1 to L. 4].

[The Opponent says]—" In that case, the following is the reason (for Sound being regarded as *eternal*)—

(B) " BECAUSE OF ITS BEING IMPARTED "—(Sū. 25).

" A thing that is *imparted* is found to be constant ; and as Sound is *imparted*, by the Teacher to the Pupil, it should be regarded as *constant*. "

Vārṭika on Sū. (25).

[P. 302, L. 12].

" Another reason for Sound being regarded as eternal consists its *being imparted*."

Sūṭra (26).

THIS ALSO IS NOT A VALID REASON ; BECAUSE SOUND IS NOT FOUND TO EXIST IN THE SPACE INTERVENING BETWEEN THE TWO PERSONS. (Sū. 26.)

Bhāṣya on Sū. (26).

[P. 111, L. 6 to L. 7.]

What is there to indicate the existence of Sound in the space intervening between the person imparting (the words) and the person to whom they are imparted ?

Vārṭika on Sū. (26).
[P. 302, L. 12 to L. 19].

As a matter of fact, we have never found any *eternal* thing being 'imparted'; so that no homogeneous example being available in corroboration of the reason, it must be rejected as being 'contradictory' (proving the *non-eternality* of Sound) ; [specially because several instances are available of *non-eternal* things being 'imparted']. If (with a view to escape from this difficulty) the reasoning be stated in the form—"Sound persists, because it is imparted, like such substances as the Jar and the like",—even so the *eternality* of Sound is not established ; for *the reason is not valid, as Sound is not found to exist in the space intervening between the two persons*—(says the *Sūṭra*). If Sound really *persisted* (continued to exist), it would certainly be found existing in the space intervening between the *imparter* and the person to whom it is imparted. Thus what the Sūṭra means to show is that the reason urged is 'Contradictory.'*

Bhāṣya on Sū. (27)
[P. 111, L. 7 to L. 10].

[The Opponent answers]—"It cannot be denied that "it is only a thing that persists (such as gold &c.) that can "leave the imparter and go over to the person to whom it is "imparted. So that—

"IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT IT (SOUND) IS TAUGHT, (THE VALIDITY OF) THE REASON CANNOT BE GAINSAID." (Sū. 27.)

"What indicates the persistence of Sound is the fact "that *it is taught* ; if the Sound did not continue to exist, it "would not be possible for it to be *taught*."

Vārṭika on Sū. (27).
[P. 302, L. 19 to P. 303, L. 2].

"There is no 'contradiction' in our theory"—the Opponent answers ;—"because the persistence of "Sound between the two persons is recognised

Vār. P. 303.

* The *Parishuḍḍhi* remarks that this Sūṭra shows the Opponent's reasoning to be 'unknown'; as is clear from the *Bhāṣya*.

" by means of Inference; and certainly, when a thing, though " not perceived by the sense, is known by means of In" ference, this does not mean that it does not exist. ' What " is the Inference that proves the existence of Sound?' " It is the fact of its being *taught* that forms the basis of " the Inference. ' What is meant by the Word-Sounds *being* " *taught*?' What is meant is the acquiring (of the Sounds, " by the person taught) of what is imparted (by the " Teacher). So that the Inference stated formally is as " follows :—Sound does persist in the space intervening " between the Imparter and the Receiver,—because it is " taught,—like the Arrow and such other things."

Sūtra (27 A).

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TWO VIEWS, ' BEING TAUGHT ' MAY MEAN ONE THING OR ANOTHER ; HENCE THE ARGUMENT FAILS TO MEET THE OBJECTION (URGED BY US).—Sū. 27 A)*

Bhāṣya on Sū. 27 A.
[P. 111, L. 11 to L. 14].

That Word-Sounds are *taught* is admitted by both parties. But the doubt still remains, as to whether in the ' teaching', the Sound that originally subsisted in the Teacher goes over to the Pupil,—or when the Pupil is *taught*, he only imitates what he finds in the Teacher, as is the case with the *teaching* of Dancing ; and by reason of this doubt, *being taught* cannot be a valid basis for the inference of Sound being " imparted."

Vārṭika on Sū. (27 A).
[P. 303, L. 3 to L. 8].

We do not deny that there is *teaching* of Sound ; but what we say is that what is *taught* is only *non-eternal*, transient ; just as in the case of the *teaching* of Dancing.

* In the printed text this does not appear as a Sūtra. The *Nyāyasūchīnibandha* as also *Bhāṣyachandra*, mentions it as a *Sūṭra* and it is also found in Sutra Mss. A and B. But with a view to retain the numbering of the subsequent Sūtras in the printed text, we have numbered this Sūtra as 27 A.

Then again, when you urge the argument that—"Sound persists in the space intervening between the Imparter and the person to whom it is imparted"—you are putting forward an entirely superfluous argument; as it is admitted by us also that when a Sound is uttered by the Imparter, it reaches the person to whom it is imparted, through the series of Sounds set up by the initial utterance.

From all this it follows that the mere fact of Sound being "imparted" cannot prove the constant persistence of Sound.

Bhāṣya on Su. (28).

[P. 111, L. 14 to L. 18.]

[The Opponent says]—"Well, in that case the following shall be the reason (proving the persistence of Sound)"—

"BECAUSE THERE IS REPETITION"—(Sū. 28).

"As a matter of fact we have found that what is re-"peated, persists; *e. g.*, when one sees a certain colour "*five times*, repeatedly, it means that what is seen is the "same Colour that persists during all that time;—we have "similar repetitions in connection with Sound; *e. g.*, people "speak of having read a certain Chapter *ten times* or *twenty* "*times*; which must mean that there is repeated reading of "what persists during all that time."

Vārṭika on Su. (28).

[P. 303, LL. 8—10.]

"In that case our reason for holding Sound to be eternal "would consist in the fact that *Sound is repeated*; just as is "found in the case of the *Lute* (which repeats, over and "over again, the same Sound).

Suṭra (29).

THIS CANNOT BE RIGHT; FOR THE TERM 'REPETITION' IS USED FIGURATIVELY ALSO, IN CASES WHERE THE THINGS CONCERNED ARE DIFFERENT (NOT THE SAME). (Sū 29).

Bhāṣya on Su. (29).

[P. 112, L. 2 to L. 3.]

Even in cases where it is not the same thing persisting all the time, people speak of 'repetition'; *e g.*, in such assertions as—'please dance *twice*', 'please dance *thrice*', 'he danced *twice*', 'he danced *thrice*', 'he offers the Agnihoṭra *twice*', 'he eats *twice*' [in all which cases the acts, of *dancing*, *offering* and *eating* spoken of as 'repeated' are not the same, the first *dancing* being different from the second *dancing* and so forth].

Vārṭika on Su. (29).

[P. 303, L. 11 to L. 18.]

(*a*) As a matter of fact, there is 'repetition' of only such things as are non-eternal,—such acts, for instance, as *jumping*, *filling* and the like; hence the reason put forward by the Opponent is 'Contradictory' (proving a conclusion to the contrary). (*b*) Secondly, what the Opponent does is to prove the persistence of Sound by the fact of its being *repeated*; but as a matter of fact, we find *repetition* of *transient* things also; hence the reason put forward is 'inconclusive' (not concomitant with the Probandum). (*c*) Lastly, the reason is 'unknown' also, as the exact nature of 'repetition' cannot be ascertained. That is to say, what is 'repetition'? Does it consist in the appearing of several cognitions with regard to the same thing? Or does it consist in the appearing of several cognitions having objects of the same form? It being thus open to doubt whether there is repetition of the same thing or of several things of the same form,—the reason put forward must be rejected as 'doubtful—'Unknown.'

Actual 'Repetition' having been found to be *doubtful*, the argument (urged by the Opponent) might be regarded as based upon the figurative use of the term 'repetition'; but in that case also the reason would be 'inconclusive';

this is what is pointed out by the Sūtra (29)—*For the term 'repetition' is used figuratively &c. &c.*

(*Bhāṣya on Sū.* 30).

[P. 112, L. 3 to L. 7].

The Opponent's reasoning having been thus shown to be based upon false premises, he proceeds to object (by a verbal casuistry) to the use of the term '*anya*,' 'different.'

"WHEN A THING IS 'DIFFERENT', IT IS 'DIFFERENT'
"FROM SOMETHING THAT IS 'DIFFERENT' (FROM IT);—
"AND WHAT IS 'DIFFERENT' FROM THE 'DIFFERENT' MUST
"BE 'NON-DIFFERENT';—SO THAT THERE IS NOTHING THAT
"CAN BE REGARDED AS (PURELY) 'DIFFERENT.'"
—Sū. 30).

"That which you regard as 'different' is *non-different* "from itself;* hence that cannot be regarded as 'different'; "[and, as the Sūtra says, what is *different* from the 'different' is *non-different* also; hence that also cannot be regarded "as 'different']; so that there is no possibility of anything "being regarded as (purely) 'different'. Hence what has "been urged (in Sū. 29)—that 'the term *repetition* is used "figuratively also in cases where the things concerned are "*different*'—is not right. [The very conception of "'different' being impossible]."

Vārtika on Sū. (30).

[P. 304, L. 1 to L. 4.]

"*When a thing is different &c. &c.*,—says the Sūtra. "That which you regard as 'different' could be either "*different* or *non-different* from the *different* thing (some-"thing else). Now if it is *different* from the different thing, "then it cannot be regarded as 'different'; certainly one "who is *different* from the Brāhmaṇa, cannot be regarded "as a 'Brāhmaṇa.' If, on the other hand, it is *non-different* "(from the different thing), then also it cannot be regarded "as 'different,' being *ex-hypothesi*, 'non-different'; for that "which is 'non-different'; how can it be 'different'?"

* The printed text reads स्वार्थेन; 'स्वात्मनो' of the Puri Mss., gives better sense.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (31).

[P. 112, L. 8 to L. 15.]

In answer to the Opponent who has objected to the use of a word (by the Siḍḍhānṭin, in Sū. 29), the Siḍḍhānṭin urges an objection against the use of a word (by the Opponent himself, in Sū. 30)—

Suṭra (31).

IF THERE IS NO CONCEPTION OF THE 'DIFFERENT', THERE CAN BE NONE OF 'NON-DIFFERENCE'; AS THE TWO CONCEPTIONS ARE MUTUALLY RELATIVE.—Sū. 31).

You are urging that the 'different' is 'non-different';* and having urged that 'you deny the conception of the 'different', and yet you admit the conception of the 'non-different'; and you yourself actually use the term 'non-different.' But as a matter of fact, 'non-different' is a compound word—where the word 'different' is compounded with the negative particle 'non'; now if the second term of the compound is impossible (i.e. without a real denotation), with what would the negative particle be compounded? In fact, of the two terms 'different' and 'non-different', one is possible only in relation to the other. Thus, when you say that 'there is nothing that can be regarded as different', you say what if not quite right.

Vārṭika on Sū. (31).

[P. 304, L. 7 to P. 305, L. 12.]

If there is no conception &c. &c.—says the Sūṭra. The purpose of this Sūṭra is to show that what the Opponent is urging is incongruous, not compatible with what he himself says;† that is to say, he has himself admitted the conception of 'non-different', and that becomes impossible (according what he has urged). "How does it become impossible?" It becomes precluded by the negation pertaining to the term 'different' (in the word 'non-different'); and if there is no such conception as 'different', there can be no such concept as 'non-different'; for if there is no such thing as

* The right reading is अन्यस्मादनन्यतामुपपादयसि as found in the Puri Mss. and in the *Bhāṣyachandra*.

† Both editions read अविरोधः: but from what follows it is clear that विरोधः is the right reading.

Brāhmaṇa', there can be no conception of the 'non-Brāhmaṇa.'

" [*The Purvapakṣin rejoins*]—If that be so, then the fol-
" lowing shall be our reason (for regarding Sound as eternal)
" —*because there is recognition of it*. In the case of such
" things as the jewel and the like, we have found that unless
" the thing is actually the same that had been known before,
" there is no *recognition* of it as being the same ;—and in the
" case of Sound, we do have such *recognition* ; hence from
" the fact of there being *recognition* of it, we conclude that
" Sound has a continuous existence."

But what is this 'recognition'?

" One is said to have the *recognition* of a thing when it is
" found to be the object of the conception of 'that same'
" [*i. e.*, when it is conceived of as being 'that same thing'].*
But as a matter of fact, the conception of 'that same' is found to appear even in cases where the thing is not really the *same* as that known before; so that the mere fact of there being the conception of 'that same' (in regard to Sound) cannot be a conclusive reason (for regarding Sound to have a continuous existence).

" What 'recognition' really consists in is the fact that
" the conception of 'that same' is *unfailing, true* [and this
" will exclude those cases where the thing is not really the
" *same*, and where, therefore, the conception of 'that same'
" is not *true*]. In regard to Sound, the conception of 'that
" same' is never found to fail [any one word-sound is *always*
" conceived of as the same]; while in a case where the notion
" of 'that same' arises in regard to a thing that is only
" *similar* to (and not the *same* as) the previously known
" thing, the said notion is always set aside as soon as the
" points of difference come to be perceived. Thus then, it is

"this fact of the notion of 'that same' being never set aside "in the case of Sound that constitutes its *recognition*."

This is not right, we reply; for in the first place it is not a fact (admitted by all persons) that the notion of 'that same' is never set aside in the case of Sound; for instance, in some cases it so happens that while one man has the notion that 'this Sound is that same', another man thinks quite the contrary: so that in this case the notion of 'that same' does become set aside; and it is therefore not true, that 'the notion is never set aside in the case of Sound. *Secondly* you say that—"in a case where the notion of *that same* arises in regard to a thing that is only similar to the previously known thing, the said notion is always set aside as soon as the points of difference come to be perceived";—this is quite true; but in regard to Sound, the question arises—When the notion of 'that same' arises, does it arise in regard to what is only *similar* to the previous Sound, by reason of the points of difference (between the two) being not perceived? Or, does it arise because the two are really the same." Now, if your proposition is that the *Recognition* in the case of Sound is due to the fact of the two being really *same*,—then also it behoves you to point out some other reason (for regarding Sound as *eternal*). "Why so"? Because 'Recognition' has been already made by you a part of the Proposition itself [and as such that same *Recognition* cannot serve as the *Probans*].*

Var. P. 305.

Thirdly, the Opponent may argue thus—"Whenever the word-sound '*go*' is uttered, people always have the idea that it is *word* '*go*'; and in none of these cases does the word '*go*' fail to have the same denotation,—in every case

* Recognition' being now explained as implying *identity*, it presupposes the continuous existence of the Sound; so that if it is put forward as the Probans, it involves the fallacy of *Begging the Question.*

The right reading is चास्य पक्षैकदेशत्वात्—as found in the Puri Mss.

the word brings about the conception of the *Cow*."* But this is open to doubt. "How so?" "Well, it is open to doubt whether the notion 'this is the word *go*' that people have in connection with every utterance of the word-sound 'go' is due to *mere similarity* of causes (bringing about that utterance),—or to the absolute *identity* of the word, in all cases. This same doubt applies also to the idea that what gives rise to the conception of the *cow* is the *same* word '*go*' [*i. e.*, this also is open to doubt whether the conception is brought about by the *same*, or *similar*, words]. The right view apparently is † the uniformity of the conceptions of 'the word *go*' and of the animal 'cow' —which are brought about by the utterance of the word 'go' —is due to mere *similarity* of causes (and *not* to the absolute identity of the word '*go*'). "How so?" Well, in regard to the *idea of the cow*, we find that in regard to every one of the several *ideas of cow* that we have, we have the same uniform conception 'this is the *idea of cow*' [and yet neither the *Siḍḍhānṭin* nor the *Purvapakṣin* accepts the view that the *idea of cow* is the *same* in all cases]; and exactly in the same manner, in regard to the idea of 'the word *go*' also, we find that it always gives rise to the same conception of 'the word *go*' (and the *animal cow*); hence it is not right to hold that what brings about the said conceptions (of 'this

* This reasoning is thus explained by the *Ṭāṭparya*—"People have such notions as 'this is the word *go*', 'this is the word *go*'; and this uniform conception cannot be explained except on the basis that there is some *one* sound which is referred to by these notions. The notions cannot be regarded as being mistaken; for if they were wrong, the conception that is produced by that word-sound in regard to the animal *cow*, would be wrong also; this however it is not; just as the conception of *fire* brought about by the mistaken perception of smoke (where there is no smoke), is found to be wrong. It must therefore be admitted that the uniform notion that people have in regard to the 'word *go*' is right; and this proves that the said word-sound is *abiding* in its nature, and not ephemeral.

† Both editions read युक्तं; but the *Ṭāṭparya* reads युक्ता, which is better.

is the word *go* ') is the actual *Recognition* (of the word-sound, as the *same* in all cases).* *Fourthly*, [the Opponent has argued, on p. 304, L. 15, that the notion of *sameness* that people have in regard to things that are merely *similar*, always ceases when the points of difference become perceived ; but] there are cases where the notion of *sameness* ceases even without points of difference being perceived ; and in these cases we ask you if there is, or there is not, any *difference* in these cases. If there *is* difference, then *the uniformity of conception* cannot be regarded as a ground of *sameness* ; as the two are not formed to be concomitant (in the cases just referred to) ;—if on the other hand, there is *no difference*, then it means that the same (non-different) thing has *two* characters [that of being *non-different*, *ex-hypothesi*, and that of being *different*, as proved by the fact of the notion of *sameness* having ceased]. Thus then, it is found that the reason put forward by the Opponent (in proof of the eternality of Sound) is contradictory ; and hence not valid. Further, the fact of the *non-cessation* (*uniformity*) *of the Conception* (which is what, according to the Opponent, constitutes *Recognition*) cannot be accepted as ' true ',—it must be rejected as ' unknown,'—if it means that *all men* have that conception ; and if it means only that some men have the conception that it is ' inconclusive ' [then it does not necessarily prove real *sameness*].

*The *Tātparya* explains thus :—Both parties admit that the *ideas of the cow* that we have are diverse, even though all these ideas are conceived of as ' the idea of the cow '. Similarly, it stands to reason that, even though all the words ' go ' may be regarded as ' the word *go* ', yet they are diverse ; the notion of sameness being due to similarity. That is, what makes possible the comprehensive conception of ' idea of the cow '—which includes all individual *ideas of cow*—is the generic conception ' idea of cow ', based upon the fact of there being certain points common to all *ideas of cow* ; similarly what makes possible the comprehensive conception of the ' word *go* '—which includes all cases of the utterance of that word—is the generic conception ' word *go* ', based upon the fact of there being certain points common to all the individual utterances of the word ' *go*.'

Bhāṣya on Sū. (32).

(P. 112, L. 15 to P. 113, L. 3).

[The Opponent puts forward another argument in support of the eternality of Sound] —"Well, now, we must accept a Sound to be eternal;—

"ALSO BECAUSE WE DO NOT PERCEIVE ANY CAUSE FOR ITS DESTRUCTION"*—(Su. 32).

"Whatever thing is non-eternal, its destruction is brought "about by some cause; *e. g.*, the destruction of the Clod of "earth is brought about by the disruption of its component "particles;—now if Sound were non-eternal, we should "certainly perceive the cause of its destruction;—as a matter "of fact however, we do not perceive any such cause (of the "destruction of Sound);—hence it follows that Sound is "*eternal.*"

Vārṭika on Su. (32).

(P. 305, L. 12 to L. 16.)

"Now the following is a reason why Sound should be "regarded as eternal.—*Because we do not perceive any cause* "*for its destruction.* We always find causes for the destruction "of things that are non-eternal; *e. g.*, the disruption of the "component particles is found to be the cause of the des-"truction of the clod of earth. In the case of Sound how-"ever, we do not find any cause for its destruction. Hence "the conclusion is that Sound is *eternal.*"

[*Answer to the above argument.*].

Sūṭra (33).

INASMUCH AS WE DO NOT FIND ANY CAUSE FOR SOUND NOT BEING HEARD, IT WOULD MEAN THAT (IF SOUND IS ETERNAL) IT SHOULD BE HEARD ALWAYS. (Su. 33).

* The *Nyāyasūchīnibandha* and the Puri Ms. of Sūṭra both read a '*cha*' here.

† The *Bhāṣyachandra* construes the *Sūṭra* as '*vināshakāraṇēna anupalabdhiḥ*,' which can only mean—'the non-apprehension of sound is due to the cause of destruction.' This interpretation is not supported either by the *Bhāṣya* or by the *Vārṭika*.

Bhāṣya Su. (33).

[P. 113, L. 5 to L. 8].

Just as not finding any cause for its destruction you argue that Sound should be *eternal*,—in the same manner, not finding any cause for its not being heard (when it exists), we can argue that Sound (being eternal) should be always heard. " But the non-hearing of Sound (at times) is due to the absence of a manifester (of it)." The hypothesis of the 'manifester' has been already exploded. And (such being the case if there is *non-hearing* of the existing Sound, even without a cause (of this non-hearing)*, in the same manner, there would also be *destruction* of the existing Sound even without a cause (of that destruction). And as for being contrary to all apparent facts,—that applies equally to both the contingencies,—of causeless *destruction*, as well as causeless *non-hearing*.

Vārṭika on Sū (33).

[P. 305, L. 18.]

Inasmuch as &c. &c.—says the *Suṭra*. The meaning has been made quite clear in the *Bhāṣya*.

Suṭra (34).

BUT (IN REALITY) WE DO PERCEIVE IT (THE CAUSE OF THE DESTRUCTION OF SOUND); SO THAT THE SAID NON-APPREHENSION (OF SUCH CAUSE) BEING FALSE, IT CANNOT BE REGARDED AS A VALID REASON.—(Sū. 34).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (34).

[P. 113, L. 10 to P. 114, L. 6.]

As a matter of fact the cause of destruction of Sound is actually apprehended by means of Inference; so that the 'non-apprehension of the cause of destruction' being *non-existent*, false,—the reason put forward (by the Opponent in Su. 32) is not a valid one; † being just like the reason in the reasoning 'this animal is a horse *because it has horns*.'

"What is that by means which you *infer* the said cause of destruction ?"

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* The right reading is यथा विद्यमानस्य निर्निमित्तमश्रवणं as found in the Puri Mss.

† It being tainted with the fallacy of the 'unknown',—A यथा is necessary; as found in several Mss. and also in the *Bhāṣyachandra*.

It is the established fact of there being a *series of Sounds* (in the case of every Sound uttered) [from which we infer the presence of causes of destruction of Sound]. We have already shown that (in the case of every Sound) there is a series of Sounds ; which means that by means of conjunction and disjunction one Sound produces another Sound, this again produces another, and so on ;—now in this series of Sounds, that (succeeding) Sound which is the product destroys that (preceding) Sonnd which is its cause [so that every Sound of the series in destroyed by that which follows it] ; and what destroys the final Sound of the series is the con-junction or impact of an obstructing substance.* [That such is the case is vouched for by our experience] ; for instance, we find that in a case where a man, though close by, fails to hear a Sound emanating on the other side of a wall ; while even though the man is at a distance, he does hear the Sound, if there is no obstacle intervening. Then again, when a bell is rung, what is heard is a continuous serios of Sounds, as is clear from the fact that the several Sounds heard are of varying degrees of loudness or dullness ; now if Sound were *eternal*, it would be necessary,—in order to account for this continuous series of audition—to postulate an equally permanent *Sound-manifester* abiding either in the Bell or in the Sound-series or in something else ; [it would be necessary to find some such cause] as it has to be explained how, the Sound remaining the *same* (*ex-hypothesi*), there is a

* This sentence has exercised the minds of commentators : As the passage stands it clearly means that it is the Sound that comes into contact with the obstructing substance and is thereby destroyed. Now this goes against the Vaishēṣika doctrine that no quality can subsist in a quality ; whence *Sound* being a quality cannot have *conjunction*, which also is a quality. Hence, as the *Parishuḍḍhi* remarks, finding the passage to be incompatible with Vaishēṣika doctrine, the *Ṭāṭparya* provides the explanation that what destroys the Sound is 'the impact with the obstacle'- of, not *Sound*, but the *Ākāsha*, the material or constituent cause of Sound ; so that what happens is that this impact of Ākāsha with a denser substance renders it incapable of functioning as the constituent cause of further Sounds, and the immaterial cause of the initial Sound—in the shape of the contact of the stick with the drum —having ceased, there is nothing to start the series afresh ; and the result is that the final Sound, and along with it, the 'series of Sounds, is *destroyed*. The *Nyāyakanḍali* on Prashasṭapāḍa (P 289) takes the contact of the obstacle to belong to *Air*, which is the efficient cause, the *nimiṭṭakāraṇa* of Sound. The *Bhāṣyachanḍra* also give the same explanation as the *Ṭāṭparya*.

The Puri Ms. B. reads अभिघातेन for अभिघातेन ; but the latter gives better sense.

diversity in the hearing (as evinced by the varying degrees of intensity perceived).* If, on the other hand, Sound is (regarded as) *non-eternal*, [the said phenomenon can be explained by the hypothesis that] there appears (at each stage of the Series) a fresh cause in the shape of a certain continuous stream of momentum, more or less forcible, subsisting in the Bell (as long as the Sound continues to be heard); which acts as an aid to the *contact* producing the initial Sound);—and by reason of this continued appearance of causes, there appears the Series of Sounds; and the greater or less force of the momentum gives rise to the greater or less intensity of the Sound; and this accounts for the aforesaid diversity of audition.†

Vārṭika on Sū. (34)

[P. 305, L. 20 to P. 308, L. 6.]

But in reality we do find the cause of the destruction of Sound, &c. &c.—says the *Sūṭra*. As a matter of fact, we do know, by means of Inference, the cause of the destruction of Sound; and certainly what is known by means of Inference cannot be non-existent.

Var. P. 306.

"*What is that by means of which you infer the existence of the said cause?*" *It is the fact of there being a series of Sounds*—

* The reading of this whole passage is corrupt in this printed text; the correct reading is supplied by the Puri Mss., which is also supported by the *Ṭāṭparya*—तत्र नित्ये शब्दे......सन्तानवृत्ति वाऽभिव्यक्तिकारणं ....भवतीति । शब्दभेदे चावृत्ति श्रुतिभेद उपपादयितव्यः ; the *Bhāṣyachanḍra* also adopts this reading.

† *Sound* itself, if eternal, cannot have any diversity, either natural or accidental; —as will be explained later on. As for the *Audition* or *Hearing*, no diversity in this would be possible if the Sound were only *manifested* by some manifester abiding in either the Bell or some other thing. It may be held that what are heard as of varying degrees of intensity are so many distinct Sounds. But in that case, they should all be heard simultaneously; as all of them have been manifested by the same stroke of the Bell and there is nothing else that could create a diversity. If however it be held that the Sounds are *produced*—not only manifested—by the stroke of the Bell,—which shows itself in a series of momentum,—the diversity in the hearing is easily explained; the Sounds themselves being diverse, having been brought by the diverse momenta of varying degrees of intensity.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

In line 4, the right reading is पटुमन्दपटुतरै which is accepted by the *Bhāṣyachanḍra* also.

(says the *Bhāṣya*). Hence the reason put forward by the Opponent (in Sū. 32)—that "we do not find any cause for the destruction of Sound "—is not a valid one; *being just like the reason in the reasoning 'this animal is a horse because it has horns'*,—says the *Bhāṣya*. "In this reasoning, what is it that is *false*?—the *Horn*? or the *connection of the Horn*?" Our answer is that both of these are false. For instance, in a case where one seeks to prove that a certain *horned* animal is a *horse*, the *Horn* is actually there; so that the existence of the *Horn* is not denied; but inasmuch as the *connection of the Horn* with the *Horse* is not there (there being no connection between the Horn and the Horse), the argument becomes false. [Whereas when one seeks to prove the *Camel* to be a Horse, and urges the *presence of Horns* as his reason, neither the Horn nor *the connection of the Horn* is there]. Thus we conclude that the *Bhāṣya* is quite right in asserting that the reason (urged by the Opponent in Sū. 32) is not a valid one.

"But it would be like '*Karmatva*' the generality of 'Motion.'" This cannot be; because in the case of the generic character of 'Motion', the substratum is ephemeral. What you mean by citing the case of the generic character of 'Motion' is to show that—"even things found to be eternal are such as are absolutely (unapprehended) [so that the mere non-apprehension of Sound at times is not incompatible with its *eternality*]." But this cannot be right; because the substratum (of the generic character of 'Motion', which substratum consists of individual *motions*) is ephemeral (every individual motion being momentary). In the case of *Sound* on the other hand, the substratum (*Ākāsha*) is *eternal*,—so that [if Sound also were eternal] no reason can be found to account for its *not being heard* (always). In the case of the generic character of 'Motion' there is a reason (for its non-apprehension), in the shape of the ephemeral character of its substratum. Hence the

two cases are not analogous, and the example cited is not effective.

[Says the *Bhāṣya*]—*When a bell is rung, what is heard is a continuous series of Sounds, as is clear from the fact that the several Sounds heard are of varying degrees of loudness or dullness.* In regard to this phenomenon, we proceed to consider the following points :—When the Sound is manifested, does the cause of this manifestation subsist in the Bell (A) ? or (B) in something else ? (A) If in the Bell,—(*a*) is it something uniformly permanent ? or (*b*) is it something in the form of a series ? (B) Similarly, if it subsists in something else,—(*a*) is it something uniformly permanent ? or (*b*) is it something in the form of a *series* ? (A*a*) if it subsist in the Bell, and is also permanent, then no diversity of hearing should be possible. (A*b*) If it subsists in the Bell and is in the form of a series, then it should be possible for several Sounds (of varying degrees of loudness) to be heard simultaneously. For as much Sound as is manifested by the permanent or serial manifester subsisting in the Bell, should all be heard at one and the same time. Further, it behoves you to explain how the manifester *subsisting in the Bell* comes to manifest the Sound subsisting elsewhere (*i. e.*, in the ear-cavity of the hearer). (B) If, on the other hand, you hold that the manifester of the Sounds subsists in something other than the Bell, and is either, (*a*) permanently uniform or (*b*) in a serial form,—then, in that case, you should point out some reason for the phenomenon that the said manifester manifests the Sounds only when one particular Bell is rung, and not on the ringing of other bells in the same locality. Further, if the Sounds are not diverse, you should explain how there is diversity in the hearing. "But the terms 'loud' and 'dull' refer to the *vibrations* (of the Air)." This cannot be ; because, as a matter of fact, these terms are always found to be applied to the *Sound* ;

Var. P. 307.

in actual usage, the terms 'loud' and 'dull' are always used in connection with *Sounds*, and not in connection with *Vibrations*. Hence they must be taken as referring to *Sound*; for if they did not refer to *Sound*, they could not be applied to it; just as the term 'blue' is applied to the 'lotus' [simply because the blueness refers to, belongs to, the Lotus]. "But the said conception is a mistaken one." That cannot be accepted; as no special reason is mentioned. What you mean is this—"When one conceives of Sound as *loud* or *dull*, this conception is a mistaken one; just like the conception of Sound as lengthy or *large**."—But this cannot be accepted; there is no special reason; that is, there is no special reason why this should be regarded as a *misconception*. If it is a *misconception*, it behoves you to point out the cause that gives rise to it; as there is in the case of the misconception of Sound as 'lengthy',—when the misconception arises from the fact that what is heard is a long-drawn out series of Sounds; in ordinary experience we find that in the case of all lengthy Substances there is a conglomeration of component particles extending in a line, which forms the subject of a serial conception; and when the case of Sound is found to be analogous, (what is heard being a long-drawn out series of cognate sounds) Sound also comes to be conceived of as 'lengthy.' There is however no such reason why there should be any reason for the said misconception, according to one who holds Sound to be *eternal* [and for whom therefore, no long-drawn out *series* of Sounds is possible]. "But this applies equally to both." Certainly not; for (in our case) the cause operates only occasionally. What you mean is as follows.—"He who holds Sound-series to be

* "Though the crystal is white, yet when it is sprinkled over with red paint, there arises the misconception that the crystal is red, though the *redness* really belongs to the paint. In the same manner, *loudness* &c., though really belonging to the manifester, in the shape of the air-vibration, is conceived of as belonging to the Sound."—*Ṭāṭparya*.

non-eternal, he also will have to point out a cause for the production (of the Sound-series),—this cause subsisting, either in a permanently uniform form or in a serial form, either in in the Bell or in something else; and the contingency of this cause subsisting in the Bell at one time producing Sound, and at another time not producing it, is as unaccountable in this case as in the case of the theory that Sound is *eternal*." —But this unaccountability does not arise (in the view that Sound is *non-eternal*); because the cause is only occasionally operative; *i. e.*, as a matter of fact, *the cause of Sound*, subsisting in the Bell, becomes operative only at certain times; and even so, being occasional, it appears in a serial form; so that the Sounds, following from these diverse causes, appear only occasionally; and because they appear in a serial form, these Sounds (in the series) give rise to Sounds partaking of the diverse characters of varying degrees of loudness And the cause of these Sounds consists in the momentum (set going by the initial utterance).* "But how is it produced?" [The process is as follows] —There is, at first, a moving of Hand, which is a tangible substance;— this motion leads to an impulsion of the Hand;—by reason of this impulsion the hand comes into contact with the Bell;—this contact gives rise to a sort of motion or vibration in the Bell;—[this vibration of the Bell, through its connection with *Ākāsha* produces the Sound; then again] this vibration, caused by the impact of the Hand, gives rise to a momentum in the Bell,
Var. P. 308. simultaneously with the removal of the Hand

* Those who regard Sound to be *eternal* cannot accept the view that in the case of every Sound there is a series of several Sounds, which may be qualified by the varying grades of loudness; so that they can not account for the phenomenon of Sounds of varying grades of intensity being heard when the bell is rung; and that too only occasionally. If on the other hand, Sound is *not eternal*, the phenomenon can be explained as being due to there being a number of different sounds being produced; so that it is only natural that different Sounds should be of varying grades of loudness; and should appear only occasionally. —*Tātparya*.

from the Bell ;—the vibrating Bell then touches the elemental Air-atoms (which causes a 'movement among the atoms); —this impact of the Bell with the moving Air-atoms produces another vibration (or motion in the Bell) ;—this second vibration sets up another momentum ;—this momentum leads to a further vibration (or motion) ;—then comes another contact with Air ; and so on in this manner, is momentum produced ; the last of this series of momenta being not forcible enough, the Bell is no longer capable of bringing about a disturbance in the elemental Air ; thus, further contact with the Air having been cut off, the momentum comes to an end [and no further Sound is produced].

Bhāṣya on Sū. (35).

[P. 114, L. 6 to L. 15.]

[The Opponent says]—" But as a matter of fact, no such further cause (of Sound) as 'Momentum' is ever perceived ; and as it is not perceived, it cannot exist."* [The answer to this is given by the next Sutra].

Sūṭra (35).

INASMUCH THE CESSATION OF SOUND FOLLOWS FROM THE TOUCH OF SUCH A CAUSE AS THE HAND' IT IS NOT RIGHT TO SAY THAT THERE IS NON-PERCEPTION (OF THE MOMENTUM).† (Su. 35).

A motion of the Hand brings about its contact with the Bell (while it is resounding) ; and upon this contact no further sound-series is perceived ; this is what explains the fact that no further sound (of that series) is heard. And the inference in this case is that the touch of

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* The printed text reads निर्निमित्तान्तरं ; but the right reading निमित्तान्तरं is supplied by the Puri Mss.

† The translation of the Sūṭra is in accordance with the interpretation of the *Bhāṣya* ; other commentators have suggested a different explanation,—'Inasmuch as we find the Sound' of the Bell to cease when the Bell is touched by the hand (while it is resounding), it is not right to say that we never perceive a cause for the destruction of Sound' ;—this being an answer to the general Pūrvapakṣa question that as we can never find a cause that destroys Sound, we cannot regard Sound to be destructible.

the striking substance (Hand) puts a check upon some cause other than the original cause that gave rise to the initial Sound [as this cause is no longer present at the time that the resonance ceases],—and this other cause is the Momentum (set up in the manner described above);—this Momentum being checked, the Sound-series is no longer kept going;—and this series having stopped, there is no further hearing.' This is analogous to the case of the Arrow, which is found to stop, when the Momentum, which is the cause of its continuous motion forward, is checked by the impact of the substance struck by the arrow;—and further, in the case of the metallic vessel, the presence of Momentum is clearly indicated, firstly by the cessation of the vibrations that could be felt by touch, and secondly by the touch of the hand itself.* For these reasons, it is not true that there is no cognition of Momentum as an additional cause (in the continuance of Sound).

Vārṭika on Sū. (35).

[P. 308, L. 6 to L. 15].

The Opponent might retort—"There is no such thing as Momentum; for the simple reason that we do not find any such thing." If he means by this that, because no such thing as Momentum is ever perceived, it cannot be existing,—our answer is as follows:—*Inasmuch as the cessation of Sound* &c. &c.—(Sū. 35). The sense of this *Sūṭra* is clear. If you do not accept the Momentum to be the cause that produces Sound, then you cannot explain the cessation of the Sound-series by the touch of the hand (put on the bell). "But even if there be such a thing as *Momentum*, the Momentum that ceases by the hand-touch must be that subsist-

* As the passage stands—and all Mss. read it as such—the above is the best interpretation. But it gives better sense if we read पाणिसंश्लेषे; the construction being कांस्यपात्रादिषु पाणिसंश्लेषे सति [illegible]: संस्कार[illegible]; that is,—'In the case of metallic vessels it is found that when they are touched by the hand, there is a cessation of vibration set up in them; and this cessation of vibration clearly proves that there has been a continuous momentum at work.'

The *Bhāṣyachanḍra* treats this as *Bhāṣya*. The number of the Sū. is wrongly printed as 35. It should be 36, and so on, up to Su. 52.

ing in the Bell ;—how can this touching (of the Bell) put an end to the Sound series (which subsist in *Ākāsha*, and not in the Bell)?" We do not say that it is the touching of the *Bell* that puts an end to the Sounds ; what we do say is that when the Bell is touched by the Hand, the Momentum in the Bell ceases, by reason of its being counteracted by the touch of a solid (tangible) object (the Hand) ;—and thus the cause (of Sound, in the shape of the Momentum) having ceased, no further effects (in the shape of further sounds in the series) are produced, and the Series (of Sounds) is brought to an end.

Sutra (36)*

FURTHER, IF THE MERE FACT OF THE CAUSE OF ITS DESTRUCTION NOT BEING PERCEIVED WERE TO PROVE THAT A THING STILL ABIDES,—THEN THAT THING (*e. g.*, THE AUDITION OF SOUND) ALSO WOULD HAVE TO BE REGARDED AS ETERNAL.†—(Su. 36).

Bhāṣya on Su. (36).

[P. 114, L. 16 to P. 115 L. 3].

If it be held that when the cause of the destruction of a thing is not perceived, that thing should be regarded as still abiding,—and as abiding, it should be eternal,—then, in regard to *Sound-hearings*, which you hold to be only so many *manifestations of Sound*, as you do not point out any cause of destruction, it would follow, from this non-indication, that the said *hearings* continue to abide, and as such should be regarded as *eternal*.† If this be not so, then it is not right to argue (as the Opponent has done) that, "because the destruction of Sound is not perceived, it must

* This Sūṭra reverts to the *Pūrvapakṣa* argument put forward in Su. 30.

विनाशकारणानुपलब्धे.चेत पूर्वोक्तं हेतुं दूषयति—says the *Ṭāṭparya*. "The same argument that the Opponent had urged in support of the eternality of sound, the Siddhānṭin now turns in support of the continuity of sound-audition."—*Bhāṣyachanḍra*.

† 'अनवस्थान' of the printed text is wrong; अवस्थान is the right reading found in several Mss.

be regarded as abiding, and hence eternal."*

Vārṭika on Sū. (36).

Further, if the mere fact &c. &c.—says the *Sūṭra*. The Opponent has argued that—"because the cause of its destruction is not found, Sound should be regarded as eternal." But if it be true that anything, the cause of whose destruction is not found, must be eternal,—then, *in regard to Sound-hearings, as you do not point out any cause of destruction, it would follow, from this non-indication, that the said hearings continue to abide, and as such should be regarded as eternal.* (Bhāṣya). If on the other hand, the Sound-hearings should be regarded as *non-eternal*, even though the cause of their destruction is not found,—then the same may be the case with Sound also; so that the argument (put forward in Sū. 32) cannot be conclusive. If it be urged that the causes of the destruction of the Sound-hearings are known by means of Inference (even though they are not *perceived*),—the same is the case with *Sound* also; and it does not militate against any of our tenets.

Var. P. 309.

Bhāṣya Sū. (37).

[P. 115. L. 3 to L. 9].

[The *Sāṅkhya* comes forward with his objection against the Nyāya view of Sound]—"(In the case of bell-ringing) "we find that the *Resonance*† subsists in the same sub-"stratum with the *Vibration*; and hence it ceases, like the "Vibration, upon the removal of its cause by the hand-touch; "—if on the other hand, the Resonance subsisted in another "substratum (and not in the same substratum with the "Vibration), then on the touch of the striking object (Hand), "what would cease would be that which subsists in the "same substratum (and not the Resonance, which *ex-hy-"pothesi*, subsists in another substratum). [For this reason, "Sound must be regarded as subsisting in the sounding sub-"stance, wherein the vibrations subsist,—that is, in the Air, "—and not in *Ākāsha*, as held by the Naiyāyika]."

* The right reading यथ नैवं, न तर्हि, &c., is supplied by the Puri Mss.

† अनुनाद is the right reading; supported by the *Ṭātparya* also.

[In answer to this, we have the following Sūṭra]—

Sūṭra (37).

INASMUCH AS (THE SUBSTRATUM OF SOUND) IS INTANGIBLE, THE SAID OBJECTION (AGAINST SOUND SUBSISTING IN ĀKĀSHA) DOES NOT HOLD.—(Sū. 37).

The *Sāṅkhya* objects to the view that Sound is a quality subsisting in *Ākāsha* *; but this objection cannot be maintained; for the simple reason that the substratum of Sound (i e. *Ākāsha*) is intangible. As a matter of fact, we find that the Sound-series is perceived even at a time when there is no perception of anything possessing Colour and other qualities †; which shows that Sound has for its substratum a substance which is intangible and all-pervading,—and it does *not* subsist in the same substratum with the *Vibrations.*

Vārṭika on Sū. (37).

[P. 309, L. 5 to L. 18.]

Says the Opponent—" What you say is not right,—because of non-co-substrateness."

What you mean is as follows: " Sound subsists (according to the Naiyāyika) in a substance other than that which touches the Bell;—and as such, how can it be put an end to by the touch subsisting in something totally different? —and if Sound, though subsisting in a different substratum, were put an end to by the touch, then it would mean that that single touch puts an end to the Sound of all Bells;—for these reasons it must be concluded that Sound subsists in the same substratum with the contact of the Bell and the Hand."

The answer to this is given by the Sūṭra—*Inasmuch as the substratum of Sound is intangible &c. &c.* What the

* The *Bhāṣyachandra* reads *Nākāshaguṇaḥ*, which is not satisfactory.

† The expression [illegible] is peculiar; in this sentence, we have translated it as 'anything possessed of colour &c.' But in l. 10, we have the term [illegible]-[illegible]; where all that the term can mean is merely *Sound.*

Sūṭra means is that as a matter of fact Sound subsists in an intangible substance.

"In that case, how is it possible for the contact of the Bell and the Hand to put an end to the Sound subsisting in a different substance?"

This objection has no force; as we have already answered this question. We have already explained that the non-production of further Sounds (in the series) is due to the disappearance of the cause (of that Sound); while the Sound that has already been produced continues in the shape of Sounds of varying grades of intensity, till the last Sound, becoming too faint, ceases, by the force of some sort of an obstruction.

Now there arises a doubt,—as to whether the Momentum, which is regarded as the cause of other sounds (in the series), is one or many. The fact is that there are several momenta; because the Sounds are several; and the diversity in the effects is found possible only when there is diversity in the cause. For one who admits of a single momentum, the Arrow should drop down before it reaches the place it should reach; or if the thing were to move onward by reason of the single momentum being not impeded,—in that case, the Arrow would never stop at all. For these reasons we conclude that there are several momenta.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (38).

[P. 115, L. 9 to L. 19.]

Further, it is not right to hold that Sound is manifested as subsisting, in each substance, along with Colour and other qualities (as held by the *Sāṅkhyas*). "Why?"

BECAUSE, IF SOUND FORMED AN AGGREGATE (ALONG WITH COLOUR &C.),—INASMUCH AS THERE ARE ALSO DIVISIONS AND SUBDIVISIONS OF IT, [SOUND COULD NOT BE REGARDED AS 'MANIFESTED'].—Sūṭra (38).

The particle '*cha*', 'also', points to the *presence of the series of Sounds* as a further reason (for denying the mere

manifestation of Sound); which has already been explained (under Sū. 16).

If Sounds, Colours and other qualities co-exsist in each substance, and form an aggregate (as held by the *Sāṅkhya*), —then, inasmuch as it is found that in any particular substance, the Colour or some other quality is always perceived to be of one and the same kind, it would follow that Sound also (as forming a member of that same aggregate of qualities) should always be perceived to be of one and the same kind*. And under the circumstances, there would be no possibility of—(1) the 'division' or diversity involved in the well-known phenomenon, that when Sound appears in connection with a substance (the string of a musical instrument, for instance), it is found to consist of several sounds of diverse kinds, belonging to different notes (in the musical scale),—or (2) of the 'sub-division'† involved in the phenomenon, that in the case of the Sounds of the same form, of the same kind and belonging to the same musical note, we perceive a diversity, due to the varying grades of intensity‡. [Both these phenomena would be impossible, in accordance with the Sāṅkhya theory; because] the said phenomena could be possible only if there were *several* Sounds and they were *produced*; and not if there is *single* Sound and that also is *manifested*. As a matter of fact, however, we know that the said 'division and sub-division' do exist. So that from the existence of these 'divisions and sub-divisions' we conclude that Sound cannot be *manifested*, subsisting, in each substance, along with Colour and other qualities.

Vārṭika on Sū. (38).

[P. 309, L. 20 to P. 310, L. 7.]

If Sound formed an aggregate &c. &c.,—says the Sūṭra.

Var. P. 310. It is not true that Sound is manifested as subsisting along with Odour and other qualities;—*because there are divisions and sub-divisions. 'Vibhakṭ-*

* The reading सर्वं रूपादिवत् gives better sense. The colour of the Jar is always the same; similarly the Sound of the Bell should be always of the same degree of intensity.

† The right reading is विभागभावत्, as found in the Puri Mss. This is also supported by the Vārṭika.

‡ The *Bhāṣyachandra* explains 'division' as 'division into Letters' and 'sub-division' as 'Sound and Resonance.'

yanṭara (in the Sūṭra) is a copulative compound composed of the two terms '*vibhakṭi*' and '*vibhakṭyanṭara*.' In connection with a single substance, we often hear diverse Sounds of different as well as of similar kinds. *The word* '*samāsa*' (in the Sūṭra) stands for *aggregate*; and as a matter of fact, no such aggregate is possible, in connection with Sounds, which subsist in an intangible substance,—as there is in connection with Odour and other qualities. [If Sound were like these other qualities, then] just as in one substance there is only Odour, so in one substance there would be only one Sound [which is absurd].

The particle '*cha*', '*also*,' *points to the presence of the Series of sounds as a further reason*—says the *Bhāṣya*. If Sound subsisted along with Odour &c., then, as subsisting elsewhere, it could not be perceived *in the Ear*. Hence, as Sound appears in the form of a series, it follows that it subsists in *Ākāsha*.

END OF SECTION (2).

SECTION (3).

The Modifications of Sound.

[Sūṭrās 39—54.]

Bhāṣya on Sū. (39).

[P. 115, L. 20 to P. 117, L. 4.]

Sound is of two kinds—Letter-sounds and Sound in general (Noise)*. Now in regard to Letter-sounds—

* 'Letter-sounds—in the shape of *a*, *k* &c.; and 'noise'—the sound produced by conch-blowing, says Prashasṭapāḍa.

Sound in general has been dealt with up to *Sū.* 38. The author now takes up the particular kind of Sound, in the shape of Letter-sounds. That Letter-sounds form the subject-matter of the present enquiry is clear from the fact that the Sound-modifications dealt with are only those pertaining to Letter-sounds.—*Ṭātparya*.

The connection of the present section with what has gone before is thus explained by the *Ṭāṭparya* :—The *Sāṅkhya* view, that 'Sound is manifested as co-existing with Colour and other qualities', having been refuted,—the same *Sāṅkhya* turns round with the view that, though Sound may not be eternal, in the sense of continuing to exist in the same unchanged form, yet it could be eternal in the sense

THERE ARISES A DOUBT, BECAUSE THERE IS MENTION OF BOTH 'MODIFICATION', AND 'SUBSTITUTION'.—(Sū. 39).

In connection with the expression '*ḍadhyaṭra*' (as resulting from the combination of '*ḍaḍhi*' and '*aṭra*') some* people hold that the '*i*' (in '*ḍaḍhi*') renounces its own character and takes the character of '*ya*',—the sense of this view being that [what the grammatical law lays down is that, when *i* is followed by *a*] there is a *modification* (of *i* into *ya*).—Others†, however, hold that what happens is that, the '*i*' having been used (in the expression '*ḍaḍhi yaṭra*'), it gives up its place, and in the place thus vacated the letter '*ya*' comes to be used (in the expression '*ḍaḍhi-aṭra*'),—the sense of this latter view being that [what the grammatical law means is that] when *i* and *a* are in juxtaposition, we use *ya* and not *i*, so that there is *substitution* (of *ya* in place of *i*). Both these opinions have been held (in connection with the grammatical law embodied in Pāṇini's Sūṭra, '*iko yaṇachi*' 6.1.77). So that one does not know what the truth is [unless he carries on a full enquiry into the matter].

‡ The true view is that there is *substitution*.

(A) As regards the theory of 'modification',—as a matter of fact, we do not perceive any continuity or persistence; so that there can be no inference of 'modification'.§ If there were some sort of persistence (of the *i*-sound, even in the form '*ḍaḍhyaṭra*'), it would show that something of it (some part of its character) had ceased and something else come in; and this might justify the inference that there is 'modification',;—as a matter of fact, however, no such persistence is ever perceived;—hence the conclusion is

that it continues to exist and undergo modifications; just in the same manner as Primordial Matter is regarded as *eternal*; just as gold remains gold even in its endless modifications; and in support of this view we may cite the grammatical laws of *sanḍhi*, by which letter-sounds undergo certain modifications. With a view to demolish this view, the Author proceeds to show that, in the case of Letter-sounds, there is no such modification, or transmutation, as would justify us in regarding them as having a continuity of existence.

* The *Bhāṣyachanḍra* attributes this view to the followers of Kalāpa; and quotes a *Kālāpa-Sūṭra*.

† *The followers of Pāṇini*—says the *Bhāṣyachanḍra*.

‡ The author adopts Pāṇini's view as his own,—says the *Bhāṣyachanḍra*.

§ विकारानुमानम् is the correct reading.

that there is no 'modification'.*—(B) *Secondly*, we find that the two letters (*i* and *ya*) being amenable to different instrumental forces, the utterance of one is possible without the utterance of the other; that is to say, as a matter of fact, the letter '*i*' is amenable to the instrumentality of what is called the 'open articulation' (applicable to vowels), while the letter '*ya*' is amenable to the instrumentality of the 'slightly touched articulation' (applicable to semi-vowels); so that these two letters are pronouncible by two different kinds of 'effort', called 'instrumentality'; and this is what makes it possible for one of them being uttered while the other is not uttered [and all this shows that *ya* is only the *substitute*, and not the *modification*, of *i*]†.—(C) *Thirdly*, the case in question that of *ya* in *ḍaḍhyatra*) is exactly analogous to that where there is no 'modification'; that is to say, there are cases where *i* and *ya* are not 'modifications' at all (even according to you); e g., in such expressions as (a) '*yaṭaṭē*', '*yachchhāṭi*', and '*prāyamsṭa*' (where there can be no chance of *ya* being a 'modification' at all), and , *ikāraḥ*', '*iḍam*' (where *i* remains itself, without undergoing any change at all);—and there are well-marked cases where the two do appear like 'modifications'; e. g. '*iṣṭvā*' (which is derived from the root '*yaj*', and in which therefore the *i* appears in the place of the *ya* in the root) and '*ḍaḍhyāhara*' which is the altered form resulting from the combination of '*ḍaḍhi*' and '*āhara*', of which

* In the well-known cases of 'modification'—e. g. when a lump of gold is transmuted into a pair of ear-rings or bracelets—they are regarded as 'modification', because whatever the particular shape, through everyone of them the character of 'Gold' *persists*. But in 'ya' (in '*ḍaḍhyaṭra*') we do not find any such *persistence* of the 'i'-sound; so that this cannot be a case of 'modification'.—*Tāṭparya.*

The *Parishuḍḍhi* remarks—The term '*vikāra*' in the present context does not stand for 'transmutation,' the total destruction of one thing and the appearance in its place of another thing; as no such 'vikāra' is admitted by the *Sāṅkhya*; it stands for that *change*, in which the basic element remaining the same, its characteristics appear and disappear. And as there is no such basic element of which 'i' could be a characteristic detail,—no 'modification' can be possible in this case.

† If *ya* were the modification of *i*, the forces necessary for its utterance would be the same as those necessary for the utterance of *i*; as a matter of fact, however, the force that is put into operation, for the uttering of *ya*, is that in the form of the effort called, 'slightly touched articulation'; while in the case of *i*, the effort is that called 'open articulation'. Thus it is that for the uttering of *ya* it is not necessary to have a previous utterance of *i*. And this would not be possible if *ya* were a *modification* of *i*.

the *i* is changed into *ya* .*—Now as a matter of fact, in both these cases, (of the utterance of *ya* or *i*, appearing by itself or as 'modification'), the effort of the speaker is precisely the same, and precisely the same also is the hearing of the hearer. All this shows that (in '*ḍaḍhyaṭra*') we have *substitution* (of *ya*, and not *modification*).†—(D) *Fourthly*, there is no perception of it in actual usage. That is to say, in actual usage, *i* is never perceived as becoming *ya*‡; what *is* perceived, however, is that *ya* is used in the place where *i* had been used before. From this also it follows that *ya* is not a 'modification' of *i*.§

The denial of *ya* being the 'modification' of *i* does not set aside the grammatical law (that '*ik* followed by *ach* becomes *yaṇ*'—Pāṇini, 6-1-77). That is to say, even in accordance with the view that *letters do not undergo modifications*, it is not impossible to have the grammatical law (of letter-changes),—which contingency (of impossibility of the law) would compel us to admit the 'modification' of letters. As a matter of fact, one letter is not the product of another letter; e.g. *ya* is not produced from *i*, nor is *i* produced from *ya*; each letter emanates from a distinct spot in the organ of speech and is the outcome of a distinct articulation; so that the correct view is that what happens (in the case of changes) is that *one is uttered in the place of another* [Hence what the grammatical law '*iko yaṇachi*' means is that when *i* and *a* are in juxtaposition, we should use *ya* in the place of *i*, and *not* that *i* is *modified* into *ya*]. And only if these two facts were otherwise, could the change in question be regarded either as a 'modification', or as a case of 'one being pro-

* The right reading is [illegible]. It is 'non-modification' and 'modification' according to the *Sāṅkhya*; but 'non-substitution' and 'substitution', according to us;—says the *Bhāṣyachandra*.

† The effort necessary for the uttering of *ya* in '*yaṭaṭē*' is exactly the same as that necessary for its uttering in the expression '*ḍaḍhyaṭra*'; similarly the effort required for uttering *i* in '*iḍam*' is the same as that required for its uttering in '*iṣṭvā*'; which shows that the 'ya' in both cases is of the same kind; *i. e.* just as in '*yaṭaṭē*', the *ya* is not a 'modification', so in '*ḍaḍhyaṭra*' also it is not a modification, and so on.

‡ *E. g.*, we perceive the *gold* becoming the *bracelet*.—*Bhāṣyachandra*.

§ In the case of the well-known case of 'modification' of milk into curd, we can perceive the milk becoming curd; in the same manner we should perceive the *i* becoming *ya*, if the letter were a 'modification' of *i*.

duced out of the other'. As a matter of fact, however, these two facts are not otherwise. Hence the conclusion is that there is no 'modification' of letters.

(E) Just as the 'modification' of a group of letters is not possible, so is the 'modification' of a single letter also not possible. In accordance with the rules—'the root *as* become *bhū*,' 'the root *brū* becomes *vach*'—when *as* is changed into *bhū*, and *brū* into *vach*,—this change of one set of letters in the root into another set of letters is not in any case regarded either as a 'modification', or as a case of one being produced out of the other; it is only regarded as a case of one set of letters being used *in the place* of another set of letters;—exactly similar should be the case when one *letter* (*i*) is changed into another (*ya*).*

Bhā. P. 117.

Vārṭika on Sū. (39).

[P. 301, Ll. 9-10.]

This Sūṭra (39) serves the purpose of pointing out the grounds of doubt on the subject.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (40).

[P. 117, L. 4 to L. 7.]

For the following reason also letters cannot be regarded as undergoing 'modifications'—

Because the enlargement of the original cause should always involve a corresponding enlargement in the modification—(Sū. 40).

As a matter of fact, we always find that modifications always follow their original base.† In the case in question however we do not find the *ya* following the shortness or length of the *i* [as whether the preceding *i* is long or short, the *ya* is always short];—and it is only if there were such following by the *ya*, that we could infer it to be a 'modification'.

* The *Parishuḍḍhi* formulates this reasoning as follows—'The case of the change of *i* into *ya* cannot be one of modification,—because the two are distinct letters,—just like *bhū* appearing in place of *as*'.

† For instance, the cloth made of long yarns is long, and that made of shorter yarns is shorter—says the *Bhāṣyachanḍra*.

Vārṭika on Sū. 40.

[P. 310, Ll. 12—13.]

This Sūṭra is meant to put forward as a reason the fact that modifications always follow their original bases; that is to say, every well-known modification is found to follow its original base.

Sūṭra (41).

[Objection]—"THE REASON JUST URGED IS NOT A VALID ONE; BECAUSE, AS A MATTER OF FACT, MODIFICATIONS ARE FOUND TO BE SMALLER THAN, EQUAL TO AND LARGER THAN THEIR ORIGINAL BASE." (Sū. 41).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (41).

[P. 117, Ll. 9—10].

"In the case of Substances, we find that some modifica- "tions are smaller than their original base, some are equal to "it, while some are larger. In the same manner *ya*, as the "*modification* (of the long *i*), may be *smaller* (than its basic "cause)."*

[*The Vārṭika does not notice this Sūṭra* 41.]

Sūṭra (41A).

[Answer]—INASMUCH AS THERE IS (IN THE OPPONENT'S REASONING) NEITHER OF THE TWO KINDS OF PROBANS,

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* "From the *small* seed of the Banyan emanates the *large* banyan tree; while out of the large cocoanut, which is *larger* than the banyan-seed, comes out the cocoanut tree, which is *smaller* than the banyan tree; and from cocoanuts of equal size, we get trees of equal size."—*Ṭāṭparya*.

It would be more in keeping with the text if we had the following examples—(1) From the small seeds we get the tree, which is the modification of the seed, and is larger than it; (2) from a large volume of steam we get a small quantity of water, where the water, the modification of the steam, is smaller in volume than the steam; and (3) when milk turns into curd, the modification, curd, is equal in volume to the milk.

The *Bhāṣyachanḍra* gives the following examples:—(1) From the *elongated* gold-pieces, we get the *round* ear-ring;—(2) from smooth yarns we get smooth cloth;—(3) from the small ball of cotton we get the long yarns. All this shows that the modification need not always correspond to its original.

THE MERE EXAMPLE CANNOT PROVE ANYTHING.* (Su. 41A).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (41A).

(*a*) In the argument urged by the Opponent (in Sū. 41), we do not find any *Probans* at all,—neither one 'similar' to the example, nor one 'dissimilar' to it [and these are the only two kinds of Probans, as explained under Sū. 1-1-34 and 35];—(*b*) secondly (though an example has been cited) a mere example, unless taken along with a Probans, cannot prove anything;—(*c*) lastly, as counter-instances are available (in support of the contrary conclusion), there would be an uncertainty in regard to the conclusion (sought to be proved); [this counter-instance being as follows :—] it sometimes happens that for the carrying of a load, a horse is yoked in the place of an ox,—and just as in this case the Horse is not regarded as a 'modification' of the Ox, so, when *ya* is used in place of *i*, it cannot be regarded as a 'modification' of *i*. And certainly there is no such rule as that a conclusion can be proved only by an *example*, and not by a *counter-example*.†

Vārṭika on Sū. (41A).

[P. 310, Ll. 15—16.]

If what the Opponent urges under Sū. 41 is an argument meant to *prove* that there are *letter-modifications*, then our answer is that what is put forward is a mere example, which cannot serve the purpose of a Probans.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (42).

[P. 117, L. 16 to L. 20].

As regards the examples of the 'modification' of Substances, cited by the Opponent,—our answer is that—

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* In the printed text this appears as a part of the *Bhāṣya*. It appears as a Sūṭra in the *Nyāyasūchīnibandha*; but neither of the Sūṭra Mss. contains this Sūṭra. The *Ṭāṭparya* introduces it as '*paṭyākhyānasūṭra*,' and it appears right that the answer to the Opponent's argument put forward in the Sūṭra (41) should be answered by the *Sūṭra* (41A). The *Bhāṣyachandra* also calls it '*Sūṭra*.'

† This Sūṭra answers Sū. 41, taking it as an argument advanced to prove the conclusion that *ya* is a modification of *i*. But Sū. 41 may be taken not as an argument to prove a conclusion, but only as pointing out a defect, a fallacy, in the premiss of the Siddhānṭin's reasoning. The answer to this comes in Sū. 42.

Sūṭra (42).

IT IS NOT RIGHT; AS 'MODIFICATIONS' ALWAYS EMANATE FROM SUCH ORIGINAL BASES AS ARE UNEQUAL [AND THEY ARE ALWAYS IN CONFORMITY WITH THESE LATTER]. (Sū. 42)

Substances that constitute the origin (from which modifications emanate) are such as are not equal (to them); and yet the modifications are always in conformity with their original bases.* In the case in question, however, we find that the letter *ya* is not always in conformity with (does not necessarily emanate from) the letter *i* †. Hence the citing of the example of the modification of substances is not effective against us.

Vārṭika on Sū. (42).

[P. 310, L. 18 to P. 311, L. 2.]

If, however, what the Opponent has urged in Sū. 41 is meant to point out an objection (against the reasoning put forward by the Siddhāntin, in Sū. 40), then our answer is as given in this Sūṭra (42); which means that, inasmuch as Modifications are found to emanate from unequal origins, what has heen urged by the Opponent is entirely irrelevant; specially as Modifications always do follow their original, while *ya* does not follow the length or shortness of the *i*.

Var. P. 311.

Sūṭra (43).

[*Objection*]—"JUST AS THERE IS DIVERSITY IN THE CHARACTER OF THE MODIFICATION OF SUBSTANCES, SO IS THERE DIVERSITY IN THE MODIFICATION OF LETTERS ALSO."—(Sū. 43).

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* E.g. From the small banyan-seed emanates the large banyan-tree; and yet from that seed will emanate only the *banyan*, and never the coco-nut tree.

† This is what we mean by what we have urged in Sū. 40, as regards the modifications following their origins; and not that the largeness and smallness of the modification follows those of the origin. If we meant this latter, then alone could the argument urged against us by the Opponent in Sū. 1 be effective.

(*Bhāṣya on Sū.* 43.)

[P. 117, LL. 22-23.]

" Just as in the case of Substances, the modification differs from its original, even though both equally are *Substance,*—so in the case of Letters also, though both equally are '*Letter,*' yet the modification differs from the original."*

Vārṭika on Sū. (43).

[P. 311, Ll. 4—6.]

" Just as, even though both are equal, in being Substance,
" yet the Modification differs in its character from the Original,
" —in the same manner, even though both *ya* and *i* are equal,
" in being Letters, the modification (*ya*) may differ from the
" original (*i*)."

Sūṭra (44).

[*Answer*]—THAT CANNOT BE; AS THE REAL CHARACTER OF 'MODIFICATION' IS NOT POSSIBLE (IN THE CASE OF LETTERS).—Sū. (44).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (44).

[P. 118, L. 2 to L. 6.]

In the case of Substances in general we find the character of 'Modification' to be as follows:—When a Substance, gold or clay, undergoes *modification*, what happens is that the general character of that substance (Gold or Clay) remaining constant, one form or shape of it (*i.e.* the *Lump* of Gold or Clay) disappears and another (*i. e.* the Ring or the Jar)

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* " In the case of Substances also it is not true that the modification always follows its original; because as a matter of fact, we often find that there is a diversity between the modification and its original; so that, even though the *ya* does not follow the *i*, in its length or shortness, yet it may be its modification."

" The sense of the argument is as follows: When the modification is spoken of as *following* its original, is it meant that the *following* or conformity is absolute?—or that it is only partial? If the former, then no such conformity would be possible in the case of substances also. If the latter, then in the case of letters also, there is conformity so far that both are ' Letter."—*Bhāṣyachandra.*

comes into existence; and this latter we call * 'modification.' In the case of Letters on the other hand (such for instance as the letters *ya* and *i*), there is no such general 'Letter'-character which, remaining constant, would give up its '*i*'-form and take up the '*ya*'-form † So that, just as in the case of the Ox and the Horse, even though both are 'Substance,' yet, by reason of the diversity in their character, one is not regarded as the 'modification' of another,—simply because they do not fulfil the conditions of the true 'modification', —exactly in the same manner, the letter *ya* cannot be regarded as the 'modification' of the letter *i*; for the simple reason that the conditions of the true 'modification' are not fulfilled in this case.

[The *Vārṭika* has nothing to say on this *Sūṭra*].

Bhāṣya on Sū. (45.)

[P. 118, L. 7 to L. 11.]

For the following reason also Letters cannot have modifications:—

Sūṭra (45).

[AS A MATTER OF FACT] WHEN THINGS HAVE UNDERGONE 'MODIFICATION', THEY CANNOT REVERT TO THEIR ORIGINAL FORM.—(Sū. 45).

Reversion (to the original form) is not possible [for real modifications;‡ *e. g.*, the Curd cannot again become Milk]. "How do you know that?" We know this because there is no proof for such reversion. That is to say, there is nothing to prove—no reasoning available for the view —that "what happens (in the case of the form '*ḍaḍhyaṭra*') is that the *i* has become *modified* into *ya*, and again becomes *i* (when the expression is again stated in its uncombined form, *ḍaḍhi-aṭra*'); and *not* that in the former case *ya* had

* The *Bhāṣyachanḍra* with four Mss., reads आपद्यते.

† For it is only the particular letter *i* that is held by the Opponent to be modified into another particular letter 'ya'; while in the case of substances the *Gold* lump becomes modified into the *Gold*-ring; the *Gold-character* being *common.—Bhāṣyachanḍra.*

‡ पुनरापत्ति: of the *Bhāṣyā* is to be construed with विकारप्राप्तानाम् of the *Sūṭra* —says the *Bhāṣyachanḍra.*

been used in the place of *i*, and in the latter case it has ceased to be so used."*

Vārṭika on Sū. (45).

[P. 311, Ll. 9-10.]

If Letters were to undergo 'modifications,' they could not revert to their original form.

Sūṭra (46).

[*Objection*]—"INASMUCH AS GOLD AND OTHER THINGS DO REVERT TO THEIR ORIGINAL FORM, THE REASON URGED IS NOT A TRUE REASON AT ALL."

Bhāṣya on Sū. (46).

[P. 119, L. 13 to L. 15.]

Says the Opponent—"It has been asserted that there is "no reasoning available for our view:—but this is not true: "The following is the reasoning that proves it:—In the case "of Gold we find that, renouncing the form of the *Ear-ring*, "it takes the form of the *Necklet*, and again renouncing the "form of the latter it takes that of the former; exactly in the "same manner, *i* having taken the form of *ya*, † again takes "the form of *i*."

Vārṭika on Sū. (46).

[P. 311, Ll. 12-13.]

What the Sūṭra means is that—"the reason put forward (by the Siḍḍhānṭin, in Sū. 45) is not valid, it is inconclusive, because we do find things that have undergone 'modifications' reverting to their original form."

Bhāṣya on Sū. 46 A.

[P. 118, L. 15 to L. 20.]

[Our answer to the above is as follows]—The reasoning put forward is not valid, as it is based upon premises that are

* The *Bhāṣyachanḍra* cites an example where there is repeated 'reversion' between *i* and *ya*. From the root '*ḍhyai*', (to think) we get the word '*ḍhīḥ*' (intelligence); this latter word being compounded with '*āpṭi*', we get the form '*ḍhyāpṭi*' (*ya* again); and this compound is explained as '*ḍhī-prāpṭiḥ*' (*i* again).

† The printed text reads अपि here; but the passage gives better sense without that word. It is not found in the Puri Mss.

not true; for instance, in the case of Curd it is found that the *Milk* having once become Curd, never again reverts to the form of the *Milk*.* "What does that prove?" It proves that in the case of Letters also there is no reversion [and the premiss that 'all modifications revert to their original position', as urged in Sū. 46, is found not true; there being no such reversions in the case of Curd].†

If the meaning of the Opponent's assertion is that the "reversion of '*i*' is analogous to the reversion of Gold [so that what is stated in Sū. 45 is not true]",—then our answer is that, so far as the analogy of the case of Gold is concerned,—

THERE IS NO ANALOGY AT ALL; AS IN THE CASE OF THE MODIFICATIONS' OF GOLD, THE 'GOLD'-CHARACTER IS NEVER ABSENT.‡—(Sū. 46 A.)

In the case of Gold what happens is that the *Gold* itself remaining the constant factor, it becomes different objects by the renouncing of one character (form) and the taking of another.§ In the case of '*i*', on the other hand, we do not perceive any such common factor, in the shape of 'Letters in general', which could become a different object by renouncing the '*i*'-form and taking the '*ya*'-form. Hence the example of Gold is not applicable to the case in question.

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* The printed text omits a न here, which is essential.

† This is the answer to Sū. 46; if the reasoning therein urged is meant to prove that "there is reversion in the case of Letters, because there is such in the case of all modifications." If on the other hand, the Sūtra is to be taken only as putting forward an objection to the arguments of the *Siddhantin*, then the answer is as given in Sūtra, 46 A.

‡ This appears as a *Sūtra* in the *Nyāyasūchīnilandha*, also in the *Vārṭika*, *Bhāṣyachandra* and in the two Sūṭra Mss. The text of the Sūṭra is न, तद्विकाराणां सुवर्णभावाव्यतिरेकात्. The Puri Sūṭra Ms., however, reads it as न तद्विकाराणां सुवर्णभावा-द्व्यतिरेकात्; which reading is not quite satisfactory; though it may be construed to mean 'the analogy is not true; *because there is a difference* व्यतिरेकात्, inasmuch as in the case of Gold, the gold-character remains constant, throughout.' The *Bhāṣyachandra* adopts this reading.

The न, according to some, forms part, not of the *Sūṭra*, but of the *Bhāṣya*.

§ उपजायमानेन is necessary. It is found in the Puri Mss.

Vārṭika on Sū. (46 *A*).

[P. 311, Ll. 15-17].

Throughout all gold-modifications, the Gold persists as the common factor. In the case in question, there is no such constant thing—in the form of 'Letters'—which could be the substratum of the *i* and *ya* characters, and could renounce the one and take the other.

Sūṭra (46 *B*).

[*Objection*]—"BUT INASMUCH AS THE GENERAL CHARACTER OF 'LETTER' IS NEVER ABSENT [IN EITHER '*i*' OR '*ya*'], IT IS NOT RIGHT TO DENY THE 'MODIFICATION OF LETTERS'."—(Su. 46 B.]*

Bhāṣya on Sū. (46 B.)

[P. 11, Ll. 21-22].

[Says the Opponent]—"In the case of Letter-modifications also, the generic character of 'Letter' is never absent; exactly in the same manner as the character of 'Gold' is present in all modifications of Gold. [Hence the two cases are exactly analogous]."

Vārṭika on Sū. (46 B).

[P. 312, Ll. 2-3.]

"Letter-modifications also are never without the character "of 'Letter'; so that this generic character
Vār. P. 312. of 'Letter' forms the common (constant) factor [just like 'Gold' in the case of Gold-modifications]."

Sūṭra (46 C).

Bhā. P. 119. [Answer]—BUT A CHARACTER SUBSISTS IN THAT WHICH IS ENDOWED WITH GENERALITY, AND NOT IN THE GENERALITY ITSELF.—(Sū 46C).†

* This also appears as a *Sutra*, in the *Vārṭika* and the Sūṭra Mss ; but not in the *Nyāyasūchīnibandha*, nor in the *Bhāṣyachandra*.

† This appears as *Sūṭra* in the Sūṭra Mss., and also in the *Vārṭika* ; but not in the *Nyāyasūchīnibandha*, nor in the *Bhāṣyachandra*.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (46C).

[P. 119, L. 1 to L. 5.]

As a matter of fact, the *Ear-ring* and the *Necklet* are forms or properties that subsist in the *Gold*, and not in the Generality or generic character of 'Gold'.—Now, what is that Letter of which '*i*' and '*ya*' are properties? They cannot be properties of the generic character of 'Letter', as this is a *Generality* (and not *something possessed of Generality*).* [Even granting that these could be properties or forms of the said Generality] as a matter of fact, a property or form that is ceasing (or disappearing) cannot form the origin of another forthcoming property; hence in the case in question, the '*i*' that is ceasing (or disappearing) could not be the origin of the forthcoming '*ya*' [which means that '*ya*' cannot be the 'modification' of '*i*'].

[The *Vārṭika* has nothing to add on this Sūṭra].

Bhāṣya on Sū. (47).

[P. 119, L. 5 to L. 12.]

For the following reason also no 'modification' of Letters is possible:—

IF LETTERS ARE ETERNAL, THEY CANNOT UNDERGO [OR BECOME] MODIFICATIONS;—IF THEY ARE NON-ETERNAL, THEY CANNOT PERSIST (AS A CONSTANT FACTOR)—Sū. (47).

According to the theory that Letters are *eternal*, † the letters *i* and *ya* should both be eternal; so that neither could be regarded as a 'modification;' for both being eternal, what could be the 'modification' of what? [As all 'modifications' as such must be non-eternal] If, on the other hand, the view is held that Letters are non-eternal, then no persistence or continuity of Letters would be possible. "What do you mean by Letters having no persistence?" What is meant by this 'want of persistence' is that having come into existence, they cease to exist; so that (under this theory) it is only after the '*i*', having come into existence, had ceased to

* The right reading is यथार्थं सामान्यं न सत्येनो धर्मौ. The Puri Mss. read यथार्थे सामान्यं न सत्येनो धर्मौ.

† The majority of Mss., including the Puri ones, read अनित्यत्वे; but the sense demands नित्यत्वे.

exist, that the '*ya*' would come into existence; and the '*i*' would come into existence again only after the '*ya*,' having come into existence, had ceased to exist; and under the circumstances (the two never coexisting at any point of time), what would be the 'modification' of what? What we have said (in regard to the *i* and *ya* coming into existence and ceasing to exist) should be taken as referring to the combining (of the two words '*ḍaḍhi-aṭra*') after having stated them in the disjoined form, and again disjoining them after having combined them.*

Vārṭika on Sū. (47).

[P. 312, L. 5 to L. 10.]

If Letters are eternal, then they cannot have modifications; as an eternal thing undergoing modifications would be a contradiction in terms. If, on the other hand, Letters are non-eternal, then also no 'modification' is possible; as we never find any modification of things that have no persistence (or continuity of existence).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (48).

[P. 119, L. 12 to L. 21.]

The Opponent makes the following answer† (on the basis of the theory that letters are *eternal*) to the argument (propounded by the *Siḍḍhānṭin* in Sū. 47)—

Sūṭra (48).

"INASMUCH AS MOST ETERNAL THINGS ARE BEYOND THE REACH OF THE SENSES, AND YET THERE ARE SOME THAT ARE OF THE OPPOSITE CHARACTER—THE DENIAL OF LETTER-MODIFICATION IS NOT RIGHT." (Sū. 48).

"It is not quite correct‡ to say that *eternal words can* "*never undergo modifications*. [Because] as a matter of fact, " we find that, of *eternal* things, while some are *beyond the* "*reach of the senses* (e.g., the *Atom* and *Ākāsha*), there

* When we say '*ḍaḍhi-aṭra*' the *i* comes into existence; when we say *ḍaḍhyaṭra*', the *i* ceases to exist and the *ya* comes into existence; when we again disjoin the words and say '*ḍaḍhi-aṭra*', the *ya* ceases to exist and the *i* comes into existence.

† This answer is in the form of a Futile Rejoinder—says the *Ṭāṭparya*.

‡ The *Bhāṣyachanḍra* explains '*vipratiṣeḍhaḥ*' as equivalent to '*apratiṣeḍhaḥ*.'

" are some that are quite perceptible by the senses * (e.g., " the genus 'Cow' and the like); in fact Letters themselves " are perceptible by the Senses (and yet they are eternal, *ex-* " *hypothesi*); similarly, of eternal things though some (e g., " *Ākāsha*) may be incapable of undergoing modification, yet " Letters may be quite capable of doing so."

But the *presence of contrary properties* cannot be accepted as a valid reason; because there is *incompatibility* (between *eternality* and *capability of modification*), [while there is no such *incompatibility* between *eternality* and *perceptibility* or *imperceptibility*]. That which is *eternal* is never born; nor does it ever cease to exist; that which is devoid of the character of being born and that of ceasing to exist is *eternal*; while that which is possessed of the character of being born and of ceasing to exist is *non-eternal*; and as a matter of fact, there can be no 'modification' without something being born and something ceasing to exist. So that if Letters undergo 'modification', they cannot be *eternal*; and if they are eternal, they cannot undergo 'modification.' Thus the 'presence of opposite characters' (urged as a reason by the Opponent) is a *fallacious* Probans, being tainted with the fallacy of 'contradiction.'

Vārtika on Sūtra (48).

[P. 312, Ll. 13—14.]

The Answer given by the Opponent is that kind of Futile Rejoinder which has been called '*Vikalpasamā*' [*Vide*, Sūtra, 5-1-4, *Bhāṣya*, P. 243, L. 15].

Bhāṣya on Sū. (49).

[P. 119, L. 21 to P. 120, L. 7.]

The Opponent now answers the Siddhānta argument (of Sū. 47) from the standpoint that Letters are *not-eternal*—

Sūtra (49).

"EVEN THOUGH NON-PERSISTENT, LETTERS MAY UNDERGO MODIFICATIONS, IN THE SAME WAY AS THEY ARE APPREHENDED (PERCEIVED)." (Sū. 49).

* The right reading is supplied by the Puri Mss.—किञ्चिद्वर्णेन्द्रियं किञ्चिदिन्द्रिय-ग्राह्यमिन्द्रियग्राह्यञ्च &c.

" Even though letters are non-persistent (transient), yet
Bhā. P. 120. " there is hearing of them (they are heard);
" and in the same manner their 'modification'
" also would be possible (even though they are non-persis-
" tent)."*

Our answer is as follows:—The 'hearing of letters' (which has been put forward by the Opponent as a reason for proving the modification of Letters) has, as a matter of fact, no connection at all (with the desired conclusion), and as such it is entirely inefficient. That is to say, the 'hearing of Letters,'—which, on being admitted, would (according to the Opponent) lead to the inference of the fact that 'letters undergo modifications'—can, as a matter of fact, only serve the purpose of bringing about the cognition of what is expressed by those letters, and it has absolutely no connection with the 'modification of letters'; and as such it is entirely inefficient (in the proving of the desired conclusion).† So that the reasoning of the Opponent is

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* 'Just as Letters, even though non-persistent, become related to the Auditory organ and thereby bring about their own cognition,—in the same manner would they bring about modifications also.'—*Tātparya.*

† The best reading of this passage appears to be—अर्थप्रतिपादिका वर्णोपलब्धिः न विकारेण सम्बद्धा अपार्थकी वा प्रसज्यमाना वर्णविकारमर्थमनुमापयेत् The construction being—या वर्णोपलब्धिःवर्णविकारमर्थमनुमापयेत् (सा) अर्थप्रतिपादिका विकारेण न-सम्बद्धा (सती) अपार्थकी. The *Bhāṣyachandra* reads thus, with the exception that for या, it reads वा.

As for the mere denoting of meanings by letters, this can be done by them, even when they can subsist just for the moment, just long enough for them to be comprehended. In the case in question however, the letters concerned should have to subsist much longer than that; they should have to subsist through the entire process—of uttering the disjoined words '*dadhi-atra*', the pronouncing of the combined form '*dadhyatra*', and the subsequent analysing into the disjoined form—before any idea could arise as to there being a 'modification.' But as such continuous existence is not possible, under the theory that Letters are non-eternal, the mere 'hearing of letters' can have no connection with the fact of 'modification'.—*Tātparya.*

The translation is in accordance with this interpretation of the *Tātparya*. The *Bhāṣyachandra* construes the passage differently. By this अर्थप्रतिपादिका वर्णोपलब्धिः (न भवति) is one sentence—'The hearing of letters does not serve to prove the desired conclusion (that the original letter undergoes modifications);'—विकारेण सम्बद्धा supplies the reason—'because the said hearing is connected with the *modified* letter (and not with the *modifying* original)'; अपार्थकी—'hence it is inefficient; incapable

exactly similar (in absurdity) to the following reasoning—'Because the Earth is endowed with the quality of Odour, it must also be endowed with such qualities as Sound, Pleasure, and the like'! Then again, the 'hearing of letters' does not preclude the possibility of the case being one of the use of one Letter after the cessation of another Letter; we hold that in the case in question what happens is that the letter '*i*' having ceased, the letter '*ya*' is used in its place; and if the possibility of such use were precluded by the fact of *letters being heard*, then there might be some justification for the view that the letter '*i*' itself becomes transformed (modified) into '*ya*'. *—[As a matter of fact however, it is not so.]—From all this it follows that the 'hearing of letters' is not a valid reason for holding that Letters undergo modifications.

Vārtika on Sū. (49).

[P. 312, Ll. 17-18.]

The answer given by the Opponent in this Sūṭra is of the nature of the *Futile Rejoinder*, which has been called '*Sāḍharmyasamā*.'

Sūṭra (50).

(1) INASMUCH AS, IF THE LETTER IS SOMETHING MODIFIABLE, IT CANNOT BE ETERNAL,—AND (2) AS THE (SO-

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of proving your proposition';—thus being अनुपलभ्यमान—'not perceived (along with the modifying original';—'वर्णविकारं' वर्णविकारत्वं, 'अर्थं अनुमापयेत्' अनुमापयेत्—'might lend probability to the modifiability of letters?

This explanation however is more far-fetched than the one by the *Ṭāṭparya*.

* It might be argued, in favour of the Opponent's view that even though the 'hearing of letters' has no direct connection with the subject of Letter-modifications, yet, inasmuch the fact of hearing precludes the possibility of all other explanations, it may be accepted as justifying the conclusion that Letters undergo modifications. The Author has anticipated this view, and has pointed out that the 'hearing' *does not* preclude the possibility of the explanation supplied by the *Siḍḍhānṭin*.

Of this passage also, the *Bhāṣyachandra* supplies a different explanation, reading निर्वर्त्तिका for निवर्त्तिका and निर्वर्त्तते for निवर्त्तते According to this, the passage means as follows:—"The hearing of the modified letter does not bring about the birth of the modified letter after the destruction of that which is meant to have been its original; e.g., if the production or birth of *ya*—were brought about by the hearing of the letter after the destruction of '*i*',—then alone could the proposition be held that 'when heard it produces the modified form *ya*.'

CALLED) 'MODIFICATION' APPEARS AT A TIME OTHER THAN THAT AT WHICH THE MODIFYING LETTER IS PRESENT,—THE OBJECTION (TAKEN IN Sū. 48) IS NOT A RIGHT ONE.—(Sū. 50).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (50).

[P. 120, L. 10 to L. 14.]

The objection taken (in (Sū. 48) on the basis of the fact that 'eternal things are of opposite characters' is not right. (1) Because as a matter of fact, no modifiable thing is ever found to be *eternal*; hence the objection based upon the example of the 'hearing of Letters' is not right. (2) In the case in question, what happens is that, having used the disjoined expression '*ḍadhi-aṭra*', the person waits for several moments, and then he pronounces the words in close juxtaposition and uses the form '*ḍaḍhyaṭra*'; so that the letter '*ya*' is used long after the letter '*i*' has disappeared (after the uttering of the disjoined words); and under the circumstances, of which letter could the '*ya*' be recognised as the 'modification'? For the effect (*the modification*, the *ya*) cannot appear at a time when the cause (the modifying original, the *i*) is absent. This is the retort to which the Opponent's argument is open.

Vārṭika on Sū. (50).

[P. 313, L. 1 to L. 8].

The assertion that '*eternal* letters *undergo modifications*' involves a contradiction in terms. And inasmuch as at the moment that the '*i*' is heard, it cannot become '*ya*',* the reason that 'it would be like the hearing of the Letters' is entirely irrelevant.

Var. P. 313.

Bhāṣya on Sū. 51.

[P. 120, L. 14 to L. 18.]

For the following reason also it is not possible to hold that Letters undergo modifications :—

Sūṭra (51).

BECAUSE IN REGARD TO LETTER-MODIFICATIONS, THERE IS NO CONSTANCY AS TO THE ORIGINAL BASE.—Sū (51).

* At the time that one uses the form '*ḍaḍhyaṭra*,' the '*i*' has ceased to exist.

In one case we find it laid down that '*ya*' is to take the place of '*i*'; and in another it is laid down that '*i*' is to take the place of '*ya*';—*e. g.*, in the word '*bidhyati*' [which, is derived from the root *byādh*, the *ya* of which gives place to *i* in the word '*bidhyati*']. Now, if the letters concerned were 'modifications', there should have been some constancy as to which is the 'modification' and which the 'original'; as is found in the case of all well-known modifications [*e. g.*, the milk is always the 'original', while the Curd is always the 'modification'; it is never found to be the other way about. In the case in question however, it has been shown that there is no such constancy; as in one case '*i*' gives place to '*ya*', while in another '*ya*' gives place to '*i*'].

Vārṭika on Sū. (51).

[P. 313, L. 3 to L. 7.]

For the following reason also it is not right to hold that Letters undergo 'modifications':—*Because there is no constancy as to the original.* That is to say, in the case of all well-known 'modifications' we have found that it is always fixed which is the 'original' and which the 'modification'; there is however no such constancy in the case of the Letters '*ya*' and '*i*'. Hence from this *absence of constancy*, it follows that there is no 'modification' in the case of Letters.

Sūṭra (52).

[*The Casuist objects*]—"AS THERE IS CONSTANCY IN NON-CONSTANCY, IT IS NOT RIGHT TO SAY THAT THERE IS NO CONSTANCY."—(Sū. 52).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (52).

[P. 120, Ll. 20-22.]

"It has been urged (by the Siḍḍhānṭin, in Sū. 51) that "there is no constancy as to what is the 'original' and what "the 'modification'. Now this 'non-constancy' is *con*-"*stant*; that is, it is constant in regard to each particular "subject: and inasmuch as this is constant, there is 'con-

"stancy'; so that what has been urged in regard to there "being no constancy as to what is original &c., is not "true."

Vārṭika on Sū. (52.)

[P. 313, L. 9.]

What the Sutra means is that there is no *non-constancy.*

Sūṭra (53.)

[*Answer*]—(A) INASMUCH AS "'CONSTANCY' AND 'NON-CONSTANCY' ARE CONTRADICTORY TERMS,—AND (B) AS THE 'CONSTANCY' (PUT FORWARD BY THE OPPONENT) SUBSISTS IN THE 'NON-CONSTANCY',—THE OBJECTION URGED IS NOT RIGHT.—(Sū. 53).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (53.)

[P. 212, L. 2 to L. 6.]

(A) The term 'Constancy' signifies the affirmation of the thing (Constancy); while the term 'non-constancy' signifies its negation; and as there is contradiction between *affirmation* and *negation*, the two terms ('constancy' and 'non-constancy') cannot be regarded as synonymous; so that *Non-constancy* cannot become 'constancy' simply by being *constant* or fixed; though we do not deny that there is no 'constancy' in 'non-constancy'; what we mean is that what is signified by the term 'constancy' may subsist *in non-constancy*, and as such the term constancy' may be applied to *non-constancy* [but what we do deny is the possibility of both *Constancy* and *Non-constancy* belonging to the same thing]. Thus the mere presence of *Constancy* in *Non-constancy* does not constitute an effective objection against us.*

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* What is impossible is the co-subsistence of both, Constancy and Non-constancy, in any one thing, and not the subsistence of Constancy *in* Non-constancy. And this latter fact does not shake our position; as the mere fact of there being Constancy in Non-constancy does not imply that there is constancy as regards the *Original* and *Modification*. It is admitted that there is non-constancy in regard to this; and if the constancy of this non-constancy were to imply constancy as regards the Original and Modification, then it would mean that in regard to this latter there are both Constancy and Non-constancy, which however is impossible.

Vārṭika on Sū. (53).

[P. 313, Ll. 10-11].

What the Sūṭra means to point out is the incompatibility between Affirmation and Negation.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (54).

[P. 121, L. 6 to L. 14].

In fact what appears (and is regarded) as the 'modification of Letters' is not that one letter becomes transformed into another, or that one letter (as product) is produced out of the other (as the constituent cause); what it really is, is shown in the following *Sūṭra*—

Sūṭra (54).

WHAT APPEARS AS THE 'MODIFICATION OF LETTERS' INVOLVES A CHANGE IN (ONE OR THE OTHER OF) THE FOLLOWING FORMS—(*a*) THE COMING IN OF FRESH PROPERTIES, (*b*) SUPPRESSION, (*c*) DIMINUTION, (*d*) INCREASE, (*e*) CURTAILMENT AND (*f*) COALESCENCE.—(Sū. 54).

What is actually meant by 'the modification of letters' is that there is substitution of another cognate letter,—*i.e.*, one cognate letter is used on the cessation of the use of another; and this substitution is in diverse forms;—(*a*) In some cases there is *coming in of fresh properties*; *e.g.*, when the low accent takes the place of the high-pitched accent;—(*b*) in some there is *suppression*; *e.g*, when one form being dropped, another comes in in its place;—(*c*) in certain cases there is *diminution*; *i.e.*, when the short vowel takes the place of the long one;—(*d*) in others there is *increase*; *e.g.*, when the long vowel takes the place of the short one, or the prolated vowel takes the place of the long and short one;—(*e*) in certain cases there is *curtailment*: *i.e.*, '*sṭaḥ*' (a single syllable) takes the place of '*asṭi*' (two syllables);—(*f*) in other cases there is *coalescence*; *e.g.*, when there is an augment, either in the base or in the affix. These are the changes that are spoken of as 'modifications'; and these are only *substitutions*. If this is what is meant by 'modification,' then we admit the statement that 'Letters undergo modifications.'

Vārṭika on Sū. (54).

[P. 313, L. 14 to P. 314, L. 2].

From the above it follows that there is *substitution* in the case of Letters, where the qualified (letters) are never perceived apart. That is to say, if Letters were modified, such Letters could be perceived apart from the properties in the shape of 'modifications': As a matter of fact, however, they are never so perceived; hence the conclusion is that Letters do not undergo modifications. If they *are* 'modified', they can be so only in the following manner:—*What appears &c., &c.*—says the *Sūṭra*.

What the Sūṭra means is that, inasmuch as in all cases of so-called 'modification,' we have only either the *coming in of fresh properties* or *suppression, &c.,* (enumerated in the Sūṭra), it follows that what actually takes place is *substitution* (and not *modification*). The whole question of the law of 'Modification' and 'Substitution' has been thoroughly discussed by the author of the *Bhāṣya*; hence (throughout this section) we have explained the meaning of the Sūṭras only.

Vār. P. 314.

Section (4).

Examination of the nature of Words and their Potencies.

[Sūṭras 55—66].

Sūṭra (55).

THESE SAME (LETTERS), WHEN ENDING IN AN AFFIX, ARE CALLED 'WORD.'—Sū. 55.

Bhāṣya on Su. (55).

[P. 121, L. 16 to L. 19].

Letters, transformed according to law and reason (*i. e.,* by *substitution* in accordance with details laid down under Sū. 54; and not by *modification*), when ending in an affix, come to be called 'Word.' Affixes are of two kinds—*Noun-affixes*

and *Verb-affixes*; '*Brāhmaṇaḥ*' is an example (of a *Word* ending in a noun-affix) and '*pachaṭi*' is an example (of *Word* ending in a verb-affix).

"According to this definition Prepositions and Indeclinnables could not be called 'Word.' Hence it is necessary to propound some other definition of 'Word'."

But it is with a view to make the term 'Word' (according to the said definition) applicable to Prepositions and Indeclinables that it has been ruled that Indeclinables drop their affixes—[by Pāṇini's Sūṭra 2-4-82];—and the reason for this convention lies in the fact that it is only *Words* that can signify (bring about the cognition of) anything [and it is admitted that Prepositions and Indeclinables do signify things] *

Vārṭika on Su. (55).

[P. 314, L. 4 to L. 14.]

Letters transformed according to law and reason, when ending in an affix, come to be called 'Word'—says the *Bhāṣya*.

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* This Sūṭra is aimed against the '*Sphota*'-theory of the Grammarian. This theory is thus outlined in the *Tāṭparya*.—

Things are not signified by *Letters*; as Letters cannot have any connection with anything, either singly or collectively. Nor can things be held to be signified by the letter as aided by the impressions left by the preceding letters; because Impressions can pertain to their own objects, and not to other things; hence the impression of letters could bring about the cognition of Letters only, and not of *things*. And yet it cannot be denied that when the letters '*gha-taḥ*' are pronounced, there comes about the cognition of the Jar. Hence the conclusion is that the letters concerned bring about the manifestation of a peculiar entity in the shape of '*Sphota*'—a kind of conglomerate Sound—which in its turn brings about the cognition of the Jar. That several letters should give rise to one *Sphota* is just like several words forming a sentence. Hence there is no such thing as 'Word,' denoting things.

In answer to this view we have the Sūṭra laying down that the 'Word'—by which things are denoted—consists of the Letters themselves,—and *not* of any such thing as '*Sphota*'. As a matter of fact, when a thing is spoken of by means of a verbal expression, we do not perceive anything except certain *Letters*. Hence we conclude that the name 'Word' must apply to the Letters; though it may not apply directly to them, these being *many*, and the word being *one* only,—yet the name may be applied to them indirectly, on the basis of the fact that though many, they bring about the cognition of a single thing. And so long as we can explain the phenomenon of verbal expression on the basis of the directly perceptible Letters, there can be no justification for the assuming of a superphysical and purely hypothetical entity in the shape of '*Sphota*'.

[The *Sphoṭavādin* objects]—"In that case no cognition of the signified thing could be possible."

Our answer is that the cognition of the signified things is certainly not impossible; as the cognition of the denoted thing follows from the perception of the last letter as aided by the *representative cognition* (recalling) of the foregoing letters.*

Affixes are of two kinds—noun-affixes and verb-affixes—says the *Bhāṣya*. The noun-affixes are 'su' and the other declensional endings, and the verb-affixes are '*ṭip*' and the other conjugational endings. Thus *Words*, qualified by one or the other of these affixes, become twofold, divided into 'nouns and 'verbs' respectively; when what is denoted by the word becomes qualified by association with a particular action,† the Word is called a 'noun'; as for example, the word '*Brāhmaṇaḥ*', which represents a conglomeration of an *action* (of *being* or *existing*) and an *agent* (one who *is* or *exists*), and is qualified by the Number of the Agent (*One*).‡

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* This is the simple meaning of this passage. But, as this explanation of the verbal cognition of things is open to the objections urged by the *Spoṭavādin* (see last note), the *Ṭāṭparya* has supplied another roundabout explanation of the *Vārṭika*. (a) '*Anṭyavarṇapratyayāṭ*' is taken to mean *the later* (*anṭya*, in relation to the first perception of each letter) *cognition of letters* (*varṇapraṭyaya*), —the comprehensive cognition, in the form of *remembrance*, that follows after the perception of each of the letters.—(b) '*pūrva-varṇa*' is explained as 'letters, the convention in regard to whose denotative potency has been previously known,' and '*praṭisanḍhānapraṭyaya*' as 'recognition'. According to this interpretation, the translation of the passage should run thus—

'*The cognition of the signified thing follows from the remembrance of the letters, as aided by the recognition of them as possessed of the denotative potency originally fixed by convention*'.

† In the term '*kriyānṭara*', the term '*anṭara*' means *particular*. The definition of the Noun thus comes to be this—'That word is called *Noun*, whose denotation is not complete unless it is connected with a certain action (denoted by the corresponding verb)'.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

‡ The *Ṭāṭparya* explains the word '*kriyā*' as standing for the action of *being-Brāhmaṇa*, '*brāhmaṇaṭva*'; and this is what has been adopted in the translation.

And that which signifies duration of action, and whereof *action* forms the predominant factor, is the 'verb';* *e. g.*, the word '*pachaṭi*', 'cooks.'

Objection—" If there are only two kinds of affixes, then Prepositions and Indeclinables cannot be called 'Word'."

Not so; as these also are included; *i. e.*, Prepositions and Indeclinables are also included under 'Nouns'; from the fact that the *Shāsṭra* lays down the rule (Pāṇini 2-4-82,) that 'Indeclinables drop their affixes,' we infer that Indeclinables also end in declensional affixes; and as such these also are included under 'Noun.'

Bhāṣya on Su. (56).

[P. 121, L. 20 to P. 122, L. 4.]

The discussion that follows is in regard to Nouns; and we take for our example the particular word '*gauḥ*', 'Cow.' †Now, in connection with this—

THERE ARISES A DOUBT; BECAUSE THE WORD IS USED IN REFERENCE TO THE INDIVIDUAL, THE CONFIGURATION AND THE GENERALITY, AS INSEPARABLE FROM ONE ANOTHER.—(Sū. 56).

It would appear simpler to take the compound '*kriyākārakasamudāyaḥ*' to mean *the conglomeration of the action (to which 'brāhmaṇaḥ' is nominative) and the case-relation.*

The *Tāṭparya* adds that the definition of 'Noun' given in the text is put in this form with a view to include infinitives and participles also; as these also are such as do not have their denotation complete except through qualification by an action; infinitives and participles always require another verb to complete their sense.

* '*Kriyākāla*' is *duration*, says the *Tāṭparya*. '*Whereof the action forms the predominant factor*' is added with a view to exclude infinitives and participles, which also signify some sort of a duration. The noun, though it implies an action, does not signify duration; e. g. '*pākaḥ*' denotes the action of *cooking*, but not its duration, which is signified only by the verb 'cooks'. Thus then, while the verb signifies action resting in itself, the Noun implies action of something else. This is what is meant by 'action forming the predominant factor'.

† तदर्थे is printed as part of Sūṭra 56, but the न्यायसूचीनिबन्ध and the Puri Sū. Ms. both read the Sū. without तदर्थे which therefore we take as part of Bhāṣya. The *Bhāṣyachandra* makes it part of the *Sūṭra*.

The term '*sannidhi* signifies inseparable existence, invariable concomitance. As a matter of fact, the word 'Cow' is used in connection with the Individual, the Configuration and the Generality,—as inseparable from one another; and it is not definitely known whether what is denoted by the word is any *one* of these three, or all of them.

Vārṭika on Sū. 56.

[P. 314, L. 15 to P. 815, L. 21.]

Inasmuch as all usage is by means of Words, the exact signification of Words is now going to be discussed; and as usage rests mainly upon Nouns, it is the exact signification of Nouns that we are going to consider. Nouns are chosen for treatment, by reason of their pervasive character; i. e. inasmuch as nearly all words are nouns, it is the noun—the particular noun 'Cow'—that is going to be considered.*

[The discussion begins with the following initial objection]—"No cognition of anything can arise from the Word; "because if the word were to bring about the cognition of "Individuality, no comprehensive notion of anything would "be possible; and inasmuch as no Individuality can be "cognised when a word is uttered, the word cannot be re-"garded as expressive (or denotative) of anything."

There is no force in this objection; as the Word does not denote an Individuality at all. Who says that the Word denotes an Individuality? The fact is that the Word always denotes a Generality; it is only the sentence that refers to Individualities. So that being expressive of the Vār. P. 315. Generality, the Word cannot be regarded as *inexpressive.*

"This also cannot be accepted. Because usage is never "found to pertain to *Generalities.* Whenever any teacher "pronounces a word, he does so for the purpose of bringing

* In one sentence there is only one verb, all the other words are 'nouns'; this is what is meant by Nouns being 'pervasive' in their character.

"about the cognition of a particular thing (an Individuality); "for as a matter of fact, no direction can apply to Generality, "and if it did, it would not be comprehended at all. Hence "the Word must be regarded as entirely *inexpressive.** "

This is not right; for though the word really signifies a Generality, yet this Generality is always individualised by means of determinants;† if the Words were not expressive, then, from the hearing of a word one could not derive the cognition of the Generality; for that which is not expressive cannot bring about the cognition of either Generality or Individuality; as we find in the case of *objects* (which being not-expressive, do not bring about the cognition of either Generality or Individuality); as a matter of fact however, the cognition of Generality does follow from Words; and it is the Generality thus cognised that becomes individualised on the hearing of qualifying (determinant) words; *e.g.*, the word 'Cow' having brought about the cognition of the Generality 'Cow,' the addition of such qualifying words as 'is standing' or 'is going' and the like tends to individualise that Generality. "But how is it that such terms as 'is standing', 'is moving' have the individualising

* This objection emanates from the Prābhākara. Its purpose is thus summed up in the *Tāṭparya*—No man ever uses a word for the signifying of a generality; words are used only for the conveying of the idea of particular things; and as this, by the Siḍḍhantin's own admission, is done by means of a sentence, there is no necessity for discussing the signification of words.

† It is true that the word 'Cow' denotes the genus *Cow*; but when further qualifications—in the shape of *black*, *white* &c.—are added, the generality becomes individualised. As regards the Prâbhākara's objection, it has to be borne in mind that the *Sentence* is nothing apart from the *words* composing it. Nor will it be right to hold that what expresses the meaning is the series of Letters appearing in the sentence, irrespective of any idea of 'words';—because under this view it should be possible for one who has no idea of the denotation of the 'words' composing the sentence to comprehend the meaning of that sentence. In order to escape from this incongruity, one has to admit that each word composing a sentence has a distinct denotation of its own; and the generic denotation of the words becoming specialised and individualised by virtue of their relation to each other, we get at the particularised idea, which is thus said to be *expressed* by the sentence.

force (when words are denotative of Generalities)?" These terms of themselves certainly do not have any individualising force; what happens is that when they are taken along with the words preceding them, they bring about the cognition of particular things; and it is in this sense that they are said to have the force of individualisation.

[Thus then, though it is found that Words are really expressive, and are expressive of *Generalities*, yet in practice Words are also found to bring about the cognition of the *Configuration* and the *Individuals* also; so that there arises a doubt as to whether all these three are denoted by the Word, or only one of them. Now the Author proceeds to show that according to the view that Words are expressive of both, Generality and Individuality, there can be no doubt as to their being expressive; but the uncertainty as to their exact denotation is as great as ever; so that in either case the enquiry undertaken by the Sūtra is absolutely necessary]—Or, both (the cognition of Generality and also that of Individuality) may follow from Words; that is to say, the same word 'Cow' brings about the cognition of the *action* (of being, *i.e.*, the Generality *Cow*) as also what what constitutes it (*i.e.*, the *indicidual* 'Cow'),—without its providing any idea as to which is the predominant and which the subordinate factor (in the denotation). So that when the word 'Cow' is based upon the presence of the Generality 'Cow'—*i.e.*, the particular thing is called a 'Cow' because it is connected with the Generality 'Cow'—then, in that case what forms the predominant element in the denotation is the *individual* Cow; and the action of *being* (*i.e.*, the Generality) comes in only as the subordinate element, serving the purpose of qualifying the said individual; while, on the other hand, when the word pertains more pointedly to the action (of *being*, the Generality),—*i.e.*, when the character of *being a Cow* is spoken as the 'Cow'—then, the individual Cow serves the purpose

of qualifying the Generality, which latter therefore forms the predominant element (in the denotation). Thus then, it is found that a Word signifies the Generality as well as the Individuality,—without any hard and fast rule as to which of these forms the predominant and which the subordinate factor.

And thus, when we come to adjudicate the predominant and subordinate position of the one or the other, then,—*in connection with this there arises a doubt, because the word is used etc., etc.* (says the Sūṭra).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (57).

[P. 122, L. 4 to L. 18].

What forms the real denotation of a word * can be ascertained only from the force of usage. And from this it is clear that—

(A.)—"IT IS THE INDIVIDUAL (THAT IS DENOTED BY THE WORD); ALL USAGE—IN THE FORM OF (*a*) THE TERM 'THAT WHICH,' (*b*) GROUPING, (*c*) GIVING, (*d*) POSSESSION, (*e*) NUMBER, (*f*) ENLARGEMENT (*g*) CONTRACTION, † (*h*) COLOUR, (*i*) COMPOUNDING AND (*j*) PROCREATION—APPERTAINS TO THE *Individual*".—(Sū. 57).

(A.)—[*The Individualistic Theory is first put forward*]—

" It is the Individual that is denoted by the word. How " so? Because such usage as is represented by the use of " the term '*that which*' and the rest applies to the Individual.

" '*Upachāra,*' 'appertaining,' here stands for *application.*

" (*a*) Such a sentence as '*that* Cow *which* stands', '*that* " *which* is sitting' can never signify the *Generality*, as in " the Generality there is no diversity ‡ (which would require " specialisation by means of such qualifying terms as *that* " *which stands* and so forth); and inasmuch as what *is* diverse " is the *Individual* substance, the said sentence should be

* The right reading is [illegible] as found in the *Vārṭika* and in the Puri Mss.

† The printed text reads उपचय; right reading is अपचय as found in the Puri Mss.

‡ The *Bhāṣyachandra* explains *abhēdāt* as 'because the agent of *standing* and *sitting* is one and the same'. But this is not compatible with the context.

" taken as referring to this latter. (*b*) The expression " '*group* of Cows' presupposes diversity, and as such " must refer to the *Individual things*, and not to the *Generality*, which is one only.* (*c*) In the expression 'he gives " the Cow to the *Vaidya*,'† the *giving* must be of an *Individual* " Cow, and not of the *Generality*; as this latter has no body, " and as such cannot be transferred from one person to another. (*d*) '*Possession*' consists in becoming related to " proprietory right; it is expressed by such words as 'Kauṇḍinya's cow,' 'the Brāhmaṇa's cow' and so forth; and these " latter must refer to the *individual* things; as it is only these " that are diverse, and as such can belong to, be possessed " by, different persons; while the Generality is one only (and " as such cannot belong to several persons). (*e*) '*Number*,' " —we have such expressions as 'ten cows,' 'twenty cows' " etc., and these must refer to the *Individual* things—as these " alone are diverse,—and not to the *Generality* which is *one* " only. (*f*) '*Enlargement*'—It is only an *Individual* thing, " which is a product brought about by (constituent) causes, that " can undergo 'enlargement', which consists in the accretion " of further component particles; as we find expressed in the " words 'the cow has grown large', which cannot refer to the " *Generality*, which is not made up of component particles " (and as such can have no accretions to it). (*g*) The " same remarks apply to '*contraction*.' (*h*) '*Colour*'—the " expressions 'the white cow,' 'the tawny cow' and the like " must be taken as referring to the presence of the particular " quality of colour in the *individual* thing, and not to the *Generality*. (*i*) *Compounding*'—such compounds as '*gohita*' " (welfare of the cow), *gosukha* (*comfort of the cow*) *must refer* " *to the connection*‡ of *welfare* and *comfort* with the *individual* " thing, and not with the Generality. (*j*) '*Procreation*'— " *i. e.* reproduction of likes; the expression 'the cow produces cows' must refer to *individuals*, as it is these that " are *produced*, and not to *Generality*, which (being eternal) " is never produced. Throughout this context the word " '*dravya*' is synonymous with '*vyakti*.' "

* The printed text omits the words गवां बहुत्व इति भेदात् द्रव्याभिधानं न जातेरभेदात् which are found in all Mss.

† The Puri Mss. and *Bhāṣyachandra* read वैद्याय for

‡ संयोगो is the right reading as in the Puri Mss.

Vārṭika on *Ṣu.* (57).

[P. 316, L. 8 to L. 14].

What forms the real denotation of a word can be ascertained only from the force of usage—says the Bhāṣya; and the Sūṭrā proceeds to show what the *usage* on the point in question is.

" '*That which*' and other expressions noted cannot refer " to the Generality. Why? Because the Generality is one only. " The Generality is one and uniform; and hence any qualifica- " tion for it is absolutely meaningless; as is found in the " expressions 'that cow which is standing', 'that cow which " is sitting'; and so in all the other expressions.

" The Word cannot denote the *Configuration* (either); for " the simple reason that the Configuration can have no ac- " tion; and that which has no action cannot move or stay or " exist. So with all the other expressions.

" As a matter of fact, the word '*Cow*' can denote only " that thing which can be connected with the qualifications " spoken of (in the expressions referred to), such as *standing* " and the like. 'Why so?' Because the qualification and " the qualified must both pertain to the same thing; it is " only when the word 'Cow' denotes the something as that " which is denoted by the qualification 'is standing,' that " the former word can serve its purpose of excluding " other *things*, and the latter word its purpose of excluding " other *actions*; and it is only under such conditions, and un- " der none other, that the co-ordination between the qualified " term ('cow') and the qualifying term ('is standing') is " possible.

" *The word 'ḍravya' is synonymous with the word vyakṭi'* " says the *Bhāṣya*. That is to say, the word 'cow' as ac- " companied by the term 'is standing' must denote the " *Individual*."

Bhāṣya on Su. (58).

[P. 122, L. to P. 123, L. 3.]

The next *Sūṭra* puts forward the refutation of the above-described Individualistic Theory—

Sūṭra (58).

THIS IS NOT RIGHT; AS THERE COULD BE NO RESTRICTION.—(Sū. 58).

The *Individual* cannot be denoted by Word. Why? *Because there could be no restriction.*—As a matter of fact, the word 'Cow' denotes that which is qualified by the terms 'that which' and the rest (mentioned in Sū. 57). That is to say, in such expressions as 'that cow which is standing', 'that cow which is seated', what is denoted by the word 'Cow' is not the mere *Individual* by itself, without any qualifications, and as apart from the Generality (to which it belongs),—but the Individual *as qualified by* (*and along with*) *the Generality*. Hence it is not right to say that the Words denote *Individuals*. Similarly in the case of the terms 'group' &c. (mentioned in Sū. 57).

Vārṭika on Sū. (58).

For the refuting of the Individualistic theory (outlined in Sū. 57) we have the next Sūṭra—*This is not so*, &c. &c. What the word 'Cow' denotes is not the *Individual* pure and simple. If the word denoted the Individual only, then it would give rise to the cognition of any and every individual (and not to any particular individual only);—this is what the *Sutra* means.

Bhāṣya on Su. (59).

[P. 123, L. 3 to L. 17.]

[*The Individualist objects*]—"If the Individual is not denoted by the Word, how is it that the Word is applied to it?"

Our answer is that we find in actual usage that for certain reasons one thing is spoken of as another, even though it is not usually the same as the latter. [For instance]—

Suṭra (59).

IN THE CASE OF—(*a*) 'BRAHMĀṆA', (*b*) 'MANCHA' ('PLATFORM'), (*c*) 'KATA' ('MAT'), (*d*) 'RĀJAN' ('KING'), (*e*) 'SAKṬU' ('FLOUR'), (*f*) 'CHANDANA' ('SANDAL'), (*g*) 'GAṄGĀ', (*h*) 'SHĀTAKA' ('CLOTH'), (*i*) 'ANNA', ('FOOD'), (*j*) 'PURUṢA' ('MAN'),—THERE IS SECONDARY (INDIRECT) APPLICATION, DUE RESPECTIVELY TO—(*a*) ASSOCIATION, (*b*) LOCATION, (*c*) PURPOSE, (*d*) BEHAVIOUR, (*e*) MEASURE, (*f*) CONTAINING, (*g*) PROXIMITY, (*h*) CONNECTION, (*i*) CAUSE AND (*j*) SOVEREIGNTY.* (Sū. 59).

What is meant by 'one thing being spoken of as another which is not the same as that' is that a thing is spoken of by means of a word which is not directly expressive of it.† For example—(*a*) In the expression '*yaṣṭikām bhojaya*', 'feed the stick', the word '*yaṣṭikā*,' 'stick', is applied to the *Brāhmaṇa* accompanied by (carrying) the stick, by reason of 'association';—(*b*) in the expression '*mañchāḥ kroshanṭi*' 'the platforms are shouting', the word '*mañcha*', 'platform' is applied to the *men* upon the platform, by reason of 'location';—(*c*) when *grass* is being collected for the making of the mat, the man is said to be *making the mat*, [when the word 'mat' is applied to the *grass*] on account of the 'purpose' (for which the grass is collected);—(*d*) the expressions '*yamo rājā*, 'this king is the god of death', '*kuvēro rājā*', 'this king is the god of wealth', the words 'Yama,' 'Death-God' and 'Kuvēra', God of wealth', are applied to the *King*, by reason of his 'behaviour' (resembling that of of the gods);—(*e*) when the *flour* is weighed by means of the particular measure of 'five pounds,' we use the expression 'five-pound-flour,' [where the word 'flour' is applied to the

* In connection with this Sūṭra it may be noted that among the words enumerated, the first, *Brāhmaṇa*, is that *to* which the figurative term '*yaṣṭi*' is applied, while all the rest are those that are figuratively applied to things other than those directly denoted by them.

But this remark applies to the Sūṭra only, in view of the way in which the *Bhāṣya* explains the case and the example it has chosen to cite. We may however cite the instance of the case where a man, who is not a Brāhmaṇa, if he is found to be always in the company of Brahmanas, comes to be regarded as a *Brāhmaṇa*. In view of this example, the Sūṭra becomes quite relevant.

†. The reading of the printed text is corrupt. The right reading is अतच्छब्दस्य तेन शब्देनाभिधानमिति, as found in the Puri Mss. and also in the *Vārṭika* and the *Bhāṣyachandra*.

five pounds] by reason of its being the 'measure' (of weight); —(*f*) when sandal is held in the balance, it is called the 'balance-sandal,' [where the word 'sandal' is applied to the balance] by reason of 'containing';—(*g*) in the expression 'the cows are grazing in the Gaṅgā, the word 'Gaṅgā' is applied to the *adjoining lands*, by reason of 'proximity;'—(*h*) when the *cloth* coloured black is called 'black,' we have the word 'black' applied to the *cloth*, by reason of 'connection;' —(*i*) in the expression 'food is life,' (the word 'life' is applied to the *food*) by reason of its being the 'cause' (of life); —(*j*) in the expressions 'this man is the dynasty,' 'this man is the race,' (the words 'dynasty' and 'race' are applied to the *man*), by reason of his 'sovereignty or predominance.'

Now, in the case in question (*i.e.*, of the ordinary noun, 'cow,' *e. g.*) what happens is that the word really denotative of the *Generality* is applied to the *Individual*, by reason of either 'association' or 'connection.'

Vārṭika on Sū. (59).

[P. 316, L. 18 to P. 317, L. 17.]

"If the Individual is not denoted by the word 'cow,' how do you account for such expressions as 'that cow which is standing' and the like (enumerated in Sū. 57)?"

Our answer is that in actual usage we find that for certain reasons one thing is spoken of as another, even though it is not exactly the same as the latter,—says the ***Bhāṣya.***

To the question—"In what cases is anything found to be spoken of as another for certain reasons?"—the answer is given by the following *Sūṭra*—'*In the case of brāhmaṇa*' *&c.* (Sū. 59). ***What is meant by one thing being spoken of as another is that a thing is spoken of by means of a word which is not denotative of it***—says the ***Bhāṣya.*** For instance, as a matter of fact, the word 'stick' denotes a certain thing (a piece of wood), and yet, by reason of the 'association' of that thing with the Brāhmaṇa, the Brāhmaṇa comes to be spoken of by means of that word; as we find in the expression 'admit the sticks.' Similarly in all other cases (cited in the Sūṭra).

"What is the ground for this figurative or indirect application of words, as in the case of Brāhmaṇas being spoken of as 'sticks'? There can be no figurative application except for special reasons."

We have already said that 'association' is that reason.

"What is meant by the 'association' of the stick is that it is permanently related to (possessed or held by) the Brāhmaṇa; and in view of this the Brāhmaṇa should be spoken of as 'possessing or holding the stick'; and certainly such a term would be applicable to the Brāhmaṇa *directly* (and not *indirectly* or *figuratively*). Hence it is necessary for you to point out some other reason."

The word 'stick' is applied to the *stick* by reason of the particular Generality—that of 'stick'; this Generality subsists in the stick; and the Brāhmaṇa's connection with the stick, as related to that Generality, is due to association; so that when the Brāhmaṇa is spoken of as the 'stick,' there is imposed upon the Brāhmaṇa that Generality which subsists in the substance (stick) with which the Brāhmaṇa is connected. The grounds for the indirect application of the other words may be similarly traced.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (60).
[P. 123, L. 17 to P. 124, L. 4.]

(B.) [*The 'Configuration' theory is next put forward*]—
"If the Individual cannot form the denotation of the word "'Cow,' then—

"IT MAY BE THE '*Ākṛiti*,' '*Configuration*,' [THAT IS DENOTED BY THE WORD]; AS THE DETERMINING OF THE EXACT NATURE OF A THING IS DEPENDENT UPON THAT."—(Sū. 60.)

"*The Configuration of a thing must be what is denoted by*
"*the word* ('Cow'). Why? *Because the determining of the*
"*exact nature of a thing is dependent upon that.* The 'Con-
"figuration' of a thing consists in the particular disposition
"(or arrangement) of its component parts and of the compo-

"nent particles of those parts; and it is only when this has "duly recognised that the exact nature of the thing becomes "determined, as to its being a *cow* or a *horse*;—this determining not being possible until the Configuration of the "thing has been duly recognised; and the word can be taken "as denotative of only that the recognition whereof leads to "the determining of the exact nature of the thing spoken of."

[*The answer to this 'Configuration' theory is as follows]—This is not possible; because as a matter of fact, what happens is that a thing is spoken of as the 'cow', as being qualified by the Generality of 'cow', only when it is really related to that Generality; and certainly the 'disposition of component parts' is *not* related to the *Generality* †

"What then is it that *is* related to the Generality?" What is related to the *Generality* is the substance (or object) composed of a definitely arranged component particles. For these reasons we conclude that the 'Configuration' cannot be denoted by the word.

Vārtika on Sū. (60)

[P. 317, L. 19 to P. 318, L. 7.]

"If the word 'Cow' does not denote the Individual, then "the 'Configuration' must be regarded as denoted by it,—"because *the determining of the exact nature of a thing is dependent upon that*—says the Sūtra. The ascertainment of the "fact of a certain thing being a 'cow' or a 'horse' is possible "only through the 'Configuration' (of the thing concerned); "and that on which is dependent the ascertainment of the "exact nature of the Cow must be regarded as the denotation "of the word 'cow.'"

This 'Configuration' theory also is open to the same objection as that urged in Sū. 58 against the 'Individualistic' theory,—viz: *there could be no restriction* [no two cows can be regarded as having the same 'configuration']. As a matter of fact too, that alone can be the object denoted by the word

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* This answer, the *Bhāṣyachandra* remarks, is from the standpoint of the Individualist.

† As the postulating of such relation would involve an unnecessary multiplication of assumptions,—says the *Bhāṣyachandra*.

'cow' which is related to the particular Generality, and not the 'configuration', which has no relation to the Generality. "What is it that is related to the Generality?" What is related to it is the composite substance consisting of particles arranged in a certain manner;—that is to say, that in which the disposition of the component parts is of one definite kind; the compound '*niyaṭāvayavavyūha*' being expounded as a *Bahuvrihi* referring to something else, in the shape of the *composite substance.*

Bhāsya on Sū. (61).
[P. 124, L. 4 to L. 10.]

(C.) [*The 'Generality' theory is next put forward*]—

"In that case, it must be the Generality that is denoted by the "word 'cow.'

Sūṭra (61)

"INASMUCH AS THE 'WASHING' &c. (LAID DOWN AS TO BE DONE TO THE 'COW') CANNOT BE DONE TO THE 'COW' OF CLAY, EVEN THOUGH IT IS ENDOWED WITH INDIVIDUALITY AND CONFIGURATION,—IT MUST BE THE GENERALITY (THAT IS DENOTED BY THE WORD)."—(Sū. 61).

"It must be the Generality that is denoted by the word '('Cow').—Why so?—Because, even though the 'Cow made 'of clay' is endowed with the Individuality and the Config-'uration of the Cow, it is not possible to do to it the "'washing' or any such act. That is to say, we meet with 'such expresions as 'wash the cow', 'bring the cow', 'give 'the cow' and so forth; and certainly none of these can refer 'to the cow made of clay. And why? Simply because it is "not endowed with the Generality 'cow'; and yet the Individ-"uality and the Configuration are there. So that that, "by reason of whose absence the said actions are not ap-"plicable to the cow of clay, must be what forms the denota-"tion of the word 'cow'."

Vārṭika on Sū. (62).
[P. 318, Ll. 10 to P. 322, L. 18]

"*In that case it must be the Generality that is denoted,—in-*"*asmuch as the washing &c., &c.,*—says the Sūṭra. As a

" matter of fact, in the case of the *Clay-cow* it is found that " it is endowed with the Individuality and with the Configura- " tion, and yet the *washing &c.*, are not done to it; such " directions as 'bring the cow', 'give the cow' and the like " are never found to refer to, nor are they ever understood " as applying to, the Clay-cow; hence the conclusion is that " what is denoted by the word 'cow' is that by reason of " whose absence the said ideas do not apply to the Clay-cow. " 'What is that by reason of whose absence the ideas are not " applicable to the Clay-cow?' It is the Generality. 'But " why should the Generality of 'Cow' be said to be absent in " the Clay-cow?' For the simple reason that the Clay-cow " is not a cow at all; certainly that which is not a *cow*, can- " not have the Generality of 'Cow' subsisting in it; as we " find in the case of the Horse. 'But why should the Clay- " cow *not* be a cow?' It is not a *cow* for the simple reason " that it is a *Clay-cow*. Nor is it right to put the question " why the Clay-cow should not be a cow.—Why?—Because " it is precluded by actual experience; even you yourself must " admit that the Clay-cow is not a cow. And this universal " experience precludes any such question as has been put. " 'Then how is it that the word *cow* is actually applied to the " Clay-cow?' That is due to the similarity of form; just as " it is in the case of pictures [the picture of the cow is called " the 'cow' because of the similarity in shape]. But it is

Var: P. 319. " all-pervading.' What you mean is that 'the " Generality ('Cow') is all-pervading; so that it " is as much related to the Clay-cow as to the real live cow.' " But this is not right; as what you assert is not admitted. " Who is there who holds that Generality is all-pervading? " The fact of the matter is that when the Generality is said " to be *all-pervading*, all that is meant is that it pervades " over all *its own objects* [and *not* that it pervades over *all* " *things*]. 'But what is it that forms the *own object* for the " Generality *Cow*?' That wherein the Generality 'cow'

"subsists. 'Wherein does the Generality 'cow' subsist?' "It subsists in those things with regard to which there is a "comprehensive conception based upon the Generality 'cow.' "'In regard to what things does the Generality '*Cow*' bring "about the comprehensive conception?' It does so in regard "to that which is its cause (or means of accomplishment). "'But the Generality being eternal, what could be its *cause*?' "That is its *cause* by which it is manifested; for instance, "the Generality 'cow' is not manifested except through the "object (animal) possessed of the dewlap &c. [So that "it is this animal that constitutes the *own object* of the "Generality].

"Some people (objecting to the whole conception of "*Generality*) have held that there can be no such Generality "as 'Cow', apart from the individual objects; for no such "entity (extending over a number of objects) is ever found "in the space intervening between any two objects [and "certainly it should be so found if it extended over both "objects].

'But this is not right; *firstly* because none of the altern- "atives possible under this view can be accepted. That is to "say, when one asserts that 'the entity is not perceived in "the space intervening between the two objects',—he should "be asked to explain what he means by 'the space intervening "between two objects.' What is this intervening space? Is it "(*a*) *ākāsha* or (*b*) negation? or (*c*) something else? If it is "*ākāsha*, then, inasmuch as the *ākāsha* is not the *cow*, it is only "natural that the Generality 'Cow' should not be perceived "there. The same reasoning applies with equal force, if the "*intervening space* be explained as either 'negation' or 'some "other substance.' *Secondly*, as a matter of fact, definite "conceptions can never be entirely baseless; so that when "we have a definite conception (of Generality) apart from "the conception of individual objects, there must be some "basis for this conception, other than these objects; speci-

" ally as we find in the case of other conceptions that differ " from those of the individual objects, that they always pro- " ceed from causes other than those objects; *e. g.*, the con- " ception of 'blue' that we have in regard to a number of " objects,—a piece of cloth, a piece of skin and a blanket " (everyone of which is blue)—is based upon something distinct " from those objects themselves. 'But it is only due to " the similarity of Configuration'. If you mean by this that " —'what has been urged may be true,—it is true that the " comprehensive conception is based upon something distinct " from the individual objects,—but what we mean is that this " something upon which it is based is not *Generality*; the " comprehensive conception is based only upon that resem- " blance of Configuration which consists of the similarity of " head, hand and such other limbs',—our answer to this is " that this cannot be true; for the Configuration is as specific " (or peculiar to each Individual) as the individual object " itself. That is to say, just as one individual object does not " subsist in another individual object, so also the Configura- " tion that is present in one object cannot be present in any

Vār. P. 320.

" other object. If however it be held that the " Configuration that is present in it is also present " in other objects,—then the quarrel is only about names, " not about facts [what we call 'Generality' you call 'Con- " figuration'].

If you do not accept a Generality apart from the " individual objects, then,—inasmuch as you deny the exis- " tence of any single Generality (as subsisting in several " individual objects),—it behoves you to point out some " other basis for the comprehensive conception; for certainly, " in the absence of some sort of *Generality*, there can be no " comprehensive conception. 'But we do find compre- " hensive conceptions even in the absence of any sort of " Generality' What you mean is as follows:—'Though

" (according to the Logician himself) there can be no Generality in Generalities, yet we do have such comprehensive conception of 'Generality' in regard to all Generalities,— when, for instance, we speak of the *Generality* 'cow' as subsisting in the cow, [the Generality 'horse' as subsisting in horses; and so forth, several Generalities being spoken of as *Generality*]; which shows that the mere presence of comprehensive conceptions cannot be regarded as a valid ground for postulating the presence of something distinct from the individual objects.' But this is not true; as we do not accept what is here urged; that is to say, we do not admit that the comprehensive conception that there is in regard to the several Generalities of 'cow', 'horse', 'jar,' and the like are without a basis; hence the answer put forward is no answer at all. 'But this involves contradiction of the *Sūṭra*'. If you mean by this that— the view that there is Generality in Generalities is directly against the Vaishēṣika-sūṭra (5-8-1), which declares that there is no Generality in Generality, nor Individuality in Individuality',—we deny this; for it is clear that you have not understood the meaning of the Sūṭra. What the *Sūṭra* actually means is this:—The comprehensive conception of *substance* that there is in regard to substances is one that has the Generality of 'Substance' for its distinctive qualification, but such is not the case with Generalities and Individualities; [*i. e.*, in the case of comprehensive conceptions in regard to these latter, no Generality enters as the distinctive qualification]; and the Sūṭra does *not* mean that the comprehensive conception in regard to Generalities is without a basis. 'What then is the basis?' If by this question you mean that—'in regard to the comprehensive conception of the Generalities of *Cow* and the rest, what is the *basis*, by virtue of which all of them are conceived of as *Generality*',?—then what you want to know is—whence it is that several Generalities come to be conceived of as 'Genera-

" lity?'; and our answer is that it is due to the *congregation of* " *several entities*; just as the Generality 'Cow' is a congre- " gation of several entities (in the shape of the individual " Cows), in the same way, inasmuch as the several entities, " —in the shape of the several Generalities of 'horse', 'cow' " and the like,—congregate in what is conceived of as 'Gener- " alities', on the basis of this congregation of several entities, " there arises the comprehensive conception of 'Generality', in " regard to the several Generalities of the 'Cow' &c. 'But " this conception may be like the conception of *cook*.' What " you mean by this is as follows—'Just as such words as *cook* " and the like stand for comprehensive conceptions, and " yet there is no such Generality as *cook*, in the same manner " there may be a comprehensive conception in regard to " cows [without there being any Generalities at all].' But " this reasoning is not right; for it shows that you have " not quite understood the meaning of the reason we have " put forward above (*Text*, p. 319, L. 13). What is meant " by our assertion that, 'definite conceptions can never be " entirely baseless', is that the conception apart from that of " the individual objects must be due to other

Vār. P. 321.

" causes; and *not* that all comprehensive con- " ceptions must be based upon Generality. Such being our " meaning, what the word *cook* denotes is that which is the " predominant factor in the cause of the action of cooking; " and as this predominance belongs to all persons doing the " act of cooking, the term is applied to these others also; and " there is nothing incongruous in this.

[" The Opponent starts a fresh objection against the con- " ception of Generality]—'If the Generality of *Cow* subsists " in several individuals, does it subsist in its entirety in each " individual? or only partially [does the whole Generality " 'Cow' subsist in the individual cow? or only a part of " the Generality subsists in it?].' What are you driving at? " Well, if in each individual the Generality subsists *in its*

" *entirety*, then, this Generality becomes as specific and " peculiar to each Individuality as the individual itself, and as " such could not be a *Generality*. If on the other hand, it is " only parts of the Generality that subsist in individuals, " then it is not a case of *one* subsisting in *many*; in fact it " is a case of *many* (parts) subsisting in many (individuals). " All this shows that there must be *sections* of each Generality " (one section subsisting in one individual). Now the ques- " tion arises—the sections of Generality that subsist in each " individual, are these *generic* in their character or not? If " they are generic, then it becomes a case of *one* subsisting " in *one*; and it is not true to say that the Generality is " is that *one* which subsists in *many*. If on the other hand, " the sections are not generic, then the assertion that *sections* " *of Generality subsist in each individual* becomes meaningless. " Further, even with the sections the Generality remains " as before, and as such becomes open to the objections " urged before. There is no third alternative possible. " Hence the conclusion is that there is no such thing as " *Generality* subsisting in several things.'

" [The answer to the above argument against the con- " ception of *Generality* is as follows]—The above argument " has no force; because the alternatives put forward are not " admissible; that is to say, there can be no such alter- " natives as that the Generality 'cow' should subsist in each " individual either in its entirety or only in parts. And as " these alternatives are not admissible, the question (based " thereupon) has no footing. 'But why'? For the simple " reason that the Generality 'Cow' is not regarded as " a group or conglomeration of individual composites. " As a matter of fact, the Generality 'cow' is neither a " *composite* nor a *group*; and the term 'one part' is applicable " to either one member of a *group* or to one component of a " *composite*; when (in regard to a Group or a Composite) the " whole is meant to be spoken of, and nothing of it is meant

" to be excluded, then alone is the Composite referred to as " a 'whole' in relation to its components, and the group is " referred to as a 'whole' in relation to the members of that " Group; and as for the Generality 'Cow', which is neither a " Composite nor a Group,—in regard to this we cannot use " either the term 'whole' or the term 'a part'; and when " these terms are not applicable to it, it is not right to put " the question in the form—'does the Generality Cow subsist " *in its entirety or only in parts.*' And further, we

Vār: P. 322.

" have already pointed out that the question " under consideration cannot be put forward against the " person who holds that the one (Generality) subsists in the " many (Individuals). 'Why?' Because there is self-con- " tradiction both ways.*

" [Being thus baffled, the Opponent asks]—'In what way " then does the Generality *Cow* subsist in the individual " cow?'

" It subsists in these by the relation of container and con- " tained. 'What is this relation *of container and contained*?' " It is the relation of *Inherence*; and the Generality 'Cow' " subsists by this relation of Inherence; we have already " explained that 'subsistence' means 'inherence',—forming " as it does the basis of the conception of one thing abiding " *in another.*

" 'In that case, there can be no such thing as the Generality " *Cow*; as such a thing could not *subsist* either in the *Cow* or

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* This 'contradiction both ways' is thus explained in the *Tātparya*—If the question means that—'when the one subsists in the many, does it subsist in its entirety or only in parts,'—then in the former case—*i. e.*, if it subsists in its entirety, then it becomes a case of the *many* subsisting in the many, each entire thing being a separate entity; and this goes directly against the very basis of the discussion. On the other hand, if the one subsisting in the many were to subsist in parts only, even that would not be a case of one subsisting in many; this also would be a case of many subsisting in many. So that both alternatives of the question are incompatible with the initial hypothesis that one subsists in many.

This has been pointed out in the *Vārṭika* in course of its treatment of the *Composite Whole.*

" in the *non-cow'*. Apparently what you mean is as follows " —'The Generality *Cow* which is held to be the basis " of the comprehensive conception of Cows,—does it " subsist in the *Cow* or in the *non-cow*? *If it subsists in the* " *Cow*, then this means that the *Cow* is a *Cow* even without " the subsistence of the Generality *Cow*; so that the postu- " lating of the Generality is absolutely futile. If, on the " other hand, it subsists in the *non-cow*, then the Horse and " other animals also (being *non-cow*) would have this " Generality *Cow* subsisting in them, and thus be liable to " be regarded as *Cow*! There is no third alternative possible " in the case. Hence the conclusion is that the comprehensive " conception in question cannot be based upon the Generality " *Cow*'.

" There is no force in this contention; as the alternatives " put forward are not accepted. As a matter of fact, the " Generality 'Cow' subsists neither in the *Cow* nor in the *non-* " *cow*; that is to say, before the Generality *Cow* comes in, the " thing is neither a *Cow*, nor a *non-cow*. Why? Because " both these conceptions (of the *Cow* and the *non-cow*) refer to " *qualified* things; and a conception of the qualified thing " is not possible until the *qualification* is there; and in the " case in question prior to its connection with the Genera- " lity 'Cow', the thing itself (the animal concerned) does not " exist at all; and that which does not exist cannot be " spoken of either as 'Cow' or as 'non-cow'; and whenever " the thing is there it is connected with the Generality " 'Cow'. Thus there is no room for the alternatives put " by the Opponent.

" This same reasoning also meets the objection based " upon the question as to whether the '*connection of being*' " (*saṭṭā*) is with what exists or with what does not exist. " As a matter of fact, the '*connection of being*' is neither " with an *existing* thing nor with a *non-existent* thing; when-

"ever the thing *exists* it is connected with 'being'; so that "there is no room for the objection based upon the question "of the connection subsisting in *existent* or *non-existent* "things.

"From all this it follows that there is such a thing as "*Generality*. And as this Generality of 'Cow' does not "subsist in the *Clay-cow*,—this is the thing by reason of "whose absence the Clay-cow is not regarded as 'Cow', and "hence this is what must be taken as denoted by the word "'Cow'."

[*Refutation of the 'Generality' theory.**]

Sūṭra (62).

THIS ALSO CANNOT BE ACCEPTED; BECAUSE (AS A MATTER OF FACT) THE MANIFESTATION (OR RECOGNITION) OF THE 'GENERALITY' IS DEPENDENT UPON 'CONFIGURATION' AND 'INDIVIDUALITY'. (Su. 62).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (62).

[P. 125, L. 1 to L. 2.]

As a matter of fact, the manifestation (or recognition) of the Generality depends upon Configuration and Individuality. That is, unless the Individuality and the Configuration have been apprehended, there is no apprehension of the *Generality*, purely by itself. Hence the Generality (by itself) cannot constitute the denotation of a word.

Vārṭika on Sū. (62).

[P. 322, L. 20 to P. 323, L. 4.]

This also cannot be accepted &c., &c.—says the Sūṭra. The recognition of the Generality depends upon the Configuration and the Individuality. The proper form of the compound would be '*vyakṭyākṛiṭi*' (by reason of '*vyakṭi*' being the shorter term); but the order of terms has been altered in consideration of the fact that of the two the *Configuration* (*Ākṛiṭi*)' is the more important. "What is it that con-

* This says the *Bhāṣyachandra*, is from the standpoint of the Philosopher according to whom the 'Individual qualified by the Generality' is what is denoted by the Word.

stitutes the greater importance of the Configuration?" It consists in the fact that the Individuality is
Vār. P. 323.
the qualification of the Configuration. Inasmuch as the Configuration qualified by the Individuality becomes indicative of the Generality, it follows that the Configuration is the more important of the two.

As a matter of fact, unless the Configuration and the Individuality have been apprehended, no word ever provides the apprehension of the Generality, purely by itself. Hence the conclusion is that the Generality by itself cannot form the denotation of the word.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (63).

[P. 125, L. 2 to L. 9 .]

* But with all this, it is not possible that the word has no denotation at all; so the question arises—what *is* the denotation of the word? [The answer is given in the next Sūṭra].

(D). [*The Final Siddhānta View of 'Composite' Denotation*].

Sūṭra (63).

IN REALITY THE INDIVIDUAL, THE CONFIGURATION AND THE GENERALITY—(ALL THREE) CONSTITUTE THE DENOTATION OF THE WORD.—(SŪ. 63).

The term '*ṭu*', in reality; serves the purpose of emphasis. "What is it that is emphasised?" What is meant to be emphasised is that all the three are denoted by words,—there being no hard and fast rule as to which one is the predominant and which the subordinate factor. For instance, when there is (on the part of the person pronouncing the word) a desire to lay stress upon the difference (of a thing from others)—and when the cognition brought about is also one pertaining to the distinctive features of that thing—then the 'Individual' forms the predominant factor (in the denotation of that word), and the 'Generality' and the 'Configuration' are subordinate factors; † when, on the other hand, the

* This serves to introduce the final *Siddhānta*,—says the *Bhāṣyachandra*.

† When, for instance, we say 'the cow is standing.'—*Bhāṣyachandra*.

difference is not meant to be emphasised,—and the resultant cognition also pertains to the commonalities,—then the 'Generality' is the predominant factor,* and the 'Individual' and the 'Configuration' are subordinate factors. Many instances (of such varying predominance and subservience) may be found in actual usage. An example of the predominance of 'Configuration' may also be found.†

Vārtika on Sū. (63).

[P. 323, L 4 to P. 334, L. 13.]

Notwithstanding all that has been said, Words cannot be absolutely without denotation. What then is it that is denoted by the word? What is denoted by the word are Individuality, Configuration and Generality.

The term 'tu' serves the purpose of emphasis.—What is it that is emphasised?—Waht is meant to be emphasised is that all the three are denoted by words, there being no hard and fast rule as to which is the predominant and which the subordinate factor.—For instance, when there is a desire to lay stress upon the difference of a thing, and the cognition brought about is one pertaining to the distinctive features of that thing,—e. g., in the case of such expressions as 'the cow is standing', 'the cow is seated,'—it is the Individual that is denoted by the word ('Cow'), the Configuration and the Generality being only subordinate factors; and [the reason why the Individual is held to be denoted lies in the fact that] the *standing* and *sitting* spoken of are not applicable to either the Generality or to the Configuration; and hence that to which these are applicable is naturally taken to be what is denoted by the word. When, on the other hand, the *difference* of a thing is not meant to be emphasised,—and the cognition pertains to its *commonalties*,—then the Generality is what is denoted by the

* When, for instance, we say 'the cow is eternal'—*Bhāṣyachandra.*

† When, for instance, one says 'make Cow of flour'—where the configuration of the cow is what is meant by the word 'cow.'

The *Tātparya* has a long note against the view that—of Generality and Individuality, only one is directly denoted, the other is only indirectly indicated.

word; *e. g.* in the expression 'the cow should not be touched with the foot.' *An example of the predominance of Configuration may also found*,—i. e., by the student himself.

"But in what case is the Configuration found to be the predominant factor (in the denotation of a word)?"

This is found in the expression 'make the cows of rice-flour.' Many such instances, of one or the other of the three being the predominant factor, may be found in ordinary usage.

Some persons [the *Bauḍḍhas*, who hold the denotation of words to consist in '*Apoha*' or 'negation of the contrary'] raise the following objections (against the *Nyāya* theory, propounded in this Sūṭra, 63]—

"The Individual, the Configuration and the Generality "cannot constitute the denotation of words; because none "of the alternatives possible is admissible.

"We proceed with the discussion, taking for example the "case of the word '*saṭ*', 'Being', on account of its having the "widest extension. Let us consider then, whether the word "'*Being*' denotes (A) a Generality, or (B) an object, or (C) a "particular relation, or (D) something (an Individual) endowed "with the Generality.'

"(A) Now, the word Being,' '*Saṭ*', cannot denote a Generality; because we find it taking the same case-endings "as words with exclusive denotations; if the word '*saṭ*' "denotes a Generality (which must be *inclusive, comprehensive*), it cannot be coextensive with (*i. e.* take the "same case ending as) the word 'substance', '*ḍravya*', which "has an *exclusive* denotation [denoting as it does substance, *as distinguished from quality and other things*]'—as it is found "to do in such expressions as '*saṭ ḍravyam*'; for the "simple reason that we never meet with such co-ordination "between words with totally diverse denotations.*

*If the word "'*saṭ*' denotes Generality, this Generality must be the widest conceivable, the *summum genus*; which must be *all-inclusive*.

" It might be argued that—the word '*sat*' can be co-extensive with such words as '*dravya*' and the like, by virtue of the fact that *sattā* (the Generality denoted by the word '*sat*') subsists in *Dravya* and such things.—But in that case '*sattā* would be subsisting in something else (and having no independent existence) and as such it should be regarded as a *Quality*; and certainly we never find a word denoting a substance with quality taking the same case-ending as (being co-extensive with) a word denoting a quality; for instance, we have the phrase '*shaṅkhasya shauklyam*' [where the word '*shaṅkha*', denoting the *white conch-shell*, has a case-ending entirely different from that taken by the word '*shauklyam*', denoting *whiteness*].

Vār: P. 324.

" (B) The same reasonings serve to dispel the notion that the word *sat* denotes a particular *relation*.

" (C) Nor will it be right to accept the view that the word '*sat*' denotes diverse individuals or *objects*; because such objects are endless (innumerable), and it is not possible to conceive of a single word being related to (expressive of) a multiplicity of things in the shape of Substances and Qualities; and unless some such relation between the word and its denotation has been conceived of (or determined), no cognition of the denoted thing can proceed from the word. And further, if the word were held to be expressive of the particular forms of objects, it would give rise to an anomaly [of the word expressive of the form of one object being applied to other objects]; specially as when one hears the word '*sat*' pronounced, the cognition resulting from it is one that is wavering or uncertain in its character, as pertaining to Substances, Qualities and Actions [all three of which are believed to be possessed of the Generality of *Sattā* denoted by the word '*sat*']; and certainly a denotation that gives rise to a wavering cognition cannot be accepted as the right denotation. From all this it follows that the word '*sat*' cannot be denotative of particular *objects*.

" (D) Nor lastly can the word '*saṭ*' be denotative of only " *that which is endowed with the Generality.* Why? Because " *it is not independent.* That is to say, as a matter of fact " the word '*saṭ*' does not produce any cognition of the Jar " and other things endowed with the Generality of *Saṭṭā*; " so that inasmuch as the word does not signify these " particular things, it should not take the same case-end- " ing (as words signifying those things) [*i. e.*, we cannot " have such expressions as '*san ghaṭaḥ*.'] Or, when we say " that the word '*saṭ*' *is not independent*, what we mean is " as follows:—The word *saṭ* primarily denotes *saṭṭā*, *Being*.; " and while denoting that, it is applied indirectly or secon- " darily to that which is possessed of *Being*;* and certainly " when a word, while denoting one thing, is indirectly appli- " ed to something else, it cannot be regarded as *denotative* " of this latter; for instance, the word '*mañcha*', 'platform' " [when applied figuratively to the man on the plat- " form, is not regarded as *denoting* the man]. Then again, " further reasons have already been pointed out by us. " 'What has been pointed out?' We have already pointed " out that, inasmuch as the number of things possessed of " *Being* is endless, they cannot be held to be denoted by the " word '*saṭ*'†. Nor will it be right to urge that—'the " conception (of the Generality) is transferred to *the thing* " *endowed with Generality*,—either by virtue of the *similarity* " *of properties*, as is found to be the case when the word " 'master' is applied (by transference) to the servant,—or " by virtue of the *transmission or reflection of properties*, as " is found to be the case when the crystal is called 'blue.'‡

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* सद्गुणपर्यवे is the right reading.

† So that the word '*saṭ*' cannot denote the individual things, independently of the Generality of 'Being.'

‡ The servant is called the 'Master' when he is found to be possessed of the Qualities of the Master; the Crystal is called *blue* when the blue colour of the flower is transmitted to it. There is no such similarity or transmission of properties of the *Generality* in the *thing endowed with Generality*; hence the word expressive of the former cannot even indirectly be applied to the latter.

" Further, in the case in question, there is no sequence in " the conceptions [*i. e.*, the conception of the Individual does " not follow *after* that of the Generality; as is often found to " be the case of indirect signification, when the indirect mean- " ing is cognised *after* the direct one has been cognised, and " found incompatible]; and it is absolutely impossible for " the two to appear simultaneously [as no two cognitions " can ever appear at one and the same time]. Lastly, [if " the cognition of the Individual were due to the transmis- " sion or reflection of the properties of the Generality], the " cognition would only be a *wrong* one [just like the cognition of " *blue* in regard to the crystal]. From all this it follows that " words cannot denote *things endowed with Generality.*

" Nor will it be right to hold that the words denote the " *specific individuality* of a thing; as if they did so, then " the word could not be applied to any other thing except " one [and further because no convention could be made in " regard to *specific individualities*].

" Now as there is no other alternative possible (in regard " to the denotation of the word '*sat*')—we conclude that " what the word does is to bring about *Apoha*; that is to say, " a word is said to *denote* something when it is found to " bring about, in its denotation, the exclusion or negation " of what is denoted by other words."*

Our answer to the above *Bauddha* objections is as follows:—We have already proved that Individual, Configuration and Generality, all three, are denoted by the word,—there being no hard and fast rule as to which of these is the predominant and which the subordi-

Vār. P. 326.

* The right reading of this passage appears to be—अन्यशब्दार्थापोहं स्वार्थे कुर्वती श्रुतिः...... specially in view of this being referred to later on, P. 331, L. 19, in the words—यदु कुर्वन्तु अन्यशब्दार्थापोहे.यः शब्द.र्थ इति: and the same passage being quoted again, on P. 334, L. 2, as—अन्यशब्दार्थापोहं स्व यं कुर्वती श्रुतिरभिधत्ते इत्युच्यते

nate factor. And the objections that have been urged (by the Bauḍḍha) may be applicable only against one who holds *one* of the three only to be denoted by the word.*

As a matter of fact however, the objections are no objections at all (*i. e.*, they are not effective against any theory). "How so?"

(A) Well, the first argument put forward by the Bauḍḍha is "that '*saṭṭā-shabḍa*', '*saṭṭā-word*', does not denote *saṭṭā*, *Being*." Now this is not right; as it involves a self-contradiction. The assertion that "the '*saṭṭā word*' does not denote *saṭṭā* or *Being*" involves a contradiction in terms.†

When the word '*saṭṭā*' does not denote the *saṭṭā*, how can it be called the 'word for *saṭṭā*'? "It is from your standpoint that we call it *the word for saṭṭā*." Your meaning is as follows:—"In accordance with our doctrines, there are no such terms as '*word for saṭṭā*,' and the like; but under

* For us words denote all the three—predominance belonging in some cases to one and in other cases to the other. If the word denotes the Individual endowed with the Generality,—this is not open to the objection based upon the two kinds of 'want of independence' urged by the Bauḍḍha; for it is not true that before they can bring about the cognition of the Individual, words must bring about the cognition of the Generality. Nor is the wavering of Cognitions necessarily objectionable; for in the case of doubtful cognitions—when a man sees something from a distance and has doubts as to the exact nature of the thing—even though the cognition is a wavering one, it does not preclude the validity of the perception that the man has (of something). Nor can the application of the word to the Individual be regarded as 'figurative' or 'indirect'; for we call that 'indirect usage' where a thing is spoken of by means of a word other than its own name; while in the case in question, according to our view the *word denoting the generality* is not 'other' than the word denoting the *Individual*; as the same word denotes both; and inasmuch as the word denoting the Generality (*saṭ*) and the word denoting the *Individual* both denote practically the same thing, there is nothing incongruous in both taking the same case-ending.—*Ṭāṭparya.*

† The compound '*saṭṭā-shabḍa*' can only mean one of two things.—(1) 'the word for saṭṭā', or (2) 'the word in the form of *saṭṭā*.' If it means the former, it involves a self-contradiction to say that 'the *word for saṭṭā*—i. e., the word expressive of *saṭṭā*—does not denote the *saṭṭā*.' If it means (2), then also there is self-contradiction in the phrase 'does not denote *saṭṭā*'; for you deny that the word '*saṭṭā*' denotes the *saṭṭā*, and yet in the phrase mentioned you are yourself using the word '*saṭṭā*' as denoting *saṭṭā*!—*Ṭāṭparya.*

your theory, opeartions are carried on by the assumption of such terms as '*word for saṭṭā*', 'words for Substance, Qualities, Actions' and so forth; and hence we also, in due accord with your views, give utterance to such terms as 'word for *saṭṭā*.'*" But this is not right; as even so the self-contradiction does not cease. What has to be considered by both of us is the question—'to what things are the well-known words, *saṭ* and the rest, applicable? What we say is that the word for *saṭṭā* applies to *saṭṭa*; while you say—'the word for *saṭṭā* is not applicable to *saṭṭā*'; and saying thus you are met by us, who urge that this assertion of yours involves self-contradiction; and without clearing yourself of this charge of 'self-contradiction', you simply say 'I am saying this, in accordance with your theory;'—and you do not, in this manner, escape from the 'self-contradiction.'† You might say that—"it is by you that words for *saṭṭā*, &c., have been assumed [and when we comprehend these, we do so simply for denying them; so that we do not in any way compromise ourselves." But this also will not be right; as you cannot say what is the exact subject of the assumption; that is to say, when a certain thing is not exactly the same as another thing, and yet there is some similarity between the two, if there is, in reference to the former thing, the cognition of the latter thing [*i. e.*, the former thing is conceived of as the latter], by reason of the fact of the properties of the latter having been imposed upon the former,—this is what forms the subject of 'assumption'; ‡ for instance, one assumes the *man*

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* The right reading is वाच्य अभ्युपैमः as in the Benares edition.

† Our view is that the word for *saṭṭā* denotes *saṭṭā*; and if you say anything according to this view, you understand our view; and if you do so, you comprehend the meaning of this term used by us. So that if you call these terms non-expressive, you stultify yourself.

‡ There are two things, post and man. The post is not the same as man, and yet it is similar to it in certain respects; when one sees the post, and imposes upon it the properties of the man, he conceives of it as *man*; and this is called the 'assumption' of 'man'.

in the *post*;—now if the words in question are 'assumed', it behoves you to point out the primary basis underlying this assumption; for certainly there can be no 'assumption' without a primary basis.

(B) The second argument urged by the Bauḍḍha (on P. 883, L. 18) against the word '*saṭ*' being denotative of Generality is the fact of the word '*saṭ*' being co-extensive with,—*i. e.*, taking the same case-ending as—words with exclusive denotation (like 'Substance' &c.). This also is not right; for apparently it shows that the arguer does not know the meaning of '*sāmānāḍhikaraṇya*', 'co-extensiveness', ('taking the same case-ending'). We do not say that the word for *saṭṭā* is 'co-extensive, with the word for substance; what we do say is that Substances, Qualities and Actions are denoted by the word '*sat*', which is expressive of that which is the principal manifester of *saṭṭā* or Being.*

Vār: P. 326. And the words 'Quality' and 'Action' † also denote the same Substances, Qualities and Actions as qualifying one another. Such being the case, it is only right that the words '*saṭ*' and '*ḍravyam*' should be co-extensive, pertaining as they do to one and the same thing (Substance). When however the word '*saṭṭā*' is used with special reference to *saṭṭā*, the character of *being* or *existing* (and not to Substance &c.), and as such signifies the subordinate factor of the *character*,—then, in that case, there is of course no co-extensiveness (with the word denoting *substance*); so that in this latter ca e we have the expression '*ḍravyasya saṭṭā*', 'the being or existence of the Substance'. Thus we see that the impossibility of co-extensiveness is not an effective objection against us.

* The word '*saṭ*' denotes the *existing thing*; and this thing is the *principal manifester* of *Being* or *Existence*; while the word '*saṭṭā*' denotes only the comparatively subordinate factor, the *character of being*; and hence the word '*saṭṭā* can never be co-extensive with the word denoting substance. We say '*saṭ ḍravyam*', and not '*saṭṭā ḍravyam*'.

† The right reading appears to be [illegible]गुणकर्मशब्दौ: in place of द्रव्यगुणकर्मशब्दौ:

This same reasoning also serves to set aside the following argument—"There can be no co-extensiveness between the word '*saț*' and '*dravyam*', because as a rule the word denoting a substance with a quality must take an ending other that taken by the word denoting the quality."*

This same explanation applies to the case of *Relation* (to which the Opponent has objected on P. 324, L. 3). "How so?" The *relation* is denoted not by the word '*saț*', but by relative-words. Relation is a quality, while the word '*saț*' is not a qualitative word; nor can there be coextentiveness between a qualitative word and a word denoting substance.

It has further been urged by the Opponent (on P. 324, 4, *et. seq.*) that—"on account of the endless number of diverse individuals, these cannot be denoted by any word expressive of Generality". But who says that words denoting Generalities do denote diverse Individuals? In fact you are denying an assertion that you have yourself conjured up †

"If words expressive of Generality do not‡ denote diverse individuals, then how does the word '*saț*' come to denote Substance, Quality and Action?"

But, Sir, the word '*saț*' is *not* a word expressive of Generality; in fact it is a word expressive of diverse individuals; and there is nothing incongruous in diverse individuals being denoted by words expressive of diverse individuals. "But how can there be no incongruity? The incongruity still remains that while the word '*saț*' is one only, the number of diverse individuals is endless; and certainly the relation of the one word to the many (individuals) cannot be determined; and until this relation is determined, the word cannot provide the cognition of the individual things concerned." There

* This verse is apparently a quotation from the work of a Bauḍḍha writer.

† The *Tāṭparya* reads अभूतं for अद्भुतं

‡ A न here is essential.

is no force in this objection; as the word '*sat*' does not denote the mere individuals *by themselves*. The objection you have urged may be effective against one who asserts that 'the word '*sat*' denotes Substance, Quality and Action in their unqualified form'; as for our ourselves, we hold that what are denoted by the word '*sat*' are Substance, Quality and Action *as qualified by sattā or Being*; one applies the word '*sat*' to things in which he perceives *sattā*; and certainly *sattā* is one only, the same conception pervading through all (*sat* things); hence the endlessness of the number of diverse individuals does not affect our position at all. Further, what sort of reasoning is this, that you put forward?—You make the '*Word*' the *Subject* [your proposition being '*word* is not expressive &c. &c.'], while you put up as your Probans, '*endlessness*,' which abides in the *things* (denoted) [and not in the *Subject* at all]. If (with a view to remove this discrepancy) you have for your 'Subject,' the 'diverse individuals themselves', with regard to which you seek to prove the fact of their not being denotable by words expressive of Generality [*i.e.* if you put forward your Proposition in the form—'diverse individuals are not denotable by words expressive of Generality'],—then you can have no corroborative Examples,* either positive or negative; hence 'because of endlessness' cannot be a valid Probans (in the proving of your proposition). If (in order to avoid this difficulty) you have only *some* (diverse individuals) for your 'subject', 'endlessness' for your 'Probans,' and the other (individuals) for your 'example', - this also will not be right; as this would lead to an absurd contingency; inasmuch as, according to this view nothing could be *denoted*, and no word

Var. P. 327.

* You cannot state the Example in the form 'all that is endless is incapable of being denoted by words expressive of Generality'; because you have included *all* 'diverse individuals' in your Proposition, which leaves none that could form the Example. Nor can you put the example in the form 'what is denoted by words expressive of Generality is not found to be endless'; as the very conception of 'generality' is baseless, under your theory.—*Tātparya*.

would be *denotative*; and the entire phenomena of denoстation—the whole relation of *denoter and denoted*—having thus ceased, any specification would be meaningless —such, for instance, as '*these* words are denotative and *these* things are not denoted.'*

The next argument put forward by the *Bauḍḍha* (on P. 324, L. 6) is that the theory (that words denote diverse individuals) would "give rise to an anomaly." And this also is not right; as *firstly* it shows that the exact meaning of 'anomaly' '*vyabhichāra*,' is not known to you: that (term or character) is regarded as *anomalous*, *too wide*, which, while applying to its own object and other cognate things, subsists in other things also; and certainly the '*word sat*' does not apply to anything other than its own object (when it denotes the diverse individuals); hence it is clear that the urging of 'anomalousness' is altogether irrelevant: *Secondly*, *Saṭṭā* has not been put forward as a 'probans'; who has ever put forward any such reasoning as—'Substance, Quality, Action, *because of sattā*'? For this reason also what has been urged (by the Opponent) is not right."†

Further, having denied the fact of the word ('*saṭ*') denoting the diverse individuals, you cannot speak of 'coextensiveness between the words *saṭ* and *ḍravya*'; as such a statement would involve contradiction in terms.‡ For (under your theory) no word can be expressive of *substance*;

* If diverse individuals cannot be denoted, there is nothing that can be denoted; there being nothing apart from 'individuals.'—*Ṭāṭparya.*

† Vyabhichāra is a defect of Probans; and in the cognition of things, Word is not a 'probans'; 'vyabhichāra' does not vitiate any and every means of cognition; for instance, the Visual organ apprehends the *blue* colour, as also other colours.

‡ On P. 323, L 19, the Opponent admits that there is coextensiveness between the word *saṭ* and the word for substance; which, he has urged, is not possible under the Nyāya view. The *Siḍḍhānṭin* now retorts that, the denotation of diverse individuals having been denied by the objector, no word can denote *substance*; hence there can be no 'word for substance'; to make use, therefore, of the term 'word for substance' involves a contradiction in terms.

hence the expression 'coextensiveness between the word *saṭ* and the *word for substance*' must involve a contradiction in the terms.

The Bauddha has argued (P. 324 L. 10, above) that—"the word '*saṭ*' cannot be denotative of *that which is endowed with the Generality*; because it is not independent; that is to say, as a matter of fact, the word '*saṭ*' does not produce any cognition of the Jar and other things endowed with the Generality of *Saṭṭā*; so that, inasmuch as the word does not signify those particular things, it should not take the same case-ending as words signifying those things." This also is not right; as it has already been answered. We have already given our answer to this argument (on P. 326, L. 2), when we pointed out that 'it is only right that the word *saṭ* and *ḍravyam* should be co-extensive (take the same case-ending), pertaining as they do to one and the same thing.' Further, it is not quite right to say that "the word *saṭ* does not produce the cognition of the Jar and other things endowed with the Generality of *saṭṭā*";—because as a matter of fact, the word '*saṭ*' does signify *Substance, Quality and Action*, which are the principal (manifesters) of *Saṭṭā* or *Being*. It may be true that Substance, Quality and Action are not denoted by the word '*saṭṭā*'; but the same cannot be said of the word '*saṭ*.' * In fact we may assert that the word '*saṭṭā*' also denotes Substance, Quality and Action, *as subordinate factors* [even though it cannot denote them as *principal* factors]. The word '*saṭ*' is an expressive or denotative † word; now what is it that is denoted by it? That alone can be regarded as *denoted* by it the cognition whereof proceeds from that word.

Var. P. 328.

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* This appears to be simple meaning of this sentence; but the *Tāṭparya* has a somewhat different interpretation—[illegible] But from what follows the interpretation adopted in the translation appears to be simpler. There may however be something defective in the reading.

† The right reading is [illegible]: in place of [illegible].

What is that? What is denoted by it is threefold, as thus analysed (in the *Vaishēṣika-Sūṭra* 1-2-4-9)—(*a*) '*saṭṭā*, the *summum genus* [Var. Sū. 1-2-4]—(*b*) the connection or presence of *saṭṭā*, Existence (by virtue of which Substance &c., are regarded as *saṭ*) [Var. Sū. 1-2 7],—and (*c*) other things, (beyond Substance, Quality and Action) (Var. Sū. 1-2-8). And when we come to consider which of these is the *principal* and which the *subordinate* factor (in the denotation), we find that the principal factor is that which is the efficient indicative or manifester (related to Effects, and which, as such serves to render the *Saṭṭā* manifest or perceptible) [and this is the *Substance*], while *saṭṭā* itself and its connection are subordinate factors. "But on what does this predominant or subordinate character depend?" It depends upon the effects produced; whenever *Saṭṭā* brings about an effect, it does so through a particular thing (by itself, it cannot do anything); so that this *thing* is regarded as the *principal* and *Saṭṭā* itself as the *subordinate* factor; specially as *Saṭṭā* serves to bring about the cognition of the principal thing,—this thing being qualified by the *Saṭṭā*, and also because as a rule when the subordinate factor is absent, the thing is not cognised as before; and in the case in question we find that when the subordinate factor, in the shape of *Saṭṭā* is absent, the thing is not cognised as '*saṭ*'. From all this it follows that it is not right to assert (as the *Bauḍḍha* has done) that—"the word *saṭ* does not bring about the cognition of the Jar and other things endowed with the Generality of *saṭṭā*."

Another argument put forward by the *Bauḍḍha* (on P. 324, L. 12) is that—"the word '*saṭ*' primarily denotes *Saṭṭā*,—Being, and while denoting that, it is applied indirectly or secondarily to that which is possessed of Being." This also is not right; as it shows that the Opponent is ignorant of the signification of the word '*saṭ*'; apparently you do not know the signification of the word '*saṭ*'. Who says that the

word '*sat*' primarily signifies *Saṭṭā*; in fact what the word '*sat*' signifies are *Substance*, *Quality* and *Action*, by virtue of the fact that these latter are the manifesters of *Saṭṭā* or Being; this we have already explained.

What we have said above (in regard to the three-fold denotation of the word '*sat*') also serves to set aside the objection based upon the 'endlessness' of the diverse individual objects (on P. 324, L. 15). For what the word '*sat*' denotes is the *manifester of Saṭṭā*; and certainly the *manifester of Saṭṭā*, as such, is one only (and not 'endless').

A further objection urged by the *Bauḍḍha* (on P. 324, Ll. 15—16) is that—"the conception of *Generality* cannot be transferred to *the thing endowed with the Generality* by virtue of the similarity of properties, as is found to be the case when the word 'master' is applied, by transference, to the *servant*."—What this means is that the word 'master' is applied to the servant, by reason of the latter resembling the former; but we do not understand how there is any 'transference of conception' in this case. If it is meant that the servant comes to cognised as the 'master',—this certainly is not a 'transference of conception'; for the conception of the master does not go over to the servant; all that happens is that when one finds the servant to be grave and agreeable (like the master), he applies to him the word 'master' in its indirect or figurative sense. "What we mean is that in this case, the servant being found to resemble the Master, the word 'master' is applied to him indirectly or secondarily; but so far as the word '*saṭṭā*' is concerned, it is never found to be so applied to Substance, &c."—But,

Var. P. 329. when the term '*saṭṭā*' stands for *the character of existing things*, (and not for the Generality), then in that case, the *existing things* do come to be (indirectly) signified by the word '*saṭṭā*', as qualifications and hence subordinate factors; and in this case the fact of their being qualifications forms the basis of the secondary signification.

This same explanation also serves to refute what the Opponent has said (on P. 324, L. 17) as to the secondary application of the term '*sat*' not being possible by virtue of reflection either, as is found to be the case when the crystal is called *blue*.

The Opponent has argued (on P. 324, L. 17) that—"there is no sequence in the conceptions, and it is absolutely impossible for the two to appear simultaneously."—The sense of this objection is as follows—"What appears to be the idea (of the Siddhāntin, when he says that the word '*saṭṭā*' is applied indirectly or secondarily to things possessed of *Saṭṭā*) is that the word '*saṭṭā*', having, in the first instance, become applied to *Saṭṭā*, comes subsequently to be applied *to things possessed of Saṭṭā*;—but as a matter of fact we do not perceive any such order of sequence. Nor is it possible for the two applications to be simultaneous; for the cognition of *Saṭṭā* and the cognition of *substance* do not appear at the same time."—There is no force in this objection either; as it has already been answered; we have already given the answer (on P. 325, L. 15) that there is, in this case, neither *sequence* nor *simultaneity*; the cognition *Saṭṭā* itself pertaining to its *manifester* [*i.e.*, *substance*, &c.; so that both *Saṭṭā* and *Substance* being comprehended in the same cognition, the ques-question as to sequence or simultaneity does not arise at all].

* This also serves to set aside the objection (urged on P. 324, L. 19) that—"the cognition of the Substance (if analogous to the cognition of the *blue* in the crystal) would only be a wrong one."

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* This objection is demolished by our explanation just given that the word '*saṭ*' denotes the *Substance as possessed of Saṭṭā*. The cognition of blue in the crystal is regarded as wrong, because the crystal is in reality purely white, and the blue colour is only superimposed upon it, and does not really subsist in it. This is not the case with regard to *Saṭṭā*; the *Saṭṭā* does really subsist in the *Substance*, and is not merely superimposed upon it *ab extra*. Hence the cognition in this latter case cannot be regarded as *wrong*.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

Thus then, inasmuch as we have demolished the entire series of wrong arguments (put forward by the Opponent), it becomes established that '*the Individual, the Configuration and the Generality, constitute the denotation of the word.*'

[Having defended his own position against the attack of the *Bauḍḍha Apohist*, the Author next proceeds to point out positive flaws in the arguments propounded by the Opponent]—

(1) The *Bauḍḍha* has made the statement that "the *word for Generality* cannot denote diverse individuals."—Now in this statement the qualification (of 'word' as 'word for Generality') is useless; for there is no word at all which is accepted by you to be expressive of diverse individuals; it is only when the unqualified thing is there, and there is also a general cognition in regard to it,—that the qualification comes in useful (for the purpose of specialising that general cognition); in the case in question however there is no unqualified thing; nor do you accept anything to be denotable by 'words for Generality'; hence it follows that the qualifying term in your statement is absolutely useless.*

(2) The said statement also involves a contradiction. If the 'word for Generality' did denote diverse individuals, it would, on that same account, cease to be a 'word *for Generality*'; as words expressive of one thing are not regarded as words for other things; how then could a word expressive of diverse individuals be called a 'word for Generality'?

(3) When you say that "the word for Generality is not expressive of diverse individuals",—you say what is quite true; for what man in his senses ever regards diverse in-

* If certain words did express diverse individuals,—or if 'words for Generality' did express anything at all,—then alone would a qualification be called for; as neither of the conditions are present for the Opponent, the use by him of the qualifying term has no sense at all.

dividuals to be expressible by 'words for Generality'? If they are expressible by 'words for Generality', they are no longer *diverse individuals*. In fact diverse individuals must be regarded as expressed by totally different words; for if they are not expressed by 'words for Generality', nor by other words, then they are inexpressible by both kinds of words; under the circumstances, what would be the significance of the qualified assertion "the word for Generality is not expressive of diverse individuals"? For these
Var. P. 330. reasons, it behoves you to put forward your assertion in the form—"diverse individuals are never denoted,—words are never expressive"! In answer to this you may argue as follows—"It is in terms of what is held by other philosophers that we make the assertion that the word for Generality is not expressive of diverse individuals."—But this is not true; for no such view is held by anyone; there is not a single philosopher who regards diverse individuals to be expressible by words for Generality. Then again, inasmuch as the 'word for Generality' is (according to you) not expressive of Generality also [for according to your tenets there is no such thing as 'Generality'], to call it the 'word for Generality' involves a contradiction in terms; for when a word is not expressive of a thing, it cannot be called the 'word *for that thing*.' Further, if the word for Generality does not denote individuals, what is denoted by it? You have already denied that the word for Generality denotes individuals. It follows then that it must denote something else. If you do not regard it as denoting something else either, then also the qualified assertion 'the word for Generality does not denote diverse individuals'—becomes meaningless; you should make the assertion in the form—"all words are not expressive of things at all"! But if words are absolutely inexpressive, the assertion 'things are not expressed' itself involves an incongruity. Words are *inexpressive*, and yet this *inexpressiveness* is spoken of by

means of *words* themselves !* And if words are inexpressive, there is incongruity in your Proposition as well as in your Premiss. Your Proposition is—'the word for Generality is not expressive of diverse individuals', and your premiss is—'because of endlessness'; and as both of these are in the form of words, they must be *in-expressive* (*ex-hypothesi*); which is most incongruous! Then again, if you regard words to be absolutely *inexpressive*, it behoves you to point out some other means of speaking of things to other persons.

"But our theory is entirely different." Your meaning is as follows—"I do not hold that words are *inexpressive*, nor that things are *not expressible*; all that we do is to deny that particular explanation of the denotative process which you put forward; according to us words do denote the *Generality*, (but) in the form of *exclusion of others*, '*Apoha*'." If then you hold that words do denote things, but only in a way different (from what we accept), then, in that case, you should state your position in a more definite form; somewhat as follows—"the words for Generality, &c. are not expressive of Generality, &c., except the Generality, &c., as postulated by us."!

(4) This leads us on to the fourth objection to which the Apohist's arguments are open: he cannot point out the exact form of 'Generality.' As a matter of fact, no other form of 'Generality' can be pointed out except that it is what forms the basis of comprehensive conceptions. The presence of the comprehensive conception cannot be denied; and it is not possible that the comprehensive conception should crop up suddenly out of the exclusive (specific) conceptions. Hence that from which the comprehensive conception arises is the *Generality*; there can be no difference of opinion on this point.

Var. P. 331.

* If words are inexpressive, the assertion 'things are not expressed' could not express anything at all.

(5) The above are the flaws in the assertion as put forward by the Opponent. If however he makes the 'diverse individuals' the *Subject* of his reasoning, in connection with which he predicates the incapability of being expressed by words for Generality [*i.e.*, if the Opponent puts forward his proposition in the form 'individuals are not expressed by words for Generality', and not in the form 'words for Generality do not express diverse individuals'],—even so, this form of the Proposition is open to the same objections that have been urged against the former assertion. If only *a few* (Individuals) are made the subject of the Proposition, then, the relation of qualification becomes impossible, and the objection urged before becomes applicable.

(6) Further, the Opponent speaks of the "co-extensiveness of the words '*sat*' and '*dravyam*' ";—but this is not right; as it involves an incongruity: there is "co-extensiveness between the words *sat* and *dravyam*," and yet "words are not expressive of individuals"—this certainly involves a self-contradiction.* [With a view to escape from the 'incongruities' just urged, the Opponent says]—" If we regard the words as used secondarily (or figuratively) there need be no incongruity."—You perhaps mean this—" The words '*sat*' and '*dravya*' have been used by us secondarily; that is, what the word

* The Ḍravya or Substance is a positive entity, so is the *sat* or Being. The word denoting these are '*dravya*' and '*sat*'; hence if these words were expressive of the 'negation of others' (as held by the Bauddha), this would involve an incongruity; it is not possible for *positive* words to be expressive of *negation of others*. Further, no co-extensiveness is possible if the two terms do not denote Individuals; words are 'co-extensive' only when, even with their different significations, they are applicable to one and the same thing; [for instance, when what is signified by '*sat*' and what is signified by '*ghaṭaḥ*' both apply to the same particular object, then alone we have the expression '*san ghaṭaḥ*.'] Under the circumstances, if the words did not denote Individuals, they could never apply to any single thing; and they would be just like a pair of words with totally distinct denotations,—like the words 'cow' and 'horse', for instance; so that they could never be *co-extensive*. This is another incongruity involved in the Opponent's theory—to call the words 'not expressive of Individuals' and yet to regard them as 'co-extensive'.—*Tātparya*.

'*dravya*' does directly is the *exclusion of what is not-ḍravya*, and the word '*saṭ*' does the *exclusion of what is not-saṭ* : and these two words, when used for the purpose of excluding the *not-substance* and the *not-saṭ*, come to apply to a single thing (which happens to be neither *not-substance* nor *not-saṭ*), and thence come to be regarded as 'co-extensive'; and in reality there is no single word that directly denotes any positive thing"—But this is not right; as in the case in question there is no possibility of any direct denotation. It is only if the words '*saṭ*' and '*ḍravya*' were capable of being used on the basis of their direct denotation, that any secondary or indirect use of them would be possible in regard to things other than those directly denoted by them,—such indirect use being possible by reason of some similarity (between what is directly denoted and what is indirectly indicated). As matter of fact however, for these theorists (the *Bauḍḍhas*) there is nothing that is directly denoted by the words in question; and without this primary or direct denotation, no secondary use is possible. Then again, no secondary usage of words is compatible with the 'Apoha' theory; for under that theory, both (what is directly denoted and what is indirectly indicated by any word) are equally *primary*; for instance, (in the case of the well-known instance of secondary or figurative usage 'this boy is a lion') the term 'lion' is applied to the Lion, only by reason of its signifying the *exclusion of the not-lion*, and to the Boy also it would be applied by the same reason [*i. e.*, the Apohist does not admit any such Generality as 'Lion' the presence whereof would make the term 'lion' applicable to the *Lion* directly, and only, *indirectly* to the Boy in whom that Generality is absent. According to him the term 'Lion' can only denote *the negation or exclusion* of the not-Lion, *i. e*, of those qualities that are not found in the Lion; and as these qualities are as much absent in the Boy as in the Lion, there would be no justification for regarding the application of the term in one case as

direct and in the other case *indirect*]; and as the term would be equally applicable to both, on what grounds could either of the two be regarded as *indirect or secondary*?

(7) Lastly, the Bauddha holds that "what forms the denotation of a word is '*Apoha*', or 'negation of what is denoted by other words'."—But this is not right. *Firstly*, because the previous conception would be possible only if words had a positive denotation; that is to say, if words have a positive denotation, then alone is it possible that this positive denotation having been previously cognised, it should be negatived by means of another word; * so that one for whom there is no positive denotation, could not have the previous cognition, and in the absence of such a cognition, how could there be any denial or negation of it? For until one has a conception of another thing, he cannot deny this another thing. That is, until one knows the Cow, he can form no idea of the *cow*, in the form that 'the word *cow* denotes what is *not the non-cow*', nor can the man form any idea of the *non-cow*, unless he knows the *Cow*; so that both conceptions (of the *Cow* and the non-Cow) are impossible (without a previous cognition of the *Cow*.

Secondly, when it is asserted that what the word 'Cow' denotes is the 'Apoha of other things', i. e. 'what is not non-cow',—is this something (A) positive or (B) negative?—(A) If it is positive, is it the *Cow* or the *Non-Cow*? If it is the *Cow*, then there is no quarrel between us. If it is the *Non-Cow* that is held to be denoted by the word 'Cow',—this shows a wonderful insight into the meanings of words!—(B) Nor can it be something negative; as nothing negative can form the subject of any injunction or comprehension thereof; as a matter of fact, when

* The word 'cow' can signify the 'negation of the non-cow', only after the non-cow has been duly perceived somewhere in its positive form, of the Horse, the Camel, and the like.

one hears the word 'cow', neither the Injunction nor its comprehension pertains to anything merely negative; and the meaning of a word is always recognised through the cognition (produced by it); and certainly no one ever comprehends anything negative on hearing the word 'Cow.'

Thirdly, it cannot be right to say that "words denote the *Apoha* of other things"; because this explanation cannot apply to all words; that is to say, in the case of words where there are two mutually exclusive contradictions, it may be that when one is affirmed the other is denied; as for instance, it may be true that when the word 'cow' is heard, the *Cow* is affirmed and the *non-cow* is denied '*cow*' and '*non-cow*' being two mutually exclusive contradictories); but this is not possible in the case of the word '*sarva*', 'all'; as there is no such thing as '*asarva*', 'not-all', (the contradictory of 'all'), which could be denied by the word 'all.' "But in this case also there is denial or preclusion of *one*, &c.; so that our explanation takes in this case also." You mean that—"*one*, &c., are the contradictories of 'all', the 'not-all', which are excluded by the word *all*."—But this is not right; as it involves the incongruity of the words abandoning their own meaning. If the word 'all' excludes *one* and the rest,—inasmuch as these latter are what go to make up the *All*, and (for the Bauḍḍha) the whole has no existence apart from its constituents—[the exclusion of *one and the rest* would mean the exclusion of everything that goes to make up the *All*], and there would be nothing left for the word 'all' to denote; and this word would thus become meaningless. Similarly all Collective Words (words denoting Groups or Composites) would become meaningless, if they were used for the exclusion of their own constituent parts, as it is held that the Group has no existence apart from the members that make up that Group. As for the words 'two' and the like, these also pertain to the Groups (of *two*, *three*, &c.); so that if

they denoted the exclusion of the *one*, &c. (that go to make up the higher numbers, *two*, *three*, &c.), as these, being precluded, would not be there to make up the said Groups, the words would become meaningless.

Var. P. 333.

Fourthly, *Apoha*, *Exclusion*, being an *action*, it behoves you to point out its object (i. e. the object excluded). That is to say, you explain '*Apoha*' as 'not being the non-cow'; now is the object of this the *Cow* or the *Non-Cow*? If it pertains to the *Cow*, then how can there be *negation of cow* in the *Cow* itself? If, on the other hand, it pertains to the *non-cow*, how can the *Apoha* or Exclusion of one thing (non-cow) lead to the comprehension of another thing (Cow)? Certainly, when the *Khadira* tree is cut, the *cutting* does not fall upon the Palāsha tree. Further, if the phrase 'the Cow is not the non-cow' is explained as the negation, in the Cow, of the Non-Cow,—then, you should explain who has ever conceived of the *cow* as the *non-cow*—which conception would be denied by the said *Apoha*? How too can there be any such negation as is involved in the term 'non-Cow', unless there is some idea of the *cow* already? For in the case of every negative word (such as 'non-cow') we find that the negation is not possible without some idea of the signification of the second term ('cow'). And we have already pointed out (pp. 331-332) that the previous conception is not possible (according to your view); and unless there is this previous conception, no subsequent negation of it is possible.

Fifthly, for the following reason also 'Apoha' cannot be accepted :——None of the alternatives possible under that theory is admissible : The *Apoha or exclusion of the Non-Cow* in the *Cow*—is this (A) different or (B) non-different (from the *Cow*)? If it is different, does it (*a*) abide (in the Cow) or (*b*) does it not abide in it? (*a*) If it does abide in it, then, inasmuch as it abides in

it, it becomes a 'quality'; that is, the word 'cow' denotes a *quality*, and not the *cow* (the animal); and under the circumstances, there can be no such co-ordination as that expressed in the words 'the cow is sitting' [as no *quality* can *sit*]. (*b*) If on the other hand, it does not abide in it, then what is the significance of the Genitive ending in the phrase '*goḥ apohaḥ*', 'the Apoha *of the Cow*'? (B) If the Apoha is *non-different* (from the Cow), then it is the same as the Cow, and the postulating of it is entirely futile.

Sixthly, you should explain whether this *Apoha* is one and the same in regard to everything? or it is different with each individual thing? If it is one and the same, and is related to several Cows, then it is the same as the Generality 'Cow' (as posited by us)). If, on the other hand, it is many (differing with each individual), then it is as 'endless' as the individual objects themselves; so that any conception of it would not be impossible; which means that no comprehension of the meaning of the word is possible.

Seventhly, you have also got to be asked the following question.——Is this *Apoha*, (A) capable of being denoted —or (B) is it not so capable? (A) If it is denotable this falsifies your assertion in regard to the denotation of words consisting of the *Apoha of other things*; * or else, it leads to a *regressus ad infinitum*; for if the *apoha* be held to be denoted only as the *Apoha or exclusion of the non-Apoha*, then the denotation of that will consist of a further *Apoha*, and so on and on, there would be no end of *Apohas*. (B) If on the other hand, the *Apoha* is not denotable, then the assertion that 'the word means the *Apoha* of what is signified by other words' becomes anomalous; for if the *Apoha* cannot be denoted by any word, then you should explain what the word '*Apoha*' (in the said

* When *Apoha*, itself as such, is denotable, it is not true that what is denoted is only the *apoha of something else*.

assertion) can signify, apart from what is denotable by it?

Var. P. 334. If that same *Apoha* forms its denoted meaning, then also this would be incompatible with the declaration (made on P. 324, *bottom*) that—"a word is said to denote something when it is found that it brings about, in its denotation, the exclusion of what is denoted by other words"; as the only meaning that this sentence could have, (under the theory that *Apoha* is *not denoted*) is that 'the *inexpressive* or *non-denotative* word ('Apoha'; which must be non-denotative as the Apoha is not denotable *ex-hypothesi*, and the word cannot denote anything else) denotes something else' (which is absurd)!

Eighthly—In the case of words like many' ('not-one') and the like, inasmuch as they pertain to *two*, &c., for the explaining of the generic conception (of 'many'), it becomes necessary to postulate the particular things (that go to make up the *Many*; as unless the particulars are posited, no generic conception can be possible [so that the cognition of no particular thing could proceed from the mere general 'exclusion of others'].

Ninthly,—In the case of the compound '*nīlotpalam*' we find that the word '*nīla*' is placed first because it denotes the *qualification blue* and the word '*utpalam*' is placed last because it signifies the qualified object, *lotus*; this would not be possible under the 'Apoha theory'; as under this theory the word 'blue' denoting 'the exclusion of not-blue' in the same way as the 'lotus' denotes the 'exclusion of the not-lotus', both would be equally predominant,—which would make any relation of qualification and qualified impossible between them. The same holds good in regard to the terms '*rājan*' and '*puruṣa*' (in the compound '*rāja-puruṣaḥ*').

Tenthly—the person who holds the 'exclusion of other things' to be the denotation of words, has got to explain the meaning of 'co-extensiveness'; when he holds that all words

denote the 'exclusion of other things', the word 'blue' would signify the 'exclusion of not-blue' and the word 'lotus' would signify the 'exclusion of not-lotus'; now, you have to explain how there could be any 'co-extensiveness' between these two *exclusions*. For one who holds that words denote positive entities, the two words 'blue' and 'lotus' denote a substance endowed with a particular *Generality* ('Lotus' and a particular quality *blue*); and [in this case there is 'co-extensiveness', for the simple reason that] both, *Generality* and *Quality*, subsist in the same substance,—which cannot be said of the two *exclusions* of 'not-blue' and 'not-lotus.' Hence it is clear that for the *Apohist* there can be no such thing as 'co-extensiveness.' Thus we find that the more we examine the *Apoha-theory*, the more contrary to all proof and reason it turns out to be.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (64).

[P. 125, L. 9 to L. 14].

"How is it known that the Individual, the Configuration and the Generality are distinct entities?"

We know this from the fact that each has a distinctive character of its own. For instance—

THE 'INDIVIDUAL' IS THAT COMPOSITE MATERIAL BODY WHICH IS THE RECEPTACLE OF DISTINCTIVE QUALITIES. (Sū. 64).

[OR, *according to the Vārṭika*,—THE INDIVIDUAL CONSISTS OF THE SPECIFIC QUALITIES, ACTIONS AND THE SUBSTANCE CONTAINING THESE.]

The Individual is called '*vyakṭi*' because it is manifested, rendered perceptible (*vyajyaṭē*), by the external organs of perception. Every substance is not an 'individual'; that substance alone is called 'Individual' which is a '*mūrṭi*'—a *material body*, so called because it is '*mūrchhiṭāvayava*,' *composed of parts*—and which, according to circumstances, is the receptacle of the *distinctive particular qualities* of

[Odour, Taste, Colour and] Touch [as enumerated in Sū. 3-1-61], Gravity, Solidity, Fluidity and Faculty, and of the non pervasive (limited) Dimension.*

Vārṭika on *Sū.* (64).

[P. 334, L. 14 to P. 335, L. 20].

"*How is it known that the Individual, the Configuration and the Generality are distinct entities?* It might be urged against this that the question cannot arise, as what is asked is well known; that is the Individual, the Configuration and the Generality are all fully known from what has been explained under Sū. 57, *et. seq.*; so that there is no room for the question here put forward. But this would not be right; all that is known is that the denotation of words is triune in its character; hence it is only natural that the question should be put as to the particular details. What the Sū. 57 has done is to explain that when the word 'Cow' is uttered, it signifies three things of varying degrees of predominance and subservience; and such being the case, it is only right that the further question should be raised as to the particular details,—as to which of those three is the 'Individual', which the 'Configuration' and which the 'Generality'."

The answer given (in the *Bhāṣya*) is that, that the Individual, the Configuration and the Generality are distinct entities is known *from the fact that each has a distinctive character of its own.*

"What is the distinctive character of the *Individual*?" In answer to this we have the Sūṭra—'*the Individual is that, &c. &c.*', which supplies the required definition of the 'Individual.'

* The *Ṭāṭparya* remarks that this definition of Individual is meant for those things that combine all these—Individuality, Configuration and Generality. Hence there is no harm if the definition given does not apply to such substances as *Ākāsha*; for *Ākāsha* has no Configuration. This is what the Bhāṣya means when it says that *Every Substance is not an 'individual.'*

It is interesting to note that the *Vārtika* is not satisfied with the *Bhāṣya* interpretation of the *Sūṭra*, and therefore puts forward another explanation.

The *Bhāṣya* explains—*The Individual is called 'vyakṭi' because it is rendered perceptible by the external organs of perception.* That is to say, that substance which is the substratum of the qualities ending with Touch (*i. e.*, Odour, Taste, Colour and Touch) in their perceptible forms, is called '*mūrṭi*',—'material body', because *it is composed of parts*,—and also '*vyakṭi*', 'Individual'.

Var. P. 335.

[The *Vārṭika* objects to the above interpretation of the *Sūṭra*]—We do not quite understand whether what is put forward here is the definition of the *Composite Substance*, or of the *Individual* as differentiated from the Configuration and the Generality,—all these three being found to constitute the denotation of Words. We hold that what is meant to be defined here is not the *Composite Substance*; what is meant to be done here is the explanation of the term 'Individual' as distinguished from 'Configuration' and 'Generality'. So that what the Sūṭra should apply to is that Individual which is neither Configuration, nor Generality. In view of this the Sūṭra should be explained as follows—The compound '*guṇavishēṣāshrayaḥ*' is to be expounded as '*guṇāḥ—vishēṣāḥ—ṭadāshrāyaḥ*'; the term '*taṭ*' being dropped in the compound;—the term '*āshraya*' stands for *substance*; *action* becomes included under the term '*guṇavishēṣa*'—this term being explained as that which is *different* ('*vishēsha*') *from Qualities* (*guṇēbhyaḥ*). "For what purpose is the term '*guṇavishēṣa*' put in?" It has been put in for the purpose of excluding *Configuration*, which would (otherwise) be included under '*guṇa*.' That is to say, Configuration is only a particular form of Conjunction (which is a quality, *guṇa*), and as such it would be included under '*guṇa*'; so that for the exclusion of that it was necessary to put in the term '*guṇavishēṣa*' (which stands for the specific qualities only—such as Odour, Taste, Colour and Touch). Thus then, the compound '*guṇavishēṣa*' is to be analysed in two ways—'*guṇas and*

vishēṣas (Specific Qualities)' and '*guṇēbhyo vishēṣāḥ*' (things other than Qualities, *i. e.*, Actions).—The term '*mūrṭiḥ*' is to be construed as co-ordinated with the term '*āshraya*' (of the compound), and it denotes Substance, inasmuch as it is derived from the root '*mūrchh*', which signifies *solidification*. In this manner the definition comes to include, by means of each of its terms, all that is meant to be included; it is thus that Colour, Ākāsha, &c., all become included: If the Sūṭra is explained in this fashion,—each word being taken as referring to a distinct factor,—then alone can it include Colour, &c., and also Ākāsha, &c., otherwise it fails to be a correct definition, not including all that should be included.*

† Or when the *Bhāṣya* expounds the compound '*guṇa-vishēṣāshrayaḥ*' as *guṇavishēṣāṇām āshrayaḥ*, we may take this latter term to mean '*guṇāshcha vishēṣāshcha, ṭēṣām-āshrayaḥ*, which would be *Substance*; and this is called '*Mūrti*' '*Body*', because it comes from the root 'mūrchh' signifying *solidification* or *composition*.

Sūṭra (65).

'CONFIGURATION' IS THAT WHICH INDICATES THE GENERALITY AND ITS CHARACTERISTICS—(Sū. 65).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (65).

[P. 126, L. 2 to L 6.]

That should be known as 'Configuration' which serves to indicate the Generality and the characteristic features of the Generality. This 'Configuration' is nothing apart ‡ from the particular arrangement of the parts of an object and the

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* In the Sūṭra, the term '*vyakṭiḥ*' states the thing to be defined.—The term '*guṇavishēṣa*' is to be construed in two ways:—(1) *guṇāshcha vishēṣāshcha*, thereby including the specific qualities and excluding such qualities as conjunction, whereby Configuration also becomes excluded; and (2) *guṇēbhyo vishēṣāḥ*, 'things other than qualities', thereby bringing in Actions.—And the term *āshraya*', the receptacle of Qualities and Action' stands for Substances.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

† Here an attempt is made to show that after all the *Bhāṣya* also may mean what has been put forward by the Vārṭika as the meaning of the Sūṭra.

‡ The *Vārṭika* reads अाव्यक्त; so also Puri Ms. A. This gives better sense than व्यक्त, which is the reading adopted by the *Bhāṣyachanḍra, and Puri Ms. B*; and it is also in keeping with what the Bhāṣya has said on P. 123, L. 20.

components of those parts. As a matter of fact, the Generality is indicated by the particles of the composite substance arranged in a definite manner; *e. g.*, that a certain animal belongs to the genus 'Cow' people infer from the particular kind of head and feet that it possesses; so that it is only when the particles of the body of Cows are disposed in a definite manner, that the generality 'Cow' can be made known. In cases where the Generality is not indicated by *Configuration*,—*e. g.*, in the case of such things as 'Clay', 'Gold', and the like—there is, in fact, no *Configuration* at all; and hence in the case of the words denoting such things, the Configuration does not form a factor in the denotation.

Vārṭika on Sū. (65).

[P. 336, L. 2 to L. 9.]

Configuration is that &c. &c. says the Sūṭra. *That should be known as 'Configuration' which serves to indicate the generality and the characteristic features of the generality; this Configuration is nothing apart from the particular arrangement of the parts of an object and the components of those parts*—says the *Bhāṣya*. That is to say, component parts arranged in a definite manner lead to the inference of the Generality; for instance, the Generality 'Cow' is indicated either by the similarity of the shape of the head, the feet, &c., or by the perception of a certain composite substance of which those Head, Feet, &c., are parts.

"But this Configuration is in some cases found to cease to be denoted by a word. 'Where does it so cease?' It does so in cases where the Generality is not manifested by Configuration *; as for instance, in the case of such things as Clay and Gold."

Stress is intended to be laid upon 'Configuration', not upon 'Generality'. That is, what is meant is that *all Configurations* indicate *Generalities*,—and *not* that all Generalities *must* be indicated by Configurations.†

* आकृतिव्यङ्ग्या is the correct reading as found in the Benares edition.

† In the case of Clay and Gold &c., the Generality is indicated by the particular *Colour*, and not by any Configuration. Similarly the Generality 'Brāhmaṇa' is indicated by *Birth*; the Generality of Butter, Oil, &c., is manifested either by *Odour* or by *Taste*.

Sūṭra (66).

'GENERALITY' IS THE CAUSE (OR BASIS) OF COMPREHENSIVE COGNITIONS. Sū. (66).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (66).
[P. 126, L. 8 to 10].

That which brings about equal or similar cognition in regard to a number of diverse things,—and which never serves the purpose of differentiating several things from one another,—and which (thus) forms the basis of the comprehensive cognition of several things,—is 'Generality' pure and simple; while that which includes some and excludes others is a Generality partaking of the (mixed) character of both Individuality and Generality.

Thus ends Vāṭsyāyana's *Bhāṣya*
ON ADHYĀYA II.

Vārṭika on Sū. (66).
[P. 336, L. 11 to P. 337, L. 5.]

Generality is the cause &c., &c.—says the Sūṭra. Generality is that by virtue of which several diverse things come to be conceived of comprehensively. For instance, the notion 'these are bowls' is a 'comprehensive' one, and 'these are not bowls' is an 'exclusive' notion. Now, that which, being one, forms the basis or cause of the comprehensive conception, is a particular kind of *Generality*,—it being called 'Generality' because it forms the basis of the comprehensive conception.

Here also stress is meant to be laid upon 'Generality', not upon the *producing of comprehensive conceptions*; because such conceptions are found to appear even in the absence of Generality; as we find in the case of the word 'cook' and other such words.*

* What is meant is that a *Generality* must always be the basis of comprehensive conception; and not that all that forms the basis of comprehensive conceptions must be Generality. The word 'cook' does represent a comprehensive notion; but 'cook' is not a Generality; as if it were, there would be a cross-division.

The *Ṭāṭparya* is not satisfied with this as a formal *definition* of Generality and remarks—'this is to be accepted as a definition simply in so far as it serves to distinguish Generality from Individual and Configuration,—and no farther.'

Thus it is established that Individual, Configuration and Generality constitute the denotation of words.

[For the benefit of those Bauḍḍhas who, through sheer perversity, deny the existence of Generality, even though it is distinctly perceptible, the Author lays down a few inferential reasonings proving the existence of 'Generality']—(1) 'The comprehensive cognition that we find in regard to *Cows* and such other things must proceed from a cause other than the individual cows,—because it has a distinctive character of its own,—just like the conception of 'blue';—(2) the Generality 'Cow' must be something distinct from the individual Cow,—because it forms the subject of another conception,—like the conceptions of Colour and Touch;—(3) the Generality 'Cow' must be distinct from the individual Cow,—because it forms the subject of a distinct name,—like Chaiṭra and Horse;—(4) the conceptions of the individual Cow and the Generality 'Cow' must be due to different causes,—because they have distinctive features of their own,—like the conception of Colour, &c.*

Vār. P. 337.

'In this Chapter have been dealt with the following subjects:—the full consideration and the exact character of Doubt and the Instruments of Cognition, the real nature of Sound and Words, and the exact character of these as means of cognition.'

Thus ends the Second Daily Lesson in the Sound Discourse of the *Nyāya-Vārṭika* of Uḍḍyoṭakara.

END OF DISCOURSE II.

* This is not the same as the *first* inference; in (1) 'Comprehensive Conception' alone was the Subject, while in (4) 'the conceptions of the Individual Cow and the Generality *Cow*' has been made the subject.—*Tāṭparya*.

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